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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation demonstrates that Martin Heidegger’s  fundamental  ontology  was  a 
significant influence on Paul Tillich’s  understanding  of  divine  and human realities, by showing 
that Tillich adopted Heidegger’s  concern  for  being and his approach to the question of being. 
Heidegger’s  philosophical  influence  on  Tillich’s thought has been well known. But the specific 
nature of this influence and its implications has not hitherto been documented. Neither has the 
issue received much attention in the secondary literature on Heidegger. The study consists of two 
  
viii 
 
parts. The first (Chapters 2-3) provides an intensive historical and philosophical survey of the 
background of the Tillich-Heidegger encounters. The second part (Chapters 4-7) is an analysis of 
the origins and development of Tillich’s  theological  and  philosophical  thought particularly in 
terms of his anthropology and ontology under the influence of Heidegger. The second part 
highlights the Heideggerian claims of human existentiality inherent in  Tillich’s  theological  
system, as distinguished from Tillich’s own theological creativity and philosophical originality. 
Chapter  2  identifies  Tillich’s  concern  with  existentialism  as  Heideggerian.  Chapter  3  investigates  
the decisive and historically unique period of encounter between Tillich and Heidegger, the years 
1924-1925, when they both taught at the University of Marburg. Chapter 4 underscores the 
important elements of  Heideggerian  existentialism  in  Tillich’s  early  theological  program. 
Chapter 5 illustrates the challenge of modern existentialism that Tillich confronted in the person 
of  Heidegger  and  discusses  Tillich’s  subordination  of  his  metaphysics  of  meaning  to  the  
Heideggerian metaphysics of being. Chapter  6  suggests  that  Tillich’s choice of existentialism is 
indebted  to  Heidegger’s  critical  analysis  of  the  relationship  between philosophy and theology. 
Chapter 7 explores a central aspect of  Tillich’s  theological  anthropology,  the  concept  of  finitude,  
in  relation  to  Heidegger’s  project of existential analysis of Dasein. The study shows that the 
Tillich-Heidegger  connection  is  not  a  mere  coincidental  structural  similarity  and  that  Tillich’s  
call  for  transcending  theism  reflects  Tillich’s  interpretation  of  Heidegger’s  philosophy  as 
theologically oriented. The study thereby establishes a point of departure from which to explore 
on  a  deeper  level  the  philosophical  foundation  of  Tillich’s  theological  endeavor  and  vision. 
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SOURCES 
 
 
This study refers extensively to the relevant German works of Heidegger and Tillich in 
comparison with their renderings into English.1 Whenever possible, I will rely on the volumes of 
the  critical  edition  of  Heidegger’s  collected  works  – the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe2 – as sources 
for the texts. The critical edition  of  Tillich’s  writings  – the Gesammelte Werke – were published 
in fourteen volumes between 1957 to 1974,3 in which Systematic Theology was reprinted in 
German translation. The value of this collection is clear, for the first edition of his Systematic 
Theology was that which he attempted to express in English what he meant in German.4 As John 
Dillenberger  notes,  “For  Tillich,  spoken  English  took  precedence  over  English  texts,  and  his  
knowledge  of  English  became  primarily  that  of  a  spoken  idiom….Tillich’s  English writings have 
                                                 
1 Although there are many different approaches to phenomenological and hermeneutic research on 
Tillich in dialogue with Heidegger, some of these have become blurred due to multiple interpretations of 
Heidegger’s  language  in  the  translated  materials. For example, Miles Groth says that the main cause of 
misunderstanding  Heidegger  is  that  translators  have  not  achieved  clarity  about  Heidegger’s  fundamental  
words, an understanding of which is crucial to gaining access to his thought. See Miles Groth, Translating 
Heidegger (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2004). 
 
2 With  the  publication  of  Heidegger’s  works  in  the  Gesamtausgabe, a standard system of 
reference has become possible. The first volume of the Gesamtausgabe appeared in 1975, one year before 
Heidegger’s  death.   
 
3 This German edition does not include everything Tillich ever published, for Tillich rejected a 
good  number  of  works  as  “occasional  pieces.”  Volume 14 only provides a textual-history of all the 
documents and an index. But the volume is particularly helpful because it has a special section describing 
where related materials on or by Tillich can be found. 
 
4 Marion Pauck is correct to say that at  some  points  “English  had  clarified  his  abstract  ideas  and  
made  them  more  understandable.”  Marion Pauck, preface to Dynamics of Faith, by Paul Tillich (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2001), xiii. 
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a  grammatical  anchorage  in  German.”
5 But  it  should  be  noted  that,  in  accordance  with  Tillich’s  
wishes, articles originally written in German and translated into English, often with considerable 
changes, should take the English translation as the authoritative version for the Gesammelte 
Werke.6 Tillich himself was part of the translation team.7 Of course, there were also problems in 
translating his English into German because  of  Tillich’s  conceptual  development  within  the  
English language. Translating his German writings into English also gave rise to new sources of 
error.8 Hence,  the  question  of  which  edition  is  “truer”  to  Tillich’s  original  thought  has  no  simple  
answer. Whenever necessary, therefore, I will carefully compare the German translation with the 
English source text. Secondary sources that I have consulted for this study include commentary, 
discussion, and scholarly journal articles. They will give this study a certain amount of 
historiographical relevance as well. And yet, my preliminary searching for secondary sources 
revealed limited publications specific to the subject matter of this study. Despite the consistent 
acknowledgement of the importance  of  Heidegger’s  ontologico-phenomenological hermeneutics 
as a paradigm for Tillich’s  philosophical  theology,  scholarly  inquiries  into  the  actual discussions 
                                                 
5 John  Dillenberger,  “The  Union  years:  Always  in  transition,”  in  Spurensuche: Lebens- und 
Denkwege Paul Tillichs, ed. Nord Ilona, René Tillich and Yorick Spiegel (Berlin: LIT, 2001), 180. 
 
6 Uwe Carsten Scharf, The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation: Interpreting the Divine-
Human Interplay in Paul Tillich's Work 1913-1964 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 11. 
 
7 Uwe Carsten Scharf, The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation: Interpreting the Divine-
Human Interplay in Paul Tillich's Work 1913-1964 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 12.  
 
8 Carl Heinz Ratschow, preface to Paul Tillich: Main Works, ed. Carl Heinz (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1990), 2:ix. 
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of this issue are few in number and limited in depth. Obviously, the primary sources will offer 
the most rewarding data for my investigation.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The philosophy of Martin Heidegger has been a major factor in the development of 
Christian theology in the twentieth century. The present study seeks to demonstrate and establish 
clearly  and  in  depth  the  influence  of  Heidegger’s  existential  philosophy  on  the  theological  
anthropology and the understanding of divine reality of Paul Tillich. At every significant turn of 
its intellectual history, Christian theology has been closely allied with philosophical movements. 
The contemporary theological scene is no exception in this regard. A wide range of existential 
theological positions is apparent among the various Christian faith traditions held by those who 
have been associated with existentialism. The dominant developments in Protestant theology in 
the twentieth century were directly influenced by and bound up with existentialist philosophy.1  
Particularly  through  Tillich,  Heidegger’s  existential  phenomenology
2 and hermeneutical 
analysis of lived experience have had tremendous influence on contemporary Protestant theology 
                                                 
1 Perhaps it is something of an anachronism today to work with  such  divisions  as  “Catholic”  and  
“Protestant”  in  the  theological  enterprise,  for  the  theologies  (though  not  the  politics)  of  the  Churches  have  
drawn much closer together since the Second Vatican Council  (1962-65).  
 
2 For early Husserl, phenomenology is a discipline that endeavors to describe how the world is 
constituted  and  experienced  through  conscious  acts.  Husserl’s  “pure  phenomenology”  describes  what  is  
given to us in immediate experience without being obstructed by pre-conceptions and theoretical notions. 
In  contrast,  Heidegger’s  “existential  phenomenology”  aims  at  describing  how  phenomena  present  
themselves  in  lived  experience,  in  human  existence.    The  difference  is  that,  in  Husserl’s  classical  
phenomenology,  the  world  as  an  object  is  “in”  the  domain of the consciousness of transcendental subject, 
whereas Heidegger’s  existential  phenomenology  describes  the  world  in  which  consciousness  makes  its  
way.  For  Heidegger,  it  is  not  possible  to  talk  about  consciousness,  or  even  “consciousness  of,”  without 
such a world in which Dasein is always already out there. According to Heidegger, Dasein as being-in-
the-world  is  not  a  subject  over  against  that  world.  “Subject  and  object,”  writes  Heidegger,  “do  not  
2 
 
 
 
and spirituality. Heidegger’s former student, colleague and lifelong friend, Hans-Georg Gadamer 
recalls that there was too much enthusiasm for Heidegger in the 1950s and too little interest in 
the 1960s and beyond.3 It seems that the dominant era of existentialism as a philosophical 
movement is now remembered as a brief scene in the history of philosophy. But the ever-
widening  impact  of  Heidegger’s  philosophy  presses  theologians  to  come  to  terms  with  his  
contributions to theology. It is undeniable that the legacy of existential thought remains as a 
leading force and directs America’s so-called mainline Christian theology in the present century. 
One  such  example  is  the  influence  of  Heidegger’s  existential  philosophy  on  the contemporary 
Protestant theology through Tillich.  
The  impact  of  Heidegger’s  ontological  explorations  on  Tillich’s  philosophical  theology  is  
quite evident and merits more attention than it has thus far received in the literature. All in all, 
Heidegger’s  influence  on  Tillich  was extensive, and yet Tillich avoided a direct evaluation of the 
theological significance  of  Heidegger’s  philosophy.  A  close  examination  of  the  foundational  
ideas  of  Tillich’s  theological  system  and  Heidegger’s  phenomenological  analysis  of  being  will  
                                                                                                                                                             
coincide  with  Dasein  and  the  world.”  BT  87/SZ  60.  What Heidegger  accuses  Husserl  of  is  the  “failure  to  
offer any adequate account of the mode access”  a  subject  could  have  to  the  world.  Søren  Overgaard,  
Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 10. 
Husserl’s  transcendental subjectivity is a whole which includes within itself the experiencing subject and 
its objectivity. Subjectivity, therefore, is not the center of Husserlian phenomenology. The later Husserl 
develops a more existentially oriented phenomenology. See for example his 1936 work The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological 
Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).  
 
3 Robert  J.  Dostal,  “Gadamer:  The  Man  and  His  Work,”  in  The Cambridge Companion to 
Gadamer,  ed.  Robert  J.  Dostal  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2002),  25.  “It  is  probably  fair  to  
say that the decade 1966-76 saw a greatly diminished interest in Heidegger in Germany as the focus 
shifted to Hegel  and  to  the  reception  of  English  analytic  philosopher  Richard  E.  Palmer,  “Hermeneutics,”  
in Philosophy of Science, vol. 2 of Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, ed. G. Fløistad (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 465. 
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demonstrate  Tillich’s  indebtedness to the philosophical apparatus of Heideggerian existentialism 
as distinguished from his own theological creativity and philosophical originality. This 
dissertation  attempts  to  show  the  legacy  of  Heideggerian  philosophy  in  Tillich’s  theology.
4 
However, it does not suggest that Tillich was a Heideggerian. In  Tillich’s  writings,  there is no 
special  preference  for  Heidegger’s  way  of  framing  ontology. If anything, Heidegger is seen as 
one of many existentialist thinkers alongside Augustine, Schopenhauer, Schelling and 
Kierkegaard.5 The present investigation only  traces  and  analyzes  Tillich’s  creative  appropriation  
and  interpretation  of  Heidegger’s  philosophy.  What motivated this study is the observation that 
those  references  to  Heidegger  in  Tillich’s  works  do  not  depict  Tillich’s  dependence  upon  
Heidegger’s  thought,  so  much  as  his  willingness  to  demonstrate  and  illustrate  his  own  
theological project in relation to its similarities with other thinkers, and therefore those critics 
who have dealt specifically with the relation of Tillich to Heidegger have either felt it 
unnecessary  or  have  been  unable  to  cite  specific  passages  to  illustrate  Tillich’s  attitude  towards  
Heidegger’s  philosophy,
6 and others only see it as a coincidental structural similarity.7 In short, 
the goal of this study is to demonstrate that Heidegger is as influential upon  Tillich’s  theological  
and philosophical formation as other important thinkers were. More precisely, this study attempts 
                                                 
4 “Theology”  is  a  widely  used  term. Within the collection of theological subjects, I isolate 
philosophical  theology  for  the  purpose  of  this  study.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  word  “theology”  will  be  
used in this dissertation.  
 
5 ST1, 62, 165. 
 
6 See for example David H. Kelsey, The Fabric  of  Paul  Tillich’s  Theology (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1967). 
 
7 Thomas  F.  O’Meara,  “Tillich  and  Heidegger;;  A  Structural  Relationship,”  in  Harvard 
Theological Review 61, no. 2 (1968): 249. 
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to highlight the Heideggerian claim of human existentiality inherent in  Tillich’s  theological 
system.  But  it  proposes  neither  a  rejection  nor  elimination  of  Heidegger’s  legacy  in  it.  My  
immediate task is not to take sides, pro or contra. Neither is there an attempt here to refute one 
thinker by means of the other. As a result, this dissertation will bear two fruits: (1) a theological 
analysis  of  Heideggerian  influence  on  Tillich’s  theology  and  (2) a church historical report on the 
influence of existentialism on theology in the present time.   
For Tillich, as for many other contemporary theologians, the doctrines of human 
existence and the structure of being are of central importance and constitute the basis of his 
whole theological system. Tillich adopted Heidegger’s concern for being – the ontological 
perspective which had been absent from theology as much as from philosophy in the early 
twentieth century – and his approach to being through a description of human existence. In 
addition to the overall structure of his theology, Tillich was influenced by Heidegger’s  
philosophy in many specific aspects of his theological system. In Tillich, “ontology” as his 
concern for being and “anthropology” as the human existential condition are the two poles that 
sustain his theological system, corresponding  to  Heidegger’s two major concerns, the question of 
being and a question about what it is to be human. Tillich correlates these two poles by his 
method of correlation in such a way that the questions posed by the human existential condition 
are answered by the revelation of  the  “divine  Ground  of  being.”8 That the method of correlation, 
so basic to the systematic approach to theology he developed, appears most markedly in terms of 
                                                 
8 ST2, 9. Otto Piper, Recent Developments in German Protestantism (London: Student Christian 
Movement  Press,  1934),  136,  has  said  of  Tillich  that  “among  the  postwar  theologians  [in  Germany]  he  
has had the clearest view of the impossibility of expressing Protestant faith with the usual theological 
methods.”   
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his ontology9 and anthropology is the reason to limit the scope of this study to the discussion of 
the impact of Heidegger’s  philosophy on Tillich’s  ontology  and  theological  anthropology. 
Comparing  Heidegger’s  entire  thought  with  Tillich’s  is  a  formidable  task,  and  is  certainly  
impossible within the compass of a single dissertation.10 This study will provide an intensive 
historical and philosophical survey and analysis of the origins and development of Tillich’s  
thought particularly in terms of his theological anthropology and ontology. Anyone glancing at a 
bibliography of work on Tillich might fairly conclude that all that could profitably be said about 
his thought has been said, and much of it more than once. The justification of the present study 
lies  in  its  philosophical  approach  to  Tillich’s  work.  Much  of  the  criticism  and  praise  directed 
toward Tillich fails in that it takes little account of the philosophical traditions on which Tillich 
drew.  Before  Tillich’s  achievement  can  be  fully  evaluated,  his  thought  needs  to  be  examined  
from the point of view of those philosophical traditions that are incorporated into it. This is a task 
which, despite the large volume of literature on Tillich’s  theology, has still not been adequately 
done. The present study is intended to be a contribution to this important task. My approach to 
Tillich’s  thought  is  undertaken with the conviction that the meaning of many of the terms 
appearing in his philosophical theology can only be made transparent by a careful 
disentanglement of their philosophical background. For this reason, I will develop a detailed 
                                                 
9 “Tillich’s  ontology,  which  is  closely  related  to  the  ontological  effort  of  Martin  Heidegger,  is  the  
backbone  of  both  his  existentialist  analysis  and  his  existentialist  theology.”  Walter  Leibrecht,  “The  Life  
and  Mind  of  Paul  Tillich,”  in  Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht 
(New York: Ayer, 1972), 26. 
 
10 Tillich’s  writings  extend  through  14  volumes,  and  the  publication  of  Heidegger’s  
Gesamtausabe is ongoing, projected to have 102 volumes. For details and updates of the publication of 
the various volumes of Gesamtausabe,  see  the  publisher’s  website  at  http://www.klostermann.de. 
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philosophical and  theological  analysis  of  Heidegger’s  Being and Time (1927), including his 
earlier and later works, and  Tillich’s  three-volume Systematic Theology (1951, 1957, 1963), 
including also his earlier and later works, which are the primary sources for the present study. In 
Chapters 4-8, attention will focus on Heidegger’s  philosophical  and  trans-philosophical projects 
as  the  theological  ground  of  Tillich’s  thought,  and  throughout,  the  question  of  its  relationship  
with Tillich’s  system  will  be  kept  in  view  to  disclose the Heideggerian root of its foundational 
theological concepts. The primary subjects are the question of God as Being itself – Tillich 
seems to have learned this title for God during the years at the University of Marburg, a brief but 
intense time of his intellectual ferment, when both Tillich and Heidegger taught at the University 
– and  Tillich’s  existential  theological  approach  to  it.  Attention  is  given  particularly  to  an  analysis  
of  Tillich’s  language.  I find that the earlier more general philosophical work of Tillich coheres 
easily with the later more theological thinking. Towards the end of his life, Tillich appeared to 
change his views in some respects, but the remarkable feature of his thought was its 
extraordinary consistency. But it is not my purpose in this study to attempt anything like a 
genetic  account  of  the  development  of  Tillich’s  thought  from  his  early  dissertations  on  Friedrich  
W. J. Schelling down to his Systematic Theology. Rather, I wish to consider his mature 
philosophy and its core of ontology, especially as expressed in the first volume of his Systematic 
Theology, which was not to appear until twenty-five years after Tillich left Marburg.  
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It is undeniable that Tillich’s  radically  innovative  vocabulary  and,  at  certain points, 
syntax are significantly Heideggerian.11 Heidegger’s  philosophical  influence on his thought has 
long been well known. But the specific nature of this influence and its implications, which this 
study will demonstrate, has not hitherto been well documented.12 The following statement of 
Calvin  O.  Schrag,  who  was  Tillich’s  assistant  while  a  graduate  student  at  Harvard  in  the  1950s,  
explains the common scholarly attitude toward this research subject. “The  Tillich-Heidegger 
connection would be a possible and important topic for a specific research project, but it is one 
we will not be able to pursue in the present essay. Suffice it to observe that Heidegger did play a 
role in shaping Tillich’s  systematic  theology.”13 Moreover, as John Powell Clayton observes, 
                                                 
11 “It  may  well  be  that  Tillich’s  ‘existentialism’  is  no  more  than  the  expression  of  what  he  had  
learnt form Schelling and his teacher, Martin Kähler,  in  language  learnt  from  Heidegger.”  John Heywood 
Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), 13. There is 
considerable overlap between Schelling and Heidegger. This might explain some similarities between 
Tillich’s  thought  and  Heidegger’s.  Heidegger  himself  maintained  an  interest  in  Schelling’s  work  
throughout his career – for example his lecture on German Idealism in the summer semester of 1929, his 
lecture on Schelling and the essence of human freedom in the summer semester of 1936, his lecture on 
Schelling in 1941 and again in 1968 where he lectured on Hegel and the difference between Fichte and 
Schelling’s  systems.   
 
12 See the following excellent detailed study of the central concepts in Tillich by some of the most 
distinguished twentieth-century theologians: Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, eds. The 
Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Macmillan, 1956); Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel: 
A Critique of Paul Tillich (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1963); J. Heywood 
Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963); Carl J. Armbruster, The Vision of 
Paul Tillich (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967); James Luther Adams, Paul  Tillich’s  Philosophy  of  
Culture, Science and Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); David H. Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul 
Tillich’s  Theology (New Haven: Yale University, 1967); Adrian Thatcher, The Ontology of Paul Tillich 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 1978); Wayne W. Mahan, Tillich’s  System (San Antonio, TX.: Trinity 
University, 1974); John Powell Clayton, The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich and the Possibility of a 
Mediating Theology (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980). 
 
13 Calvin O. Schrag, God as Otherwise Than Being: Toward a Semantics of the Gift (Evanston, 
IL.: Northwestern University Press, 2002), 14. 
 
8 
 
 
 
“There  is….no ready  consensus  in  the  literature  as  to  the  exact  extent  of  Tillich’s  intellectual  
indebtedness  to  Heidegger.”
14 Many books and articles on Tillich simply state the basic concepts 
of  his  system  and  criticize  his  use  or  abuse  of  Heidegger’s  language  of  existentialism from one 
point of view or another. Neither has the issue received much attention in the secondary literature 
on Heidegger. In my view, Tillich himself is partly responsible for the concealment of the 
existential origin of his theological system. It is noteworthy that most of the theologians who 
have dealt with Heidegger have been less hesitant than Tillich to judge the religious import of 
Heidegger’s thought. There  are  remarkably  few  direct  allusions  to  Heidegger  in  Tillich’s  own  
writings. Tillich  is  rarely  explicit  about  his  reliance  upon  Heidegger’s  philosophical framework. 
In his three volume Systematic Theology there are a total of 11 mentions of Heidegger,15 most of 
which tend to either make cursory references to certain aspects of Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology16 or list him among other existentialist philosophers and theologians.  
                                                 
14 John Powell Clayton,  “Questioning,  Answering,  and  Tillich’s  Concept  of  Correlation,”  in  
Kairos  and  Logos:  Studies  in  the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, 
GA.: Mercer University Press, 1984), 135. 
 
15 Volume one mentions Heidegger five times (183, 186-7, 208, 217), volume two, three times 
(12, 28, 84), and volume three another three times (62, 217, 247). 
 
16 Heidegger’s  project  of  fundamental  ontology is an attempt, in Being and Time, to raise anew 
the question of the meaning of Being through an analysis of the existence of Dasein for whom Being is a 
question.  Three  senses  of  the  phrase  “fundamental  ontology”  are  indicated  in  the  following  groups  of  
passages. (1) Passages stressing the ontical founding of ontology: SZ, 13, 194, 268, 301, 377. (2) 
Passages stressing the transition to scientific ontology: SZ, 37-8, 200, 213, 216, 316, 400. (3) Passages in 
which fundamental ontology deals with the fundamental question of the meaning of Being in general: SZ, 
183, 196, 406.  
9 
 
 
 
Tillich’s  unwillingness  to  admit  any  close  and  ongoing  philosophical  relationship  with  
Heidegger does not seem to lie in his resentment against the Nazis.17 Tillich was an outspoken 
critic of the Nazis and was suspended from his position as professor of philosophy at the 
University of Frankfurt by the Nazi government.18 It is said that Tillich “wore it as a badge of 
honor to be the first non-Jewish professor thus dismissed by the Nazis.”19 In this regard, Tillich 
could not be more different from Heidegger, who at the same time was busy in translating his 
philosophical work into the language of the new regime.20 George Steiner points to the affinity 
between  Heidegger’s  Being and Time and  Hitler’s  Mein Kampf – both were simultaneously dark 
                                                 
 
17 William  J.  Richardson,  introduction  to  ““Only  a  God  Can  Save  Us”:  The  Spiegel Interview 
(1966),”  by  Martin  Heidegger,  in  Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: 
Preceden Publishing, 1981), 45. 
 
18 Tillich was dismissed by the Nazis from his position on April 13, 1933, when he was the height 
of his German academic career as professor. Of the twelve dismissed at Frankfurt one was Tillich and the 
other eleven were Jewish. Mary Ann Stenger and Ronald H. Stone, Dialogues of Paul Tillich (Macon, 
GA.: Mercer University Press, 2002), 176.  
 
19 John Lachs and Robert Talisse, eds., American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 764. 
 
20 Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger’s  Nazism  and  Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992), 28-72. 
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yet full of promise and expectation.21 According to Roy Dennis Morrison, “Heidegger  became  a  
Nazi  culturally,  mythically,  philosophically,  religiously,  academically,  and  politically.”
22 But this 
does  not  explain  Tillich’s  reluctance  to  pronounce  himself  a  Heideggerian in the sense that he 
maintained  or  defended  Heidegger’s  central  philosophical  tenets. Tillich would later offer a 
critique  of  the  “political  romanticism”  to  which  Heidegger  fell prey in the early 1930s. Tillich 
has  cautiously  said  that  “It  is  not  without  some  justification,”  that  the  names  of  Nietzsche  and  
Heidegger  “are  connected  with  the  antimoral  movements  of  fascism  or  national  socialism”
23 and 
of these two Nietzsche was certainly far more remote from modern barbarism, both in time and 
in thought, than Heidegger. But Tillich must have understood the difficulty of making a 
judgmental decision about Heidegger from his writings. In a 1946 letter responding to the 
questions concerning  his  relation  to  Sartre’s  existentialism,  known  as  the  Letter  on  “Humanism,” 
Heidegger himself provides an example of this difficulty of bracketing knowledge of his 
personal life off from what he writes. The Letter was  Heidegger’s  first  published  essay after the 
                                                 
21 For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  connection  between  Heidegger’s  philosophy  and  his  Nazi  
politics, see Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). Steiner 
stresses  in  1978  that  “There  were instrumental connections between the language and vision of Sein und 
Zeit, especially the later sections, and those of Nazism. Those who would deny this are blind or 
mendacious.”  George  Steiner, Martin Heidegger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 121-
3.  Steiner  seems  obsessed  with  Heidegger’s  Nazism  (153-66). But a decade later, Steiner argues that in 
1927, the year Being and Time was  published,  there  was  obviously  “no  Nazism”  in his philosophy. 
Steiner  proposes  that  the  question  that  really  needs  to  be  asked  is  not  “What  did  Heidegger  find  in  
Nazism”  but  rather  “What  did  Nazism  find  in  Heidegger’s  earthy,  ontological  thought?”  Tamara  Chaplin,  
Turning on the Mind: French Philosophers on Television (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 
211. 
 
22 Roy Dennis Morrison, Science, Theology, and the Transcendental Horizon: Einstein, Kant, and 
Tillich (Atlanta, GA.: Scholars Press, 1994), 158. 
 
23 TC, 81. 
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defeat of Nazism, and it is hard to read statements such as the following and deny he was 
undergoing “de-Nazification”24:  “Because  we  are  speaking  against  ‘humanism’  people  fear  a  
defense  of  the  inhuman  and  a  glorification  of  barbaric  brutality.”
25 Tillich continued to draw 
from  Heidegger’s  existential  insights  in  the  human  condition.
26 Even as Tillich made his way to 
the United States, and even as he lent his support to the allied war effort (in the form of weekly 
addresses to the German people, urging them to abandon the Nazi cause), he continued to 
employ the fundamental existential categories Heidegger had outlined in Being and Time.27 
Moreover, in  discussing  Heidegger’s  collaboration  with  the  Nazis,  Tillich  shows  himself  to  be  
charitable in judgment.  “One should not judge the worth of a philosopher only in terms of the 
political  shortcomings  of  one’s  life.  We  have,  for  example,  the  caricatures  of  the  great  ancient  
philosophers, Socrates and Aristotle, and knowledge of the fact that even Plato was foolish 
                                                 
24 In 1945, Heidegger faces the commission of de-Nazification at Freiburg University. He asked a 
member of the de-Nazification committee to inquire about his supposed anti-Semitism intimated by 
Jaspers.  In  reply,  Jaspers  wrote  a  negative  report  that  ultimately  led  to  Heidegger’s  forced retirement 
without  license  to  teach.  The  university  and  its  philosophy  department  came  to  Heidegger’s  defense.  In  
1951, he was granted emeritus status and allowed to teach and lecture again at the university. Frank 
Schalow and Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary  of  Heidegger’s  Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD.: 
Scarecrow Press, 2010), xxix. 
 
25 LH, 263/ GA9, 176. 
 
26 Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 175; Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. Allan 
Blunden (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 260, 265. 
 
27 Tillich delivered 112 addresses in German for broadcast into occupied Europe from March 
1942 through May 1944. These powerful political sermons were broadcast into Germany by the U.S. 
Office  of  War  Information.  On  Tillich’s  wartime  addresses,  see  Paul  Tillich,  Against the Third Reich: 
Paul  Tillich’s  Wartime  Addresses  to  Nazi  Germany, eds. Ronald H. Stone and Matthew Lon Weaver, 
trans. Mathew Lon Weaver (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998). For more recent attempt to 
revive this legacy, see Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in 
a Violent World (New York: Basics, 2003), 99-112. 
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enough to become an adviser to the Hitler of his time, the tyrant of Syracuse. In spite of these 
facts, one cannot identify the worth of a philosopher merely with the personal decisions of daily 
existence, the terms and circumstances of which are constantly changing.”28 These episodes 
undercut the  possible  suggestion  that  Tillich’s intentional dissociation of himself from Heidegger 
arose from his uncomfortable feeling against the Nazi supporters. Rather, as James Luther 
Adams reveals, Tillich simply “was  good  at  covering  his  tracks  and  he  didn’t  want  anybody  
uncovering  them.”
29 This study will prove rewarding in that it will help the discerning 
contemporary theological reader to read Tillich more critically and better understand his thought. 
It will also bear meaningful and lasting church historical witness which would contribute to 
posterity’s  critical  assessment  of  a  memorable  encounter  of  two  great thinkers of the twentieth 
century.  
This study will combine analysis and interpretation.The principal research method used 
in this study is philosophical hermeneutics that is primarily concerned with interpreting, 
clarifying, and evaluating arguments. Making diagnostic use of philosophical methodology in the 
assessment of the existential theology of Tillich is in itself doing theology in correlation with the 
present situation. There is some indication that Tillich gradually came to have respect for the role 
of philosophical hermeneutics in a philosophically authentic mediation of theology. Tillich went 
so far as to suggest that analytic philosophy could potentially serve the present age as a sort of 
                                                 
28 HJ, 24-5. This lecture was delivered at the Cooper Union Forum, New York City, March 23, 
1954. 
 
29 James Luther Adams, An Examined Faith: Social Context and Religious Commitment (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1991), 126. 
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“conceptual  clearing  house”  in  the  same way that scholastic philosophy had served the medieval 
period.30 In attempting to philosophically analyze Tillich’s  ontology, I will attach great 
importance  to  grounding  Tillich’s  complex  thought  in  the  historical  traditions  of  philosophy  
upon which he drew, hoping that the neglected philosophical approach to his work will uncover 
the unexpectedly subtle and perhaps long-forgotten philosophical meanings of his basic 
theological concepts. Hence, while some repetition of the themes of earlier commentators is 
inevitable, the approach of this study presents Tillich’s  ontology  in  a  fresh  light.  Many  of  the  
works on Tillich are overly influenced by the particular theological viewpoints of their authors. 
For instance, two of the major English writings on Tillich which I referred to above, Kenneth 
Hamilton’s  The System and the Gospel: A Critique of Paul Tillich and  J.  Heywood  Thomas’  
Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, are both written from standpoints which are largely unsympathetic to 
the kind of theology Tillich produced. The standpoint of the present study is sympathetic towards 
Tillich’s  theological  aims  and  methods. I am convinced that to achieve an understanding of 
Tillich,  it  is  important  to  practice  what  Kenan  Osborne  calls  “willful  suspension  of  disbelief.”  By  
this  he  means  that  a  person  must  first  seek  to  approach  Tillich’s  theology  in  an  open,  wiling-to-
learn attitude. In other words, one must  first  follow  Tillich’s  system  as  a  working  model.31 I will 
approach  Tillich’s  work  from  his  own  standpoint  of  liberal  Protestantism  and  in  the  belief  that  
                                                 
30 Paul Tillich says  that  “we  have  no  such  clearing  house,  and  this  is the one point at which we 
might be in sympathy with the present day so-called logical positivists or symbolic logicians or logicians 
generally. They at least try to produce a clearing house.” NRL, 53. 
 
31 Kenan B. Osborne, New Being: A Study of the Relationship Between Conditioned and 
Unconditioned Being According to Paul Tillich (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), 187, 205. 
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the language of existentialism is an indispensible asset to Christian theism and that theism cannot 
finally avoid ontology.  
In the mid-1930s,32 Heidegger appeared to move away from the sort of analysis of Being 
that he pursued in Being and Time towards a greater concern with language and with the function 
of philosophical language of the western metaphysical tradition in obscuring the 
“unconcealment”  of  Being
33 in  its  “house  of  language.”34 This change in emphasis is often called 
“the  turn”  in  Heidegger’s  thinking. Heidegger shifts to the point of view of what he calls the 
“history  of  Being,”  which, he suggests, was originally illuminated for only a moment in the early 
Greek (pre-Socratic) experience, but then gradually occluded by the rising tide of metaphysics. 
Accordingly in his later writings, Heidegger developed his thought on the basis of the tragic 
world experience as Greek tragedy has developed it, that is, on the basis of the happening of 
truth that comes to pass in an art which is seen from the viewpoint of Greek tragedy. This so-
called  “turning”  of  the  later Heidegger was often understood as a reversal in the sense of a 
departure from his earlier standpoint. Many commentators are in agreement that Heidegger 
                                                 
32 Iain Donald Thomson fixes the turning period more precisely between 1929 and 1937. 
Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 117. 
 
33 “Unconcealment”  as  the  meaning  of  the  Greek  word  for  truth  was  not  spoken  by  Heidegger  
before 1928. In Being and Time, for example, the word unconcealment only appears in one passage, and it 
is  introduced  only  to  be  equated  with  “uncoveredness.”:  “To  say  that  an  assertion  “is  true”  signifies  that  it  
uncovers  the  entity  as  it  is  in  itself.  Such  an  assertion  asserts,  points  out,  ‘lets’  the  entity  ‘be  seen’  
(άπόφανσις)  in  its  uncoveredness.”  BT, 219/SZ, 175.  
 
34 “Thinking  accomplishes  the  relation  of  being  to  the  essence  of  the  human  being.  It  does  not  
make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to being solely as something handed over to 
thought itself from being. Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking being comes to language. 
Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell. Those who think and those who create 
with  words  are  the  guardians  of  this  home.”  LH, 239/GA9, 145.  
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dropped  the  word  “ontological”  in  the  later  works.  It  has  been  argued  that,  a  few  years  after  the  
publication of Being and Time (1927), Heidegger dropped the earlier notion  of  “ontology”  
altogether.35 Heidegger said in Being and Time that  “Of  course  only  as  long  as  Dasein  is (that is, 
only  as  long  as  an  understanding  of  Being  is  ontically  possible),  ‘is  there’  Being….Being  (not  
entities) is dependent  upon  the  understanding  of  Being.”36 Simply put, Being and Dasein “‘are’  
equiprimordially.”
37 That is, Being is an entirely intrinsic phenomenon in Dasein. But the later 
Heidegger  claimed  that  the  Being  that  ‘is  there’  only  in  and  through  Dasein is already conceived 
as essentially transcendent in relation to Dasein.  Being  is  only  “illumined  for  man”  in  the  light  
cast  by  man’s  own  projects.
38 That is, it is through our existential questioning that determines 
how Being will appear and give itself to us.  “But  this  projection  does  not  create  being.  Moreover,  
the projection is essentially a thrown projection. What throws in such projection is not the human 
being but Being itself, which sends the human being into the ek-sistence of Da-sein that is his 
essence.”39 But this only means his turn away from the analytic of Dasein, which was focused in 
                                                 
35 Michael Roth, The  Poetics  of  Resistance:  Heidegger’s  Line (Evanston, IL.: Northwestern 
University  Press,  1996),  46.  Heidegger  himself  has  said,  “I  have  forsaken  an  earlier  position,  not  to  
exchange it for another, but because even the former position was only a pause on the way. What lasts in 
thinking is the way. And ways of thought conceal within them the mysterious factor that we can walk on 
forwards  and  backwards;;  even  the  way  back  first  leads  us  forward.”  Sprache, 98-9. 
 
36 BT, 255/SZ, 212. 
 
37 BT, 272/SZ, 230.  
 
38 LH, 257/GA9, 168. 
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Being and Time as the most direct route to the study of Being itself, to Being. Heidegger’s  basic  
concern with Being remains constant throughout. His thought overall manifests a deepening or 
radicalizing of his interest in Being and Time.40 Even if, as J. G. Gray claims, Heidegger’s 
interest  moves  “from  human  existence  to  nature”  as  his  later  writings  proceed,  the  plan  of  the  
projected work begun in Being and Time nevertheless confirms that Heidegger remains at all 
times concerned with the question of being.41 His shift marks only a decisive break from his 
earlier study with respect to language. But Heidegger’s  philosophy  is  onto-centric throughout. 
Heidegger’s  retrospective claim reveals the fact that Heidegger himself is very emphatic about 
this  issue.  “One  need  only  observe,”  he  says,  “the  simple  fact  that  in  Being and Time the problem 
is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism – that the entire anthropological problematic is kept 
at a distance, that the normative issue is emphatically and solely the experience of Da-sein with a 
constant view to the question of being – for  it  to  become  strikingly  clear  that  the  ‘Being’  into  
which Being and Time inquires cannot long remain something which the human subject posits. 
Rather Being, stamped as presence by its time-character, approaches Dasein. Consequently, even 
in the initial steps of the question of Being in Being and Time thought is called to a change 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 LH, 257/GA9, 168. It has been argued from this that the philosophy of the later Heidegger was 
as a whole more compatible with Barthian theology. James  M.  Robinson,  “The  German  Discussion  of  the  
Later  Heidegger,”  in  The Later Heidegger and Theology, vol. 1 of New Frontiers in Theology: 
Discussing Among German and American Theologians, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 5. 
 
40 Benard Jacques Boelen, “Martin Heidegger as a Phenomenologist,”  in  Phenomenological 
Perspectives: Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg, ed. Philip J. Bossert 
(Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 111. 
 
41 J.  Glenn  Gray,  “Heidegger’s  Course:  From  Human  existence  to  Nature,”  Journal of Philosophy 
54, no. 8 (April 1957): 197-207. 
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whose movement corresponds to the turn.”42 This statement disproves that his turn is a 
“reversal.” Heidegger says that “The  thinking  of  the  reversal  is a change in my thought. But this 
change is not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental 
issue, of Being and Time.”  The later Heidegger is a phenomenologist for exactly the same 
reasons as the early Heidegger. 
But the question whether these interpretations are correct is beside the point here. For, as 
Tillich’s  selective  appreciation  of  Heidegger suggests, Heidegger’s  turn was already after Tillich 
had  become  thoroughly  imprinted  with  Heidegger’s  earlier  ontological  language and ideas. What 
matters is the fact that Tillich  saw  the  “late”  Heidegger  in  unbroken  continuity  with  the  “early”  
Heidegger. Tillich did not understand this  movement  in  Heidegger’s  thought  which  happened  in  
his work in the mid-1930s, as a conversion, a moving away from the insights of Being and 
Time,43 but, as Christopher N. Chapman argues,  “a  logical  development”44 from his concern with 
the world and the human condition as described in Being and Time. As I will discuss in 
Conclusion of this study, Tillich also  saw  that  Heidegger’s  early  religious  orientation  was  
                                                 
42 Preface, xviii-xix. 
 
43 See, for example, Catriona Hanley, Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger: The Role of 
Method in Thinking and the Infinite (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), xx; 
Richard M. McDonough, Martin  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006), 
28. 
 
44 Christopher N. Chapman, Freud,  Religion,  and  Anxiety:  How  Freud’s  Critique  of  Religion  
Neglected His Advances in Psychoanalytic Theory (Morrisville, NC.: Lulu.com, 2007), 76. 
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fulfilled in his later works.45 In a published lecture from 1954,  Tillich  remarks:  “The  answers  one  
finds  in  the  later  Heidegger….do  not  come  from existentialism but from the medieval Catholic 
mystical  tradition  within  which  he  lived  as  a  seminarian.”
46 Gadamer underscores this point 
while addressing the question of why Heidegger retained an orientation to religious issues 
despite  forsaking  a  career  as  a  theologian:  “….it  was  Christianity  once  again  that  challenged  the  
thought of this man and held him in suspense; it was once again the old transcendence and not 
the modern worldliness [Diessetigkeit]  that  spoke  through  him….it  was  clear  to  Heidegger  that  it  
would be intolerable to speak of God like science speaks about its objects; but what that might 
mean, to speak of God – this was the question that motivated him and pointed out his way of 
thinking.”
47  
Heidegger’s  early  major  work,  Being and Time,  which  Heidegger  regards  as  Heidegger’s  
“fundamental  book,”
48 provides an important reference point for the interpretation of the 
profound ontological concepts in Tillich’s philosophical theology. It is certainly not correct to 
say that only the early Heidegger was significant  for  Tillich’s  theological  development. Even 
though the early Heidegger who was existentialist and phenomenologist is the central concern of 
                                                 
45 Tillich must have been well versed in both early and later works of Heidegger. Tillich 
comments  on  the  difference  between  Sartre  and  Heidegger  that  “Sartre  draws  consequences  from  the  
earlier Heidegger which the later Heidegger did  not  accept.”  CTB  149.  This  demonstrates  Tillich’s  
knowledge of both early and later works of Heidegger. 
 
46 HJ, 27.  
 
47 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s  Way, trans. John W. Stanley (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1994), 182-3.   
 
48 Paul Tillich,  “Heidegger  and  Jaspers,”  in  Heidegger and Jaspers, ed. Alan M. Olson 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 22. 
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this investigation, Heidegger’s  later thought also bears important relevance to the present study. 
My discussion will also address Tillich’s  understanding  of  the theological potentialities and aims 
of the later Heidegger. The character and extent of its significance for Tillich’s  theology  will  
occupy us at appropriate places in this study. The next two chapters provide a historical survey 
of the background necessary for understanding Heidegger’s  influence  on Tillich’s  thought.  
Chapters 4-8 will explore in closer detail Tillich’s  creative  appropriations  of  Heidegger’s  
existential thought. Chapter 8 concludes the study with a comprehensive summary of its findings 
and by pointing out important issues for future study within the framework proposed in this 
study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE AGE OF MODERN EXISTENTIALISM1 
 
 
 
The Definition of Existentialism 
 
 
Jean-Paul  Sartre  once  complained  that  the  word  “existentialism”  was  “so  loosely  applied  
to so many things that it has come to mean nothing at  all.”2 Walter Arnold Kaufmann, who wrote 
convincingly  on  this  subject,  said:  “Existentialism  is  not  a  philosophy,  but  a  label  for  several  
widely  different  revolts  against  traditional  philosophy.  Most  of  the  living  “existentialists”  have  
repudiated this label, and a bewildered outsider might well conclude that the only thing they have 
in common is a marked aversion to each other…Certainly,  existentialism  is  not  a  school  of  
thought nor reducible to any set of tenets. The three writers who appear invariably in every list of 
“existentialists”  – Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre – are not in agreement on essentials. Such 
alleged precursors as Pascal and Kierkegaard are different from all  
                                                 
1 Tillich experienced the First World War as an absolute catastrophe, the collapse of the 
bourgeois period of European culture and “the  end  of  a  theology  that  could  exist  in  a  happy  alliance  with  
the  bourgeois  optimism  of  progress  and  stability.”  Christoph  Schwöbel,  “Tillich,  Paul  (1883-1965),”  in  
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought, ed. Alister E. McGrath (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996), 639. It was a tragic witness to much erosion of the confidence in the idea of human progress – the 
maxim of rationalistic Enlightenment thought – while romantic idealism failed to account sufficiently for 
the despair and sense of helplessness experienced by both individuals and communities in their concrete, 
contemporary predicaments. With this emerging crisis Tillich saw the genesis of modern western 
European  existentialism.  He  claimed  that  “When  with  31  July  1914,  the  19th  century  came  to an end, the 
Existentialist  revolt  ceased  to  be  revolt.  It  became  the  mirror  of  an  experienced  reality.”  CTB, 130. 
   
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale 
University, 2007), 20. 
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three  men…”
3 Tillich notes that “But existentialism is not only a revolt; it is also a style. 
Existentialism has become the style of all great literature, of the arts and the other media of our 
self-expression. It is present in poetry, in the novel, in drama, in the visual arts, and it is my 
opinion that our century will in historical retrospect be characterized as the period of 
existentialism.”4 
It is necessary to begin with a definition of existentialism that will guide this study. There 
are many dictionary definitions of existentialism. Each carries some degree of truth. For instance, 
existentialism can be defined, in short, as “a theory that affirms the primacy, or a priority, of 
existence….[in] relation to essence.”5 Of course, this definition is not comprehensive. It only 
explains Kierkegaardian existentialism which was developed in protest against Hegelianism,6 but 
to which neither that of Heidegger’s  existentialism nor Tillich’s belongs exactly.7 Kierkegaard 
was concerned with the actual existing individual. The existence that humans live is one of 
                                                 
3 Walter Arnold Kaufmann,  “Existentialism  from  Dostoevsky  to  Sartre,”  in  Existentialism from 
Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1956), 21. 
 
4 AHCT, 539. 
 
5 Paul Foulquié, Existentialism, trans. Kathleen Raine (New York: Roy Publishers, 1950), 9. 
 
6 Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s  Relation  to  Hegel (Princeton University Press, 1980), 110-3; 
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 2:25. Thulstrup 
argues that Kierkegaard was ill-acquainted with Hegel’s  texts,  and  that  his  anti-Hegelian critique was 
inspired primarily by contemporary Danish Hegelians.  
 
7 William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (New York: Anchor Books, 
1990), 237. Tillich published an article on modern existentialism  in  1944,  in  which  he  called  it  “a  
specifically  German  creation.”  EP, 76. 
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actuality. Possibility is not real for him. The conceived possibility is not the end in itself but a 
goal to  be  actualized  in  one’s  own  actuality.  For Kierkegaard, reality is actuality, hence actuality 
is prior to, or higher than, possibility.8 Therefore, his treatment of existence does not deal with 
the strictly philosophical problem of transcendence. For him, human essence does not transcend 
its existence. The essence is to be found within existence. The essence of human existence is not 
a “state,” but the “act of transgressing from possibility to actuality.”9 Our essence is what we are.  
But the opposite can be said for Heidegger and Tillich. At the very beginning of Being 
and Time Heidegger states, “Higher  than  actuality  stands  possibility.”10 For Heidegger, human 
existence is a creature whose being is constituted by possibilities. Human existence cannot be 
understood from actual objects, but only from possibilities which make that existence what it is. 
Heidegger makes a distinction between “ontic” and “ontological.” An ontic inquiry is concerned 
with individual and actual facts or events, and seeks to establish some general classifications and 
laws for these actualities. An ontological inquiry, on the other hand, is “concerned with the 
                                                 
8 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol. 12.1 of 
Kierkegaard’s  Writings, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 320-1. But this does not mean for Kierkegaard, as Sartre puts it, that existence 
precedes essence. Kierkegaard dissociated himself from such form of existentialism. While Kierkegaard 
asserts a very real and irreducible freedom, he does emphasize that humans are created beings subject to 
certain  limiting  factors,  for  example,  a  dependence  on  God.  For  Kierkegaard,  “it  [human  freedom]  is  a  
deeply  “entangled”  freedom,  entangled  in  its  own  given  purpose  and  orientation, namely, for the self to 
choose to be and to become that self which it has been given to be, both in its past and its future. The 
struggle and the agony of this kind of freedom must be apparent to every human with any degree of self-
awareness and self-consciousness.”  Arnold  Bruce  Come,  Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s  University  Press,  1995),  125. 
 
9 Türker  Armaner,  “The  Reception  of  Kierkegaard  in  Turkey,”  in  Kierkegaard’s  International 
Reception, ed. Jon Stewart, vol. 8 of Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2009), 8. 
 
10 BT, 63/SZ, 38. Heidegger’s  emphasis. 
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general structures that, as potentialities, pervade human existence.”11 Simply put, the distinction 
between ontic and ontological distinguishes between concern about beings and concern about 
being. This distinction between the ontic and ontological is cardinal for the understanding of 
Heideggerian existentialism. Tillich’s analysis of human existence is based on the distinction 
between essence and existence,  or  “a  distinction  between  essential  and  existential  being.”12 
Essence is potentiality, or possibility, and existence is an imperfect state of essence. Essence is 
real, therefore possibility is prior to, or higher than, actuality.13 For this reason, Tillich repudiates 
Hegel’s  notion  of  reality  as  the  union  of  essence  and  existence.14 Existence as actuality is the 
fragmentary expression of the possibility.15 The true meaning of existence or being, for 
Heidegger and Tillich, lies behind the Platonic distinction between essence and existence.16 
                                                 
11 William Barrett, What is Existentialism? (New York: Grove Press, 1964), 157. 
 
12 ST1, 202. 
 
13 “The  principle  that  being  precedes  acting  implies  a  basic  criticism  of  the  history  of  religion.”  
ST2, 80. 
 
14 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s  Logic, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), sec142. 
 
15 “The  task  of  existential  philosophy  was  first  of  all  to  destroy  this  Hegelian  “reconciliation,”  
which was merely conceptual, and left existence itself unreconciled.”  EP, 82-3.  
 
16 In Plato, possibility is what is in its very essence ordered to being something individual, that is, 
to exist contingently, or to be what  it  is  in  determination  with  other  beings.  Tillich  does  not  share  Plato’s  
devaluation  of  sensory  reality.  In  connection  with  the  end  of  history,  Tillich  speaks  of  “essentialization,”  
the return to what something is essentially. In his view, the new thing that is actualized in time and space 
adds to essential being and is not lost. ST3, 427. 
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Heidegger is right in protesting that he and Sartre have nothing in common in this regard.17 
Reading Heidegger as an existentialist, Sartre appealed to him as support, if implicitly.18 But 
Heidegger denied that his thought ever dealt with Sartrean existentialism, describing his 
approach to phenomenology in Being and Time as  an  “analytic  of  existence,”  or  a  “hermeneutic  
of Dasein.”19 Heidegger  points  out  Sartre’s  failed attempt to define existentialism as a 
philosophy that concerns the true meaning of existence because his is merely a Kierkegaardian 
attempt to reverse the  priority  of  essence  and  existence.  “Sartre  expresses  the  basic  tenet  of  
existentialism in this way: Existence precedes essence. In this statement he is taking existentia 
and essentia according  to  their  metaphysical  meaning,  which  from  Plato’s  time  on  has  said  that  
essential precedes existential. Sartre reverses this statement. But the reversal of a metaphysical 
statement  remains….in  oblivion  of  the  truth  of  being.”
20 I  resist  Christopher  N.  Chapman’s  
classifying  Tillich  as  a  Sartrean  existentialist.  It  is  highly  disputable  to  say  that  “Tillich  was  
never  a  Heideggerian.”  Chapman  explains  that  Tillich  is an existentialist in that he is concerned 
with  the  meaning  of  truth  in  relation  to  human  beings  and  their  existence,  but  “After  Being and 
Time,  Heidegger’s  philosophy  is  neither  explicitly  concerned  nor  unconcerned  with  this  sort  of  
                                                 
17 LH, 250/GA9, 159.  Heidegger’s  “Letter  on  “Humanism”  (1949)”  is  a  response  to  Sartre’s  
“Existentialism  Is  a  Humanism  (1946).”   
 
18 Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939–40, trans. Quintin Hoare 
(London: Verso, 1984), 184-5.  “It  was  certainly  to  escape  from  this  Husserlian  impasse  that  I  turned  
towards  Heidegger.” 
 
19 BT, 62/SZ, 38. 
 
20 LH, 250/SZ, 159. 
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analysis of meaning; he  tries  to  dig  beneath  the  metaphysics  implicit  in  such  ideas.”  Chapman  
suggests  that  Heidegger  should  be  designated  as  a  “post-phenomenologist.”21  
As  I  will  show  in  what  follows,  however,  Tillich’s  actual  concern  with  existentialism  
comes much closer to the work of Heidegger than to Sartre. Tillich opposes Sartre’s  “pure  
existentialism” in so much as it denies all essential structure. Tillich interprets existence as both 
the actualization of and the estrangement from essence. He is not satisfied with mere existential 
analysis. He drives beyond it to that point of identity where the infinite reveals itself in the finite, 
where the split of subject and object is overcome.22 Hence, Tillich criticizes Sartre. “We  can  
make  the  same  criticism  of  Sartre’s  pure  existentialism and his sensitive psychological analysis. 
The greatness of this  man  is  that  he  is  the  psychological  interpreter  of  Heidegger…But…Sartre 
says  man’s  essence  is  his  existence…We  have  the  same  problem  in  Heidegger.  Heidegger  talks  
also as if there were  no  norms  whatsoever,  no  essential  man,  as  if  man  makes  himself.”23 Tillich 
reads  Sartre  as  “overstepping  the  bounds  of  existentialism  by  denying  the  reality  of  structures  in  
existence  at  all.”
24  Tillich’s  term  “essence” corresponds  to  Heidegger’s  concept of “authentic 
existence” and  Tillich’s  term  “existence” is  analogous  to  Heidegger’s  “inauthentic  existence,”  
                                                 
21 Christopher Chapman, Freud, Religion, and  Anxiety:  How  Freud’s  Critique  of  Religion  
Neglected His Advances in Psychoanalytic Theory (Morrisville, NC.: Lulu.com, 2007), 76. 
 
22 Tillich  explains  the  identity  as  follows.  “The  prius of subject and object cannot become an 
object to which man as a subject is theoretically and practically related. God is no object for us as 
subjects.”  TT,  25.  The  “prius,”  or  a priori, is the point in the human being where the human being is one 
with God. The prius is the precondition of subject-object division of reality.    
 
23 TSEP, 121.  
 
24 John P. Dourley, Paul  and  Tillich  and  Bonaventure:  An  Evaluation  of  Tillich’s  Claim  to  Stand  
in the Augustinian-Franciscan Tradition (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1975), 53. 
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which will be discussed in later chapters. Tillich writes, “[I]n  the  background  of  Heidegger’s  
ontology lies the mystical concept of being which is without significance for Sartre. Sartre 
carried  through  the  consequences  of  Heidegger’s  Existentialist  analyses  without  mystical  
restrictions. This is the reason he has become the symbol of present-day Existentialism, a 
position which is deserved not so much by the originality of his basic concepts as by the 
radicalism,  consistency,  and  psychological  adequacy  with  which  he  has  carried  them  through.”
25 
Tillich sometimes defines his existentialism as the “philosophy  of  existence.”26 But 
strictly speaking, Tillich’s theological philosophy is fundamentally the philosophy of essence27 
that is concerned about existence in order ultimately to understand and explain its estrangement 
from essence. For Tillich, without an essentialist basis, existentialism, religious or otherwise, is 
incomprehensible. On  the  relation  of  existentialism  to  essentialism  Tillich  writes:  “Existentialism  
is not a philosophy which can stand on its own legs. Actually it has no legs. It is always based on 
a vision of the essential structure of reality.”28 Tillich makes much the same point when he writes, 
“Whenever  existentialists  give  answers,  they  do  so  in  terms  of  religious  or  quasi-religious 
traditions  which  are  not  derived  from  their  existential  analysis.”
29 He is aware of the 
                                                 
25 CTB, 149. 
 
26 EP, 79; IH, 40.  
 
27 In this regard, Tillich  is  an  essentialist.  J.  Lawrence  Burkholder,  “Power,”  in  Power, Authority, 
and the Anabaptist Tradition, ed. Benjamin W. Redekop and Calvin W. Redekop (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001), 3.  
 
28 Perspectives, 142.  
 
29 ST2, 25. 
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existentialism’s surreptitious essentialist presuppositions in its claim to priority of the existential. 
Tillich argues that without the essential, human discourse would be impossible since discourse 
presupposes the universals and so the essential structure of mind and reality. “Existentialism 
served Tillich well to identify in existence the distortion of the essential. But distortion always 
depends on the reality of the distorted.”30 It is such an understanding of the priority of essence to 
its distortions in existence which  enables  Tillich  to  be  consistent  when  he  states,  “Often I have 
been asked if I am an existentialist theologian, and my answer is always short. I say fifty-fifty. 
This  means  for  me  essentialism  and  existentialism  belong  together.”
31 Pure essentialism and pure 
existentialism are equally impossible. Tillich’s  vision  of  the  ontological  and  epistemic  intimacy  
of  essence  and  existence  leads  to  the  conclusion,  “So  mere  existentialism  does  not  exist.”
32 
Therefore, it is not appropriate to consider Tillich as an existentialist as popularly done. It 
“obscures the underlying essentialism of his reflections on existence.”33  
Existentialism can be defined in a more comprehensive way as a type of philosophy that 
is concerned about the nature of human existence and endeavors to analyze the basic structures 
of human existence.34 There have been arguments that lead plausibly to the conclusion that 
                                                 
30 John P. Dourley, Paul Tillich, Carl Jung and the Recovery of Religion (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 26. 
 
31 Perspectives, 245. 
 
32 Perspectives, 143. 
 
33 Carl E. Braaten,  “Paul  Tillich  and  the  Classical  Christian  Tradition,”  in   AHCT, xxv. 
 
34 Fernando Molina, Existentialism as Philosophy (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Co., 1953), 2. 
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Heidegger was not an existentialist at all.35 It  certainly  must  be  conceded  that  Heidegger’s  stated 
philosophical interest was in the question of the meaning of Being and not in the ethical or 
psychological issues36 of the popular existentialism that concerned Kierkegaard and Sartre. 
Heidegger does state that his philosophy is an ontology and that his chief preoccupation is with 
Being and not with existence. Heidegger also vehemently  repudiated  Sartre’s  description  of  his  
thought as an atheistic existentialism.37 In an interview with his former student, Heidegger said, 
“I  am  not  primarily  concerned  with  existence….My  book  bears  the  title  Being and Time and not 
Existence and Time.  For  me,  the  haunting  question  is  and  has  been,  not  man’s  existence,  but  
‘being-in-totality’  and  ‘being  as  such.’”38 But  Heidegger’s  philosophy  can  be  understood  as  
existentialist in that it is deeply concerned about human existence in order to answer the question 
of Being. As Nathan A. Scott argues, it is the  “...brilliant originality with which [Being and 
Time] probes the essential modes of human being – 
anxiety...care...temporality…‘resoluteness’...transcendence...that makes Being and Time one of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
35 See, for example, Eva Hauel Cadwallader, guest preface to Martin Heidegger on the Way, by 
William Henry Werkmeister, ed. Richard T. Hull (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), xxi-xxiv. 
 
36 “Existentialism  is  the  struggle  to  discover  the  human  person  in  a  depersonalized  age.”    Jackson 
J. Spielvogel, Western Civilization, Volume C: Since 1789, 7th ed. (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth, 2008), 
904.  
 
37 In a way, Heidegger repudiated this classification of his thought in that existentialism was 
unsystematic. See  his  “Letter  on  “Humanism,”” in which he repudiates both existentialism and 
humanism.  For  Heidegger,  existentialism  is  “a  restricted  philosophy  that  is  on  another  track  and  headed in 
a  direction  different  from  that  of  his  own  thinking.”  William  Alan  Sadler,  Existence and Love: A New 
Approach in Existential Phenomenology (New  York:  Charles  Scribner’s  Sons,  1969),  64.     
 
38 Kurt Reinhardt, The Existentialist Revolt (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1964), 132.  
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the classic texts  in  the  literature  of  modern  Existentialism.”39 In the same vein,  Tillich’s  theology  
can also be identified as existential despite his preference for systematic treatment of his thought. 
Kierkegaard criticized Hegelianism as claiming to be able to reduce all of existence into one 
philosophical system. Hegel believed that his system could achieve an immanent identity 
between thought and being, or thinking and existing.40 Against this notion, Kierkegaard wrote, 
“A  logical  system  is  possible;;  an  existential  system  is  impossible.”  
41 Implicit in this statement is 
the fundamental separation that Kierkegaard posited between thinking and existing. 
Kierkegaard’s  critique  against  Hegel  expresses  the  “existential danger”42 that tempts 
philosophers to philosophize themselves out of existence into objectivity and the system.43 But 
Tillich makes a distinction between systems in a narrow and a wider sense. The first kind starts 
with a set of the highest principles and deduces from them a whole hierarchy of lower ones. The 
second kind is not hierarchic-deductive.44 But it is a system in which a whole of propositions are 
                                                 
39 Nathan A. Scott, The Unquiet Vision: Mirrors of Man in Existentialism (New York: World 
Publishing, 1969), 94-6.  
 
40 Hegel argues for the identity of thought and being. This does not simply mean that all that exist 
are things in our  or  God’s  mind.  Nor  does  it  mean  that  all  existing  things  are  thinking  things.  It  means  that  
all existing things are intelligible to thought because they have a logical form that is identical with the 
categorical structure of reason.  
 
41 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter 
Lowrie, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 99, 107. 
  
42 George Hunsinger, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Concept of Death (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968), 25. 
 
43 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter 
Lowrie, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 55. 
 
44 “The  present  system  is  by  no  means  deductive.”  ST1, 68.  
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“consistent,  interdependent,  and  developed  according  to  a  definite  method.”
45 In other words, his 
Christian theology  as  a  system  is  “a  totality  made  up  of  consistent,  but  not  of  deduced,  
assertions.”
46 It is in this wider sense that Tillich sees the necessity of a systematic approach to 
the question of Being in order to understand and expound theological problems. Every meaning, 
however fragmentary, seeks a system. Without it, existentialists could not communicate even 
fragments.  Tillich  makes  an  existentialist  creed:  “Every  meaningful  fragment  is  an  implicit  
system,  as  every  system  is  an  explicit  fragment.”
47  
In the final analysis, Heidegger and Tillich can be interpreted as existentialist thinkers in 
the sense that the ultimate concern of their philosophical inquiries is directed toward the meaning 
of concrete, personal human – “my”  in  Heidegger,  “our”  in  Tillich  – existence. William Lovitt 
argues that “Heidegger  is  not  an  “existentialist.”  He  is  not  concerned  centrally  or exclusively 
with man. Rather he is centrally concerned with the relation between man and Being, with man 
as the openness to which and in which Being presences  and  is  known.”48 This view treats 
Heidegger as if he were an ontic scientist rather than ontological thinker – “Ontic”  is  the  
counterpart  to  “ontological,”  characterizing  beings,  not  their  being.  Heidegger has never been a 
mere observer of human being or of the relation between human being and Being. Heidegger 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
45 PTM, 23-4. 
  
46 ST1, 66. 
 
47 PTM, 23-4. 
 
48 William Lovitt, introduction to Martin  Heidegger’s  The  Question  Concerning  Technology  and  
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper, 1977), xiii. 
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argues against such attitude of detached or isolated subject that would regard the world around it 
as objects of scientific observations. For Heidegger, the investigation of the beings, including 
human being, of the detached, scientific regard, which are  the  objective  things  termed  “present-
at-hand,”49 is ontic.50 At the outset of Being and Time, Heidegger introduces a distinction 
between  “ontic”  and  “ontological”  that  will  be  crucial  to  all  that follows in the work. Heidegger 
does not conceive of his philosophical project as an ontic science among others. His 
investigation is ontological precisely because of its existential engagement of his own being. 
Dasein  “as  a  whole”  is  to  be  brought  into  focus in order for an authentic ontology. This focusing 
on  the  whole  is  possible  only  “on  the  basis  of  the  extreme  existential  engagement”  of  the  
philosophizing person himself or herself.51 The fundamental ontologist can existentially analyze 
only what he or she has existentially lived through.  
 
Overcoming Nihilism 
 
Twentieth-century existentialism renews the meaning and purpose that were left out of 
the old philosophy. Perhaps no other philosophical movement has had as great an impact on the 
philosophy, literature, and general cultural outlook of the twentieth century as has existentialism. 
Existentialism has attracted more attention from non-philosophers than any other recent 
                                                 
49 BT, 136/SZ, 102.  
 
50 Heidegger holds that every science has some prior understanding  of  the  “being”  (the  “what it 
is”  and  the  “that it  is”)  of  beings  it  studies.  In  this  sense,  ontic  science  is  an  applied  ontology. 
 
51 MFL, 139/GA26, 176. 
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philosophical movements. The existentialists react in common against their philosophical 
heritage. It is perhaps the force of this reaction against the past that has gained this movement 
much of the attention it has received, the force of “the hostility to closed systems, secular or 
religious, which pretend to be exact mirrors of what the world is all about.”52 For this reason, it is 
generally accepted that existentialism is necessarily a “philosophy of pessimism”53 – or at least, 
of a very limited, Stoical kind of optimism. For  instance,  Sartre  described  himself  as  a  “Stoic” in 
the popular sense of the word.54 He goes on to characterize Stoicism as a philosophy directed 
towards a total existential transformation of the individual,55 a philosophy that might teach one 
how to live,56 although he concludes that he cannot wholly endorse the Stoic conception of 
freedom as detachment from both external objects and other people.57 Indeed, most of the 
                                                 
52 Ernst Breisach, Introduction to Modern Existentialism (New York: Grove Press, 1962), 5. 
 
53 Oliver Bennett, Cultural Pessimism: Narratives of Decline in the Postmodern World 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 5. 
 
54 Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939–40, trans. Quintin Hoare 
(London: Verso, 1984), 46. 
 
55 Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939–40, trans. Quintin Hoare 
(London: Verso, 1984), 82. 
 
56 Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939–40, trans. Quintin Hoare 
(London: Verso, 1984), 185.  
 
57 Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939–40, trans. Quintin Hoare 
(London: Verso, 1984), 293. “It  would  be  wrong  to  interpret  me  as  saying  that  man  is  free  in  all  
situations, as the Stoics claimed. I mean the exact opposite: all men are slaves in so far as their lives 
unfold in the practico-inert  field  and  in  so  far  as  this  field  is  conditioned  by  scarcity.”  Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Theory of Practical Ensembles, trans. A. Sheridan-Smith, vol. 1 of Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(London: New Left Books, 1976), 331. 
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existentialist texts seem to share this experience.58 Existentialism pessimistically reflected the 
anxieties of the twentieth century. Max Scheler wrote, “This  is  the  age  when  man  has  become  
fully  and  thoroughly  problematic  to  himself.”
59 This does not mean that life has suddenly 
become a problematic object to be solved. The problem is the situation in which the human 
needs to strive to be. The problem is the question of what it means for the human to be. The 
problem is the human itself as a question,60 not the human life as its possession. The central point 
of the pessimistic existentialism of the twentieth century was the absence of God. As Albert 
Camus expressed  it,  “A  world  that  can  be  explained  even  with  bad  reasons  is  a  familiar  world.  
But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, 
a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the 
hope of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is 
properly  the  feeling  of  absurdity.”
61 If the world is absurd and without meaning, humans are 
without meaning and purpose as well. This means that humans have no preordained destiny and 
are utterly alone in the universe. Reduced to despair and depression, humans have but one source 
of hope – themselves. “Man  is  nothing  else  but  what  he  makes  himself.  Such  is  the  first  principle  
                                                 
58 Existentialism is certainly a cure for superficial optimism about the future of human existence 
on earth. But it can be argued from the twenty-first-century perspective that the existentialist picture of 
human predicament erred greatly on the side of pessimism.  
 
59 Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (Darmstadt: Reichl, 1928), 13.  
 
60 “Man  is  the  question  he  asks  about  himself,  before  any  question  has  been  formulated.”  ST1, 62. 
  
61 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, trans.  Justin  O’Brien  (New  York:  
Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 6. 
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of existentialism,”62 declares Sartre. Hence, “existentialism is a humanism.”63 Such an atheistic 
existentialism could never have come into being in an age of religious faith. Atheistic 
existentialism is “a post-Christian philosophy.”64 Most Christians of whatever status in the 
medieval period believed that life was meaningful because God had created them, and Christ had 
redeemed them. The starting point of nihilism is the feeling that human existing is a question 
mark. The twentieth century has been a witness to the human feeling of frustration for having 
been thrown out of the promised land. There was a feeling that humans were in the world on 
their own. Existentialism was born largely of the desperation caused by this situation. The world 
is absurd, but humans are still unique. They determine what they will be. Nevertheless, there 
could be no escape from the pessimistic conclusion.65 For the human being is free, but the world 
is empty and meaningless. This leads to nihilism in the end – Nothing matters.  
Nietzsche defined nihilism  as  the  situation  which  obtains  when  “everything  is  permitted.”  
If everything is permitted, then it makes no difference what we do, and so nothing is worth 
                                                 
62 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: 
Citadel Press, 1985), 15. 
 
63 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale 
University, 2007), 18. 
 
64 Colin Wilson, Introduction to the New Existentialism (London: Hutchinson, 1966), 19. Wilson 
distinguishes  between  the  “critical  existentialism”  of  such  thinkers  as  Camus  and  Sartre  and  the  “positive  
existentialism”  of  the  new  existentialists,  which  “rejects  Sartre’s  notion  of  man’s  contingency…Its  bias  is  
therefore  distinctly  optimistic,  and  its  atmosphere  is  as  different  from  that  of  the  ‘old  existentialism.’”  
(17-8) David Holbrook, Gustav Mahler and the Courage To Be (London: Vision Press, 1975), affirms the 
possibility of a positive existentialism by invoking Tillich as his hero.  
  
65 Sartre caught the sense of this in his play No Exit (1944). There is, for Sartre, no exit from the 
hell of human existence save suicide. Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. S. 
Gilbert (New York: Random House, 1955). 
 
35 
 
 
 
anything.66  He saw himself everywhere surrounded by the varied permutations of nihilistic 
worldviews,67 a total exhaustion of values that could not be restored. “This nihilism doomed to 
extinction the age of humanity that had begun with the Socratic transformation of Hellenic 
values and that had developed into modern science.”68 New values and new forms of life were 
required. Attempting to overcome nihilism, Nietzsche claimed to have revealed the essence of 
nihilism and the way toward a self-overcoming of nihilism. But Heidegger still sees in the 
philosophy of Nietzsche nihilistic pessimism and he considers it as the final moment of 
metaphysics.69 Although  Heidegger’s  initial readings of Nietzsche favored his perspective of the 
possibility of overcoming metaphysics on the basis of his aesthetics, that is, on the basis of his 
concept of will to power as art,70 he  soon  began  to  associate  Nietzsche’s  name  with  the  
                                                 
66 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol 
Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 111. 
 
67 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol 
Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7. 
 
68 Robert John Ackermann, Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look (Amherst: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1990), 5. 
 
69 Heidegger  concludes  that  “In  metaphysics  as  such  is  concealed  the  reason  why  Nietzsche  can  
indeed experience nihilism metaphysically as the history of value-positing, yet nevertheless cannot think 
the  essence  of  nihilism.”  WN, 93.  
 
70 James J. Winchester, Nietzsche’s  Aesthetic  Turn:  Reading  Nietzsche  After  Heidegger,  Deleuze,  
Derrida (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 40. For  Nietzsche,  art  is  “the  most  
important  way  in  which  a  being  is  made  into  a  being”  and  art  is  the  highest  gestalt of the will to power. 
N1, 154. Heidegger thought that, in Nietzsche, the essence of art, the will to power, constitutes the 
affirmation  of  Being  of  beings.  Central  to  Heidegger’s  project  of  overcoming  metaphysics  is  a  new  
understanding of time. He attributed to Zarathustra his own vision of time. Heidegger thought that his 
interpretation of the moment in Thus Spoke Zarathustra seems to be offered as a precursor to an authentic 
understanding of time as passage towards death, which would help prepare the way for an eventual 
overcoming of metaphysics thought.   
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“completion of the metaphysical nihilism.”71 For Heidegger, nihilism originates from “forgetting 
Being itself”72 in which the true meaning of beings, or beings in particular, is grounded. Being 
concerned solely about “beings in  particular” necessarily leads to nihilism. Forgetting Being 
itself eventually makes “beings in  particular”  meaningless. For Heidegger, it is not, strictly 
speaking, that nihilism takes place because beings suffer a loss of value. Therefore nihilism 
cannot be overcome by re-creating values for beings. Nihilism was the central problem of 
Nietzsche’s  philosophy.  He understood nihilism as the devaluation of the highest values,73 and 
proposed a radical revaluation as a means of overcoming of nihilism.74 Nietzsche said,  “Attempts 
to escape nihilism without revaluating our values so far: they produce the opposite, make the 
problem  more  acute.”
75 Nietzsche’s  desire  to  overcome  nihilism  and  his  revaluation  of  values  
mistakenly took human subjectivity itself as the source of nihilism. Heidegger points out that 
                                                 
71 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (New York: Routledge, 2002), 72. 
Cf.  Michel  Haar,  “Remarks  on  Heidegger’s  Reading  of  Nietzsche,”  pp.293ff.   
 
72 Vincent Vycinas, Earth and gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 5.  
 
73 Nietzsche  asks,  “What  does  nihilism  mean?”  and  he  answers  “That the highest values are 
losing their value.”  Then  he  adds,  “The  aim  is  lacking;;  “Why?”  finds  no  answer.”  Friedrich  Wilhelm  
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random 
House,  1968),  9.  Italics  original.  “Hence  we  can  grasp  Nietzsche’s  concept  of  nihilism  adequately  only  
when we know what Nietzsche understands by value. It is from here that we understand the 
pronouncement  of  God’s  absence.”  WN, 70. 
 
74 For Heidegger, this attempt to overcome nihilism by way of a willful revaluation worsens the 
situation.  “It  is  precisely  in  the  positing  of  new values from the will to power, by which and through 
which Nietzsche believes he will overcome nihilism, that nihilism proper first proclaims that there is 
nothing to Being itself,  which  has  now  become  a  value.”    N4, 203. 
 
75 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968), 28. 
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thinking  in  terms  of  “values”  involves  essentially  “the  viewpoint.”76 This causes Nietzsche to be 
trapped within the modern metaphysics of subjectivity which began with Descartes.77 Heidegger 
claims,  “Insofar  as  Nietzsche  experiences  nihilism  as  the  history  of  the  devaluation  of  the  highest  
values, and thinks of the overcoming of nihilism as a countermovement in the form of the 
revaluation  of  all  previous  values,”  Nietzsche’s  thought  is  itself fundamentally nihilistic.78 
Nietzsche’s revaluating of the lost traditional values is based on a self-certain subjective Will. 
With Nietzsche everything that exists becomes a willed, or created, value. As a result, even 
Being becomes something that is merely willed by Nietzsche. Being is reduced to a mere value 
among others. This is nihilism because in Nietzsche there is no true ontological foundation. 
Heidegger says that “[Nietzsche’s]  supposed  overcoming  is  above  all  the  consummation  of  
nihilism. For now metaphysics not only does not think Being itself,79 but this not-thinking of 
Being clothes itself in the illusion that it does think Being in the most exalted manner, in that it 
esteems  Being  as  a  value.”
80 Nietzsche’s  “overman”81 re-creates values to self-overcome82 
                                                 
76 N3, 198. 
 
77 The difference between Descartes and Nietzsche is that Descartes grounds truth in the self-
certainty of human consciousness, while Nietzsche grounds truth in the will to power of the overman. 
Heidegger  explains,  “That  Nietzsche posits the body in place of the soul and consciousness alters nothing 
in  the  fundamental  metaphysical  position  which  is  determined  by  Descartes.”  Nietzsche  merely  gives 
priority not to the soul and consciousness but to the body and its drives, or will to power. N4 133.  
 
78 N4, 200. 
 
79 This foundational insight and radical criticism regarding traditional metaphysics are 
emphasized by the early as well as by the later Heidegger. For example, see Identity and Difference 
published in 1957, in which the idea of ontological difference,  or  “the  ontico-ontological  difference,”   is 
submitted to powerful scrutiny.  
 
80 WN, 104. 
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nihilism caused by the loss of values of beings. It is in this doctrine of the overman that 
Heidegger locates the completion of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity. “Nietzsche never 
thought existentially,” says Heidegger,  “he thought metaphysically.”83 The overcoming of 
nihilism by re-creating values for beings through the shaping of the overman is at bottom a 
humanism,  indeed  the  last  phase  and  the  fulfillment  of  humanism  under  the  condition  of  God’s  
absence, where humans in the form of the overman become the center of all things and the 
absolute value. 
Nihilism reaches its culmination when metaphysics that has forgotten Being itself, the 
ultimate and the most fundamental meaning of existence, self-creates values of existing. The 
“essence  of  nihilism,”  according  to  Heidegger,  “is  the  history  in  which  there  is  nothing  to  Being 
itself.”84 Nietzsche  claims  that  the  “highest  concepts”  such  as  Being itself is nothing but a 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
81 Nietzsche  writes,  “I  teach  you  the  overman.  The  overman  is  the  meaning  of  the  earth.”  
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian Del Caro and Robert Pippin, trans. Adrian Del 
Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.  As  Bernard  Reginster  points  out,  “the  pursuit  of  
[overman] does not entail the negation of our earthly life, but on the contrary permits to affirm it. And this 
ideal  is  an  ideal  of  “overcoming.””  Bernard  Reginster,  The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche On Overcoming 
Nihilism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 250. “This  [overman]  means,  in  the  first  place,  the  
man  who  surpasses  Platonism.”  Daniel  Chapelle,  Nietzsche and Psychoanalysis (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1993), 66.  
 
82 Nietzsche  frequently  discusses  “self-overcoming”  in  his  works  of  1887-88. See, for example, 
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Random 
House, 1974), sec.357; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, trans. William A. 
Hausemann, vol. 10 of The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Alexander Tille (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1897), 87, 224; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, “Ecce  Homo,”  in  Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 
trans. and ed. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 2000), 784. 
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“fume.”
85 He  thinks  that  “Heraclitus  will  always  be  right  in  this  that  being  is  an  empty  fiction.”86 
Thus according to Nietzsche, what is needed to overcome nihilism is not a reopening of the 
question  of  being,  but  a  “will  to  power”  strong  enough  to  posit  its  own  “new  values.”
87 
Heidegger  describes  nihilism  as  “the  stagnation  of  our  awareness of Being itself in an 
anthropocentric table of values.”88 Heidegger’s analysis of Being itself overcoming nihilism 
begins with the thought  that Being matters, in contrast to the feeling of nihilistic despair that 
“nothing  matters.” Likewise, Heidegger’s meditation on nihilism becomes a philosophical 
turning point. In Heidegger’s form, therefore, existentialism can still be optimistic.89  
                                                 
85 “[T]hey should not occur at all! – the  “highest  notions,”  that  is,  the  most  general,  the  emptiest  
notions,  the  last  fume  of  evaporating  reality.”  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, 
trans. Thomas Common, vol. 11 of The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Alexander Tille (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1897), 117.  
 
86 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, trans. Thomas Common, vol. 11 of The 
Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Alexander Tille (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897), 116. 
 
87 Nietzsche  identifies  the  will  to  power  as  characteristic  of  modern  person’s  thinking  and  acting.  
Tillich  understood  the  Nietzschean  will  to  power  as  a  rejection  of  Schopenhauer’s  buddhistic  resignation.  
It distressed Tillich that Nietzsche was so frequently misunderstood and misinterpreted. Tillich attempted 
several  times,  as  did  Heidegger,  to  correct  the  erroneous,  prevailing  interpretations  of  Nietzsche’s  concept  
of will to power, showing it to be much more profound than the popular concept that many scholars had 
associated  with  the  rise  of  Nazism.  For  Nietzsche,  Tillich  insists,  “power  is  the  self-affirmation of being. 
Will  to  power  means  power  to  affirm  one’s  power  of  living,  the  will  to  affirm  one’s  own  individual  
existence.”  P  198-207; CTB 24-31. Tillich has pointed out that Nietzsche proclaimed the absence of God 
but  reclaimed  God  as  “creative  life.”  Nietzsche  challenged  whatever  opposed  life.  NBS  307-9. 
 
88 F.  Ruth  Irwin,  “Heidegger  and  Nietzsche,”  in  Heidegger, Education, and Modernity, ed.  
Michael A. Peters (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 192. 
 
89 Michael Gelven, a well known writer of commentary on Heidegger, thinks that the threat of 
nihilism is profoundly answered by Heidegger. He says, “It is difficult to understand why so many 
contemporary theorists….should make the outrageous claim that Heidegger espouses nihilism, or that his 
thinking “leads” to nihilism.” Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, rev. ed. 
(Dekalb, IL.: Nothern Illinois University Press, 1989), 13. 
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The valuable can be valuable when it is meaningful. Nietzsche is correct when he use the 
terms  “meaningless”  and  “valueless”  interchangeably. No value can be independent of a valuing 
consciousness. This means that there is no necessary value. For the nihilist, everything is 
necessarily valueless. Nothing is meaningful. Fundamentally, nihilism is the problem of 
meaninglessness of existing itself.  Creating new value vis-à-vis nihilism is the last resort of the 
anti-nihilist. In  Heidegger’s  view,  the powerless anti-nihilistic metaphysics cannot go farther, or 
worse,  than  this.  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  is  the  culmination  of problematic metaphysics that 
dissolves itself meaninglessly into nihilism. The attempt to overcome nihilism should start by 
examining  the  meaning  of  the  “meaninglessness  of  existing.”  But  to  understand  such  
meaninglessness, one must first know the meaning of existing itself. Therefore, the first step 
towards a remedy for nihilism should begin by answering the question of existing itself, or Being 
itself. But the question of Being itself is not the question of existing things. 
 
 
Overcoming Metaphysics 
 
Metaphysics molds our sense of what it means for something to be. Metaphysical 
thinking in the West takes place within the difference between Being and beings,90 an 
“ontological  difference,”  and  nihilism  begins  with  “the  metaphysical  forgetfulness  of  Being.”
91 
                                                 
90 OCM, 51. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Beginning of Philosophy, trans. Rod Coltman (New 
York: Continuum, 1998), 123.  
 
91 Dominique Janicaud and Jean-François Mattéi, Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought, 
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The forgetfulness of Being itself is the forgetfulness of the ontological difference. The 
ontological difference between Being itself, or being as such, and beings in particular can be 
explained  as  a  difference  between  “what  sort  of  thing  an  entity  is”  and “their  [entities’]  manners  
of  being.”  Heidegger’s  assertion  on  this  obvious  distinction  is  intended  “to  raise  the  question  of  
what  it  means  for  something  to  exist,”
92 the most fundamental question about existence. 
Heidegger stresses that nihilism is the outcome  of  the  withdrawal  or  “default”  of  Being itself at 
the origin of all Western metaphysics.93 From the very beginning of the Western history, Being 
itself was left unthought.94 The question of Being itself was forgotten and withdrew into the 
background, and beings in particular take precedence as the already presupposed object of 
metaphysical inquiry. Being itself was conceived not as it is in itself, but as an a priori cause, 
which means that Being itself was thought as a being, a supreme being as the first cause, behind 
which there is utter emptiness. Heidegger  laments  that  “Metaphysics  does  not  ask  about  the  truth  
of Being itself.”95 In the introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger announces his project as 
                                                 
92 Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s  Concept  of  Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), xxii-xxiii. 
 
93 Gregory Bruce Smith, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 231. 
 
94 WCT, 103. 
 
95 LH, 246/GA9, 154. 
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overcoming the ontotheological metaphysics,96 which has thus far provided an understanding of 
what and how entities are. In  Heidegger’s  “history  of  being,”  Plato  is  the  first  ontotheologist,  and  
Nietzsche is the last.97 The problem of ontotheology is the confusion of Being itself with Highest 
Being which, disguised  as  the  “grounding  ground,”98 “all-founding  entity,”99 and so on, is as a 
matter of fact a being among beings in particular. Since Aristotle, a science of being as such 
needed to posit Highest Being, or God, though not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. With 
this, ontology becomes theology, or, as Heidegger puts it, “ontotheologic”100 in its very nature. 
The history of this confusion precedes Christian theology. Many things played the role of 
Highest Being under the direction of various philosophers. Nietzsche’s  Highest  Being  was  the  
                                                 
96 Heidegger  says,  “The  thinking  attempted  in  Being and Time (1927) sets out on the way to 
prepare  an  overcoming  of  metaphysics”  which  is  ontotheological. IWIM 279. “We  understand  this task as 
one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of 
ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determining the nature of Being – the  ways  which  have  guided  us  ever  since.”  BT  44/SZ  22.  Heidegger’s  
emphasis.  
  
97 Iain  Thomson,  “Ontotheology,”  in  Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays, ed. Daniel O. 
Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 113. 
 
98 OCM, 58. 
 
99 Iain Donald Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and Politics of Education 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15. 
 
100 OCM, 59. 
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will to power in its eternal recurrence.101 The human subject now plays the role of Highest Being 
in science and technology as the metaphysics of modernity. In Being and Time, as noted above, 
“overcoming”  was  originally  called  “destruction.”
102 But what Heidegger exactly meant by the 
word, as he later explained, was  “deconstruction.”103 The metaphysics that is to be overcome in 
order  for  nihilism  to  be  overcome  is  only  a  problematic  ontotheological  metaphysics.  “Wherein  
does the overcoming of nihilism then consist? In the getting over [Verwindung] of 
metaphysics.”
104 The  problematic  metaphysics  is  a  metaphysics  that  “does  not  recall  Being 
itself.”105 Heidegger has never intended to destroy or eliminate metaphysics as such. He says 
instead,  “Metaphysics  remains  what  comes  first  in  philosophy….We  can  no  longer  accept  the  
claim  of  metaphysics  to  preside  over  our  fundamental  relation  to  “Being”  or  to  decisively  
                                                 
101 From  Heidegger’s  perspective,  Nietzsche’s  will  to  power  is  not  a  mental  capacity  but  rather  
the  “innermost  essence  of  Being.”  WN,  79.  Heidegger  finds  in  Aristotle  the  origin  of  Nietzsche’s  concept  
of  the  will  to  power  as  a  metaphysical  principle.  “No  matter  how  decisively  the  interpretation  of  being  as  
will  to  power  remains  Nietzsche’s  own,  and  no  matter  how  little  Nietzsche explicitly knew in what 
historical context the very concept of power as a determination of being stood, it is certain that with this 
interpretation of the being of beings Nietzsche advances into the innermost yet broadest circle of western 
thought….For Nietzsche power means all this at once: dynamis, energeia, entelecheia….Although  
Nietzsche does not appreciate the concealed and vital connection between his concept of power, as a 
concept  of  being,  and  Aristotle’s  doctrine….we  may  say  that  the  Aristotelian doctrine has more to do with 
Nietzsche’s  doctrine  of  will  to  power  than  with  any  doctrine  of  categories  and  modalities  in  academic  
philosophy.”    N1, 63-5. Heidegger interprets will to power and eternal recurrence of the same as the 
traditional metaphysical elements of essence and existence. N4, 237.  
 
102 Heidegger  later  noted  that  the  term  “destruction”  had  lent  itself  to  a  misunderstanding  “of  
insuperable  grotesqueness.”  OQB, 315/GA9, 244.  
 
103 “I  do  not  say….that  alleged  demolition…a  destruction….has  no other intent than to reattain 
the originary experiences of being belonging to metaphysics by deconstructing [Abbau] representations 
that  have  become  commonplace  and  empty.”  OQB, 315/GA9, 244-5. 
 
104 OQB, 313. 
 
105 IWIM, 278. 
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determine  every  relation  to  beings  as  such.  But  this  “overcoming  of  metaphysics”  does  not  
abolish metaphysics. Overcoming  means  “inquiring  first  into  the  truth of be-ing – into that which 
in metaphysics never became a question – and  never  could.”106 Overcoming is transforming. As 
long as man remains the animal rationale, he is the animal metaphysicum….if  our  thinking  
should succeed in its efforts to go back into the ground of metaphysics, it might well help to 
bring about a change in the human essence, a change accompanied by a transformation of 
metaphysics.”
107 
The guiding light of the early Heidegger’s  pathway  of  thought  is  the  question  of Being 
itself that arises from the thinking of the ontological difference between Being itself and beings 
in particular. Heidegger calls attention to the fact that the traditional ontological metaphysics 
takes for granted the meaning of Being itself, and that the history of the ontological questioning 
has been a history of the problem of the Highest Being. The history of the traditional 
metaphysics has been preoccupied with an attempt to show what this Highest Being is and to 
prove that this Highest Being is. The history of this attempt has been nourished by the error of 
the metaphysical interpretation of Being itself. But for Heidegger all that is worthy of thought 
about Being itself is hidden behind the pseudo ontological difference made between the Highest 
Being and beings in particular. What is hidden is Being itself, not Highest Being. He presents a 
new notion of Being itself by indicating  that  which  remains  “unsaid,  unthought, unquestioned”  in  
                                                 
106 CTP, 128/GA65, 182. Heidegger’s  emphasis. 
 
107 IWIM, 279. 
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all metaphysics.108 Being itself is not itself in the same way as a particular being is, or even as a 
Highest Being is. It is not a being. But the event of the ontological difference does not mean a 
splitting apart of Being itself and beings in particular. Being itself, or being as such, becomes 
manifest to the thinker only in and through particular beings. The concept of the ontological 
difference is a thought of Being itself with beings in particular. This new understanding of Being 
itself is something quite different from the ambiguity of that meaning of being as such that has 
been taken for granted by traditional metaphysics. In the traditional metaphysics, an ontological 
difference was made erroneously between God, or Highest Being conceived as the ontological 
ground of all beings in particular and  of  itself  (“causa sui,”109 or “ens increatum”110), and beings 
in particular. The difference was made between the highest being and other beings. “Metaphysics  
thinks of the Being of beings both [ontologically] in [terms of] the ground-giving unity of what is 
most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also [theologically] in [terms of] the 
unity of the all that accounts for the ground, that is, of the All-Highest.”111 Metaphysics as 
ontotheology forgets Being itself because of its mistakenly taken-for-granted ontological 
difference between the highest being as God and the rest of beings. For Heidegger, the God of 
the traditional metaphysics is a consequence of the hidden transcending of being human. This 
reduction of the divine to the God of philosophy is the consequence of the ontotheological 
                                                 
108 KTB, 362/GA9, 307. 
 
109 OCM, 60. 
 
110 BT, 46/SZ, 24.  
 
111 OCM, 58. 
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structure Heidegger discovers at the core of the entire tradition of Western metaphysics. For 
Heidegger,  “God as thought in metaphysics is not the God of faith, but a consequence of the way 
metaphysics thinks transcendence.”112 God as given in metaphysics is nothing other than a 
projected  and  transcendent  “I.”  “Nihilism  proclaims  this  “I”  dead.”
113 Therefore, the spoken 
declaration  of  God’s  absence  declares  only the absence of the God of metaphysics, not the God 
of faith.114  
 
Overcoming Religious Nihilism 
 
Paul Tillich, commenting on Barth’s The Epistle to the Romans,  wrote  that  “the  
extraordinary  effect  that  Barth’s  book  has is  summed  up  in  the  words  of  one  pastor:  “it  is  now 
possible  to  preach  again!””115 But Barth was an “epistemological nihilist”116 who rejected 
knowledge, which could function independently of faith, as a means to truth. He believed that we 
                                                 
112 Laurence  Paul  Hemming,  “Nihilism:  Heidegger  and  the  Grounds  of  Redemption,”  in  Radical 
Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 96.  
 
113 Laurence  Paul  Hemming,  “Nihilism:  Heidegger  and  the  Grounds  of  Redemption,”  in  Radical 
Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: 
Routledge, 1999), 102. 
 
114 Alfred Denker, Historical  Dictionary  of  Heidegger’s  Philosophy (Lanham, MD.: Scarecrow 
Press, 2000, 124. 
 
115 Karen Leslie Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to 
Meaninglessness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 60. 
 
116 Ronald E. Martin, American Literature and the Destruction of Knowledge: Innovative Writing 
in the Age of Epistemology (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), xxiii. 
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were completely isolated and shut off from God and from truth, and he knew that the theological 
recognition of this fact led to existential nihilism. But for Barth such nihilism is not the end result 
of theological inquiry, but rather, in an important sense, its point of departure as an essential part 
of faith. Barth deepens the epistemological nihilism, which has become endemic to life in 
postmodernity, in order to give a religious interpretation, so that it may culminate in faith. For 
Barth, says Karen Leslie Carr, genuine faith is only possible within the context of nihilism.117 
But  for  Tillich,  Barth’s  way  of  overcoming  nihilism  resembles  the Nietzschean way of self-
overcoming nihilism. Faith that overcomes epistemological nihilism is a value-laden 
phenomenon. That is, faith overcoming nihilism is generated by that which is valuable, or God. 
Neo-orthodoxy is the return of the orthodoxy that takes it for granted that its apology makes 
sense in a meaningful way. The idea of absolute, or supreme, value that sustains the Christian 
faith of both orthodox and neo-orthodox traditions violates  “the  correct  and  indispensable  first  
principle of the neo-orthodox  movement  that  “God  is  in  heaven  and  man  is  on  earth.””118 
Theology, whether orthodox or neo-orthodox, cannot ascribe value to God. Tillich points out that 
“the  attempt  of  neo-orthodox theologians to escape this mark of finitude [of theology] is a 
symptom of that religious arrogance against which these very same [neo-orthodox] theologians 
are  fighting.”
119 If God does not ground our faith upon the valuable, then nihilism threatens to 
                                                 
117 Karen Leslie Carr, The Banalization of Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to 
Meaninglessness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 76. 
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overwhelm our  faith.  This  undeniable  reality  compelled  Tillich  to  speak,  alternatively,  of  a  “God  
above the God of theism.”120 
The  God  of  the  old  theology  cannot  be  the  answer  to  “the  question  of  the  ultimate  
meaning  of  existence,”
121 which leads to the question of Being itself. Tillich argues that theology 
must  be  an  “answering  theology”
122 that ultimately answers this question. Religious nihilism is 
the  “existential  situation”
123 of the human being ontologically estranged from God, without the 
answer to the question of the ultimate meaning of existence. For Tillich, therefore, the 
estrangement  to  be  overcome  is  “estrangement  from  Being itself.”124 Both Heidegger and Tillich 
worked out a post-theistic interpretation of Christian faith and attempted to overcome nihilism by 
answering to the question of Being itself. In order to overcome the religious nihilism by way of 
answering the question of the ultimate meaning of existence, however, the question must first be 
asked rightly concerning the ultimate meaning of existence. A right question about the ultimate 
meaning of existence can be raised when the ultimate meaning of existence is analyzed in a right 
way. For Tillich, existential philosophy was a means to analyze the ultimate meaning of 
existence and raise questions about it in the right way. For this reason, “each part of his 
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124 Richard Grigg, Symbol  and  Empowerment:  Paul  Tillich’s  Post-Theistic System (Macon, GA.: 
Mercer University Press, 1985), 74n41. 
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theological system begins with an extensive existential analysis, systematically penetrating to an 
understanding of the structures of our existence.”125  
The  uniqueness  of  Tillich’s  systematic  understanding lies in the distinctiveness of its 
existential foundation. Efforts to continue the use of an ontological grammar after a rejection of a 
metaphysics of theism are observed  in  Tillich’s  project  of  “transcending theism” through an 
appeal to the God above God.126 Although Tillich recommends that we be done with the 
categories of theistic metaphysics, in his three-volume Systematic Theology he still finds a utility 
in  the  resources  of  ontology  for  speaking  about  the  God  above  God  as  “Being-Itself,”  “the  
Ground  of  Being,  “  and  “the  Power  of  being.”  To  be  sure,  there  is  more  than  the  Heideggerian  
influence that provides the background for  Tillich’s  Systematic Theology. Tillich draws deeply 
on the works of many theologians and philosophers, including the theological traditions of 
Augustine, Jacob Boehme, Meister Eckhart and Martin Luther, together with recurring 
references to the philosophical contributions of Kant, Hegel and Schelling. But Heidegger’s  
project of fundamental ontology was of the greatest single influence on Tillich’s  semantics, 
categories, metaphorical language, and theological symbols.  
                                                 
125 Walter  Leibrecht,  “The  Life  and  Mind  of  Paul  Tillich,”  in  Religion and Culture: Essays in 
Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht (New York: Ayer, 1972), 26. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TILLICH’S  ENCOUNTER  WITH HEIDEGGER 
 
In the spring of 1924, Tillich accepted a position as associate professor of theology at the 
University of Marburg, in order to replace the theologian Rudolf Otto. The meeting of the two 
thinkers has been widely discussed. What has not really been discussed, however, is the 
philosophical and theological milieu in which this meeting took place. This is understandable 
because the work of the two thinkers moved to a level that seemed to leave no place for historical 
reflection or for reflection of a specifically philosophico-theological sort. 
  
Preparation 
 
 
When the existentialist thinking became a major impact on European thought, its 
introduction into the sphere of religious thought could easily be expected, especially since there 
are elements in existentialist thought which are capable of removing the gap between religious 
thought and itself. The existentialist themes of estrangement and authentic existence could hardly 
fail to attract the attention of religious thinkers because in connection with them the existentialist 
analysis of the human existence has emphasized such uncomfortable and threatening experiences 
as anxiety, despair, and death. Schelling, an early nineteenth-century idealist, was the first 
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dominant  influence  on  Tillich’s  philosophical  development.
1 It should be recalled here that 
Schelling is the one who coined  the  term  “existential  philosophy  (Existentialphilosophie)” to 
designate his later philosophy.2 The  most  significant  aspect  of  Schelling’s  thought  that  Tillich  
emphasizes in his interpretation of his late philosophy and which was so clearly absorbed into 
the foundations of  Tillich’s  own  thought  is his philosophical theology,3 or his philosophical 
solution to the problem of religious nihilism. Tillich’s  analysis of  Schelling’s  intellectual  
development and the centrality of religion in his philosophy was not very well accepted as 
compared to other philosophical interpretations of Schelling. But there are its supporters.4 As 
Russell Re Manning sums up, “the identification of the philosophical absolute with God,” “the 
religious fulfillment of creation and history,” and “the continuity between myth and revelation” 
are  major  ways  in  which  Tillich’s  view of Schelling stresses the theological aspect of  Schelling’s  
                                                 
1 Tillich  states  that  “what  I  learned  from  Schelling  became  determinative of my own 
philosophical  and  theological  development.”  P, 142. 
 
2 Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary (New York: 
Doubleday,  1965),  180.  Tillich  notes,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  “Existential    thinker”  is  Kierkegaard’s  
coined term. EP 88-9. 
 
3 By contrast, Andrew Bowie, one of the most prominent interpreters of Schelling, denies that 
theological  necessity  of  Schelling’s  late  philosophy.  He admits  that  “the  project  of  Schelling’s  later  
philosophy is to make Christianity into a philosophically viable religion.”  But, he continues, “it  would,  
however, be invidious in a philosophical account of his work to focus primarily on this question, given 
the  complexity  of  the  issues  involved.”  Andrew  Bowie,  Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An 
Introduction (London: Routledge, 1993), 141.  
 
4 See in particular, Robert F. Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influence of Boehme 
on the Works of 1809-1815 (Lewisburg, PA.: Bucknell University Press, 1977); Werner Marx, The 
Philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling: History, System, and Freedom (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1984). 
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philosophy.5 It  is  well  known  that  there  are  at  least  two  periods  in  Schelling’s  philosophical  
career and it is work of the later more theological, period  (“Schelling  II”6) which influenced 
Tillich’s  philosophical  and  theological  system-building.7 Much of his later philosophy is 
concerned with the attempt to turn Christianity into a philosophically viable religion.8 Tillich 
says  that  “I  had  found  the union of theology and philosophy in the philosophical explanation of 
the  Christian  doctrine  through  the  older  Schelling.”
9 Tillich  regards  the  philosophy  of  Schelling’s  
second period as being the decisive break with Hegelian idealism and the beginning of modern 
existentialism10 which “represents a revival of the existentialist elements of earlier thought in 
                                                 
5 Russell Re Manning, Theology  at  the  End  of  Culture:  Paul  Tillich’s  Theology  of  Culture  and  
Art (Leuven: Peeters Publishers: 2005), 84. 
 
6 ST1, 165. 
 
7 Schelling’s  reputation  as  an  idealist  had  been  firmly  established  on  the  basis  of  his  earlier  
publications.  This  account  of  Schelling’s  position  in  the  history  of  philosophy  began  to  change  in  the  
early decades of the twentieth century, as the voluminous works of his post-Hegelian philosophy began to 
be published and studied by subsequent generations after his death. Schelling scholars have not been able 
to  reach  a  consensus  on  when  his  “later”  philosophy  begins.  “Some  think….that  Schelling  published his 
drafts, thus creating a situation in which each new book makes a new period in his ephemeral 
thought….Others  see  substantial  lines  of  continuity  in  all  of  Schelling’s  thought.  They  replace  strict  
periodizations with accounts of the development  of  earlier  notions  in  his  later  works.”  Jerry  Day,  
Voegelin, Schelling, and the Philosophy of Historical Existence (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
2003), 7n10. 
 
8 Kierkegaard who heard Schelling’s lectures in Berlin in 1841-2 thought he was hopeless. In a 
letter to his close friend, Emil Boesen, dated 6 February 1842, Kierkegaard writes, “I  have  completely  
given up on Schelling. I merely listen to him, write nothing down either there or at home.”  Søren 
Kierkegaard, Letters and Documents, trans. Henrik Rosenmeier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978), 138. 
 
9 “Here  [Schelling’s  second  period]  lies  the  philosophically  decisive  break  with  Hegel,  and  the  
beginning  of  that  movement  which  today  is  called  existentialism.”  IH, 35.  
 
10 AR, 11; EP, 76-7.  
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Plato, in the Bible, in Augustine, Duns Scotus, Jacob Boehme, etc.”11 He  writes,  “This  appeal  to  
“Existence”  emerged  just  a  hundred  years  ago  in  the  decade from 1840 to 1850. During the 
winter of 1841-42 Schelling delivered his lectures on Die Philosophe der Mythologie und der 
Offenbarung in the University of Berlin before a distinguished audience including Engels, 
Kierkegaard…”
12 Tillich did his postgraduate research on the writings of Schelling. In 1910 
Tillich wrote his first dissertation on Schelling and submitted it to the University of Breslau to 
obtain his doctorate in philosophy.13 Two years later he wrote another thesis on Schelling.14 His 
second Schelling dissertation awarded him the Licentiate in theology which was the highest 
theological degree that could be earned in Germany.15 This  detailed  knowledge  of  Schelling’s  
later work, together with his knowledge of Kierkegaard and his dependence on the philosophy of 
                                                 
11 IH, 540.  
 
12 EP, 77. 
 
13 Its English text was published under the tile of The Construction of the History of Religion in 
Schelling’s  Positive  Philosophy:  Its  Presuppositions  and  Principles, trans. Victor Nuovo (Lewisburg, 
PA.: Bucknell University Press, 1974). The dissertation was originally intended as a criticism of 
Troeltsch’s  theory  of  absoluteness  of  Christianity.  Nevertheless, Tillich expresses his thanks to Troeltsch 
for  “the  influence  his  work  has  had  upon  the  spiritual  foundations”  of  his  first major publication, which he 
significantly  dedicated  to  Troeltsch  when  he  died  in  1923.  In  its  preface,  Tillich  confesses  that  “It  was  his  
passionate  aspiration  to  arrive  at  a  system.”  SS  18.  The  German  original  of  The System of the Sciences, 
was first published in 1923; it was reprinted in the first volume of Gesammelte Werke.  
 
14 Its English text was published under the title of Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in 
Schelling’s  Philosophical  Development, trans. Victor Nuovo (Lewisburg, PA.: Bucknell University Press, 
1974). 
 
15 Mark  Kline  Taylor,  “Introduction:  The  Theological  Development  and  Contribution  of  Paul  
Tillich (1886-1965),”  in  Paul Tillich: The Theologian of the Boundaries, ed. Mark Kline Taylor (London: 
Collins, 1987), 53. 
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life movement,16 had prepared Tillich to accept existential philosophy. It is not without 
significance for Tillich that Heidegger lectured on Schelling. According to Heidegger, he 
developed  a  “growing  interest”  in  Schelling in the years between 1910 and 1914.17 He offered 
his first seminar  on  Schelling’s  essay,  “Philosophical Investigations on the Essence of Human 
Freedom,”  in  1927-8. Heidegger  judged  Schelling’s  treatise  on  the  essence  of  human  freedom  to  
be  his  “greatest  accomplishment  and  at  the same time was one of the most profound works of 
German,  thus  of  Western  philosophy.”
18 Heidegger  saw  in  Schelling  that  “a  new  essential  
impulse  enters  into  philosophy’s  basic  question  of  being.”
19 Although Heidegger worked on 
Schelling lather than Tillich, Heidegger’s  engagement  with  Schelling  must  have  granted  Tillich  a  
closer affinity with Heidegger.  
                                                 
16 Tillich understood  his  own  work  to  be  related  to,  although  by  no  means  identical  with,  the  “life  
philosophy”  inspired  by  Henri  Bergson.  Thomas  G.  Bandy  points  out,  however,  that  Tillich’s  appreciation  
of Bergson comes only at the point of his own preoccupation with the concept  of  participation,  “the  
mutual  participation  of  the  infinite  and  the  finite.”  Thus  “Tillich’s  criticisms  of  Bergson  came  precisely  at  
the  points  where  his  own  developing  concept  of  participation  departed  from  Bergson’s  thought.”  Thomas  
G.  Bandy,  “Tillich’s  Limited  Understanding  of  the  Thought  of  Henri  Bergson  as  “Life  Philosophy,”  in  
Theonomy  and  Autonomy:  Studies  in  Paul  Tillich’s  Engagement  with  Modern  Culture, ed. John J. Carey 
(Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1984), 4. 
 
17 GA1, 56. 
 
18 ST, 2. But Heidegger later criticizes Schelling for falling prey to the ontological tendencies and 
subordinating the question of being to a conception of a supreme being as an absolute subjectivity. GA28, 
90-122.  As Dahlstrom observes, Heidegger no longer offered a lecture on Schelling after 1945. 67. 
Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger  and  German  Idealism,”  in A Companion to Heidegger, ed. Hubert L. 
Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 67. 
 
19 GA42, 147. 
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Tillich  remarks,  “The  World  War  in  my  own  experience  was  the  catastrophe  of  idealistic  
thinking  in  general.”
20 Tillich longed for a real religion vis-à-vis religious nihilism, beyond a 
mere possibility of religion, and he worked on securing the philosophical viability of theology 
that explains true religion. He thought that for a theology to be true and real, it had to speak to 
the existential realities of estrangement, despair, and death. Tillich develops his concept of true 
theology as “theonomous philosophy,”21 the  ultimate  task  of  which  is  “the  making  visible  of  the  
inner transcendence of Being itself.”22 Tillich was in this regard attracted to several aspects of 
Schelling’s  philosophy, particularly his distinction between negative and positive types of 
philosophy. Put simply, “whereas negative philosophy, or the rationalist philosophy of pure 
reason, is aprioristic and deductive, positive philosophy is aposterioristic and empirical.”23 
Negative philosophy is so named in that it negates particular, subjective differences of 
experience “in order to understand the a priori nature of the mind common to all human beings 
as such.”24 In agreement with Kant, Schelling admits that the whole world lies in the nets of the 
understanding or of reason. But Schelling perceives a fundamental limitation in this type of 
thinking.  “There  is  obviously  something  other  and  something  more than mere reason in the 
                                                 
20 IH, 35. 
 
21 As early as in 1923, Tillich described  and  explained  his  concept  of  theology  as  “theonomous  
philosophy”  or  “theonomous  metaphysics.”  SS, 204, 210.  
 
22 CI, 233. 
 
23 CHR, 64. 
 
24 Jerry Day, Voegelin, Schelling, and the Philosophy of Historical Existence (Columbia, MO.: 
University of Missouri Press, 2003), 128.  
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world, indeed there is something  which  strives  beyond  these  barriers.”  A  negative  philosophy  
does  not  explain  “how exactly  [reason]  got  into  those  nets.”25 A different aspect of philosophy is 
needed to account for the meaning of perceived structures in reality. Positive philosophy 
presupposes the truth of essence in order to understand particular things and events as true 
appearances of it. In  short,  “what  positive  philosophy  “wants”  is  to  understand  how  finite  things  
can  be  true  appearances  of  the  infinite  All.”
26 Experience is the only means of proof in positive 
philosophy. It was Kant, according to Schelling, who unwittingly prepared the way for a clear 
distinction between the two types of philosophy specifically in his critique of metaphysics, but 
he criticizes Kant for extending what he had proved only for his epistemological argument to 
philosophy  in  general,  thereby  “tacitly”  assuming  that  “there  is  no  other  philosophy  than  the  pure  
rational  philosophy”  employed  by  the  former  metaphysics  and  his  own  negative  philosophy.27 
Kant claimed the end of metaphysics by his demonstration that the concepts of the understanding 
are not applicable to the supersensuous realm. Schelling countered that if that is the case, the 
supersensuous realm could not only not be known, it could not be thought. Kant had fallen into a 
contradiction. In his Philosophy of Nature (1797) Schelling attempted to demonstrate the 
                                                 
25 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, vol. 10 of 
Sämmtliche Werke (Stuttgart:  J.  S.  Cotta’scher,  1861),143-44.  
 
26 Jerry Day, Voegelin, Schelling, and the Philosophy of Historical Existence (Columbia, MO.: 
University of Missouri Press, 2003), 129.  
 
27 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin 
Lectures, trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 81. 
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possibility of the existence of the outside world.28  For Schelling only the positive philosophy 
can produce understanding of religion and this is done by means of its elevating a philosophy of 
mythology and of revelation. He  suggests  that  “it is with the transition to positive philosophy that 
we  first  enter  the  sphere  of  religion.”
29 In other words, the distinction between positive and 
negative philosophy means a distinction between a philosophy that is truly religious and one that 
does not make room for religion. Schelling’s  understanding  of  a  true  religion  is  given  in  the 
exposition of the nature of religion in his Philosophy of Revelation (1841-2), which makes a 
distinction between two types of religion, scientific and unscientific. “Scientific religion” is an 
entirely rational religion manifesting the original unity of the intellect and the object, and as such 
is completely ideal and unhistorical. Elsewhere Schelling says that it is not religion at all.30 
“Unscientific religion,” on the other hand, is so thoroughly “historical” a phenomenon that is 
based on a pre-rational consciousness of God.31 For Schelling, unscientific religion is the true 
religion. In his lecture “The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,”  Tillich  furthers  Schelling’s  
distinction between the two types of religion and illustrates  an  “ontological  type”  of  philosophy  
                                                 
28 The ultimate solution is found in the absolute identity of mind in us and nature outside us, 
which  is  reflected  in  Tillich’s  “question  of  an  underlying  unity  of  subjective  and  objective  reason.”  ST1, 
76. 
 
29 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Sämmtliche 
Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1859), 5:750.   
 
30 Paul Tillich, The  Construction  of  the  History  of  Religion  in  Schelling’s  Positive  Philosophy:  Its  
Presuppositions and Principles, trans. Victor Nuovo (Lewisburg, PA.: Bucknell University Press, 1974), 
21. 
 
31 John  Heywood  Thomas,  “J.  G.  Fichte  and  F.  W.  J.  Schelling,”  in  Nineteenth-Century Religious 
Thought in the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1:67. 
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of  religion  as  that  which  explains  Schelling’s  unscientific,  true religion.32 Tillich contrasts an 
“ontological  type”  of  philosophy  of  religion  in  which  humankind’s  estrangement  from  self,  
world, and God was  overcome,  and  a  “cosmological  type”  in which God was confronted as 
essentially different from oneself. 
“Schelling’s  positive  philosophy  is  an  attempt  to  think  philosophically  about  the  divine  
activity in myth and revelation.”33 In a sense, what is positive is the divine.34 Schelling reflects, 
“At the end of negative philosophy I have only possible and not actual religions, religion only 
“within  the  limits  of  bare  reason.””  The  real  religion  is  a  religion  that  satisfies  the  longing  for the 
real God and for redemption through the real God. The real God cannot be a mere logical 
postulate as in Kant. But this is not the end of the relationship between philosophy and religion. 
For Schelling, the resolution lay in the combination of negative and positive philosophy.  “Any  
philosophy which does not remain grounded in the negative but tires to reach what is positive, 
the divine, immediately and without that negative foundation, will inevitably end up dying of 
spiritual  impoverishment.”
35 Positive philosophy is not meant to replace, but to supplement and 
ground negative philosophy, which, in its turn, helps understand positive philosophy. Schelling 
notes that when positive philosophy joins negative philosophy, the latter is not changed in any 
                                                 
32 TT, 10-29. 
 
33 Jerome  Arthur  Stone,  “Tillich  and  Schelling’s  Later  Philosophy,”  in  Kairos and Logos: Studies 
in  the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, GA.: Mercer University 
Press, 1984), 17; John Heywood Thomas, Tillich (London: Continuum, 2000), 29. 
 
34 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Sämmtliche 
Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1859), 10:76.  
 
35 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Sämmtliche 
Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1859), 5:246.  
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way,  “on  the  contrary,  by  this  it  finds  itself  grounded  for  the  first  time  in  its  true  essence.” 
Positive philosophy is a philosophy which gives an account of what lies beyond philosophy but 
which comes to philosophy for its comprehension.36 Schelling argues that “Without 
philosophical religion it is impossible to comprehend the real religions – mythological and 
revealed – or to interpret and give  an  account  of  them.”37 It is not very difficult to  see  in  Tillich’s  
notion of a theonomous philosophy a parallel  to  Schelling’s  positive philosophy which unities 
the autonomy of reason with an ultimate concern for the divine Ground and activity. Tillich 
confesses  that  “I  find  more  “theonomous  philosophy”  in  Schelling  than  in  any  of  the  other  
idealists.”
38 His enthusiasm for Schelling drew him to Heidegger when both were at Marburg in 
1925. For Tillich regarded Heidegger’s  work  as  “theonomous  philosophy”  which unintentionally 
establishes a doctrine of man which is both the doctrine of human freedom and human finitude, 
and which is closely related to the Christian interpretation of human existence. Tillich knew that 
Schelling’s  program  for the unification of philosophy remained incomplete, for Schelling did not 
rewrite a negative philosophy from the positive philosophical point of view.39 For Tillich, the 
                                                 
 
36 Jerome  Arthur  Stone,  “Tillich  and  Schelling’s  Later  Philosophy,”  in  Kairos and Logos: Studies 
in  the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, GA.: Mercer University 
Press, 1984), 29. 
 
37 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Sämmtliche 
Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1859), 5:750.  
 
38 IH, 35. 
 
39 “The  result  is  that  Schelling’s  own  “negative  philosophy”  comes  to  mean  his  own  earlier  
philosophy  of  identity  and  “positive  philosophy”  the  larger  fragments  published  posthumously  as  his  late  
philosophy.”  Vincent  A.  McCarthy,  Quest for a Philosophical Jesus: Christianity and Philosophy in 
Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Schelling (Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1986), 186. 
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philosophy of Heidegger better  serves  to  the  need  to  satisfy  “the  quest  for  a  new  theonomy”40 
than that of Schelling, who recently has been elevated to the status of the teacher of Heidegger.41 
From  Tillich’s  perspective, Heidegger’s  thought  in  Being and Time “is  so  closely  related  with  the  
Christian interpretation of human existence that one is forced to speak of a “theonomous  
philosophy.””42  
 
Heidegger’s Protestantizing Turn 
 
Tillich  was  prepared  for  Heidegger’s  philosophy  by  his  reading  of  Schelling.
43 For 
example,  Schelling  raised  the  question  of  the  “ground”  of  being,  or  of  what  is  beyond  being  and  
thinking, beyond being and nothing, in a form that appears to be more radical than the way it is 
raised in Hegel.44 Alfred  Jäger  points  out  that  the  structure  of  Heidegger’s  question  of  being  is  
                                                 
 
40 ST3, 252. 
 
41 See  Slavoj  Žižek,  The Indivisible Remainder: Essays on Schelling and Related Matters 
(London: Verso, 1997); and Thomas Pfau, Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three Essays by F. W. J. 
Schelling (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). 
 
42 OB, 27. 
 
43 Tillich  speaks  of  the  “three  factors”  that  prepared  the  ground  for  his  acceptance  of  existential  
philosophy.  “The  first  was  my  close  knowledge  of  Schelling’s  final  period, in which he outlined his 
philosophy  of  existence  in  response  to  Hegel’s  philosophy  of  essence.”  OB  56.  So there is a real sense in 
which  for  Tillich  “Heidegger’s  ideas  were  filtered  through  Schelling.”  John  Heywood  Thomas,  Tillich 
(London: Continuum, 2000), 11. 
 
44 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung, vol. 3 of Friedrich 
Wilhelm  Joseph  Schelling’s  Sämmtliche  Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1858), 5.75. 
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made more accessible and intelligible by reference to its background in Schelling. But what 
finally  won  Tillich  in  his  Marburg  days  from  resisting  Heidegger’s  thought  to  an  active learning 
from  it  was  Heidegger’s  close interest in Martin Luther’s  theology  of  the  Cross and his doctrine 
of faith as trusting in a promise.45 Tillich saw in Schelling the first appearance of the break with 
the Western metaphysics of being, and that Heidegger represented that break by incorporating it 
into a constructive philosophy, which Schelling was unable to do.46   
Both Heidegger and Luther drive Christianity away from the metaphysics of 
Scholasticism back to historical life.47 The background of the strong theological aspect of 
Heidegger’s  thought  is  important  for  understanding  Tillich’s  affinity  for  Heidegger.  For the 
purpose of the present study, it  is  of  the  upmost  importance  to  review  the  events  of  Heidegger’s  
education, professional appointments, teaching, research, and publications. For they cast new 
light on Tillich-Heidegger connection. My review  will  focus  particularly  on  Heidegger’s  
discovery of Protestantism through the theology of Luther. For it is through  Heidegger’s  
“Protestant turn” to Luther48 that  Tillich  had  an  “existential  encounter”49 with Heidegger. The 
                                                 
45 S. J. McGrath, The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the 
Godforsaken (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 48. 
 
46 Georg  Picht,  “Einleitung  undAntworten  von  Georg  Picht,”  in  Theologie – Was ist das?, ed. 
Georg Picht and Enno Rudolph (Stuttgart: Kreuz Verlag, 1977), 20. 
 
47 S. J. McGrath, The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the 
Godforsaken (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 48. 
 
48 Bert W. Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston, IL.: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007), 27; Thomas Sheehan,  “Reading  a  Life:  Heidegger  and  Hard  
Times,”  in  The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 75.  
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following  detailed  analysis  of  Heidegger’s  early  theological  commitments  will  help us to 
describe the Heideggerian legacy embedded in Tillich’s system in distinction from his own 
theological creativity in it. 
Heidegger was born in a rural Catholic town in south Germany. His father was a sexton 
and he grew up as a Catholic. It is said that Heidegger and his only brother grew up playing in 
the church courtyard and helping their father in the church.50 In 1903, at the age of 14, Heidegger 
entered the seminary, 30 miles away from home, and lived a semi-monastic life, attending the 
local grammar school.51 Three years later he moved to the Jesuit Seminary of the Archdiocese of 
Freiburg with the intention of joining the priesthood. After graduating in 1909, Heidegger 
entered the novitiate of the Jesuits.52 But he did not meet the strict health requirements of the 
Jesuits. He had to leave only after the initial test period of two weeks because of his heart 
troubles. In the winter of 1909, he transferred to the seminary in Freiburg, the Collegium 
Borromaeum, where he continued his theology studies until  1911.  Heidegger’s  early works 
published in this period53 forcefully defended the authority of the Catholic Church against the 
                                                                                                                                                             
49 ST3, 165.  
 
50 S. J. McGrath, The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the 
Godforsaken (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 26. 
 
51 For  a  detailed  description  of  Heidegger’s  childhood  and  seminary  years,  see  Rüdiger  Safranski, 
Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1998), 1-15.  
 
52 Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger (London: Continuum, 2005), 184. 
 
53 These works are suppressed in Gesamtausgabe and not mentioned on official lists.  
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modern worldview.54 This means that Heidegger’s  intellectual  journey began as an antimodern.55 
His early publications in 1911, appearing in a Catholic journal, praised the  Church’s  stand  
against  the  “influences  of  modernism”  – against  the  “decadence  of  individualism”  and  “the  
trendy  wave  of  subjective  worldviews”  that  are  “adapted  to  life  instead  of  the  reverse.”
56 But in 
February of 1911, Heidegger was again forced to break off his seminary studies when a medical 
examination revealed his heart trouble.57 The road to priesthood was blocked forever.58 From 
then on, Heidegger intended to become a Catholic philosopher. On July 26, 1913, Heidegger 
received his doctorate in philosophy at the University of Freiburg. He wrote his doctoral 
dissertation on a problem central to the early Husserl, entitled The Doctrine of Judgment in 
                                                 
54 Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Being:  A  Critical  Interpretation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 173.  
 
55 Michael  A.  Peters,  “Introduction:  Heidegger,  Education,  and  Modernity,”  in  Heidegger, 
Education, and Modernity, ed.  Michael A. Peters (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 12. 
Peters  suggests  three  sources  of  Heidegger’s  anti-modernism: his early Catholic training and Catholic 
theological anti-modernism, the ideas of the völkish movment, and  finally,  the  influence  of  Nietzsche’s  
works, especially The Will to Power, exerted upon him from the mid-1930s on. 
 
56 Steven Galt Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward 
Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 156. 
 
57 Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. Allan Blunden (New York: Basic Books, 
1993), 64-9, 95, holds that this involuntary abandonment of his theological studies became one of the 
reasons  for  Heidegger’s  later grudge against the Church.  
 
58 Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Being:  A  Critical  Interpretation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 173. 
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Psychologism. Having received his doctorate in 1913 and his license to teach in 1915,59 he hoped 
to get the chair of Christian (Catholic) philosophy in Freiburg University.  
Heidegger, in his pursuit of the chair, endeavored to assure the administrative officers of 
Freiburg’s  Catholic  archdiocese,  in  writing letters to the university, that his academic work 
would  be  devoted  to  “researching  and  teaching  Christian-Scholastic  philosophy”  [September  20,  
1914],  that  he  saw  himself  as  standing  “in  the  service  of  Christian-Scholastic philosophy and the 
Catholic  worldview”  [November 23, 1914], and that this philosophical career would be dedicated 
to  “making  the  intellectual  riches  stored  up  in  Scholasticism  available  and  usable  for  the  spiritual  
battle of the future over the Christian-Catholic  ideal  of  life”  [December  13,  1915].60 Moreover, 
in a handwritten curriculum vitae that he presented to the philosophy department on July 2, 1915, 
he  declared  that  his  “basic  philosophical  convictions  [remain]  those  of  Aristotelian-Scholastic 
philosophy”  and  that  his  lifework  would  be  taken  up  with  “a  comprehensive  presentation  of  
medieval  logic  and  psychology  in  the  light  of  modern  phenomenology.”
61 In fact, since 1913,62 
                                                 
59 Heidegger’s  habilitation  (qualifying  dissertation)  thesis  was  entitled  “Die  Kategorien- und 
Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus),”  and  was  
reprinted in GA1. 
 
60 The  entire  letters  are  translated  in  Thomas  Sheehan,  “Heidegger’s  Lehrjahre,”  in  The 
Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years, ed. John Sallis, Giuseppina Chiara Moneta, and 
Jacques Taminiaux (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 114, 137n178.  
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Heidegger had been in close contact with Heinrich Finke who was an eminent member of 
Freiburg University with influence in its philosophy department. Finding a patron in him, 
Heidegger must have been “an active candidate for the chair in Catholic philosophy”63 since 
1914 through June of 1916. As Husserl, who was present at the faculty meeting of June 23, 1916, 
recollected, Heidegger  was  inside  favorite  for  the  chair,  “under  the  protection  of  our  “Catholic  
historian,”  Colleague  Finke.”
64 But the decision made on the meeting came as a disappointment 
to Heidegger. The justification for that decision can be ascertained from Husserl’s  letter to 
Professor Paul Natorp of Marburg University, who later inquired Husserl  about  Heidegger’s  
suitability for a professorship at Marburg.65 In his 1917 letter to Natorp to  answer  the  latter’s  
inquiry about Heidegger, Husserl writes  that  “he [Heidegger] is confessionally tied [to 
Catholicism]….Accordingly,  last  year  [June  23,  1916]  during  committee  discussion  about  filling  
the  professorship  in  Catholic  philosophy  here  in  our  Philosophy  Department….[Heidegger]  was  
                                                                                                                                                             
62 On November 14, 1913, the Catholic priest Engelbert Krebs,  Heidegger’s  friend  and  colleague, 
records  in  his  diary:  “This  evening  between  five  and  six  he  [Heidegger]  came  to  see  me  and  told  me  how  
Finke had urged him to do his thesis on some aspect of the history of philosophy, and that Finke had 
clearly given him to understand that as long as the chair remained vacant Heidegger should seek to 
qualify as a lecturer as soon as possible, thereby making himself  available  as  a  candidate.” Rüdiger 
Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. Ewald Osers (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 46. Heidegger had known Krebs since his early teens, co-teaching a seminar on 
Aristotle’s  logic  with  him at Freiburg in 1916. Krebs married Heidegger and his fiancée Elfride Petri in 
1917.   
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placed in consideration, at which point Finke discussed him as an appropriate candidate in a 
religious-denominational  sense….In  the  final  analysis  we  found  him  to  be  too  young  and  not  yet  
mature  enough  for  the  position  here,  or  even  for  a  supplementary  assistant  professorship.”
66 
Whatever the reasons may have been, this decision was shocking to Heidegger. For this event 
took  its  place  in  a  chain  of  frustrating  experiences:  Heidegger’s  rejection  at  the  hands  of  the  
Jesuits in 1909, the subsequent interruption of his theological studies in 1911, and now Finke 
who nourished the expectation that Heidegger would become a full professor breaks his word. 
As Herman Philipse notes, “Catholicism  had  thwarted  his  ambitions  for  a  third  time.”67 These 
events amount to three rejections Heidegger received from the Catholic Church. Heidegger must 
have felt betrayed. This bitterness in the traumatic experiences of Heidegger’s  formative years 
entailed the  following  verdict:  “Among  other  things,  Communism  may,  perhaps,  be  horrible,  but  
the matter is clear: Jesuitism is diabolical,  if  you  will  excuse  the  expression.”68 Several years 
later,  Heidegger  “emerges  as  a  “protestant  apostate,””69 teaching at the Marburg University 
which has been famous since the time of the Reformation as the first Protestant university in the 
world. 
                                                 
66 The letter is translated in Martin Heidegger, Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early 
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Heidegger underwent “the personal and philosophical conversion” after acquiring another 
motive for moving away from Catholicism in 1916. He spent the summer of 1917 reading the 
Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher70 and began to read Luther closely as early as 
1918. A small grant through Husserl allowed Heidegger to obtain the complete Erlangen edition 
of Luther,71 which was far superior to any other editions then available and the publication of 
which created a new basis for the study of Luther. That year, Heidegger married Elfride Petri, a 
Lutheran student at Freiburg, in a Catholic ceremony at the Freiburg University Chapel, but a 
week later remarried in a Protestant ceremony in the presence of the Petri family. Accordingly, 
the marriage was annulled when Catholic authorities learned that the couple had also been 
married in a Protestant church.72 Heidegger felt tension between, on the one hand, the conformity 
to  ecclesiastical  authority  that  the  Vatican’s  anti-modernist campaign demanded and, on the 
other  hand,  the  “inner  truthfulness  towards  oneself  and  those  one  is  supposed  to  teach.”  The  
increasing tension arising from the confrontation between religious demand and inner 
truthfulness that was demanded by his vocation to philosophy, or, as he describes,  “the  tension  
between  ontology  and  speculative  theology,”
73 culminated  in  his  abandonment  of  his  “strong  
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73 MWP, 252. 
 
68 
 
 
 
[dogmatic]  Catholicism”
74 In  fact,  Heidegger’s  Protestantizing  turn  predates  1916.  Already  in  
1914, Heidegger could mock pope Pius X when he issued a motu proprio Sacrarum antistium in 
1910, an “anti-modernism  oath” to be taken by all Catholic scholars. In a cynical letter to his 
friend, Heidegger wrote that “Perhaps  as  an  ‘academic’  you  could  apply  for  better  treatment:  all  
who succumb to having independent thoughts could have their brains taken out and replaced 
with Italian salad.”75 This contradicts the impression he gave to the faculty of the Philosophy 
Department of Freiburg University. Heidegger may be said to be opportunistic in this respect.76 
His connection with the Catholic Church remained ambivalent in so far as he clearly declared 
himself a Catholic on questionnaires from the Ministry of Education of the Weimar Republic 
which controlled the universities in 1920s in Germany.77  
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It was Heidegger’s  philosophical research, not his anger,78 however, that led him to annul 
his faith in Roman Catholicism. Heidegger left the Catholic Church because of his independence 
of mind,79 and his relationship to the Catholicism as an organized religion came to an end. In 
1919, at the age of thirty, and on the occasion of the baptism of his first child, Heidegger 
officially broke with the Catholic faith, writing to the priest who had married Heidegger and 
Elfride in 1917 and who would have performed the baptism. Heidegger said that “over  the  last  
two  years  I  struggled  for  a  basic  clarification  of  my  philosophical  position….[However]  
epistemological insights extending to the theory of historical knowledge have made the system 
of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me, but not Christianity and metaphysics – these, 
though,  in  a  new  sense.”
80 As Pádraig Hogan points out, the “epistemological insights”  refers  to 
the phenomenology of Husserl whose work on securing the foundations of knowledge was an 
                                                 
78 In  fact,  Heidegger’s  anti-Catholic statements are many, significant, and public. For instance, 
defending the purity of the revolutionary movement of Nazi, Heidegger wrote angrily to the leader of the 
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inspiration to Heidegger.81 The  reference  to  metaphysics  “in  a  new  sense”  indicated his rejection 
of the scholastic philosophy that had been central to his previous academic concern, and it points 
to the ingenuity of Heidegger’s  interest  in  the  question  of  being, a question that was to occupy 
him throughout his life. That rejection was in consequence of Heidegger’s  view  that  “the 
foundations of scholastic philosophy produced a theology that proceeded not so much from the 
challenges posed to faith by Scripture, but from all-embracing metaphysical claims raised to the 
level of dogma.”82 Heidegger claims to have grasped the values held by medieval Catholicism 
“better  perhaps  than  its  official  interpreters.”
83 His letter to the priest concludes with a profession 
of faith in free Christianity:  “I  believe  myself  to  have  the  inner  call  to  philosophy.  By  fulfilling  
this call in research and teaching, I wish to do all that is within my powers for the eternal 
vocation of the inner man – and only for this – and so to justify my existence and my work itself 
before  God.”
84 This important letter bearing witness to a decisive turning point for Heidegger 
addresses his own development over the previous two years beginning with his study of 
Schleiermacher’s  second  “Speech  on  Religion.”
85 This may be the  first  “turn”  in  Heidegger’s  
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thought.  Charles  B.  Guignon  notes  that  “its importance cannot be emphasized enough. For with 
the turn from Catholicism to Protestantism, the philosophical interests of the young thinker 
shifted from the questions of logic to those of history….and from dogmatic theology to the 
theology  of  the  New  Testament.”
86 
These two years, 1917-19, have been said to be Heidegger’s  lost  years,  the  “obscure  and  
virtually  unknown”  period of which Theodore Kisiel  calls  “the  interregnum.”87 As Ben Vedder 
notes,  “This marks the end of his career as an aspiring Catholic philosopher, the course he had 
set for himself since his dissertation in 1913.”88 At the same time, Heidegger turned to Husserl 
“the  father  of  phenomenology,” for intellectual support because Heidegger felt that his own work 
and interests were “close  to  Husserl’s  thought  and  would  grow  in  precision  and  coherence  as  a  
result.”89 Heidegger first met Husserl in 1916 when the latter took the chair of non-Catholic 
philosophy at the University of Freiburg – the chair that Heidegger himself would come to 
occupy thirteen years later. Heidegger had been reading the work of Husserl since his seminary 
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days90 and had identified Husserl as a potential mentor, hoping to work as his assistant. When 
Husserl, who also called  himself  a  “free-Christian”  and  a  “non-dogmatic  Protestant,”91 learned 
that  Heidegger  had  “freed  himself  from  dogmatic  Catholicism,”
92 he was happy to help 
Heidegger get some part-time teaching at his university. Husserl understood Heidegger’s  turn to 
his own particular brand of nondenominational Protestantism93 as the  result  of  “difficult  inner  
struggles”  that  precipitated  “radical  changes  in  [Heidegger’s]  basic  religious  convictions.”  
Heidegger worked as a Privatdozent (unsalaried lecturer) and  as  Husserl’s  assistant  from  1919  
until 1923 at Freiburg. Thereafter at Marburg, where he was appointed associate professor in the 
fall of 1923 and taught until the summer of 1928.  
Heidegger became a two-in-one candidate when the faculty of Marburg University was 
informed of his developments in applying phenomenological method to the history of 
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philosophy,94 for the University had needed both a professor to teach phenomenology and a 
professor familiar with the history of medieval philosophy.95 In a recollection of his student 
years at Marburg, Gadamer writes, “When  my  decisive  encounter  with  Heidegger  occurred,  I  
was  a  young  man  and  had  just  completed  by  doctorate  in  philosophy….For  the  entire  time  of  my  
study….the  feeling  had  accompanied  me  that  something  was  missing….a feeling about which I 
was somehow reassured when I met Heidegger. All at once I knew. This was what I had missed 
and  what  I  had  been  seeking.”
96 In his new position as an Extraordinariat (associate professor) at 
Marburg, Heidegger could develop his own thought in full independence and in relation to a new 
philosophical environment. Although important ingredients of Being and Time were formulated 
during his early academic years in Freiburg, it was not until his first Marburg period that he 
began systematic work on this project.97  
Heidegger’s  serious interest in Luther began around 1917 with his study of 
Schleiermacher.98 Heidegger began from the assumption that, as he said in his lecture course 
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1919-20,  “the  ancient  Christian  achievement  was distorted and buried through the infiltration of 
classical science into Christianity. From time to time it reasserted itself in violent eruptions (as in 
Augustine,  in  Luther,  in  Kierkegaard).”
99 From 1919 to 1923 Heidegger immersed himself in 
private research on Luther. Karl Jaspers recalled his visit to Heidegger in the spring of 1920, 
when he “sat  alone  with  him,  watched  him  at  his  Luther  studies,  saw  the  intensity  of  his  
work.”
100 It is reported that Heidegger even carved above the door of his house words from 
Luther’s  translation  of  the  Old  Testament  engraved.
101 It is certainly not correct to say that 
Heidegger became acquainted with the work of Luther through Rudolf Bultmann, his colleague 
at Marburg.102 Luther’s  most  significant  influence  on  the  young  Heidegger was his critique of 
scholasticism as the theology of glory, a critique that took issue with scholastic theology on the 
basis of genuine Christian experience in an effort to attain the true, Biblical faith. Luther attacked 
scholasticism as the theology of  glory.  The  theology  of  glory  “substitutes metaphysics for 
authentic  discipleship  and  presumes  to  “have”  God  by  seeing  the  divine  glory  omnipresent  in  
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creation.”103 Through a progressive forgetting of the meaning of authentic faith and a substitution 
of Aristotle for the Bible, medieval Christendom lost touch with the reality of God. The theology 
of glory claims to have a sure metaphysical knowledge of God deduced from incredible 
empirical  evidence.  In  Luther’s  view,  the  speculative  notion  of  an  omnipotent and omniscient 
First Cause is idolatry for it is  the  construction  of  a  God  of  our  own  making.  “The  condition  of  
this life is not that of having God but of seeking God,”  Luther  argued.104 S. J. McGrath observes 
that  “In  the  early  Heidegger’s  interpretation  of  the  history  of  philosophy  and  theology,  Luther’s  
de-Hellenization of Christianity is singled out as a moment when the factical experience of life 
comes to the fore.”105 In his early study of Luther, Heidegger was particularly attracted to the 
Lutheran doctrine of the deformation of human nature resulting from original sin. Luther’s  
critique of the theology of glory led Heidegger to undertake an intensive study of the factical 
experience of life, a concept taken from Wilhelm Dilthey,106 of the New Testament stories in an 
effort to recover authentic Christian experience. Luther  argues,  “Let  us  rather  follow  experience,  
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which  shows….that  from  the  very  nature  of  the  [unclean]  seed  we  acquire  ignorance  of  God.”
107 
With Luther, Heidegger found in the New Testament stories a wholly different set of pre-
philosophical paradigms. The first discussion of “factical life” was given in a lecture course he 
offered in the winter semester 1921-22 at the University of Freiburg.108 He explains the two 
aspects of what the “experience” of factical life designates as “the experiencing activity”  and 
“that which is experienced through this activity.” However, “factical life-experience is 
comprised of both the activity of experiencing and that which is experienced,”109 and one cannot 
separate one  from  the  other.  “The experiencing self and what is experienced are not torn 
apart….“Experiencing”  does  not  mean  “taking-cognizance-of”  but  a  confrontation-with, the self-
assertion of the forms of what is experienced.”110 Factical life-experience is thus both  a  “what”  
and  a  “how.”
 
“Factical”  does  not  mean  naturally  real or causally determined, nor does it mean 
real in the sense of a thing. “The  concept  “factical”  may  not  be  interpreted  from  certain  
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epistemological presuppositions.”111 A factical life is a life of human Dasein in an understanding 
of its own being as a question and a burden. A factical life of Dasein questions and burdens itself 
because it is and it is without a whence and whither. A factical life is a life in understanding of 
Dasein’s  thrownness  into  its  “here.”112 For Heidegger, such living within an understanding of 
being is a fact.  ““Facticity” is  the  designation….for  the character of the being of “our”  “own” 
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not being-here, nor being-there, nor being-here-there. The reason is that the Da is not just a here or a there 
or a here-there, but rather is the essential disclosure by which here, there, here-there become possible. It is 
the  source.”  I  am  persuaded  by  Daniel  O.  Dahlstrom  that  the  “colloquial  uses  of  ‘da’  with  ‘sein’  suggest  a  
nearness  and  a  dimension  that  is  lost  if  ‘Da-sein’  is  translated  ‘there-being’  or  ‘being-there.’”  He  
recommends  “being-here.”    ““[B]eing-there”  has  the  distinct  disadvantage  of  introducing  a  distance  
where  there  is  none....More  importantly,  translating  ‘Dasein’ as  ‘being-there’    runs  the  risk  of  rendering  
the theme something that need not be a matter of intimate, pressing concern, or in other words something 
that  we  do  not  necessarily  care  about.”  Daniel  O.  Dahlstrom,  Heidegger’s  Concept  of  Truth (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), xxiv-xxv.  Heidegger  explains  his  use  of  “Dasein”  in  Being and Time 
as  follows:  “In  the  philosophical  tradition,  the  term  “Dasein”  means  presence-at-hand, existence. In this 
sense, one speaks, for instance, of proofs of God’s  existence.  However,  Da-sein is understood differently 
in Being and Time. To begin with, French existentialists also failed to pay attention to it. That is why they 
translated Da-sein in Being and Time as être-lá, which means being here and not there. The Da in Being 
and Time does not mean a statement of place for a being, but rather it should designate the openness 
where beings can be present for the human being, and the human being also for himself. The Da of 
[Dasein’s]  being distinguishes the humanness of the human being. The talk about human Da-sein is 
accordingly a pleonasm, avoidable in all contexts, including Being and Time. The appropriate French 
translation of Da-sein should be: Etre le lá, and the meaningful accentuation should be Da-sein in German 
instead  of  Dasein.”  ZS, 120. Jeff Malpas explains that the French translation Heidegger proposes here, 
“être  le  lá  (being  the  there),”  does  not  dispense  with  the  idea  of  the  “there”  at  all,  but  rather  “proposes  a  
particular  emphasis  in  the  way  the  “there  is  understood  to  relate  to  “being”…“being-there”  means  the  
kind  of  being  that  is  or  has  its  own  “there.”  Jeff  Malpas,  Heidegger’s  Topology:  Being,  Place,  World 
(Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006), 48. William Lovitt notes that, in a letter 
to the editor J. Glenn Gray (October 10, 1972) concerning the publication of [his essays on technology], 
Heidegger  emphatically  expressed  his  preference  for  “openness”  and  his  disapprobation  of  “there”  as  a  
translation of da in Dasein. William Lovitt, introduction to The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, by Martin Heidegger, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper, 1977), xxxv.  
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Dasein. More precisely, this expression means: in each case “this”  Dasein  in  its  being-there for a 
while at the particular time….insofar  as  it  is.”113  The hermeneutics of facticity is not  a  “chilly  
science of facticity,”114 like “the botany of plants.”115 Rather, it can be understood as factical life 
itself interpreting itself. Heidegger’s  early Freiburg lectures significantly turn on the notion of 
factical life, through which he discovered a new approach to theological texts. But Heidegger 
does not explain exactly what factical life includes. Heidegger does explain what non-factical life 
is. The non-factical condition of this life is such that the human will twists everything with its 
perverse intention to make something of itself on its own and be free of God. Luther says, “Just  
as reason is overwhelmed by many kinds of ignorance, so the will has not only been confused 
but has been turned away from  God.”116 Heidegger discussed the three Heidelberg theses in his 
course of summer 1921, “Augustine and Neo-Platonism,”117 the purpose of which was an 
interpretation  of  Augustine’s  ontotheology  and  its  proof  text,  Romans  1.20,  “For  the  invisible  
things of God ever since the creation of the world are clearly seen in the things that have been 
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made.”  On  the  basis  of  this  text, according to Heidegger, Augustine and the Scholastics assumed 
“a basic knowledge of God manifest in creation, a natural revelation of a constantly present 
God.”118 The invisible things of God are seen through the visible things God has made. This text 
was taken to be a Pauline confirmation of the Platonic ascent of the soul from the sensible to the 
supersensible world.119 Heidegger maintains that it is a misunderstanding of the passage that 
returns again and again in patristic writings as the foundation for the whole of patristic 
philosophy. It is only in Luther, Heidegger contends, that the meaning of this text is properly 
elucidated.120 Luther does not deny that Paul affirms a natural knowledge of God. However, 
under the pressure of sin, we cannot but misinterpret the natural revelation, which is the non-
factical condition of this life. As John D. Caputo argues, this view of Luther fundamentally 
shaped  Heidegger’s  idea of a hermeneutics of facticity.121 Heidegger  quotes  Luther,  “The  man  
who looks upon the invisible things of God as they are perceived in created things does not 
deserve to be called a theologian. He who sees what is invisible of God in what has been created, 
is no theologian. – The presentation [Vorgabe] of the object of theology is not attained by way of 
a  metaphysical  consideration  of  the  world.”
122 As early as 1921, Heidegger had adopted  Luther’s  
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attitude towards the relation of philosophy and theology as formulated in his theses for the 
Heidelberg Disputation of 1518.123 One of the most arresting features  of  Heidegger’s  
philosophical work in the early Freiburg period was his call for philosophy to return to its pre-
philosophical origins,124 to  the  long  neglected  conditions  of  “factical  life,”  or  “facticity.”125 “The  
point of departure of the path to philosophy is factical life experience. It seems, however, as if 
philosophy is leading us out  of  factical  life  experience.”126 Luther  had  studied  Aristotle’s  
writings in detail and lectured on them. “I  understand  him,” Luther  maintained,  “better  than  
Thomas or Duns Scotus.”127 According  to  Luther,  “it  is  not  that  philosophy  is  evil”  in  itself  for  
the  Christian,  but  rather  its  “misuse,”128 which lies in replacing the New Testament with Aristotle 
instead of working from a position of faith. One should only “philosophize  well.” Luther 
comments on Paul’s  statement  in  Romans  8.18-27 in his 1515-16 Lectures on Romans that “[t]he 
Apostle philosophizes….in  a  different  way  than  the  philosophers  and  the  metaphysicians  do.”  
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Thus Luther  creatively  appropriated  Aristotle’s  philosophical  concepts  in  order  to  clarify the 
Christian sense. But Heidegger complains in his 1922 essay on Aristotle that the believer-God 
relation  of  original  Christianity  is  forced  into  the  foreign  Aristotelian  concept.  “This  means  that  
“the  idea  of  human  being  and  the  Dasein  of  life [as presented in the traditional theology]….is  
based on Aristotelian  “physics,”  “psychology,”  “ethics,”  and  “ontology.””129  
Heidegger initially appreciated Husserl’s  method of phenomenology and its strength for a 
theoretical justification of mathematics and logic. But he soon began to see that Husserl’s  
phenomenology was mistaken. Heidegger came to a conclusion, as Richard Sembera explains, 
that  “Husserl’s  orientation  towards  a  philosophy  of  consciousness  and  towards  a  traditional  
conception of science – in other words, his focus on the theoretical problems of logic and 
mathematics – was misplaced.”130 Heidegger criticizes Husserl for confusing the difference 
between”  the formal worlds of the theoretical sciences” and  “the actual pre-theoretical life-world 
of everyday experience.”131 “Husserl, rather than discovering the foundation of the formal 
sciences in consciousness, had imposed a theoretical foundation upon consciousness for the sake 
of justifying the ultimate validity of logic and mathematics.”132 For  Heidegger,  the  “lived”  world  
as the pre-theoretical life-world has little thing to do with the world as it is described in formal 
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sciences. Heidegger questions accordingly the true nature and reality of the actual life-world in 
which the human subject lives. Heidegger’s  investigation  of  factical  experience  of  life  developed 
as a direct response to this question. This is “the  authentic  question  of  Being.”133 Hence, the 
authentic question of Being arises from factical life experience. One  of  the  Heidegger’s  early  
names for his expanded  phenomenology  was  the  “hermeneutics of facticity,” or what came to be 
called in Being and Time an “existential  analytic.”134   
 As illustrated above, Heidegger’s  attempt  to  formulate a hermeneutics of facticity was 
inspired  by  Luther’s  critique  of  Aristotelian metaphysics and medieval Aristotelian 
scholasticism.135 Heidegger  was  convinced  by  Luther’s  theology  that  it  was  possible to 
experience in a completely new way the Christian faith, that is, in its primordiality.136 Taking his 
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up a new understanding of primordial Christianity. Later on, he himself fell victim to the burden of 
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lead  from  Luther,  who  described  as  “destruction”
137 his project of recovering an authentic 
Scriptural Christianity beneath “the conceptual scaffolding of medieval theology,”138 Heidegger 
makes  his  attempt  at  a  “destruction”  of  the  traditional, or the Aristotelian, metaphysical 
conceptuality of western theology and philosophy, in order also to uncover the original or 
primitive  Christian  experience,  an  attempt  which  he  called  “phenomenology  of  religious  
consciousness”  in  1919.139 The  prototype  of  the  “destruction  of  the  history  of  ontology”  in  Being 
and Time, and of what was later called  “overcoming  metaphysics,”  was  this  essentially  
theological project of 1919 in which Heidegger set out to recover the original categories of 
factical Christian life. John van Buren explains that “The  young  Heidegger  saw  himself  at  this  
time as a kind of philosophical  Luther  of  western  metaphysics….The  young  Heidegger’s  
concern….was  to  find  a  new  “genuine  beginning”  not  only  in  a  new  ontological  language,  but  
also in the end of Aristotelian-Scholastic theology and the initiation of a new Lutheran 
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theological  language  in  his  phenomenology  of  religion.”140 Luther was referred to and discussed, 
along with Paul, Augustine, Pascal, Schleiermacher, and Kierkegaard, repeatedly in  Heidegger’s  
lecture courses from 1919 to 1923.141 In van Buren’s  word, “the  Heidegger  of  the early Freiburg 
period seems actually to have been moving for a time toward “a kind of free mystical 
Lutheranism or free Lutheran  mysticism.”142 But it  was  not  Luther’s  religious  faith  that  inspired  
Heidegger. Heidegger saw in Luther, rather, an “attitude” toward theoretical philosophy that was 
his own.143 Ben  Vedder  explains  that  “As philosophy does not offer knowledge of God, 
according to Luther, so Heidegger maintained in similar fashion that theoretical philosophy does 
not offer insight into factical life. In the theoretical approach to religion and to God, the factical 
was displaced and concealed in the form of questioning after a metaphysical entity.”144 
Heidegger attempted to go beyond Aristotelian metaphysical concepts so as to discover its 
sources in factical life. Heidegger put this discovery to work not as a way of rejecting 
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Aristotelian metaphysics, but rather as a way of re-interpreting Aristotle.145 That is, as discussed 
above, Heidegger’s  “destruction”  does  not  mean  to  annihilate  but  to  break  through the 
conceptual surface of traditional Aristotelian metaphysics in order to retrieve146 its living roots 
and life-giving  experiences.  Therefore,  the  “destruction”  of  metaphysics  or  of  the  history of 
ontology in Being and Time is always to be understood as a fundamentally positive operation, 
not a negative one. Heidegger  says  that  “to bury the past in nullity [Nichtigkeit] is not the 
purpose of this destruction; its aim is positive.”147 Precisely  speaking,  Heidegger’s  destruction  is  
a “deconstruction” of  “factically  oriented  Aristotle.”  The Luther scholar Gerhard Ebeling, with 
whom  Heidegger  later  collaborated,  argues  that  Luther  also  defends  the  “true  Aristotle”  against  
Scholastic misinterpretation.148 In Luther’s  references  to  Aristotle  shows his attention to the 
hidden aspect of Aristotle that he believed the Scholastics did not correctly understand.  “It  is  
very  doubtful  whether  the  Latins  comprehended  the  correct  meaning  of  Aristotle,”  Luther  
writes.149 Luther even said  that  Aristotle  was  sent  by  God  “as  a  plague upon us on account of our 
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sins.”150 But a plague is, strictly speaking, not Aristotle himself, but Scholastic distortions of him. 
“The  father of  ontotheology”151 is not Aristotle, but the Latins. Heidegger thought, as did 
Luther,152 that Aristotle had the greatest phenomenological sensitivities in the ancient world. The 
task of the re-interpretation of Aristotle on which he had set out was to recover the factical life 
experience that had taken conceptual form in Aristotelian philosophy. The factically oriented 
Aristotle whom Heidegger attempted to defend is the Aristotle whose object is not God but life. 
It can be said in this sense that the shift of Heidegger’s  interest  from  theological  studies about 
Catholicism to philosophical studies about factical life experience is  an  “atheological  turn.”153 
However, we cannot conclude from this that Heidegger was an atheist, which I will discuss 
below in detail to  better  illuminate  Tillich’s  philosophical  affinity  to  Heidegger. What he really 
wanted to do was to “find a way of getting himself out from under theology while still keeping in 
touch with what theology had been about.”154 “Theological  questions  motivated  [Heidegger]  
from  the  start.”
155 Heidegger’s  “atheological  turn”  should  be  understood  to  mean  that  his 
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philosophy no longer addresses directly the problem of God. It is a turn to a  “Godless  
theology.”156 At  Bultmann’s  invitation, Heidegger, in the summer of 1924, gave a lecture to the 
Marburg theologians on the concept of time.157 This lecture is a perfect example of Heidegger’s  
“philosophical silence on matters of theology.”158 He assured his audience at the beginning that 
he did not wish to say anything on theological or divine matters and he would confine himself to 
the  “human.”  “But  he  then  talked  about  the  human  in  such  a  way a theology of the type of 
Bultmann’s  fitted  like  a  key  into  a  lock.”
159 Appropriating  Luther’s  early  theology,  Heidegger  
attempted to lead the theological “questions” of sin, faith, and human relation to God back to 
more properly philosophical territory. Therefore, Heidegger’s  claim  to  incompetence  in  
theological matters is to be understood as a claim to incompetence in giving “answers” to the 
theological questions. Without such a competence in theological questioning, his works would 
have not evoked lively responses from the leading theologians of the twentieth century. 
Heidegger’s  interpretations  of  Aristotle  at  this  time  were  so  innovative  that  they  were  directly  
responsible for the appointment that Heidegger received from Marburg160 when the university 
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needed someone who could teach phenomenology in relation to the medieval theology, as 
explained above.161 Heidegger confirms the influence of Aristotle on his own original thought. 
He says in Being and Time that  “the  question  we  are  touching  upon  is  not  just  any question. It is 
one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from 
then on as a theme for actual investigation.”162 Heidegger  calls  his  study  of  Franz  Brentano’s  
work  on  Aristotle  “the  ceaseless  impetus  for  the  treatise Being and Time.”163 Heidegger’s  
purification of Aristotle consisted of a twofold retrieval, of Aristotle on the one hand and of the 
original structures of factical Christian life on the other.164 This is evidenced by the fact that 
Being and Time is thoroughly interwoven with theological questions. The very goal of Being and 
Time was  “to  formalize  these  factical  structures  to  give  them  a  formal-ontological 
conceptualization.”
165 The hermeneutics166 of facticity of Being and Time, which was “a  
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165 John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 
172. 
 
89 
 
 
 
hermeneutics of the  New  Testament  experience  of  life”167 and also was “the  earliest  form  of  
Being and Time,”168 was  Heidegger’s  principal  preoccupation  even after Being and Time. Tillich 
must have thought that these two tasks were one in Heidegger. For Heidegger’s  1919  letter on 
his break with Catholicism that occasioned his embrace of Lutheranism and the introduction to 
Being and Time both cite metaphysics as the primary motivation for the project of retrieval. It is 
precisely because of this nature that the work was received with enthusiasm by the contemporary 
Protestant theologians. Caputo writes, “When Christian theologians looked into the pages of 
Being and Time they found themselves staring at their own image – formalized, ontologized, or 
as  Bultmann  said  “demythologized.””
169 What Being and Time had discovered, Bultmann said, 
was the very structure of religious and Christian existence. As Theodore Kisiel and Thomas 
Sheehan observe, Heidegger’s  Being and Time refers to Luther only twice, and they occur 
marginally to its project of a fundamental ontology and existential analysis of Dasein. But in his 
early lecture on the problem of sin in Luther and in  Heidegger’s  attentive reading  of  Luther’s  
                                                                                                                                                             
166 In 1959 Heidegger published an account of a dialogue occasioned in 1953/4 by the visit of a 
Japanese  scholar.  In  this  dialogue,  while  discussing  the  term  “hermeneutics,”  Heidegger  makes  the  
following  remark:  “The  term  ‘hermeneutics’  was  familiar  to  me  from  my  theological  studies.  At  that  time  
I was particularly agitated over the question of the relation between the Word of Holy Scripture and 
theological-speculative  thinking.”  Heidegger  follows  up  this  remark  by  stating  that: “Without  this  
theological  background  I  should  never  have  come  upon  the  path  of  thinking.”  OWL, 9-10. 
 
167 John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 
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works provide abundant evidence that indicates “the impact of Luther on  Heidegger’s entire 
project.”170 This does not mean, however, that Heidegger intended to do theology as such in a 
certain way. Being and Time is a philosophical investigation and the debt to Luther is 
methodological. In his definition of the relationship between philosophy and theology Heidegger 
is attempting to achieve such a connection between philosophical questioning and theological 
interpretation. Tillich takes up this task and develops it in his Systematic Theology. 
 
Heidegger as a Lutheran at Marburg 
 
 
In his last lecture  series  at  Freiburg  in  the  summer  of  1923  that  explored  Luther’s 
influence on Kant and German idealism,  Heidegger  wrote  that  “Companions  in  my  searching  
were  the  young  Luther  and  the  paragon  Aristotle….Kierkegaard  gave  impulses,  and  Husserl  gave  
me my  eyes.”171 This  ontology  lecture  course  must  have  made  a  powerful  impression.  “Quite  a  
number of men who were later to achieve name and standing in philosophy were then sitting at 
the feet of Privatdozent Heidegger, who was beginning to be regarded as the secret king of 
philosophy.”
172 
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After his move to the University of Marburg in the fall of 1923, Heidegger’s  
preoccupation with Luther continued, and he continued to hold an interest in Luther late in his 
career, as evidenced from the assistance he gave the Luther scholar Gerhard Ebeling on his 1961 
book on  Luther’s  Disputatio de Homnine.173 His engagement with Luther deepened in the 
context of seminars with the Lutheran theologian Bultmann,174 who had come to Marburg two 
years ahead of Heidegger. Heidegger quickly perceived Bultmann’s  expertise  as  a  valuable  
resource for his own interests. Bultmann also regarded Heidegger as a Luther expert.175 
Heidegger  immediately  joined  Bultmann’s  theology seminar on the ethics of the Apostle Paul in 
the winter semester of 1923-24. In this semester-long participation in the seminar, Heidegger 
was invited to offer a two-part lecture176 entitled, “Das  Problem  der  Sünde  bei  Luther  (The 
Problem of Sin in Luther),”177 in which he followed closely with Luther in his critique of 
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scholastic philosophy,178 introducing  into  the  discussion  Luther’s  interpretations  of  Genesis  and  
Exodus. This collaboration with Bultmann also proved fruitful for Heidegger, who was at that 
time intensively occupied with Luther. The important contribution of Heidegger to this seminar 
concerns “Luther’s  conception  of  the  radicality  of  sin  and  the  consequences  of  this  radicality  for  
a  theological  understanding  both  of  the  being  of  the  human  and  of  the  human’s  proper  relation  to  
God.”179 He concludes with Luther that “One  can understand faith only when one understands 
sin, and one can understand sin only when one has a correct understanding of the being of man 
itself.”  
180 As such Heidegger attempted to reduce the theological questions of sin, faith, and 
human relation to God to philosophical issues.181 
The move from Catholic Freiburg to Protestant Marburg gave Heidegger an immediate 
and uninhibited opportunity to demonstrate his long familiarity with the Lutheran theology. 
Gadamer, who served as assistant to Heidegger at Marburg from 1923 to 1928 and eventually 
wrote his habilitation under Heidegger’s direction, offers a vivid picture of the time when 
Heidegger  arrived  in  Marburg.  It  was,  by  Gadamer’s  own  account,  a  “tension-filled time when 
the theological break with historical and  liberal  theology  took  place….when  the  philosophical  
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abandonment of Neo-Kantianism occurred, the [old] Marburg School dissolve, and new stars 
arose  in  the  philosophical  heavens.”
182 It was a time of crisis in theology and transition in 
philosophy. By this time Heidegger was well on his way toward a different direction from 
Bultmann. In other words, as  Theodore  Kisiel  argues,  “the  real  contribution  of  this  academic  
year [in Marburg]  to  Heidegger’s  development  is  not  this  religious  content  but  rather  the  
abstrusely  formal  elaboration  of  his  hermeneutic  phenomenology  which  inaugurates  the  year.”183 
It is clear, however, that during the formative period in his writing of Being and Time Heidegger 
does not consider his work to be divorced from theology.184 Rather, Heidegger’s  confrontation  
with theological themes was of paramount important in his philosophical development at 
Marburg.185 Most  importantly,  Luther’s  theology  continued to play a  central  part  of  Heidegger’s  
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intellectual life in the Marburg years.186 Eric B. Berg  observes  that  “the  tone  and  occasion  of  the  
Heidelberg Disputation matches the intention of Being and Time,” 187 the project of which took 
shape in 1922-24. The Luther scholar Edmund Schlink even went so far as to maintain that 
“Heidegger’s  existential  analytic  of  human  Dasein  is  a  radical  secularization  of  Luther’s  
anthropology.”
188 
The decisive and historically unique period of encounter between Tillich and Heidegger 
was the years 1924-1925, when they both taught at the University of Marburg. Shortly after his 
second marriage to Hannah Werner Gottschow, Tillich moved to Marburg, where he had been 
appointed as the successor of Rudolf Otto, the renowned systematic theologian and philosopher 
of religion. Tillich remained in Marburg for only three semesters,189 but this was a period of 
immense importance in his theological development. It was here that he first set about creating a 
systematic theology,190 lecturing on it.191 It is all the more important to understand the 
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significance  of  this  period  from  Tillich’s  theological point of view. It was there that he met with 
existentialism in its twentieth-century form.192 Once there, he was thrown into a context of fierce 
theological debate represented by his students who were either radical Barthians193 or else 
enthusiastic followers of Heidegger.  
I find widespread understandable inclinations to minimize, ignore, or deny the influence 
of Heidegger on Tillich in Marburg. It is impossible to agree, however, that  “Tillich  was  never  a  
Heideggerian,”
194 and to reduce what he adopted from Heidegger to simply a matter of language, 
even if it is true that with respect to the problem of Being, their conclusions were seemingly 
opposed. I  maintain  that  Tillich’s  thought  shifted  in  both  emphasis  and  content  after  his  
encounter with Heidegger in 1924-5 and the publication of Being and Time in 1927, although 
this  does  not  deny  the  fundamental  continuity  of  Tillich’s  thought.  Phenomenology attracted 
attention in Marburg,  especially  with  Heidegger’s  arrival. But between 1916 and 1927 Heidegger 
                                                                                                                                                             
191 According to my research, his lecture-notes for that course seem unfortunately not to be 
extant. It is not possible therefore, to measure the extent to which their structure and content contributed 
to the published version of the Systematic Theology. 
 
192 Tillich  reflected  later  in  life,  “In  Marburg,  existentialism  in  its  twentieth  century  form  crossed  
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did not published any work.195 This  establishes  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  “Tillich’s  Heideggerian  
turn”
196 in the mid-1920s. But it should be noted, as Hanna Arendt recalls, that Heidegger’s  
“fame” precedes the publication of Being and Time. The retrospective account of Arendt 
explains that “The beginning [of fame] in  Heidegger’s  case is….the first lecture courses and 
seminars which he held as a mere privatdozent (instructor) and assistant to Husserl at the 
University of Freiburg  in  1919.”197 Heidegger was principally known “through his teaching, 
partly also through unpublished manuscripts of small circulation.”198 Arendt is right in saying 
that the immediate success  of  Heidegger’s  Being and Time both inside and outside the academic 
circle would not have been possible, if his reputation among the students had not preceded its in 
1927. The success of Being and Time only confirmed what his followers had known for years.199 
“In  Heidegger’s  case  there  is  nothing  tangible  on  which  his  fame  could  have  been  based,  nothing  
written, save for the notes taken at his lectures which circulated among students 
everywhere….There  was  hardly  more  than  a  name,  but  the  name  traveled  all  over  Germany  like  
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the  rumor  of  the  hidden  king.”
200 This means that Being and Time was the outcome rather than 
the origin of a dialogue between Heidegger as a philosopher and the contemporary Christian 
theologians.  
There are other more practical reasons that account  for  the  attraction  of  Heidegger’s  
philosophy to Tillich. First, Heidegger, who was deeply influenced by religious and theological 
matters, was actively involved in theological debates and had influential interaction with the 
theologians at Marburg. For him, it was “a time of intense dialogue with Marburg theology.”201 
According to Bultmann, the philosophy and theology faculties were cooperative at this time. It 
was in this academic ambience that Heidegger closely worked with Bultmann.202  Heidegger and 
Bultmann collaborated intensely in a number of joint seminars and study groups that included 
reading the Gospel of John in regular Saturday sessions.203 Quickly these joint seminars created a 
strong atmosphere of discipleship among those students who were attracted to these scholars. 
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When Hans Jonas, who was a former student of Heidegger and later became one of the most 
severe critics of the theological appropriation of Heidegger, arrived on campus in 1924, he was 
overwhelmed by the enthusiasm of these followers of Bultmann and Heidegger.204 The effects of 
these scholars were certainly not limited to their students. Tillich  was  impressed  by  Heidegger’s  
profound influence on his own students.205 Bultmann also acknowledges the influence of 
Heidegger  on  his  own  thought:  “The  work  of  existentialist  philosophy,  which  I  came  to  know  
through my discussion with Martin Heidegger, has become of decisive significance for me. I 
found in it the conceptuality in which it is possible to speak adequately of human existence and 
therefore  also  of  the  existence  of  the  believer.”
206 Bultmann was convinced that theology now 
had to move in an existentialist direction.207 “Bultmann’s  continual  attack  upon  liberal  theology  
and  his  growing  reservation  about  dialectic  theology  as  well  as  Heidegger’s  attack  upon  the  
traditional model of neo-Kantian epistemology captured the attention of both philosophy and 
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theology faculties at Marburg University.”208 Troubled, as a result, the philosopher Nicolai 
Hartmann  became  convinced  that  “Heidegger’s  ideas  represented  a  negative  atmosphere  in  the  
philosophy  department.”
209 Rudolf Otto, whom Tillich would replace, also became increasingly 
critical  Bultmann’s  work,  as  Bultmann  grew  closer  to  Heidegger.
210 “At  Marburg,”  wrote  the  
visiting  scholar  W.  R.  Boyce  Gibson,  “it  is  not  [Rudolf]  Otto  that  the  theologians  came  to  hear  
but  Heidegger.”
211  
Second, Heidegger left his mark on Tillich through the medium of the students who 
attended the lectures of both professors. J.  H.  Randall,  Tillich’s  colleague  at  Columbia  
University,  writes  that  “Tillich  found  an  exciting  colleague  at  Marburg,  Martin  Heidegger.  He  
was impressed by Heidegger’s  profound  influence  on  his  students.”212 As Karl Löwith put it, 
Heidegger during this time resembled more a “preacher”  than  the  typical  academic.213 “The  
enormous  success  of  his  lectures  and  the  extraordinary  influence  of  his  work”  was  a  “natural  
                                                 
208 William D. Dennison, The Young Bultmann: Context for His Understanding of God, 1884-
1925 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), 133.  
 
209 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 134. 
 
210 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 133. 
 
211 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 150. 
 
212 John Herman Randall,  “The  Philosophical  Legacy  of  Paul  Tillich,”  in  The Intellectual Legacy 
of Paul Tillich, ed. James R. Lyons (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1969), 33. 
 
213 Karl Löwith was  Heidegger’s  first habilitation student and sometime colleague. He labored 
over  Heidegger’s  philosophically  rich  correspondence  with  him  for  many  years.  
 
100 
 
 
 
consequence,”  Löwith  suggested,  of  Heidegger’s  role  as  a  “displaced  preacher.”214 The intensity 
and  the  touching  quality  of  Heidegger’s  teaching  at  Marburg  are recounted from memory by 
Gadamer:  “One  cannot  adequately  present  the  dramatic  appearance  of  Heidegger  at Marburg. 
Nothing he did was intended to cause a sensation…but  the  force  of  his  person  and  teaching  
rested in the fact that he would throw himself fully into his work and he transmitted this energy. 
There was always something new in his lectures.”215 Gadamer  continues,  “How could anyone 
following him then forget the breathtaking storm of questions that he developed early on in the 
semester….lightening  flashed,  leaving  us  half  stunned.”
216 Hannah Arendt also recalled the 
excitement of the group around Heidegger, telling us how they thought of him at the time: 
“Thinking  has  come  to  life  again;;  the  cultural  treasures  of  the  past,  believed  to  be  dead,  are  being  
made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things altogether different 
from the familiar, worn-out trivialities they had been presumed to say. There exists a teacher; 
one can perhaps learn to think.”217 The same excitement must have affected Tillich, triggering 
his interest in the topic of being and the structures of human existence in the world as well as 
creating a marked tension between the two. Tillich’s  wife  Hannah states  that  her  husband’s  main  
struggle  at  Marburg  “was  with  the  philosophy  of  Heidegger.  He  met  some  of  Heidegger’s  
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doctoral  students,  and  endless  debates  followed….The gossip about what Heidegger had said in a 
lecture  about  Paulus  would  be  carried  by  Heidegger’s  faithful  underlings.  Paulus  would  answer  
in  his  own  lecture,  and  that  would  be  forwarded  again.”
218 Consciously or unconsciously, Tillich 
became interested in Heidegger’s  thought.  According to Hannah Tillich, Tillich and Heidegger 
never met formally, but only informally.219 It was not, however, because of the tension between 
the two, but because “Heidegger  was  open  only  to  the  most  formal  relations.” 220 Tillich’s  
theological existentialism inherits Heidegger’s  early  philosophical  work.  Tillich  knew 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche before his acquaintance with Heidegger. But “his exposure to 
Heidegger, who year after year held crowds of students captivated in his classes, was a crucial 
turning point in Tillich’s career.”  For Tillich, the Marburg years were “brief but, intellectually 
speaking, very important.”221  
                                                 
218 Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), 116-7.  Tillich’s  friends  
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Third, Tillich recognized that Heidegger’s philosophy was theologically oriented, though 
not theological in itself, and Biblically grounded.222 As both Heidegger and Tillich were laboring 
under  and  against  the  intellectual  influence  of  Barth’s  neo-orthodoxy at Marburg,223 a sense of 
shared alienation must  have  deepened  Tillich’s  sympathy  with  Heidegger. Tillich rejected neo-
orthodoxy as  being  an  inadequate  alternative  for  the  future  because  it  “vacillate[s]  between  
protest against and compromises with the spirit  of  capitalist  society.”224 This even caused a 
general  disregard  for  Tillich’s  interest  in  the  relationship  of  religion and culture at Marburg.225 
Tillich was not a liberal, however. His career was begun when liberal theology was on the wane. 
The experience of the crisis of modern German culture made Tillich, a former Lutheran chaplain 
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in World War I, highly critical of pre-war liberal theologians such as Ritschl, Harnack, and even 
Troeltsch, despite his deep admiration for them.226 Tillich particularly rejected a synthesis of 
Protestant Christianity and “bourgeois culture attempted by pre-war German liberal theology 
which was no longer viable in the face of the crisis of German culture.”227 For Tillich, liberal 
criticism was the glory of liberal theology, but liberal dogmatics tended to be religiously 
shallow.228 Tillich writes, “It  was  the  Protestant  principle  that  gave  liberal  theology the right and 
the good conscience to approach the Holy Scripture with the critical methods of historical 
research and with a complete scientific honesty in showing the mythical and legendary elements 
in  both  Testaments…In  this  respect  Protestant  theology  must  always  be  liberal  theology…But  it  
is also the Protestant principle that has induced orthodox theologians (both old and new) to look 
at Scripture as Holy Scripture, namely, as the original document of the event which is called 
“Jesus  the  Christ”  and  which  is  the  criterion  of  all  Scripture  and  the  manifestation  of  the  
Protestant  principle.  In  this  respect  Protestant  theology  must  be  “ortho-dox”  and  must  always  
maintain  the  ground  in  which  the  critical  power  of  the  Protestant  principle  is  rooted.” Yet, Tillich 
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continues,  “Is  the  acceptance  of  these  propositions  liberal,  is  it  orthodox  theology?  I  think  it  is  
neither the one nor the other. I think it is Protestant and Christian, and, if a technical term is 
wanted,  it  is  “neodialectical.”” Tillich was neither a liberal nor a conservative. He found in 
Heidegger’s  existentialism  a better alternative framework for interpretation of the reality of God, 
an antidote to the theological weakness of Protestantism. Heidegger’s  Lutheran  theology  in  his  
Marburg period was more conservative than is recognized by many of its critics. Compared with 
Heidegger, Wilhelm and Marion Pauck have put it, Tillich was certainly more liberal, both 
theologically and culturally.229  This is an important fact to be considered in describing  Tillich’s  
encounter with Heidegger, in that it rendered Tillich strongly sympathetic toward the theological 
aspect  of  Heidegger’s  philosophical  aims  and  methods.   
Shortly  after  his  arrival  in  Marburg,  Heidegger  attended  a  guest  lecture  by  Barth’s  friend 
and collaborator, Eduard Thurneysen.230 Gadamer recalls  Heidegger’s  contribution  to  the  
discussion  following  the  lecture.  “I  find  unforgettable  the  way  he  [Heidegger]  concluded  his  
contribution  to  the  discussion  of  Thurneysen’s  address….he  said  it  is  the true task of theology, 
which must be discovered once again, to seek the word that is able to call one to faith and 
preserve  one  in  faith….In  speaking  these  words,  Heidegger  seemed  to  be  posing  a  task  for  
theology.”
231 To  Gadamer’s  surprise,  “what Heidegger said ran counter not so much to the spirit 
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of the place as to what rumor in Marburg  attributed  to  Heidegger.”232 This shows that Heidegger 
did not turn away from Christian faith. The following comment of Heidegger on Bultmann does 
indicate that he may have been theologically more conservative than Bultmann:  “When  I  came  to  
Marburg in 1923, my friend Bultmann had removed so much from the New Testament that there 
was  almost  nothing  left.”
233 It was the year 1924 that Tillich arrived in Marburg and, as indicated 
above, Heidegger lectured directly on Luther that year. For Tillich, there was more to Heidegger 
than a mere philosopher. Speaking in retrospect, Tillich recalls that when he was a colleague of 
Heidegger at Marburg University, he had the opportunity to hear Heidegger present a colloquium 
paper on the question of Being, one of his early articulations of the discussion between Being 
and beings: “The  next  morning,  I  took  a  walk  with  him [Heidegger], and he asked me what I 
thought about it (incidentally, it was one of the best he ever gave). To his surprise I told him, 
“You  gave  a  sermon  last  night,  an  atheistic  sermon,  but  couched entirely in the phraseology of 
early  German  pietism.”
234 He  understood  immediately  what  I  meant  and  accepted  it.”235 Tillich’s  
“little  respect”  for  Heidegger
236 was certainly not because Heidegger’s  philosophical program 
was disjointed from faith in God. Heidegger set forth his views on the relationship between 
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philosophy  and  theology  in  one  of  his  last  lectures  at  Marburg,  “Phenomenology  and  Theology”  
(1928), in which Heidegger even insisted on the fideistic claim of faith. In  his  view,  “Theology  
can only render faith more difficult, that is, render it more certain that faithfulness cannot be 
gained through the science of theology, but solely  through  faith.”  He  explains  “faithfulness”  as 
“a  “graciously-bestowed”  mode  of  existence.”237 Heidegger understands theology as a self-
clarification of faith, and not a harmonizing of faith and reason. With this attitude he continues to 
resist the kind of harmonization of philosophy and faith that is characteristic of neo-scholastic 
theology and Christian philosophy. Heidegger has always held that there exists a sharp 
dichotomy between thinking and faith, and consequently between philosophy and theology. This 
applies also to Heidegger’s  own thinking. For this reason, Heidegger has not developed for 
himself a specific philosophy of religion and he himself claimed to have no competence in 
matters of religion.238 Tillich must have thought that Heidegger is right in not attempting to give 
religious answers to the questions raised by his philosophy, questions which Tillich thinks must 
be answered by the theologian. The interrelation of philosophy and theology in the history of 
Christianity was criticized by Heidegger “for having been responsible for the degeneration of 
both philosophy and theology.”239 Thus, “even at the height of the theological reception of his 
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work in the United States,”240 Heidegger maintained that he had no theological competence.241 In 
his letter to give  “some  pointers  to  major  aspects  for  a  theological discussion”242 held at Drew 
University, Heidegger advised  that  “One  should  avoid  [in  this  letter]  the  impression  that  
dogmatic theses are stated in terms of a Heideggerian philosophy, when there is no such 
thing.”
243 But this does not mean that he broke off his theological studies. Many interpreters have 
said that Heidegger  himself  “maintained,”  or  “insisted,”  that  he  was  not  a  theologian.244 Indeed, 
his way into a religious career was hindered and he renounced a career as a theologian. But the 
direct evidence is entirely lacking to prove that he himself ever maintained that he was not a 
theologian. Rather, the reverse is true. The philosophically and interpersonally telling 
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correspondence between Heidegger and Löwith provides a revealing self-portrait of his 
fundamental orientation in the early 1920s. In 1921, Heidegger makes a “confession”245 to 
Löwith:  “I  work  concretely  and  factically  out  of  my  “I  am,”  out  of  my  intellectual  and  wholly  
factic origin, milieu, life-contexts….To  this  facticity  of  mine  belongs  what  I  would  in  brief  call  
the  fact  that  I  am  a  “Christian  theologian.”  This  involves  a  particular  radical  concern….I  am  all  
this in the life-context  of  the  university.”246 There is no doubt that Tillich appreciated the 
theological  orientation  of  Heidegger’s  philosophy,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  Heidegger’s  
existential analytic is theistic. Nevertheless, Tillich’s occasional references to  “Heidegger’s  
emphatic  atheism”
247 should not be taken to mean that Heidegger is an atheist. James Luther 
Adams alleged that “Heidegger  considered  himself  as  an  atheist,  a  person  lacking  in  religious  
faith.”
248 As John D. Caputo rightly points out, however, that Heidegger was an atheist is only a 
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“popular  impression”  that  was  “hastily  drawn.”
249 Heidegger denied those accusations of 
nihilism and atheism that his Being and Time (1927) and What is Metaphysics? (1929) had 
caused, by defending his positive interpretation of being, and he radically distanced his thinking 
from an atheistic  existentialism.  He  explains  that  “With  the  existential  determination  of  the  
essence  of  the  human  being,  therefore,  nothing  is  decided  about  the  “existence  of  God”  or  His  
“non-being”…Thus  it  is  not  only  rash  but  also  an  error  in  procedure  to  maintain  that the 
interpretation of the essence of the human being from the relation of his essence to the truth of 
being is atheism. And what is more, this arbitrary classification betrays a lack of careful 
reading.”
250 Heidegger, a baptized Catholic and former seminarian, has apparently never been 
subjected to any official condemnation by the Catholic Church. During the Marburg period, 
Heidegger did not regard his work as atheistic in any way. What he objects to is the wrong sort 
of deity. Heidegger became a critic of scholasticism, not because he was an atheist, but because 
he had rejected the intellectualist standpoint common to scholasticism. In laying a 
phenomenological-ontological foundation for theology, Being and Time, like every 
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phenomenological inquiry, had merely put the question of God in brackets.251 Being and Time is 
not atheistic, but it is methodologically neutral,252 providing an existential ontological ground on 
whose basis one may make a choice either for or against God. Heidegger said that we must 
practice a  “methodological  atheism,”253 or  “theological  indifference,”254 a systematic suspension 
of the data of revelation and faith in God, “in order to isolate the formal structure of the “factical 
life of Dasein.””255 In his 1921-22 lecture, Heidegger  insisted  that  “questioningness 
[Fraglichkeit] is not religious, but it may nevertheless lead me to a position where I must make a 
religious decision. I do not behave religiously in philosophizing, even if I as a philosopher can be 
a  religious  man.  “But  here  is  the  art”:  to philosophize and thereby to be genuinely religious, i.e., 
to take up factically its worldly, historical task in philosophizing, in action and a world of action, 
not in religious ideology and fantasy. Philosophy, in its radical self-positing questioningness, 
must be in principle a-theistic.”256 Philosophy is radical questioning, but to really question – to 
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push  one’s  questioning  to  the  very end – one must suspend,  or  bracket,  one’s  faith, for faith gives 
answers too soon. “For  example,  anyone  for  whom  the  Bible is divine revelation and truth 
already  has  the  answer  to  the  question  “Why  are  there  beings  at  all  instead  of  nothing?”  before  it  
is  even  asked:  beings,  with  the  exception  of  God  Himself,  are  created  by  Him….One  who  holds  
on to such faith as a basis can, perhaps, emulate and participate in the asking of our question in a 
certain  way,  but  he  cannot  authentically  question  without  giving  himself  up  as  a  believer….He 
can act only “as  if.”” 257  This methodological neutrality reclaims the freedom of ontological 
inquiry against the constraint imposed by adopting the tenets of any religious doctrine. Therefore, 
Heidegger’s  philosophical  work  was  always  ““methodologically”  atheist.”
258 As István M. Fehér 
points out, Heidegger  used  the  term  “atheism” in order to direct philosophy to  the experience of 
factical life which lies beneath the phenomenon of faith, rather than to oppose theism. Hence 
Heidegger’s  atheism  “is  more  methodological  than  thematic.”
259 For Heidegger, all philosophy is 
atheistic in a sense.260 Heidegger  was  “a  theologian  by  tradition,  and  an  atheist  as  a  scholar.”261 
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258 John  D.  Caputo,  “Heidegger  and  Theology,”  in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. 
Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 333. 
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(Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), which traces the development of his 
explanation of philosophy as a methodological atheism. 
 
261 Karl Löwith, My Life in Germany Before and After 1933: A Report, trans. Elizabeth King 
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This made on the public mind the impression of atheism. To this, Heidegger responded that “It  is  
preferable to put up with the cheap accusation of atheism, which, if it is intended ontically, is in 
fact completely correct. But might not the presumably ontic faith in God be at bottom 
godlessness? And might the genuine metaphysician be more religious than the usual faithful, 
than  the  members  of  a  “church”  or  even  than  the  “theologians”  of  every  confession?”
262 
There is little sense in calling Heidegger a theist in any conventional sense, however, and 
it lies beyond the scope of the present work to resolve the question as to whether the later 
Heidegger arrives at a religious position,  or  he  moved  “ultimately  to  a  frankly  “aggressive  
atheism.”263 In  Heidegger’s  thought,  as Barth points out,264 “God  and  His  revelation  are  not  
provided  for  at  all,  nor  indeed  can  be.”
265 But, as Barth later  also  says,  “Heidegger  does  not  deny  
the existence of a deity, only that this deity is concealed under the pseudonym of 
nothingness.”
266 Even if God is real for Heidegger, he “placed  the  actuality  of  God  prior  to  the  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
262 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. M. Heim (Bloomington: 
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Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 334. 
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division  between  theism  and  atheism  and  even  prior  to  the  logical  form  of  contradiction.”
267 For 
the same reason, Tillich was never a theist in the traditional sense. It is meaningless, Tillich 
declares, to discuss the existence or non-existence of God.268 It is not meaningful to ask if God 
“exists”  in  the  sense  of  being  found  within  the  whole  of  spatio-temporal reality. God does not 
“exist”  in  this  sense.
269 Divine being is never to be regarded as in any way comparable to finite 
being. God is not a creature, not a member of the world, and not even an existing thing. Tillich 
detected an important aspect of  Heidegger’s  pursuit of an ontological thinking as a whole, that 
Heidegger’s  philosophy  is  theologically  oriented.  Tillich’s  sympathy  with  Heidegger’s  thinking  
resides in this theological potentiality. For Tillich, “the  methodological  atheism  of  the  “early”  
Heidegger was still  too  theological.”270 With Heidegger, Tillich hoped for a conversion to 
authentic Christianity, prepared by methodological atheism. Tillich  confesses  that  “by the 
appearance of the so-called  “Existential  Philosophy”  in  Germany,  I  was  led  to  a  new  
understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. The lectures of Martin 
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Heidegger given at Marburg, the impression of which on my Marburg students and upon some of 
my colleagues I experienced; then his writing, Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), also his 
interpretation of Kant, were of greater significance to followers and opponents of his philosophy 
than  anything  else  since  the  appearance  of  Husserl’s  Logische Untersuchungen (Logical 
Studies).”271 Tillich was concerned with the problem of the historical Jesus and the New 
Testament during his student years.272 While unresolved historical issues from New Testament 
studies  provided  the  focus  for  Tillich’s  earliest  theological  development,  philosophical  concerns  
soon played an increasing role in his work. The impetus for this new development is his 
Systematic Theology, the first volume of which appeared in 1951. Tillich tells us that he began 
working and lecturing on it in his third and last semester at Marburg,273 that is, after his exposure 
to and developing troubles  with  Heidegger’s  philosophy.  This  explains  the  role  of  Heidegger’s  
philosophy in his own project of systematic theology. Wilhelm and Marion Pauck point out that 
“there  are  some  who  feel  that  had  it  not  been  for  Heidegger’s  Being and Time, Tillich would 
never  have  developed  his  ontology  as  he  did.”
274 Relative to this discovery of existentialism at 
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272 Bernard Martin, The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich (New Haven: College and 
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York: Harper and Row, 1976), 98. 
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Marburg, Tillich has written: “It  took  years  before  I  became  fully  aware  of  the  impact  of  this  
encounter on my own thinking. I resisted, I tried to learn, I accepted the new way of thinking 
more  than  the  answers  it  gave.”
275 As he says, Tillich’s  relationship  to  Heidegger was not 
accidental, but was a conscious relationship which he cultivated in order to achieve a new way of 
thinking. In some ways it was not a new way of thinking in that Tillich regards himself as having 
been prepared by his affinity with Schelling, his knowledge of Kierkegaard and the philosophy 
of life.276 It would be a mistake to  assume  that  Tillich’s  existentialism  was  simply  an  extension  
of Heidegger’s  philosophy  into  theology.  It is certainly not correct to say that Tillich could say 
no  more  because  his  own  theological  existentialism  was  so  entwined  with  Heidegger’s.  Rather, 
Tillich  adapted  Heidegger’s  philosophy  to  fit  his  own  theological  purposes. More specifically, 
Tillich  assimilated  Heidegger’s  thought  to  an  older  philosophical-theological tradition. Tillich 
did impose certain  limits  on  the  theological  use  of  Heidegger’s  analysis  of  existence,  but  he  feels  
that it is valid within these limits and can be used with profit by the theologian to interpret the 
existence of the faithful. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
275 AR, 14.   
 
276 OB, 56.  Cf.  Alasdair  MacIntyre  writes,  “Particularly  unfortunate  is  the kinship here between 
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Philosophy, ed. Daniel John O’Connor  (New  York:  The  Free  Press,  1964),  522.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE QUESTION OF THE ULTIMATE MEANING OF EXISTENCE 
 
The Question of the Meaning of Life 
 
 
The central preoccupation of modern existential philosophy, broadly understood, is to 
understand how it is possible for human beings to live a meaningful life in a world where 
traditional meanings are no longer convincing. Life by itself does not constitute a twentieth-
century philosophy. But it amounts to a constant theme throughout the twentieth century since 
European philosophers in particular continuously appropriate and transform the concept of life. 
The question of the ultimate meaning of life lies  at  the  heart  of  Tillich’s  theological  enterprise.  
Life philosophy  is  of  great  importance  for  Tillich’s  early  development.  But  Heidegger’s  
philosophy shows him that life philosophy is not able to answer the question of the meaning of 
life, and that the question of the meaning of life is fundamentally the question of the meaning of 
“existence.”  Following Heidegger, Tillich approvingly and critically engages himself with life 
philosophy in search for an alternative philosophy of life in order to answer the question of the 
meaning of existence.  
For Tillich, the question of the meaning of existence is not merely the question of 
“existence in time and space.” By “existence” he means “the whole of human reality, the 
structure, the meaning and the aim of existence.”1 That the world is, that the world exists, as 
                                                 
1 ST1, 14. Italics mine. 
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Wittgenstein declared, is the mystical fact.2 People are endlessly fascinated with the spiritual and 
mysterious dimension of life. Existential thinkers agree on the importance of the question of the 
meaning of life, while they differ in their answers. By contrast, analytic philosophers for many 
years dismissed the question of the meaning of life as illegitimate. An extreme point of view, 
developing largely under the influence of logical positivism, held that the phrase “the meaning of 
life” is meaningless. Following a line of critical thought initiated by Kant, questions reaching 
beyond empirical knowledge were viewed as attempts at the old-fashioned metaphysics.3 But the 
mysterious matters in so far as it is believed to be the place where the answer to the question of 
the  ultimate  meaning  of  existence  can  be  found.  The  Kingdom  of  God  matters  because  it  is  “a  
symbolic  expression  of  the  ultimate  meaning  of  existence.”
4 The ultimate concern for Tillich is 
the meaning of existence. Life, death, God, Being itself, faith and religion are all penultimate 
questions.  “I  exist.  Why?” This is the ultimate question, and Tillich believes that he shares this 
concern with Heidegger. Heidegger and Tillich are not so much ontologists as existentialists in 
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this respect. Heidegger says that “Every  question  of  philosophy  returns  to  existence.”5 Heidegger 
was initially attracted to “life  philosophy”  under  the  overpowering  influence  of  Nietzsche, and 
Tillich under the influence of Heidegger, concerning the question of the ultimate meaning of life 
which, as Tillich concludes, life  philosophy  “never  was  able  to  answer.”6 A comparison between 
Heidegger’s  critique  of  life  philosophy  and  that  of  Tillich, particularly concerning the life 
philosophies of Dilthey and Bergson, will demonstrate the important element of Heideggerian 
existentialism  in  Tillich’s  early  theological  program.   
 
Heidegger’s  Concept of Life 
 
 
As  he  had  suggested  in  the  habilitation’s  conclusion  in  1916,  Heidegger  “no longer 
believes in the corrigibility of the dogmatic system of scholasticism by authentic religious 
experiences.”7 Heidegger came to endorse the Lutheran thesis that Greek metaphysics had 
contaminated the Christian life of the spirit. “In  the  end,  the  system  totally  excludes  an  original  
and genuine experience of religious  value…Accordingly,  scholasticism,  within  the  totality  of  the  
medieval Christian lifeworld, severely jeopardized the immediacy of religious life and forgot 
religion for theology and dogmas. This theorizing and dogmatizing influence was exercised by 
church authorities in their institutions and statues already in the time of early Christianity. [In a  
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situation like this,] an experience like that of mysticism is to be understood as an elementary 
countermovement.”
8 Fundamentally and ultimately, Heidegger’s  central  concern  was  the  
meaning of life. “Life  designates  a  manner  of  being  for  which  each  category  from  previous  
ontology  is  wanting.”
9 As Gabriel Marcel  describes  it,  life  as  a  “mystery  to  be  experienced”  is  a  
“problem  to  be  solved.” The  “meaning”  of life is what Heidegger focuses on initially in his 
analysis of Christianity. In the early 1920s, his basic argument during his lecture course in the 
summer semester of 1920 is that, in one way or another,  “life”  is  the  central  problem  of  
contemporary philosophy.10 Heidegger  thinks  that  “life”  is  central  to  problems  in  the  
contemporary  philosophy  of  history  and  of  culture,  as  well  as  the  “logic  of  the  sciences,”  i.e.,  
theories regarding concept formation in the sciences. The fundamental task that Heidegger gives 
himself is  to  gain  a  deeper  appreciation  for  the  problem  of  “life”  by  confronting  the  “concrete,  
contemporary  situation.”
11 For this purpose, Heidegger first attempted to reawaken an authentic 
Christian living, or the life of the Spirit. Thus, in his course on the phenomenology of religion 
during the winter semester of 1920-1921,  interpreting  Paul’s  Letters,  Heidegger  analyzed the 
life-experience of early Christianity, which had been obscured by the Scholastic tradition. Then, 
Heidegger narrows down his object to life as such. Heidegger avoids biological approaches to 
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life, “insisting always on the priority of philosophy over the sciences.”12 “Life”  as  such  receives 
in-depth treatment in his lecture course in the winter semester of 1921-1922.13 In this lecture, we 
find  a  sentence  that  runs:  “living  =  being-there [Dasein],  being  in  and  through  living.”14 
Heidegger is concerned with life because it is problematic. In the same lecture, Heidegger says 
that  “life  is  worrying  [Sorgen].” It is in its own anxiety that the living human being is concerned 
with  its  living.  Gadamer  states  that  “If  we  think  this  sentence  through,  we  have  before  us  the  
unity  of  Heidegger’s  entire  path  of  thought.”
15  
Dasein dies. It is born to that end. Heidegger writes, “The  instant  a  human being comes to 
be  alive  it  is  old  enough  to  die.”
16 In  an  early  lecture  course  at  Freiburg,  Heidegger  cites  Luther’s  
commentary  on  Genesis  to  similar  effect:  “For  as  soon  as  we  abandon  our  mother’s  womb  we  
begin  to  die.”
17 David Farrell Krell observes that “Almost  always,  “life”  will  appear  in  “scare-
                                                 
12 David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), 38. 
 
13 The entire third part of the course  is  devoted  to  “factical  life.”  See  GA61  79-155. 
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15 Hans-Georg  Gadamer,  “Martin  Heidegger’s  One  Path,”  trans.  P.  Christopher  Smith,  in  Reading 
Heidegger From the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 25. 
 
16 BT, 289/SZ, 245. Heidegger refers to lines in Alois Bernt and Konrad Burdach, eds., Der 
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quotes”  in  Being and Time.  Almost  always,  “life”  will  have  to  be  shooed  away.”18 Dasein lives 
to die. It is, Heidegger assures us, a fact. This seems to be all Dasein can know about its living. 
Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Bergson all characterized life as such an irreducible fact. But Dasein 
desires to understand the reason of its living. Hence it is agitated. Facticity refers, after all, to the 
fact in its being a fact, i.e., precisely the fact back of which and behind which one cannot go. For 
Heidegger, the fact of facticity is a fact of life. He  endorses  Dilthey’s  remark  that  “‘life’  is  that  
which  one  cannot  get  back  behind.”
19 But Heidegger was deeply concerned with the meaning of, 
that is, the origin and destiny of, life. In Heidegger, life is not considered as such, but instead in 
relation to its ultimate values. In other words, he searches for a motive which maintains the 
concern and affliction over life. Life as such does not have any meaning that concerns Heidegger. 
The ultimate question is not what life is, but why we live. For Heidegger, genuine philosophy is 
a pre-theoretical originary science (Urwissenschaft als vor-theoretische Wissenschaft).20 And 
that, he argues, is phenomenology. In his war emergency semester lecture course of 1919, 
Heidegger  declares  that  “Phenomenology  is  the  investigation  of  life  in  itself.”  Again, he states in 
the lecture courses, “Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation Into 
Phenomenological Research,” which Heidegger delivered in the winter semester of 1921-1922, 
that  “Philosophy  is  a  basic  How  of  life  itself,  so  that  in  each  case  it  authentically  re-trieves life, 
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taking it back from decline, and this taking-back,  as  radical  research,  is  life.”21 The genuine 
insights of  phenomenology  can  be  obtained  only  by  “an  honest  and  unreserved  immersion  in  life  
itself in its genuineness, and this is ultimately possible only through the genuineness of a 
personal  life.”
22 Philosophy as phenomenology is the plunge into life itself in its authenticity in 
order for a breakthrough to pre-theoretical life. Philosophy, as Heidegger understands it, is 
therefore fundamentally  an  “originary  science of  the  origin  of  [factical]  life.”23 Heidegger’s  
phenomenology does not concern simply factical life, but life as arising from the origin. The life 
at issue here is  “my”  personal  situation.  “I  myself”  is  really  a  decisive  context  in  which  I  live. 
Having oneself is thus the expression of life in its originality.  
 
Heidegger’s  Critique  of  Dilthey and Bergson 
 
 
Following the lead of the influential turn-of-the  century  movement  called  “life  
philosophy,” Heidegger hoped to recover a more original sense of life by emphasizing futurity as 
the mode of authentic existence. The weakness of life philosophy in its attempted explanation of 
the meaning of life was  called  to  Tillich’s  attention  by  Heidegger’s  critique  of  life  philosophies  
of Wilhelm Dilthey and Henri Bergson. Consequently,  Tillich’s  critique  of  life  philosophy  
centrally focuses on the loss of the meaningful future for human existence in life philosophy. 
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The philosophy of life plays an important role in  Heidegger’s  own  development. His 
attraction to this movement was “a  necessary  stage  to  radical  phenomenological  philosophy.”24 It 
is clear from numerous references in his early lectures that one of the decisive inspirations for the 
young  Heidegger’s  turn  to  early  Christianity  is particularly the work of Dilthey, who, for 
Heidegger, is “the most important of the names one could suggest in relation to hermeneutics.”25 
He  regarded  Dilthey  as  “the  strongest  effective  philosopher  for  the  next  decades.”26 Heidegger’s  
project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time originates from  Dilthey’s  philosophy  of  life.    
In 1925, Heidegger offered  lectures  on  Dilthey’s  philosophy  of  life  with  a  reference  to  “a  
fundamental problem for the entire history of Western philosophy, the problem concerning the 
meaning (Sinn)  of  human  life.”27 Dilthey  sought  to  base  himself  on  “life”  as  the  ultimate  
foundation from which all philosophy must proceed. Dilthey  identifies  “to  understand  life  from 
life  itself”  as  “the  dominant  impulse  in  [his] philosophical  thinking.”28 For Dilthey, life is a 
historical reality. The concepts derived from the natural sciences cannot be applied to the 
interpretation of life. Life must not be interpreted in the epistemologically abstract way. He 
suggests instead that philosophy must proceed from life as ever present reality and lived 
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experience. Dilthey describes his understanding life in terms of a “descriptive psychology.”29 
Descriptive psychology is, as Pierre Keller defines it, “concerned with the individual experiences 
that make up an individual life as well as the distinctive way in which human beings experience 
their lives in different societies and historical epochs.”30 Dilthey explains that life manifests itself 
in developments of  lived  experience,  and,  in  one’s  life,  these  lived  experiences  are  connected  
together into the structural whole of  one’s  life-history. And one’s  life  constituted as such is in 
turn grounded in the wider historical context in which it is an element. For Dilthey, therefore, the 
meaning of life is apprehended by analyzing the  historical  objectification  of  life.  “Man  does  not  
understand his own self by means of any kind of rumination upon  himself…only  through  an  
understanding of the historical reality generated by him does he obtain a consciousness of his 
capacities,  for  good  or  for  ill.”
31 Life is to be understood through categories derived from life 
itself  by  “entering  ever  more  deeply  into  the  historical  world.”
32 Dilthey  says,  “Only  his  history  
tells  man  what  he  is.”
33 But Heidegger argues that Dilthey, and also Bergson, do not succeed in 
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determining  the  meaning  of  life  because  “futurity”  remains  occluded  in  their  formulations.34 
Heidegger points out that the proper method of understanding life is not scientific because 
science looks at things from the outside, and life can be understood only from within.  
Heidegger criticizes Dilthey and Bergson for having moved merely on the ontical, 
empirical plane. In his view, historical existence in the past enables for one to act with a 
consciousness toward future possibilities. Thus,  futurity  becomes  history’s  dominant  principle.  
Dilthey and Bergson do not provide us with a theory of human existence that accounts for this 
futurity of human existence.35 The genuine understanding of historicity of humanity requires an 
existential and ontological analysis of human existence. In contrast, the nineteenth-century 
understanding of history as a positive science attempted to capture the past the way it really was. 
This attitude originated with the theory of Leopold von Ranke whose understanding of historicity 
focused primarily on the object of research within the stream of historical time. This so-called 
historicism “remained incapable of providing orientation or directives for the historical 
present.”36 Heidegger regards historicism as dead end in twentieth-century German philosophy. 
Based on scientific objectivity and epistemological certainty, historicists tried to understand the 
reality of historical experience by denying or avoiding the problem of subjectivity. By attempting 
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to interpret history within the frame of science, historicists denied the “subjective hermeneutic 
experience” that makes history possible at all. Dilthey objected to this approach by stressing the 
historicity of the subject. Dilthey emphasized the importance of lived experience as a response to 
the problem of historicism. According to Dilthey, historicity meant that all life was historically 
determined, which means for him that life was in history. This implies that the meaning of life is 
determined by its history. In Heidegger’s  view,  Dilthey does not make serious approach to the 
problem of historicity of human being. Heidegger rejects the view that human life is simply 
something that occurs in history, and suggests, instead, that historicity is a fundamental category 
of human life. In other words, history depends on the historicity of human being. As such, 
Heidegger’s  understanding of life experience denies Diltheyan ground of historical meaning. The 
historical understanding of humanity must proceed from the explication of the meaning of life. 
For Heidegger, history is determined by the meaning of life. Life as the lived experience of 
human existence is not in history. The human existence itself is the historicity of history. As he 
remarks,  “History  as  Geschichte signifies a happening [Geschehen]  that  we  ourselves  are…we 
are  this  very  happening…We  are  history.”
37  
Dilthey was not able to ask the question about historicity as such because he did not ask 
the existential ontological question about the meaning of life.38  Heidegger suggests that Dilthey 
was at once aware of the radical nature of the question of the essence of history but also limited 
by his own approach. What is missing in Dilthey is an insight into the existentiality of 
consciousness, and consequently a hermeneutics of facticity. For Heidegger, the existentiality of 
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consciousness is historicity. Dilthey made a distinction between the natural and the human 
sciences. According to him, the objects of the natural sciences are the facts that, as external 
appearances of objects and individuals, come into consciousness. The objects of the human 
sciences such as the science of history are internal. They enter consciousness from inside. Based 
on this distinction, Dilthey sought to describe the subjective conditions that produce historical 
knowledge of human existence. But, Heidegger accuses, Dilthey did not provide  “an  ontological  
interpretation of the being  of  consciousness.”39 Dilthey has left ontologically uninvestigated the 
essential nature of humanness that makes lived experiences possible in the first place.40 The 
genuine meaning of history depends on the genuine interpretation of the lived experiences that 
constitute history. But the genuine meaning of lived experiences can be obtained by an 
existential ontological analysis of the existentiality of consciousness. In an unpublished essay 
written immediately before Being and Time, Heidegger remarks on Brentano’s  psychology  
Heidegger  that  “Psychology  was  a  doctrine  of  life,  of  human  existence  itself.  Not  only  Dilthey,  
but also Husserl is determined  by  Brentano’s  psychology,  that does not want to explain 
psychological processes, but basic constitutions.”41 Thus, Dilthey, like Descartes, fails to 
question into the existential structure of Dasein, forgetting that it is only Dasein who is allowed 
for lived experiences. Having no ground in an existential-ontological account of our human 
being, Dilthey’s  work is determined by a general theory of the human sciences which is 
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constructed by a survey of natural scientific investigations in a purely analytical way and which 
is incompatible with his basic insight into the historicity of human being. Heidegger observes 
that, in  Dilthey,  “‘life’  is  to  be  understood  in  the  historical  context  of  its  development  and  its  
effects, and understood as the way in which man, as the possible object of the humane sciences, 
and especially as the root of these sciences, is.”42 He points out that “The  historical  is  today  
almost  exclusively  an  objective  interest…because  we  do  not  genuinely  see  the  phenomenon  of  
existence  today.”
43  
Heidegger sees life as historical and grounded in an intimate immersion in the world. But 
life cannot be explained from mere analysis of its past. As George Seidel  rightly  explains,  “The  
possibility of factual history or of historiological understanding, the very possibility of 
historiography as a science, depends for its basis upon the historicity of Dasein, and not vice 
versa.”
44 Historicity refers to the possibility of history. The authentic sense of historicity is to be 
sought primarily in the way in which the past is made meaningful to the self. The past has 
meaning only according to the mode in which it is appropriated by Dasein in its concern for 
fulfillment of a sense of existence. But the past is appropriated by Dasein under the condition of 
its futurity. Dilthey’s  way  of  disclosing  life focuses only on personalities of the past, which are 
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past things.45 For Heidegger, history as understood in historicism, that is, as objective events and 
processes of the past, is merely the ontic manifestation of a more fundamental ontological 
condition that provides its ground, namely the temporality of human life. It is the temporality of 
Dasein  that  constitutes  Dasein’s  historicity.  It  is  not an objective past  but  “the happening that we 
ourselves are.”46 The historicity is what we ourselves are.47 After all, what is historical is Dasein. 
It is not that Dasein is in history. Heidegger  says,  “We  contend  that  what  is  primarily  historical  is  
Dasein. That which is secondarily historical, however, is what we encounter within-the-the-
world…Entities  other  than  Dasein…are  what  we  call  ‘world-historical.’”48 For Heidegger, 
history must be studied by asking an existential ontological question about the temporality of the 
human being – The  question  is  “existential  and  ontological”  in  that  the  existential  analysis  of  
Dasein is the only way to approach the ontological foundation of Dasein. Dasein’s  temporality,  
the  “there-ness”  of  “being  there,”  as  the  phenomenon  of  human  existence,  can  be  understood  
only against the background of  the  “being-ness,”  or  “Being itself,”  of  “being  there.”  For this 
reason, Heidegger continues to maintain that the sciences of history will not be grounded until 
one possesses an adequate idea of Being itself as the ontological Ground of Dasein, as 
distinguished from the concept of being in particular which is experienced as the existentiality of 
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Dasein.49 Dilthey admits the possibility of ultimate understanding of the meaning of human 
existence, but only at the end of human history. For  him,  a  conception  of  the  “meaning”  of  life  
makes  sense  only  in  terms  of  the  “development”  in  history, that is, in terms of the 
accomplishment of certain values and goals in the process of history. Dilthey is not willing to 
accept the teleological conception of life. He thinks that such conception of life is an illegitimate 
metaphysics.50 For sufficient empirical evidence is lacking for such an idea of the ultimate 
meaning of life.51 He declares that there is no ultimate value or goal for life.52 Thinking of a 
certain goal or end in history is to go beyond the empirical evidence. Besides the purposes of 
human agents themselves, Dilthey rejects the teleology of life. 
The beginning of the twentieth century saw another revival of interest in the mystery of 
human existence, mainly thanks to Bergson. He was also one of the philosophers who criticized 
metaphysical conceptions of truth and sought a new paradigm under the idea of “life.”  He 
viewed life as endowed with a psychic character.53 Bergson “intuites  the essence of personal life 
as an incessant tendency to self-creation. This intuition of personal existence makes its presence 
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felt.”54 Human life is constituted by the continuous stream of the felt psychic experience. In his 
study  on  time,  Bergson  presents  “pure  duration”
55 in  which  the  ego  “lets  itself  live”56 as 
immediate givenness, or an inner object, that is  accessible  to  our  original  “intuition”57 for 
theoretical contemplation. Personal life at any moment consists of a group of possibilities. 
Bergson pictures human existence as an ongoing process of creation founded on these 
possibilities. As such, life is always moving and accumulating experience. This movement is an 
élan or thrust. It has a direction, though not  a  goal.  Bergson’s  most  striking  illustration  of  human  
life is that of the rolling snowball.58 Human being is conscious of its personal life as an evolution. 
Bergson argues that the foundation of the  life’s  evolution  is  “duration.”  Duration is what makes 
evolution possible. Life is possible because it endures. Duration is, for Bergson, the ultimate 
reality of life. For Bergson, duration is not merely a succession of instantaneous existences. It is 
an active, cumulative carrying-forward of past into future – Physical things do not endure, but 
change. Life process has a direction in the sense that it is irreversible, while physical change is 
reversible. We experience this duration as life. Our life does not consist in a succession of 
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separate moments, but we endure, mature, are creating ourselves. For Bergson, duration is real 
time,  and  it  is  “what  is  happening,  and  more  than  that,  it  is  what  causes  everything  to  happen.”
59 
Time, in this sense, is vital, and the vital is of the nature of time. Time is the very essence of life, 
and life is a phase of duration. Heidegger considers Bergsonian vitalism as an attempt to show 
how life is better explained when it is understood through the concept of duration.  
Heidegger’s  objection  is  that  Bergson’s  narrow  focus  on  biological  evolution  concerning  
life does not go deep enough to answer the question of the ultimate meaning of existence. Again 
Heidegger’s  critique  of  Bergson  focuses  on  the  lack  of  the intuition of the motif of futurity in 
historical time. The question of the relation between temporality and subjectivity stands in the 
center of Being and Time.  The  discovery  of  the  genuine  meaning  of  “future”  is  one  of  the  most  
fruitful and important features of his analysis of being and time. An important goal of Being and 
Time is to show that the genuine conception of time or temporality, which can function as a 
horizon of understanding of being, must be developed on the basis of an interpretation of the 
temporality of human existence. For Heidegger, Bergson “explicitly adheres to a theoretical 
understanding of time consciousness in an emphatic sense.”60 Heidegger maintains that, although 
Bergson sets out to criticize Aristotelian time, and explicitly contrasts his own concept of 
“duration”  to  the  quantitative  time  of  Aristotle,  he  is  unable  to  arrive  at  an  adequate  alternative  
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view. He merely reduces time to a psychological phenomenon.61 Bergson says  that  “There  is  a  
reality that is external and yet given immediately  to  the  mind…This  reality  is  mobility.”62 The 
goal of life is its own mobility without destiny. In contrast, Heidegger writes that “Only  a  reality  
that is essentially future in its being so  that  it  is  free  for  its  death…makes  possible  something  like 
destiny.”
63 This statement is perhaps the most evident expression of the fundamental 
disagreement between  Bergson’s  and  Heidegger’s  philosophy  of  life.  What is the ultimate 
meaning of life for Bergson? Like Dilthey, Bergson thinks that the question is a pseudo-
question.64 He thinks that the question of the ultimate meaning of life arises from the pseudo-idea 
of nothingness. “The  idea  of  the  absolute  nought,  in  the  sense  of  the  annihilation  of  everything,  is  
a self-destructive idea, a pseudo-idea, a mere word.”65 “The  pseudo-idea would create a pseudo-
problem.”
66 The question of the ultimate meaning of life is a question derived from the question 
why there is something rather than nothing. But the metaphysical concept of nothing is a pseudo-
idea. Bergson says therefore that  the  question,  “Why  does  something  exist?”  is  without  meaning,  
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a pseudo-problem raised about a pseudo-idea.67 Life is a mystery and it becomes a problem only 
in the sense that life exists rather than not. All existence – matter, consciousness, God – becomes 
a question only when it is understood as a conquest of nothingness. Bergson concludes that there 
is not really a mystery about life. The whole something-versus-nothing question is based on an 
illusion, illusion that it is possible for there to be nothing at all. Bergson suggests that the idea of 
absolute nothingness is self-contradictory. Since nothingness is a pseudo-idea, he concludes, the 
question  “Why  is  there  something  rather  than  nothing?”  is  a  pseudo-question. Heidegger was not 
persuaded by this conclusion. For him nothingness is reality. It is the force that annihilates the 
realm of being. Heidegger  declares,  “Why  is  there  being  rather  than  nothing  at  all?”  to  be  the 
“deepest,”  “the  most  far-reaching,”  “the  most  fundamental  of  all  questions.”68  
 
The Primacy of Life in Tillich’s  Post-War Religious Socialism 
 
 
During World War I, Tillich served as a chaplain in the German army. According to 
Tillich, the horrors of the war aroused his “awareness  of  the  irrationality  of  the  existent”69 and 
undermined his assumptions about the meaning of life. The War marked “the breakdown of an 
older order, the end of a great historical epoch, the collapse of traditional conceptions of God and 
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religion.”70 Tillich recalls that his personal turning point came in the battle of Champagne in 
1915.71 “All  night  long  I  moved  among  the  wounded and dying as they were brought in – many 
of them my close friends. All that horrible, long night I walked along the rows of dying men, and 
much of my German classical philosophy broke down that night – the belief that man could 
master cognitively the essence of his being, the belief in the identity of essence and 
existence…The  traditional  concept  of  God  was  dead.”72 To make matters worse, Tillich came 
home to a broken nation and a broken marriage – Tillich’s  wife  ran  off  with  his  best  friend.  The  
experience  left  him  “utterly  transformed.  The  traditional  monarchist  had  become  a  religious  
socialist,  the  Christian  believer  a  cultural  pessimist,  the  repressed  puritanical  boy  a  “wild  man.”  
These years represent the turning point of Paul  Tillich’s  life  – the  first,  last  and  only  one.”73 
Tillich must  have  “felt compelled to question not only the capitalist root of the war but much of 
the cultural and theological tradition in which he had been educated.”74 Tillich sanctions 
Heidegger’s  observation  about the features of modern society that prompt individuals to 
experience their lives as meaningless. Tillich agrees that “human  existence  has  fallen  into  utter  
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meaninglessness.”
75 “A  belief  breaks  down through external events or inner processes: one is cut 
off from creative participation in a sphere of culture, one feels frustrated about something which 
one had passionately affirmed, one is driven from devotion to an object to devotion to another 
and again on to another, because the meaning of each of them vanishes and the creative eros is 
transformed into indifference or aversion. Everything is tried and nothing satisfies. The contents 
of the tradition, however excellent, however praised, however loved once, lose their power to 
give  content  today.  And  present  culture  is  even  less  able  to  provide  the  content.”
76 
Tillich  writes,  “The  World  War  in  my  own  experience  was  the  catastrophe  of  idealistic  
thinking  in  general.  Even  Schelling’s  philosophy  was  drawn  into  this  catastrophe.”
77 After the 
war, Tillich still ranked Schelling above other religious philosophers,78 but he thought that 
Schelling played down the experience of the meaninglessness. Tillich judged that Schelling 
perceived the meaninglessness in life,  but  Schelling’s  romantic  idealism  compelled  him  to  cover  
it up.79 For philosophy to be true and real, it had to speak to the existential realities of 
estrangement, despair, the void, the demonic, and most importantly death.80 Tillich says that 
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“The  experience of the four years of war tore this chasm open for me and for my entire 
generation  to  such  an  extent,  that  it  was  impossible  ever  to  cover  it  up.”
81 In trying to understand 
Tillich’s  philosophy  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  his  study  of  Schelling was substantial 
influence on his philosophical outlook and his view of the development of modern philosophy. 
John Heywood Thomas testifies that “His  knowledge  of  Schelling  was  not  only  profound  – he 
was  one  of  the  century’s  greatest  Schelling  scholars  – but so sympathetic that, on more than one 
occasion,  he  would  quote  a  remark  of  Schelling’s  as  being  his  own.”
82 Before World War I, 
Tillich  believed  that  Schelling’s  philosophy  of  existence  and  his  interpretation  of  history  as  the  
history of salvation showed how the disciplines of theology and philosophy should be united, 
“the  eschatological  unity  of  theology  and  philosophy,”
83 which is the  ultimate  goal  of  Tillich’s  
theological  project.  According  to  Tillich,  Schelling’s  philosophical  development  is  orientated 
towards  the  concept  of  “philosophical  religion,”
84 which  expresses  “the  religious  self-
consciousness  of  Idealism.”
85 “But  to  be  sure,”  Tillich  laments,  “not  even  Schelling’s  philosophy  
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was able to bring about a unity of theology and philosophy.”86 Tillich says  that  “If  a  union  of  
theology and philosophy should again become possible, it could be achieved only in such a way 
as  would  do  justice  to  this  experience  of  the  abyss  of  our  existence.”
87 It is very easy for one to 
view the influence of Schelling in the light  of  Tillich’s  own  claim  that  Schelling  was  the  
beginning of modern existentialism.  Tillich’s  connection  with  Schelling  is  so  obvious  that  one  
can  overestimate  Schelling’s  reference  and  read  Tillich  as  some  scholars  do  merely  in  the  light  of  
Schelling. The Protestant theologian of whom one might first think when the question of 
Schelling’s  influence  is  raised  is  Tillich. Robert P. Scharlemann acknowledges that “No  other  
one of either nineteenth or the twentieth century so explicitly acknowledged his indebtedness to 
Schelling.”
88 And certainly, as discussed above, no other one has the distinction of having 
written his philosophical and his theological dissertation on Schelling. It would be wrong, 
however, to think of Schelling as the only key that one needs  to  Tillich’s  thought,  or  to  conclude  
that  Schelling  was  the  greatest  single  influence  on  Tillich’s  philosophical  development.
89 Rather, 
as Tillich himself states, the Tillichian theological project begins by turning away from 
Schelling.90 
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Tillich broke with liberal theology came with the experienced of war. This led him to 
engage himself in radical thought and politics. Tillich started his academic career as an adjunct 
professor of theology at the University of Berlin, from 1919 to 1924, before he began to develop 
his own systematic theology at the University of Marburg. During the Berlin period, Tillich was 
preoccupied more than anything else with politics. Tillich writes, “In  the  years  after  the  
revolution my life became more intensive as well as extensive. As a Privatdozent of theology at 
the University of Berlin (from 1919 to 1924), I lectured on subjects which included the relation 
of religion to  politics.”91 Tillich’s  post-war interest in religious socialism was one of the  war’s  
powerful consequences on his life. For Tillich, the goal of religious socialism was a meaningful 
society in which the power of life of every individual and every group can actualize itself.92 He 
organized a Christian socialist movement called “Kairos Circle,”  and  he  was  the first Lutheran 
minister to join the German Social Democratic Party.93 “Sensitive to these social, political and 
religious uncertainties,”94 Tillich wrote extensively during the 1920s and early 1930s concerning 
the strength and weakness of socialism. Consequently, Tillich’s  political  views  were  directed  
against the Nazi rise to power in 1933. Tillich must have been profoundly affected by the 
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question about religious certainty95 posed in such a historically conscious age in which 
“Nietzsche’s  atheism  and  nihilism  were  only the celebration – if one may call it that – of the 
triumph  of  the  questions  over  any  possible  answers.”
96 “Today  man  experiences  his  present  
situation in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all 
realms of life…It  has  given  theology  a  new  understanding  of  the  demonic-tragic structures of 
individual and social life.”97 It is not out of curiosity that Tillich is interested in politics, but out 
of his desire to seek the meaning of life. Tillich  asks,  “Today,  people in Germany know what 
death  is.  But  do  they  also  know  what  life  is?”
98 Tillich justifies this desire to know the meaning 
of life by saying that a Christina is called to love life. The way he chose to tackle the struggles of 
his age was to offer a comprehensive account of the meaning of life at every possible level. His 
moving away from politics is to make the problem of the meaning of life central to his system. If 
Tillich’s  early  socialist  existentialism  was  about  how  to  live,  his post-war theology concerns 
“why”  we  live,  “the  primacy  of  life  as  over  against  its  products.”
99 Tillich  writes,  “The  ecstatic  
form of existence, which prevailed so widely during the first years after the War, as a reaction 
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against  the  years  of  death  and  hunger  during  the  War,  made  “the  philosophy  of  life”  very  
attractive.”
100  
 
Tillich’s  Critique  of  Life  Philosophy 
 
 
Tillich’s  affirmation  of  the  will  to  life  was  indebted  to  Nietzsche’s  ontology  of  courage
101 
whose work he thinks as “the  most  impressive  and  effective  representation  of  what could be 
called  a  “philosophy  of  life.”
102 As did Heidegger, Tillich attempted to correct the erroneous, 
prevailing  interpretation  of  Nietzsche’s  concept  of  will  to  power,  showing  it  to  be  much  more  
profound than the vulgar concepts that many scholars had associated with the rise of Nazism – 
Tillich  does  confirm  Nazi’s misuse of Nietzsche.103 For  Nietzsche,  Tillich  insists,  “power  is  the  
self-affirmation  of  being.  Will  to  power  means  power  to  affirm  one’s  power  of  living,  the  will  to  
affirm  one’s  own  individual  existence.”
104 Tillich has pointed out that Nietzsche challenged 
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Relation to the Nazi Myth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).  
 
104 AHCT, 493.  
142 
 
 
whatever opposed life. These  concerns  of  Nietzsche’s  were  also  concerns  of  Tillich’s. Clearly 
Tillich saw himself allied with Bergson for his conception of the élan vital. Tillich felt that 
Bergson was also disturbed by the  insensitivity  of  “static, scholastic, or positivistic mode of 
thought” about life.105 But, in Tillich’s  view, Nietzsche, Bergson and other life-philosophers had 
instantaneous success and were unsuccessful in the long run. Tillich  thinks  that  Nietzsche’s  idea  
of the will-to-power is an adequate description of life process. But Tillich  criticizes  Nietzsche’s  
doctrine  of  the  eternal  return.  “There  is  a  lack  of  novelty,  of  the  really  new.  True,  Nietzsche  did  
have a strong emphasis  on  the  new  in  history…But  this  happens  only  within  a  particular  segment  
of  the  circle.  Nothing  absolutely  new  is  created.”
106 This  view  introduces  “a  fatalistic  
psychology.”
107 In  Nietzsche’s  world,  the  meaning  of  Dasein’s  life  must  be  self-created. Hence 
“A symbol  such  as  the  kingdom  of  God  as  the  aim  of  history  is  very  remote  from  Nietzsche.”108 
Tillich’s  discussion  and  criticism  of  the philosophy of life after Nietzsche center on Bergson. For 
Tillich, Bergson appeared as the most persuasive proponent of  “the primacy of life as over 
against  its  products”
109 “The  philosophy  of  life,  which  had  been  influenced  strongly  by  Nietzsche,  
has set forth in very impressive fashion the distinction between creative life and petrifying 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
105 John  J.  Carey,  editor’s  introduction  to  Theonomy  and  Autonomy:  Studies  in  Paul  Tillich’s  
Engagement with Modern Culture, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1984), xiv. 
 
106 AHCT, 502.  
 
107 Brad Hastings, Twist of Fate: The Moirae in Everyday Psychology (Lanham: University Press 
of America, 2008), 43.  
 
108 AHCT, 502.  
 
109 EP, 110. 
 
143 
 
 
calculation. Bergson in France and Simmel in Germany have restored to life its right to be 
considered  as  a  primal  and  original  datum…Now  the  way  into  the  profounder  levels  of  life  is  not  
to be found by means of physical and psychological analysis but only by means of intuitive 
insight, of apprehension  of  the  basis  of  one’s  own  aliveness…It  is  the  creative  and  inexhaustible  
ground  of  reality  which  has  been  rediscovered  by  the  philosophy  of  life.”
110 “What  has  become  
familiar under the rubric of  “life  philosophy”  is  a  tendency toward living existence. Life 
philosophy  recognizes  clearly  that  “life  is  not  an  object  of  controlling  knowledge;;  that  life  must  
be killed in order to be subjected to the means-ends  structure.”111 Bergson says that “In  reality,  
life is  a  movement…[this] movement is of the very essence  of  reality.”112 In other words, reality 
for him is “pure creative life.” His definition of life “excludes those ideas of perfection and 
finality.”113 Human  life  is  an  eternal  “becoming,” a ceaseless changefulness. Its essence is 
“dynamic  creativity”
114 which distinguishes itself from the merely mechanical.115 Tillich says 
against  process  philosophy  that  “A process philosophy which sacrifices the persisting identity of 
that which is in process sacrifices the process itself, its continuity, the relation of what is 
conditioned to its conditions, the inner aim (telos) which makes a process a whole. Bergson was 
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right when he combined the élan vital, the universal tendency toward self-transcendence, with 
duration, with continuity and self-conservation in the temporal flux.”116  
Tillich  agreed  with  Bergson’s  revolt  “against  the  rising  technology  that  devalued  the  
human  spirit  and  left  existence  meaningless”  and  with his  “anti-rationalistic,”  “intuitive,”  
“creative,”  “dynamic”  metaphysic  of  “the  self-affirmation  of  self.”117 Tillich clearly saw that this 
anti-rationalistic approach paralleled his own attack on mere controlling knowledge that 
transformed people into things. Tillich perceived Bergson as one who  desires  to  “save  life  from  
the destructive power of self-objectivation…for  the  preservation  of  the  person…in  a  situation  in  
which  the  self  was  more  and  more  lost  in  its  world.”
118 At bottom, however, life philosophy 
shows how little it has understood its very self, its basic task, the ultimate “meaning” of life. It is 
not in terms of the ultimate meaning of life,  but  of  the  “way”  of  life, that life philosophy 
develops its theory. Bergson’s  philosophy  that  explains  life  within  “psychological  categories”  is 
not a theory of life in the strictest sense.119 Life philosophy does not discuss the foundation, or 
the  origin,  of  life.  Therefore  “Any  attempt  to  investigate  the  current  philosophy  of  life  with  
respect  to  its  foundation  must  come  to  naught.”
120,Bergson worked under the influence of 
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“mechanism” and “teleology.”  These  rival  theories concerning the evolution in the sphere of 
earthly  life  “tried to assimilate the facts that Darwin brought to light, and people had to choose 
between the mechanical theory of evolution and the finalist theory of evolution. Bergson 
introduced his own theory by a criticism of these two.”121 Tillich pointed out that Bergson left no 
room for a vision of utopia, final harmony, or fulfillment. For Bergson the future is simply open 
without destiny. For Tillich, what is missing in Bergson’s  life  philosophy is the Heideggerian 
temporal ontology based on Dasein-centered “ecstatic temporality”122 in which Dasein happens 
transcendentally,  or  “stands  out  (ek-sists),”  into its past heritage, into its present world and into 
its future possibilities. For example, as Heidegger says, “The  future  is  not  later  than  having  been  
and  having  been  is  not  earlier  than  the  present.”
123 In terms of the meaning of life, Heidegger 
says, the primordial and authentic temporality is the future. Throughout, Heidegger argues that 
the future takes temporal priority for Dasein. The priority of the ecstasis of the future explains 
the  essential  nature  of  Dasein’s  being.  For without the ecstasis of the future,124 it is hard to see 
how human life in the present moment could be an issue for itself in the first place. Heidegger 
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claims  that  “temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future.”125 Without the 
priority of ecstasis of the future, consequently, “Bergson  devaluated  the  present  by  denying  the  
possibility  of  its  anticipation.”
126 The sense of historical purpose and destiny is lost when 
replaced by élan vital.  “What  about  the  problem  of  utopia?  In  Bergson  we  have  no  utopia,  we  
have the élan vital, the dynamic, creative, and continuing life-force. Bergson has asserted even of 
God, Who for him is the Ground of the life-process, that He can be identified only in relation to 
the past, for in relation to the future God Himself is open and does not know, so to speak, what 
the  future  will  be.”
127 For Bergson, the future is simply and absolutely openness.  “The  future  is  
genuine  only  if  it  is  open,  if  the  new  can  happen…This  is  the  motive  which  led  Bergson  to  insist  
upon the absolute openness of the future to the point of making God dependent on the unforeseen 
that  might  happen.”
128 For  Tillich,  “A  God who is not able to anticipate every possible future is 
dependent  on  an  absolute  accident  and  cannot  be  the  foundation  of  an  ultimate  courage,”  without  
which the ultimate meaning of life cannot be held up. How can there be meaning without 
purpose? Bergson says that  evolution  “takes  directions  without  aiming  at  ends.”  For Tillich, a 
physical force might do that, but not a conscious life. As Thomas G. Bandy has pointed out, 
“Bergson’s  conception  of  the  élan vital…does  not  carry  any  specific  religious  meaning  or  moral 
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demand,”  and  it  is  this  deficiency  Tillich  attempts to remedy by  undertaking  Heidegger’s  
existential analytic.129  
Tillich wished to penetrate to the deeper levels of life’s  reality. “Reality  in  itself  is  what  it  
is, and it can neither be true nor false. This certainly is a possible line of arguing, but it is also 
possible  to  go  beyond.”
130 For this, Tillich is in accord with Heidegger’s  claim that to make the 
distinction  between  the  ontical  reality  and  the  ontological  reality  of  life  is  “the  fundamental  goal 
of  the  philosophy  of  life.”
131 The only kind of theology that deserved to be written after the war 
is that which was able to address the abyss in human existence that the war revealed. The 
“theology  of  culture”  was  created  by  Tillich  in  a  moment  in  which  the so-called  “liberal  
theology”  stood  before  its  catastrophe  as  “a  surrender  of  the Christian message to cultural 
trends,”132 although Tillich’s  break  with  nineteenth  century  theology  was  not  absolute.133 Tillich 
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was concerned to overcome the undeniable gap between religion and culture in post-First World 
War Germany. Tillich’s  initial  formulation  of  the  idea  of  a  theology  of  culture  was  given  in  a  
lecture at the Kant Society in 1919134 to describe his proposals for a new understanding of 
theology135 able  to  “address clearly the urgencies of the general culture and yet remain faithful to 
[the]  Christian  church  communities”  of  his  time.
136 Tillich’s  theology  of  culture  is  in  effect  the  
elaboration of the philosophy of life that aims to be both theologically and practically relevant to 
the situation of humanity in the twentieth century.137 Tillich later described the situation toward 
which his theology of culture was directed and which he himself felt as a chaplain who had 
survived war in the trenches: “The  political  problems determined our whole existence; even after 
revolution and inflation they were matters of life and death. The social structure was in a state of 
                                                 
134 Tillich first used the term in his lecture to the Kant Society of Berlin, delivered on April 16th, 
1919.  It  first  appeared  as  “Über  die  Idee  einer  Theologie  der  Kultur,”  in  Religionsphilosoophie der Kultur. 
Zwei Entwürfe von Gustav Radbach und Paul Tillich (Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1919), reprinted in 
HW2, 69-85. There are two English translations, the first by William Baillee Green, which first appeared 
in Paul Tillich, What Is Religion? edited with and Introduction by James Luther Adams (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1969), 155-81, and is reprinted in Mark Kline Taylor, ed., Paul Tillich: Theologian of 
the Boundaries (London: Collins, 1987), 35-54. The other translation is by Victor Nuovo in Visionary 
Science.  A  Translation  of  Tillich’s  ‘On  the  Idea  of  a  Theology  of  Culture’  With  an  Interpretive  Essay 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987). Russell Re Manning, , Theology at the End of Culture: 
Paul  Tillich’s  Theology  of  Culture  and  Art (Leuven: Peeters Publishers: 2005), 8n8, notes that this lecture 
is  perhaps  Tillich’s  most  important  piece  of  writing  in  that  it  is  in  this  programmatic  lecture,  above  all  
others, that Tillich sets out his proposals for a new interpretation of theology as theology of culture.  
 
135 Peter  Phillips,  “Romanticism  and  the  Early  Thought  of  Paul  Tillich”  (doctoral  dissertation,  
Nottingham  University,  1992),  200,  compares  the  “revolutionary  manifesto  of a  theology  of  culture”  with  
Schleiermacher’s  On Religion. Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers and  Wordsworth’s  Prelude. 
 
136 Mark  Kline  Taylor,  “Introduction:  The  Theological  Development  and  Contribution  of  Paul  
Tillich (1886-1965),”  in  Paul Tillich: The Theologian of the Boundaries, ed. Mark Kline Taylor (London: 
Collins, 1987), 17. 
  
137 Ian E. Thompson, Being  and  Meaning:  Paul  Tillich’s  Theory  of  Meaning,  Truth  and  Logic  
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 77. 
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dissolution; the human relations with respect to authority, education, family, sex, friendship, and 
pleasure  were  in  a  creative  chaos.”138 As  Eugene  Taylor  points  out,  “Christianity was fast 
ceasing to be an influential force on industrial society.”139 Tillich’s  position  is  that  in  the  modern  
age, we need something more than traditional religion to guide us. The traditional theology 
completely failed to offer solution to the existential problem of meaning. The fundamental 
problem is that it is lacking in existential sensitivity that is strong enough to respond to the forces 
of the time. “It may provide some consolation, but does not adequately solve the existential 
problem lived by the existing individual. The individual remains with his and her quest for 
unambiguous life with no hope of attaining unambiguous life.”140 Tillich’s  position  is  that  
theology must begin with the questions raised by the human predicament. “The answers provided 
by revelation will remain unintelligible if they are not correlated with and addressed to concrete 
existential questions posed by the place and time in which the theologian lives.”141 Tillich 
suggests that theology stand within the existentialist movement. The lack of existential 
sensitivity is a necessary consequence of defining religion with reference to the non-existential 
spheres of religion. “Religion  has  the  peculiarity  of  not  being  attributable to any particular 
psychic function. None of the theories advanced either by Hegel, who assigned religion to the 
                                                 
138 AR, 13. 
 
139 Eugene Taylor, The Mystery of Personality: A History of Psychodynamic Theories (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2009), 235. 
 
140 Joel  R.  Smith,  “Creation,  Fall,  and  Theodicy  in  Paul  Tillich’s  Systematic Theology,”  in Kairos 
and  Logos:  Studies  in  the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology, ed. John J. Carey (Macon, GA.: 
Mercer University Press, 1984), 158. 
 
141 John J. Thatamanil, The Immanent Divine: God, Creation and the Human Predicament 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2006), 96. 
 
150 
 
 
theoretical sphere of the mind, or by Kant, who assigned it to the practical sphere, or by 
Schleiermacher, who assigned it to the realm of feeling, has survived…[Religion]  is  an  attitude  
of the spirit in which practical, theoretical, and emotional elements are united to form a complex 
whole.”
142 The idea of a theology of culture tries to introduce the larger concept of religion, 
challenging the undialectical use of the narrower,  “non-existential” definition.143 For this purpose, 
the Heideggerian existentialism  functions  as  the  philosophical  foundation  of  Tillich’s  project  of  a  
theology of culture.144  
 
 
 
                                                 
142 OITC, 39. 
 
143 ST2, 26. 
 
144 John Powell Clayton, The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich and the Possibility of a 
Mediating Theology (Berlin:  Walter  de  Gruyter,  1980),  118,  points  out  that  “Despite  the  not  
inconsiderable  attention  paid  to  Tillich’s  ‘theology  of  culture,’  no  one  to  my  knowledge  has  succeeded 
satisfactorily in sorting out his concept of culture and the various layers of influence which are at work in 
it.” 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 
 
The Essence of Life 
 
 
Rightly understood, existentialism is always and only about life not only as an end but 
also as a source. Life is that out of which all existentialist philosophical enquiry develops as well 
as that to which it directs all of its questions. Hence, as Heidegger points out, the phrase 
“philosophy  of  life”  is  as pleonastic  as  the  “botany  of  plants.”1 The primary object of philosophy 
for the early Heidegger is life. Being and Time was  largely  inspired  by  Dilthey’s  philosophy of 
life. Although in Being and Time,  Heidegger’s  tone  is  often  critical  when  he  speaks  of  the  
“ontological  indeterminateness  of  Dilthey’s  foundation,”
2 this critique, as opposed to his critique 
of  Husserl,  is  not  so  much  concerned  with  Dilthey’s  philosophical points of departure as such, as 
with the fact that he did not carry these points through radically enough. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger recognizes his indebtedness to Dilthey, writing that “Our  analysis  of  the  problem  of  
history grew out of an appropriation  of  Dilthey’s  work.”3 Heidegger states that the ultimate 
purpose in Being and Time was to support the view of  Dilthey.  He  says  that  “the  preparatory  
                                                 
1 BT, 72/SZ, 46. 
 
2 BT, 253/SZ, 210. 
 
3 BT, 449/SZ, 397. 
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existential  and  temporal  analytic  of  Dasein  is  resolved…in  the  service  of  Dilthey’s  work.”
4 
Heidegger  takes  more  seriously  Dilthey’s  doctrine to understand life from out of itself. 
Heidegger  aims  at  “a  fundamental  radicalization”  of  Dilthey’s  philosophy.
5 Heidegger’s  
fundamental ontology is an alternative philosophy of life that makes a clear advance on  Dilthey’s  
work.6 From  the  early  Heidegger’s  point  of  view,  fundamental ontology is an “ontology of life.”7 
Heidegger suggests that life  philosophy’s  historical  research  on  human  existence  must  be  
prepared by an existential analysis of the human being. In a lecture delivered the year before the 
composition of Being and Time, Heidegger remarks:  “It  is  crucial  to  illuminate  the  being  of  the  
historical, i.e., historicity, not history; being, not beings, reality, not real things. What is of 
concern is thus not the question of empirical research on history…we do not yet have historicity. 
Dilthey penetrated into that reality, namely, human  Dasein…Dilthey succeeded in bringing this 
reality to the fore. He defined it as living, free, and historical. However, he did not pose the 
question of historicity itself, the question about the meaning of being, about the being of beings. 
Only now, thanks to the development of phenomenology, are we in the position to pose this 
question  correctly.”
8 As illustrated above, for Heidegger, the being of the historical is the human 
                                                 
4 BT, 455/SZ, 404. 
 
5 BT, 455/SZ, 403. 
 
6 Jacob Owensby, Dilthey and the Narrative of History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 
43. 
 
7 BT, 75/SZ, 50. 
 
8 WD, 156. 
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being.  Tillich  finds  that  Heidegger’s  existential  analytic  of  Dasein  is  more  direct  approach  to  the  
question of the ultimate meaning of existence than that of any other life philosophies.  
The question of the ultimate meaning of life must be approached by investigating the 
essence of life. For Heidegger, life is essentially a kind of existence.9 The concept of life in life 
philosophy exceeds Dasein’s  existential  structure  of  being-in-the-world. Dilthey’s  concept of life, 
for example, contained too many biological and psychological,  that  is,  “ontic,”  connotations, so 
that the existential character of human existence was not sufficiently portrayed, and this 
existence was therefore in danger of continually being misunderstood as being mere objective 
presence.10 The “essence of life”11 is “existence,” which has to die. Therefore, the question of the 
ultimate  meaning  of  human  life  is  fundamentally  the  question  of  the  meaning  of  human  Dasein’s  
existence. For this reason, Heidegger avoids the concept life from his analysis of existence. 
“Heidegger’s  shortcut,”  says  Theodore  Kisiel,  “stands  in  sharpest  contrast  to  Dilthey’s  detour  of  
self-understanding through all the expressions of human life.”12 Being and Time brings to our 
attention  “the philosophical end of life philosophy” in that Heidegger “replaces Dilthey’s  
“hermeneutic  of  life with an existential  analytic  of  Dasein”13 which  attempted  to  grasp  the  “lived  
                                                 
9 BT, 75/SZ, 50. 
 
10 BT, 72-5/SZ, 46-50. 
 
11 GA29-30, 387. 
 
12 Theodore Kisiel, Heidegger’s  Way  of  Thought:  Critical  and  Interpretative  Signposts, ed. Alfred 
Denker and Marion Heinz (New York: Continuum, 2002), 92. 
 
13 Udo  Tietz,  “German  Existence-Philosophy,”  in  A Companion to Phenomenology and 
Existentialism, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 166. 
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experience”  of  self  and  world  in  order  to  retain  the  truth  of  world view, but in which life never 
became a problem in its mode of existence. Heidegger  replaces  “life”  with  “existence”  seeing  
that this term better explains the ontological character of human existence. But what exactly 
concerns Heidegger is the meaning of Dasein,  that  is,  the  meaning  of  “human”  existence, rather 
than  existence  as  such  or  in  general.  The  kind  of  existence  at  issue  is  Dasein’s  existence. 
Therefore, the primary and central topic of investigation in Being and Time is not Being itself, 
nor is it time, although they are mostly discussed. The central topic, rather, is Dasein, a term that 
is often confusedly identified with the human being. Dasein must be distinguished from its 
existence.  Dasein’s  existence  is  that  to  which  Dasein  belongs.
14 Dasein must be distinguished 
from human being as well. Dasein is the human being insofar as it is concerned about its own 
Being.15 The human being forgetful of its own being is being-nowhere. Dasein is a phenomenon 
that takes place through human being at the moment  human  being  “understands  itself  in  terms  of  
its  existence.”
16 When Dasein takes place, Dasein “is  already-in a world and is already caught up 
in the task of living. The project of my life stands before me as an enterprise I must take up and 
as a quest that has already been undertaken.”17 This means that life is not Dasein.18 Life is that to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
14 BT, 290/SZ, 246. 
 
15 BT, 32/SZ, 12. 
 
16 BT, 33/SZ, 12. 
 
17 Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 
90. 
 
18 BT, 75/SZ, 50. 
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which Dasein is thrown. Dasein is the true essence of life. There is no true human life without 
Dasein.  “Dasein  is  never  to  be  defined  ontologically  by  regarding  it  as  life.”
19 Dasein becomes 
merely a life when it is ontically treated.  “Dasein  may  be  considered  purely  as  life.  When  the  
question is formulated from the viewpoint of biology and physiology, Dasein moves into that 
domain of Being which we know as the world of animals and plants. In this field, we can obtain 
data and statistics about the longevity of plants, animals and men, and we do this by ascertaining 
them ontically.”20 For Heidegger, the meaning of Dasein cannot be explained without ontological 
investigation of Being itself. Hence, “existential  concerns  from  Heidegger’s  early  period  
transform into ontological concerns in Being and Time, even if both of these concerns were 
operative for him all along.”21 The ontological origin of existence is explored in order to answer 
Heidegger’s  existential  questions  about  the  ultimate  meaning  of  life  and  human  existence,  which  
is the question of the meaning of Dasein. But Being itself cannot be an object of discussion or 
research. Human reason can only endeavor to approach it, and the only way to approach it is by 
way of analyzing Dasein in an existential way. In Being and Time, therefore, Dasein is analyzed 
as preparation for grasping the meaning of Being itself. Heidegger’s  existential  analytic  of  
Dasein is deeply rooted in the philosophy of life, and his work takes the concept of life as 
philosophically fundamental. Dasein is the manifestation of life. Heidegger’s  criticism  of  life  
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20 BT, 290/SZ, 246. 
 
21 Scott M. Campbell, The  Early  Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Life:  Facticity,  Being, and Language 
(Fordham University Press, 2012), 4 
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philosophy is a criticism of the specific form of it.  “Heidegger’s  quarrel  with  these  life-
philosophers is a family quarrel.”22  
In the early 1920s, Tillich also attempts to formulate an alternative philosophy of life 
which, as a means to disclose the existential meaning of life, 23 “liberates  the  word  “life”  from  its  
bondage to the organic and psychological realm and elevates it to the level of a basic term that 
can  be  used  within  the  theological  system.”
24 The System of the Sciences (1923),25 which is 
Tillich’s  first  major book after the First World War is essential background to any serious 
attempt to  understand  Tillich’s  early  project  for  a  theology  of  culture, is a further stage of this 
                                                 
22 Richard M. McDonough, Martin  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 2006), 5. 
 
23 ST3, 11. 
 
24 ST3, 12. 
 
25 The System of the Sciences was an attempt to systematically understand the relationships 
among  the  various  cognitive  disciplines  “to  overcome  the  disruption  of  meaning  incident  to  the  separation  
of  theology  from  other  concerns.”  James  Luther  Adams,  Paul  Tillich’s  Philosophy  of  Culture,  Science,  
and Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 120. The book was not concerned directly with 
theology or religion. As Adams observes, the  terms  “God”  and  “Word  of  God”  seldom  appear in it at all. 
Tillich  wrote,  “…in  my  book  Das System der Wissenschaften (System of the Sciences). My ultimate 
concern there was with the questions: How can theology be a science in the sense of Wissenschaft? How 
are  its  several  disciplines  related  to  the  other  sciences?  What  is  distinctive  about  its  method?”  OB, 55. In 
his later years, Tillich viewed this work, which was his first large book, with some ambivalence. He 
explains the  fact  that  the  book  had  “remained  without  an  extensive  influence”  by  pointing  out  that  it  is  “an  
outline,  which  attacks  an  enormous  topic  with  limited  means,”  but  he  acknowledges that the writing of the 
book was an  important  event  in  the  development  of  his  thought,  because  for  him  “it  was  a  first  orientation  
in  the  confused  variety  of  scientific  operations,  and  the  way  to  establish  the  place  of  theological  work”  
within the whole of science. DSW, 9. Tillich also reports that the volume represents his  “first  and  rather  
insufficient  step”  toward  his  later  definition  of  theology and theological position. He nevertheless 
acknowledges that many of the ideas contained in the book have remained with him. PE, 55-7. There have 
been several solid studies about The System of the Sciences. For example, Robert Scharlemann undertook 
a comparative study of The System of the Sciences and  Tillich’s  later  Systematics.  See  Robert P. 
Scharlemann,  “The  Scope  of  Systematics:  An  Analysis  of  Tillich’s  Two  Systems,”  Journal of Religion, 
vol. 48, no. 2 (April 1968), 136-49. 
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development. The First World War provoked a fundamental reorientation of thought and life for 
Tillich because it presented in an unforgettable way the questionability of human existence. 
Robert  P.  Scharlemann  writes,  “If  Tillich’s  experience  of  the  Frist  World  War  was  an  exposure  
to sheer abyss – to the unanswered question of the meaning of existence at all – his experience of 
the 1920s was an answer to this question.”26 The war had shattered the idea of self-sufficiency, 
but in the 1920s a new current of expectation made its way through the German intellectual 
world. Gadamer says that the mid-twenties  in  Marburg  were  the  beginning  of  an  “exciting  era  of  
philosophical and  theological  discussion.”27 Thus, the First World War and the 1920s provide the 
experiential  background  for  the  questions  and  answers  formulated  in  Tillich’s  later  existential 
theology. As illustrated above,  Tillich’s  dependence  on  the  life  philosophy movement had 
prepared him to accept Heidegger’s  existential  philosophy.  Tillich  notes  that  “A  new  impulse  to  
“Existential”  thinking  came  from  the  “Lebensphilosophie”  or  “Philosophy  of  Life”…The  
“Philosophy  of  Life”  is  not  identical  with  Existential  philosophy. But if we understand the latter 
in a larger sense – as for historical and systematic reasons we must – then  the  “Philosophy  of  
Life”  includes  most  of  the  distinctive  motives  of  Existential  philosophy.”
28 Throughout his 
career, Tillich has held fast to a fundamentally existential motivation. Tillich  writes,  “The  
                                                 
26 Robert P. Scharlemann, Reflection and Doubt in the Thought of Paul Tillich (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969), 160. 
 
27 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Martin  Heidegger  und  die  Marburger  Theologie,”  in  Zeit und 
Geschichte, ed. Erich Dinkler (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1964), 479. 
 
28 EP, 79. 
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philosophy of existence asks the question in a new and radical manner, the answer to which is 
given  in  theology  for  faith.”
29 
 
Transformation of the Subjectivistic Philosophy of Life 
 
 
The concept of life dominated European philosophical movements up to the end of the 
1920s.30 After  that,  Heidegger’s  thought  of  being dominated European philosophy throughout 
the middle of the twentieth century.31 The turning point is Heidegger’s  criticism  of  subjectivism 
of life philosophy. It is certainly not true that “The  thought  of  Being  drives out the philosophy of 
life.”32 Heidegger only rejects a particular type of life philosophy that lacks ontological approach 
to human existence and thus is unable to grasp the essence of life. The problem of such life 
                                                 
29 IH, 40. 
 
30 Leonard  Lawlor,  “Life:  An  Essay  on  the  Overcoming  of  Metaphysics,”  in  The Edinburgh 
Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophies, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007), 517. 
 
31 But this does not mean the end of the philosophical interest in life. In 1960s, Jacques Derrida, 
Gilles Deleuze, and Michel Foucault, each in his own way of critique, took up once again the concept of 
life. The re-emergence of the question of life during the 1960s resulted in three central texts on this 
subject:  Deleuze’s  “Immanence:  A  Life,”  in  Pure Immanence: Essays On A Life, trans. A. Boyman (New 
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Wills, Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 369-418.  
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philosophy is its failure to discern the fact that the existential is grounded in the ontological, the 
fact  that  the  human  existence  is  constituted  by  “being”  and  “there.”   
It is in the early 1920s that Heidegger begins  to  use  the  term  “life”  in  place  of  the  
Husserlian notion of consciousness to describe what is distinctive about human experience.33 
“Life”  is  a  term  he  takes  over  from  Dilthey. Heidegger investigates the concept  of  life  “with the 
less subjectivist perspective,”34 and  gradually  replaces  it  with  “existence.”  As early as 1910, 
Heidegger produced a series of book reviews, poems, and other texts, which represent the 
intellectual starting point of his philosophical development. In these texts he condemns what he 
perceives to be the subjectivist orientation of modern philosophy. He notes that “Certainly  the  
modern  age  has…introduced  subjectivism  and  individualism.”
35 He sees this subjectivism and 
individualism as  the  central  ingredient  of  “the anthropocentric humanism that has informed at 
every step the metaphysics of the modern age, expressed not only in the epistemological designs 
of grounding all knowledge in a cognitive subject, but also in the ethical designs of a domination 
and control of nature and history by a willful subject.”36 Heidegger probes the roots of the 
                                                 
33 The  systematic  use  of  the  term  “life”  goes  back  to  Hegel’s early work. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, 
Hegel’s  Ontology  and  the  Theory  of  Historicity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 201ff. A detailed look at  
the  development  in  Heidegger’s  position  from  the  notion  life  to  that  of  Dasein  can  be  found  in  Theodore  
Kisiel, The Genesis  of  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 
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36 Calvin O Schrag, Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity (Bloomington: Indiana 
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various forms of subjectivism that have pervaded modern thought. He questions the whole mode 
of  thinking  whereby  we  take  the  “subjective”  and  the  “objective”  as  signifying  a  basic  
epistemological or metaphysical distinction. According to Heidegger, subjectivism is an attempt 
to identify a single underlying foundation, or sub-jectum. It is in this sense that he describes 
subjectivism as  “metaphysical.”  Subjectivism reduces the human to mere subject and the world 
to object. Subjectivism “gives a certain priority to the human, but in a way that also privileges 
the purely objective.”37 The human is that which provides the fundamental criterion of what is. 
Being thus becomes that which can be represented to a knowing subject. Being always stands 
over against the knowing subject, and whose existence can be ascertained by a knowing subject. 
Being stands over against the knowing subject is necessarily a being, not Being itself. Therefore, 
Being itself is especially forgotten, according to Heidegger, in the Cartesian conception of being. 
Descartes  fails  to  investigate  the  ontological  status  of  “I  am.”  Descartes,  says  Heidegger,  “takes  
the  Being  of  ‘Dasein’…in  the  very  same  way  as  he  takes  the  Being  of  the  res extensa – namely 
as  substance.”
38 The  meaning  of  Descartes’s  concept  of  substantiality  remains  ontologically  
unclarified and is assumed to be incapable of clarification.39 “By characterizing the subject as res 
cogitans, a thinking thing, or a thing that thinks, Descartes treats the subject as if it were 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
37 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Exploration in the Topology of Being 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), 108.  
 
38 BT, 131/SZ, 98. 
 
39 BT, 126/SZ, 94. 
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ontologically equivalent to a thing, but with the added capacity for thought.”40 For Heidegger, 
therefore, the problem of subjectivism entails the problem of objectivism. Thus, “the  
subjectivism that appears in Being and Time as  the  target  of  Heidegger’s  critical  engagement  
actually  appears  as  a  form  of  objectivism.”
41 Heidegger suggests therefore that the Cartesian 
ontology remains rooted in the traditional metaphysics. The Aristotelian definition of a human 
being as a rational animal and the Christian notion of the human being as imago Dei are both 
ontologically misleading.42 Heidegger’s  attack  on  Cartesian  metaphysics  is  important  for  
understanding Being and Time, for Being and Time is a direct attack on Cartesian metaphysics 
and thinking.  
Transforming the subjectivistic philosophy of life is to be done by metaphysical 
investigation of existence and Being. But Heidegger recognizes that the modern metaphysics is 
itself subjectivistic, and subjectivism of the modern philosophy of life results from the 
subjectivistic metaphysics that questions and treats Being as a being standing over against the 
knowing subject, thereby forgetting the ontological difference between Being itself and beings in 
particular. The traditional metaphysics has been an  attempt  to  explain  the  “meaning”  of  Being  
without considering Being as such. Heidegger is compelled to “overcome”  the  traditional  
                                                 
40 Tina Chanter, Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 79. 
 
41 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger’s  Topology:  Being,  Place,  World (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Press, 2006), 107. 
 
42 Tina Chanter,  “The  Problematic  Normative  Assumption  of  Heidegger’s  Ontology,”  in  Feminist 
Interpretation of Martin Heidegger, ed. Nancy J. Holland and Patricia Huntington (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State Press, 2001), 76-7. 
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metaphysics by transforming, not abolishing, it. His project of destructing and overcoming of 
metaphysics is his move beyond the impasse of life philosophy. Heidegger’s  project of 
overcoming metaphysics should be understood as “metaphysical” re-approaching  “life,” or as 
developing  an  “original”  metaphysics  of  life through a destruction of the history of subjectivistic 
ontology. Subjectivity always seems to be involved in the conception of life. Thus Heidegger 
rejects all subjectivistic forms of philosophy of life.43 Heidegger radially admits a subjectivist 
tendency in Being and Time. But Being and Time is a work that is proposed to overcome the 
problem of subjectivism.44 An accusation was made against  Heidegger’s  broad  range  of  
“metaphysics,” that he “lumps  together  seemingly  disparate  phenomena  under  the  rubric  of  
“metaphysical.”
45 But it is not true that “Heidegger’s  relation  to  metaphysics  is  ambiguous.”46 In 
his view, there are only two types of metaphysics, subjectivistic and existential ontological. His 
understanding of metaphysics as existential ontological has concrete specificity concerning the 
term. To practice existential ontological metaphysics means to transcend the obviousness of the 
given understanding of Being in order to let the openness of Being in which beings come to 
presence. Heidegger understands the existential ontological metaphysical question of being 
                                                 
43 BT, 252-3/SZ, 209-10. 
 
44 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Exploration in the Topology of Being 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), 107. 
 
45 Christopher Rickey, Revolutionary Saints: Heidegger, National Socialism, and Antinomian 
Politics (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 2002), 139n15. 
 
46 Frank Schalow and Alfred Denker, Historical  Dictionary  of  Heidegger’s  Philosophy, 2nd ed. 
(Lanham, MD.: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 185. 
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which lets beings appear as a question  concerning  the  “what”  of  Being. Heidegger calls this 
existential ontological metaphysics as “fundamental ontology.” 
 
A Postulation of the Unconditioned Being and Meaning 
 
 
Existence is the essence of life, and it is itself the ultimate question that Dasein raises. 
Dasein experiences its existence as conditioned. The conditionality of existence is the ultimate 
problem that Dasein has with its existence. As early as 1916, in the conclusion to his qualifying 
dissertation on Scotus,47 Heidegger  made  use  of  the  following  quotation  from  Novalis:  “We  
everywhere seek the Unconditioned (Unbedingte)  and  ever  find  only  things  (Dinge).”48 
Heidegger  states  that  “We  are  – in the strictest sense of the word – conditioned (Be-Dingten). We 
                                                 
47 “Conclusion:  The  Problem  of  Categories”  was  written  as  a  supplement  for  the  publication  of  
the dissertation. See CPC. Heidegger finished his postdoctoral qualifying dissertation in the spring of 
1915, presented it to the philosophy department in July, and received his official Privatdozent status early 
in  August.  For  the  literature  on  Heidegger’s  Habilitationsschrift,  see  John  D.  Caputo,  “Phenomenology,  
Mysticism and the Grammatica Speculativa:  A  Study  of  Heidegger’s  Habilitationsschrift,”  Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology 5, no. 2 (1974): 101-17;;  Roderick  M.  Stewart,  “Signification  and 
Radical  Subjectivity  in  Heidegger’s  Habilitationsschrift,”  Man and World 12, no. 3 (1979): 360-86; John 
D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1982), 36-43; Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993), 25-38; John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the 
Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 70-112.  
 
48 GA1, 541. This passage is from the fragments of the poet Novalis, a passionate proponent of 
anti-modern medievalism who was influenced by Schleiermacher and Schelling.  Gary J. Dorrien, The 
Making of American Liberal Theology: Idealism, Realism, and Modernity: 1900-1950 (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press,  2003),  484,  notes  that  “Tillich’s  attraction  to  Schelling  was  rooted  in  his  
lifelong nature romanticism and his cultivated affinity for the poetry of Goethe, Hölderlin, Novalis, and 
Rilke.”   
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have  left  the  presumption  of  everything  unconditioned  behind.”
49 The  experience  of  “being  
conditionedly  there”  leads  to  the  thought  that,  as  Heidegger  points  out,  that  which  determines  the  
conditionality of the conditioned cannot itself be a conditioned thing, but an unconditioned.50 It 
is precisely this conditionality of human existence that compels us to seek the Unconditioned. In 
other words, in asking what conditions thing, we are seeking the Unconditioned.51 Seeking the 
Unconditioned reveals the truth about the existential homelessness, or groundlessness, of 
everyday  modes  of  experiencing  Dasein  as  well  as  “homecoming,”  the  returning  of  Dasein  to  
nearness to Being itself. The theme of homelessness and homecoming provides Heidegger with a 
subject matter of the greatest human importance. With existential homelessness and ontological 
homecoming  we  discern  a  ultimate  theme  that  provides  a  unity  to  his  life’s  work  – a key that 
Heidegger has left hidden in plain sight – The ontological search for Dasein’s  home  is  the  
solution  to  Dasein’s  existential  loss  of  home.  As  Novalis  says,  “Philosophy is homesickness.”52 
It  is  “an  urge  to  be  at  home  everywhere.”
53 Philosophy as such a drive is possible because we are 
everywhere not at home. The aim of this longing is to be at home everywhere. Not just here and 
there.  This  “everywhere”  Heidegger  calls  ‘the  world.’”
54 Seeking the Unconditioned, but not in 
                                                 
49 VA, 179. 
 
50 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995), 187. 
 
51 WIT, 7-10. 
 
52 Novalis, Werke und Briefe, ed. Alfred Kelletat (Munich: Winkler, 1962), 422. 
 
53 FCM, 6-8/GA29-30, 7. 
 
54 FCM, 5/GA29-30, 7-8. 
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the traditional metaphysical sense, is to be at home dwelling in the world. It is to seek the answer 
to the question of the ultimate meaning of existence.  
Tillich’s  philosophical  development  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Unconditioned  is  deeply  
indebted  to  Heidegger’s  concept  of  the  Unconditioned.  Tillich  appreciates  Heidegger’s  diagnosis  
of homelessness as the basic state of human being. The problem of existence which needs to be 
solved in order to answer the question of the meaning of life is fundamentally the problem of 
non-existence,  as  shown  through  the  illustration  of  Tillich’s  own  war  experiences.  The  
problematized existence in Tillich is the existence before the threat of non-existence. Again it is 
not out of curiosity that Tillich is concerned with the question of the meaning of life. It is 
because  of  “ultimate  insecurity”  of  his  own  existence.  Tillich  explains  the existential insecurity 
as  “an  ultimate  lack  of  weight,  an  indication  of  [its]  possible  non-being, a deficiency of ultimate 
necessity.”
55 If existence is absolute without possibility of non-existence, existence will not be 
problematized the way existential philosophy problematizes it. It only becomes an ontical object 
of  scientific  curiosity.  The  “threat”  of  non-existence is the limited duration of existence. The 
meaning of existence is questioned because of this limited condition. Tillich thinks that the 
answer to the problem of the meaningfulness of the conditioned existence in the threat of the 
possibility of non-existence can be provided by postulating an “absolute  reality”56 of the 
Unconditioned. The term “the Unconditioned”  is  employed  as  the infinite Ground of meaning 
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and being “without” the imposed categories of human understanding.  The Unconditioned is one 
of the most important concepts in Tillich’s  theology, which in his later thought is more 
frequently  referred  to  in  Heideggerian  terminology  as  “Ground  of  being”  or  “Being itself.”57 As 
a matter of fact, Tillich has never elucidated in depth the concept of the Unconditioned. James 
Luther  Adams  points  out  that  “Curiously  enough,  his  writings  lack  any  systematic  presentation  
of the principal meanings he attaches to the term [the Unconditioned]. Nor do we find any 
systematic survey of the historical lineage of the concept. Moreover, we encounter a bewildering 
variety  of  usage.”
58 Adams  adds,  “This is unfortunate, for his many and scattered references to it 
make for great difficulty in securing a consistent and synoptic view of it. The difficulty is 
increased by the fact also that Tillich has not remained consistent in his definitions.”59 It is 
because of the evolution of his view of the absolute reality under  the  influence  of  Heidegger’s  
ontology.  
The  concept  of  the  Unconditioned  is  variously  referred  to  as  “the  unconditioned  
transcendent,”  “the  unconditionally  real,”  “the  unconditionally  powerful,”  “the  unconditionally  
personal,”  “the  unconditionally  perfect,”  “the  unconditional  demand,”  “the  unconditioned  
meaning,”  “the  unconditioned  form,”  and  so  on.  The  Unconditioned  is  neither  another  order  of  
                                                 
57 James Luther Adams, Paul  Tillich’s  Philosophy  of  Culture,  Science and Religion (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1965), 32-52, provides one of the finest treatments of this subject.  
 
58 James Luther Adams, Paul  Tillich’s  Philosophy  of  Culture,  Science  and  Religion (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1965), 261. 
 
59 James Luther Adams, Paul  Tillich’s  Philosophy  of  Culture,  Science  and  Religion (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1965), 41. 
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reality  nor  a  part  of  finite  conditioned  reality,  but  rather  it  is  a  postulate  “whose  conceptions  are  
created from  the  primordial  concerns  of  the  human  spirit.”60 It  cannot  be  proved  or  disproved.  “It  
can  only  be  indicated.”
61 The Unconditioned can be dealt with by indicating it as the meaning 
which founds all realizations of meaning.62 The Unconditioned is not properly spoken of as 
“existing”  because  it  is  postulated  in  order  to  answer  the  problem  of  existing.  “Existence”  is  a  
limiting  concept.  “Metaphysics  does  not  ask  whether  the  Unconditioned  exists.  This  question  is  
meaningless…If  the  Unconditioned  were  established, it would no longer be the Unconditioned; it 
would  be  some  object  whose  existence  it  is  possible  to  prove.”
63 “It  is  the  character  of  the  
Unconditioned  that  it  cannot  be  grasped;;  its  power  includes  its  unapproachable  mystery.”
64 
 
The Metaphysics of Meaning 
 
 
For Tillich, existence as such is the absolutely given, and it points to the depth and 
creative power of all reality, the Unconditioned. Accordingly, consciousness is directed toward 
the Unconditioned. For, if existence has any meaning at all, there must be something behind 
                                                 
60 Kairos, 32.  Tillich  does  not  employ  the  term  “postulate.”  Rather,  he  explains  it  as  an  
“abstraction”  from  the  religious  symbols.   
 
61 SS, 183. 
 
62 SS, 183. 
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existence as the source of the meaning of existence. This  “pointing”  explains  the  relation  
between consciousness and existence. The phenomenon of existence in the threat of non-
existence directs the consciousness toward the Unconditioned.  “The  direction  of  consciousness  
toward  the  Unconditioned  is  a  necessary  function  that  constitutes  the  reality  of  meaning.”
65 “The  
concept  “the Unconditioned”  is  therefore  the  central  metaphysical  concept.”66 The term is 
intended to avoid the limited conception of reality. The Unconditioned is not necessarily of 
infinite duration of time. The answer to the question of the meaning of existence is neither an 
infinite duration of existence nor non-existence. Tillich  writes  that  the  Unconditioned  “is  not  a  
being,  nor  is  it  the  substance  or  totality  of  beings…Even  the  predicate  “is”  already  disguises  the  
facts of the case, since we are here dealing not with a reality of existence, but with a reality of 
meaning, and that indeed is the ultimate and deepest meaning – the reality which shakes the 
foundation  of  all  things  and  builds  them  up  anew.”
67 The Unconditioned is the absolute reality 
that gives meaning to the conditioned existence. For Tillich, the Unconditioned is a possible 
answer to his ultimate question. The Unconditioned is the self-sufficient meaning-giving reality68 
that  “supports  all  meaning-giving.”69 In The System of the Sciences,  Tillich  develops  “a  
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philosophy of meaning as a foundation of the whole system [of the sciences]”70 which he calls 
“the  metaphysics  of  meaning.”  Developing metaphysics of meaning was an important step for 
Tillich to reduce politics to existential theology.71 This  reduction  in  Tillich’s  thinking  indicates  
his changing from historical-political existentialism to individualistic existentialism,72 a shift of 
emphasis from the threat-character of historical existence to the threat of non-existence.73 Tillich 
                                                 
70 IH, 38. 
 
71 Terence  O’Keeffe,  “Paul  Tillich  and  the  Frankfurt  School,”  in  Theonomy and Autonomy: 
Studies  in  Paul  Tillich’s  Engagement  with  Modern  Culture, ed. John Carey (Macon, GA.: Mercer 
University  Press,  1984),  87,  notes  that  “Tillich’s  political  and  socialist  thought  became  ‘frozen’  and  we  
can see from the late 1940s the theologizing of most of the basic concepts of the 1920s and 1930s, which 
was completed in the almost totally apolitical text of Systematic Theology. This is in true sense the 
reduction of politics  to  theology.”  David Henry Hopper, Tillich: A Theological Portrait (Philadelphia: J. 
B. Lippincott, 1968), 100 makes a similar claim: “What  Tillich  did…was essentially to abandon his 
earlier preoccupations with the broad social-political dimensions of history in order to offer a formulation 
(‘New  Being’)  more  open  to  individualistic  applications.”  Evidence  of  deliberation  and  intent  in  Tillich’s  
move away from the tenets of religious socialism is found in his brief  article,  “Existentialism  and  
Religious  Socialism,”  Christianity and Society, 15, no. 1 (Winter 1949-50): 10. In fact, as shown in The 
System of the Sciences, Tillich already sought to develop what he alternately called a  “philosophy  of  
meaning”  and  a  “theology  of  culture”  that  might  serve  as  an  answer  to  the  anxiety  of  meaninglessness  
expressed  by  his  contemporaries.  Theology  underlay  Tillich’s  religious-socialist theory from the very 
start. Tillich writes, “…more  obvious  than  the  changes  from  the  earlier  to  the  more  recent  articles  in  this  
collection is the continuity of the main line of thought and the permanence of the basic principles. It 
sometimes strikes me (and this is probably a very common experience), when I read some of my earliest 
writings, how much of what I believed to be a recent achievement is already explicitly or at least 
implicitly  contained  in  them.”  AI, x-xi.  
  
72 In a letter to one of his close colleagues and friend in the religious-socialist movement, 
Emanuel Hirsch, who became an ardent adherent of the movement of German Christian compromise with 
National Socialism, Tillich made a distinction between two types of existentialism: one that derives from 
the existence of individual and another that derives from the historical-political situation. There he 
numbered among the individualistic existentialists Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Jaspers; whereas he listed 
only Marx, Hirsch, and himself as standing for a corporate-historical existentialism. The letter was 
published  as  “Die  Theologie  des  Kairos  und  die  gegenwärtige  geistige  Lage,”  Theologische Blätter 23, 
no.11 (November 1934): 305-6. 
 
73 David Henry Hopper, Tillich: A Theological Portrait (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), 84. 
 
170 
 
 
 
argued that  “Metaphysics  cannot  attempt  to  grasp  the  Unconditioned  from  the  perspective  of  
being, but must try to grasp it from the perspective  of  meaning.”74 For the Unconditioned is not a 
being that can be treated as an object for metaphysical research. We can only grasp the meaning 
of the Unconditioned, but not the being of the Unconditioned. In The System of the Sciences, he 
describes his metaphysics  of  meaning  as  “genuine  metaphysics.”  This  genuine  metaphysics  
differs  from  the  “original  metaphysics”  which  Tillich  defines  later  in  Systematic Theology as an 
“analysis  of  those  structures  of  being  which  we  encounter  in  every  meeting  with  reality.”
75 
Tillich’s  early  metaphysics  also  differs  from  old-fashioned metaphysics76 that Tillich criticizes in 
Systematic Theology. It was not until his stay as professor of theology at Marburg in 1924 and 
1925 that he was confronted by the challenge of modern existentialism in the person of 
Heidegger  and  subordinated  his  “genuine”  metaphysics  of  meaning  to  the  Heideggerian  
“original”  metaphysics  of  being.  The central task of his metaphysics of meaning is to explain the 
meaning of the Unconditioned in order to give meaning to the conditioned existence. Tillich’s  
metaphysics of meaning is not a merely abstract philosophical theory, but an integral part of a 
coherent philosophy of life. For Tillich’s  interest  in  meaning  has  to  do  with  the  problem  of  the  
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76 R. Allan Killen, The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich (Kampen: Kok,1956), 112, writes, 
“The  surprising fact that emerges from a study starting with his earliest book, Das System des 
Wissenschaften in 1923, and following down till today, is that no major change has developed in his 
ontology during the whole period.”  Jeremy  S.  Begbie, Voicing  Creation’s  Praise:  Towards  a  Theology  of  
the Arts (London: Continuum, 1991), 44n10, also points out, the ontology of the Systematic Theology is 
an  extension  of  thoughts  which  were  germinating  in  Tillich  in  the  late  1920’s.   
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meaning of existence. The human being is for Tillich as being that is ultimately concerned about 
the meaning of its being. So Tillich places the primary emphasis on the experience of existing 
and the discovery of its meaning. Tillich’s  metaphysics  of  meaning  is not so much of an 
epistemology in the conventional sense77 as an existential hermeneutics in that its emphasis is on 
an  interpretation  of  the  meaning  implicit  in  existence.  Tillich’s  interest  in  meaning  has  to  do  with  
the meaning of life against the problem of the meaningless life. His metaphysics of meaning 
flowed out of a longing to counteract what he felt to be a sense of meaninglessness and futility in 
his own culture. The  decisive  stimulus  for  Tillich  to  develop  the  concept  of  “meaning”  was  
offered by “the  storms  of  our  times,”78 in which the meaning of existence is radically threatened. 
Tillich’s question of the meaning of existence is not abstract one.  
 
God and the Unconditioned 
 
Tillich states that “Metaphysics  [of  meaning]  is  the  will  to  grasp  the  Unconditioned”79 
although the Unconditioned cannot be grasped in the individual forms of objects. The 
                                                 
77 Tillich has been criticized for his failure to recognize the primacy of epistemology in the field 
of philosophy. He acknowledged this criticism, and defends this comparative neglect of epistemology in 
the  following  terms:  “Many  contributors  ask  me  about  my  epistemology,  some  of  them  with  misgivings  
about  the  lack  of  a  developed  doctrine  of  knowledge.  Again  I  answer…That in spite of this attitude I did 
not mean to neglect epistemology is proved by the First Part of my Systematic Theology, which contains 
under  the  title  “Reason  and  Revelation” my  theological  epistemology.”  RIC, 376.  
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Unconditioned can never be made into an object.80 Rather,  “the  Unconditioned  itself  is  to  be  
grasped”
81 in  order  to  avoid  an  idolatry.  “But  metaphysics  can  grasp the Unconditioned only in 
the  forms  of  the  conditioned.  This  is  the  profound  paradox  inherent  in  metaphysics.”
82 
Metaphysics is nothing but the paradoxical attempt to fit into forms the experience of the 
Unconditional which is above and beyond all form.”83 Tillich is concerned with the breakthrough 
(Durchbruch) of the Unconditioned into the realm of finite conditioned existence.84 This 
breakthrough is a revelation in the Tillichian sense. The Unconditioned that breaks in shows 
itself in the content by means of the form, that is, culture. Tillich suggests that the task of 
theology  is  to  grasp  the  “breakthrough”  of  the  Unconditioned  into  the  conditioned, not the 
Unconditioned itself. The  “breakthrough”  of  the  Unconditioned  is  an  illustration  of  the  
experience of the Unconditioned85 which  is  obtained  when  the  consciousness  is  “directed  
toward”  it.  Tillich  defines  religion  as  “directedness  toward,”  which  Tillich  refines  as  a  pure  
“being-grasped.”  “The  term  “unconditional”…points  to  that  element  in  every  religious 
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experience which makes it religious. In every symbol of the divine an unconditional claim is 
expressed.”
86 Theology must be concerned with religion in order to grasp the breakthrough of the 
Unconditioned. Theology must also be concerned with culture because it is culture into which 
the Unconditioned breaks. Tillich  puts  this  in  the  following  terms:  “Theology,  therefore,  is  the  
concrete  and  normative  science  of  religion…This  implies  a  twofold  denial.  First,  theology  is  not  
a science with a special object singled out from among others, and which we call god…Second,  
theology  is  not  the  presentation  of  a  particular  complex  of  revelation.”
87 Tillich did not consider 
the theology of culture to be a subdivision of the wider theological task. In contrast to the 
contemporary dialectical theologians, Tillich demands that “the essential inter-relation of 
religion and culture demands that theology be re-formulated as theology of culture.” Theology is 
concerned with the conditioned, or culture, into which the Unconditioned breaks. Therefore 
theology must not segregate itself from culture but rather consider itself “as precisely theology of 
culture.”88 Tillich  says,  “It  seems  to  me  that  the  unconditioned  character  of  religion  becomes  far  
more manifest if it breaks out from within  the  secular,  disrupting  and  transforming  it.”89 Russell 
Re  Manning  correctly  interprets  Tillich’s  theology  as  “the synthesis of religion and culture,”  that  
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is  to  say,  “the synthesis of the two attitudes toward the conditioned and Unconditioned.”90 “If  
consciousness is directed toward the particular forms of meaning and their unity, we have to do 
with culture; if it is directed toward the unconditioned meaning, toward the Gehalt of meaning, 
we have religion.”91 As such, religion and culture are the proper objects of the theology of 
culture. On the other hand, as shown above, metaphysics is also the paradoxical synthesis of the 
two attitudes toward conditioned form and Unconditioned. For this reason, in Tillich, the genuine 
metaphysics and the theology of culture are identical. 
The language of the Unconditioned implies the infinite quality of the Unconditioned and 
the necessarily finite human knowledge of it.92 Therefore the qualification of the Unconditioned 
is twofold – negative (limiting) and positive. The negative qualification of the Unconditioned is 
that which qualifies, or conditions, finite reality as its Ground or depth. In other words, the 
Unconditioned is that which is “presupposed in any meaningful order of thought or being.”93 
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Negatively, the Unconditioned is to be understood as a limiting concept. Positively, the 
Unconditioned points to its “paradoxical participation or manifestation in the finite, conditioned 
order.”94 As James Luther Adams observes, the concept of the Unconditioned was not 
differentiated  as  “negative”  and  “positive”  in  Tillich’s  early  writings.  His later use of them 
reflects the result of his working out in detail his conception of the method of correlation 
between philosophy and theology. According to this view, philosophy is concerned only with the 
negative Unconditioned, and theology gives answers to the philosophical question of the 
negative Unconditioned by the Christian revelation of the positive Unconditioned.95 The positive 
Unconditioned is the symbol of the depth of things, “the  basis  of  the  being  of  things  whereby  
‘being’  is  taken  absolutely,  transcendentally,  as  the  expression  of  the  secret  into  which thinking 
cannot penetrate.”96 As  Mary  Ann  Stenger  and  Ronald  H.  Stone  point  out,  however,  “The 
positive meanings of the Unconditioned, especially in relationship to ontological participation of 
the infinite in the finite, raise the question of the relationship between the Unconditioned and 
God.”97 Tillich makes it clear that God is the symbol for the Unconditioned. In the early and 
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mid-1920s, Tillich speaks of God as “a symbol for the Unconditioned.”98 Tillich says in “Church  
and  Culture  (1924)” that “we  can  therefore speak of the Unconditioned simultaneously as basis 
of meaning and abyss of meaning. We call this object of the silent belief in the ultimate 
meaningfulness, this basis and abyss of all meaning which surpass all that is conceivable, 
God.”
99  Again in his Dogmatik of 1925, he says that “Revelation  therefore, conceptually, is 
indirect. It is expressed in something that is not  the  thing  itself…Since  all  our  words  classify  
objects in this world, the Unconditioned is therefore first the unspeakable. If it expresses itself 
after all, this can only happen in indirect words, in symbols. The symbol has the depth that it 
honors [or respects, achtet] the hiddenness and nonetheless points to what it means. Also the 
word  “God’  is  such  a  symbol.”
100 But Heidegger’s  fundamental  ontology  shows  the weakness of 
Tillich’s  metaphysics of meaning as a solution to his ultimate question. Persuaded by 
Heidegger’s  fundamental  ontology,  Tillich comes to the understanding that the absolute 
hiddenness of the Unconditioned101 only means that the Unconditioned is a symbol itself, a 
symbol that symbolizes the absolute hiddenness of the God above God. The Unconditioned 
symbolizes  “the  Unconditioned  meaning”
102 of what is hidden. The metaphysics of meaning is, 
precisely speaking, a metaphysics of the symbolic meaning of the Unconditioned. The new 
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understanding is that that to which the Unconditioned points is absolutely hidden behind Being 
itself. In order to answer the question of the ultimate meaning of existence, the metaphysics of 
meaning as the genuine metaphysics and theology calls for a metaphysics of being.  
Tillich’s  metaphysics  of  meaning  does  involve  ontology, which Tillich calls the 
“metaphysics  of  being.”  Tillich  states  that  “[M]etaphysics  must  answer  three  basic  questions:  
first, the question of the relation of the Unconditioned to the being (das Seiende)…The  
metaphysics of being, or ontology, answer the  first  question.”103 Ontology is subordinated to 
metaphysics whose object of inquiry is meaning.  Tillich  adds  that  “It  is  not  the  task  of  ontology,  
accordingly,  to  discern  some  “being”  (ein Seiendes) behind the empirical phenomena; its task is 
rather to represent the structure of all beings (den Aufbau alles Seienden),  and  its  unity.”104 As 
Adrian  Thatcher  argues,  however,  “the subsidiary role assigned to ontology as the metaphysics 
of  being  does  not  last  long”  due to the limitations of the metaphysics of meaning.105 After his 
becoming acquainted with Heidegger in 1925, that is, after his having been on the same faculty 
with  Heidegger  in  Marburg,  and  more  substantially  after  having  been  exposed  to  Heidegger’s  
fundamental ontology through the publication of Being and Time in  1927,  Tillich’s  philosophical  
position shifts to a more ontological formulation, replacing metaphysics with ontology, or a 
metaphysics of  being,  as  the  fundamental  philosophical  discipline.  “Being”  replaces  “Meaning”  
as the ultimate philosophical absolute, and the question of being came to occupy a more central 
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position. Accordingly, ontology became the most important philosophical inquiry for Tillich, 
particularly existentialist ontology.106 By the time of the systematic theology, ontology had come 
to mean what it meant in Heidegger. In Systematic Theology, Tillich defined philosophy as to 
make  it  virtually  synonymous  with  ontology:  Philosophy  is  “that  cognitive  approach  to  reality  in  
which  reality  as  such  is  the  object,”
 107 and  ontology  is  the  “analysis of those structures of being 
which  we  encounter  in  every  meeting  with  reality.”
108 Philosophy and theology are both 
concerned with the question of being, but only from different perspectives. Tillich immediately 
adds  that  ,  although  this  was  “the  original  meaning  of  metaphysics,”  it  may  be  less  misleading  
now  to  speak  of  “ontology”  instead  of  metaphysics  because  the  term  “metaphysics”  has  come  to  
connote  a  “transcendent  realm  of  beings”  that  is  a  “duplication  of  this  world.”
109 Tillich 
continues,  “Philosophy asks the question of reality as a whole; it asks the question of the 
structure of being. And it answers in terms of categories, structural laws, and universal concepts. 
It  must  answer  in  ontological  terms.”
110 At its root, then, philosophy is ontology, the study of 
being. Ontology is the true center of all philosophy111 and its questions and concerns are implicit 
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in every other approach to philosophy.112 Later in the Firth lectures, Love, Power and Justice, 
which he gave at Nottingham in 1952, Tillich distinguishes even more sharply between ontology 
and metaphysics. There, he suggests that ontology “deals only with elements that are universally 
constitutive of everything that is. All events, persons, and all objective particulars are left to 
scientific analysis and to metaphysical constructions.”113 Tillich  asks,  “How  is  ontology  
distinguished  from  what  has  been  called  metaphysics?”  He  answers  that  “ontology  is  the  
foundation  of  metaphysics,  but  not  metaphysics  itself.  Ontology  asks  the  question  of  being…It  
separates those elements of the real which are generic or particular from those elements which 
are constitutive for everything that is and therefore are universal. It leaves the former to the 
special sciences or to metaphysics constructions; it elaborates the latter through critical 
analysis.”
114  
The change in his conception of ontology and God that seems to take place during the 
mid-1920s can be dated by reference to his works The System of the Sciences According to 
Objects and Methods (1923), Dogmatik (1925),  and  “Die  Gestalt  der  religiösen  Erkenntnis”  
(1927).115  In his 1925 Dogmatik, which appears to be a transitional work, Tillich starts to 
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develop his ontology with a more existentialist bent. In the Dogmatik, Tillich calls God not only 
“the  Unconditioned”  (das Unbedingte)  but  also  “the  unconditionedly  being”  (das Unbedingt 
Seiende). Seeing that, in Systematic Theology, das Seiende is equivalent to the created order 
while das Sein means “Being”  and  is  mostly  used  as  a  designation  for  God,  sometimes  in  the  
combination das Sein selbst,  “Being itself,”  this  seems  to  be  relegating  the  Unconditioned  to  the  
finite realm. But, as Robert P. Scharlemann points out in  his  unpublished  paper,  “Ontology  of  
Tillich’s  Dogmatics  of  1925,” the adverbial rather than adjectival meaning  (“that  which  is  
unconditionally”)  is  to  be  stressed  in  order  to  see  das Seiende as an ontological, rather than 
merely ontic, concept.116 In later years, Tillich becomes more careful to distinguish God from 
das Seiende in reserving the noun das Sein for ultimate reality and reserving das Seiende for the 
created order, as well as through his  refusal  to  state  that  “God  exists.”  This  sensitivity  in  
terminological  distinctions  was  most  likely  a  direct  influence  of  Heidegger  on  Tillich’s  thinking.  
Dogmatik of 1925 indicates that Tillich begins to define God in the ontological way, and 
Tillich’s  use  of  the  term  “Being itself”  in  relation  to  God  first  appears  in  “Die  Gestalt  der  
religiösen  Erkenntnis.”(1927).  The  Newsletter  of  the  North  American  Paul  Tillich  Society 
reports  that  Tillich  “was  involved  in  a  continuous  conversation  with  Heidegger  in  this  period  [of  
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the  late  1920s  up  to  1930].”
117 The evidence is drawn from examining the notes of articles that 
Tillich included in 1930 volume of his collected essays.118 The report suggests that Tillich did 
indeed dialogue in writing with Heidegger as early as 1927. For  Tillich,  Heidegger’s  ontological  
difference provides a formal determination of the concept of God. Tillich realizes that Heidegger 
himself does not identify Being with God, but the rejection of the idea of God in the 
subjectivistic metaphysics seems to leave open the possibility of a new concept of God based on 
the concept of Being itself.  
As Tillich’s  thought  was  affected  by  his  contact  with  Heidegger  from 1925 onwards, he 
began to emphasize that the  Unconditioned  is  not  God.  In  his  1946  essay,  Tillich  says,  “Neither  
“The  Unconditioned”  nor  “something  unconditional,”  is  meant  as  a  being,  not  even  the  highest  
being, not even God. God is unconditioned, that makes  Him  God;;  but  the  “unconditional”  is  not  
God.119 In  his  1947  essay,  “The  Problem  of  Theological  Method,”  Tillich  again  suggests  that  it  is  
wrong  to  call  the  transcendent  ultimate  or  the  Unconditioned  “God”:  “There  is,  however,  one  
point (which is only a point, without length or breadth) in which medium and content are 
identical, because in this point subject and object are identical: it is the awareness of the ultimate 
itself, the esse ipsum, which transcends the difference between subject and object and lies, as the 
presupposition of all doubts, beyond doubt; it is the veritas ipsa, as Augustine has called it. It is 
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wrong  to  call  this  point  ‘God’  (as  the  ontological  arguments  does),  but  it  is  necessary  to  call  it  
‘that  in  us  which  makes  it  impossible  for us  to  escape  God.’  It  is  the  presence  of  the  element  of  
‘ultimacy’  in  the  structure  of  our  existence,  the  basis  of  religious  experience.”
120 The 
Unconditioned is the point at which the God above God and the human existence meet when the 
“paradoxical  breakthrough”
121 of the divine revelation takes place.  
It  is  undeniable  that  Tillich’s  philosophical  thought  concerning  the  problem  of  existence  
shifted  in  both  emphasis  and  content  after  his  Marburg  period,  but  to  talk  of  Tillich’s  
Heideggerian turn in the mid-1920s  is  to  overstate  the  case.  Tillich’s  thought  cannot  be  evenly  
divided into two systems, for example, into an early Tillich and a late Tillich. The present 
research  does  not  support  neat  divisions  of  Tillich’s  theological  development.  As  John  Powell  
Clayton  observes,  “There  are  rather  numerous  strands  which  are  roughly  interwoven  in  the  
process of his theological and philosophical development. Some strands are extremely persistent, 
running all the way through from the earliest to his most mature writings, though there are 
sometimes slight and at other times great changes in colour and texture; some strands begin 
abruptly and others being almost imperceptibly; some end as abruptly and others simply fade out, 
perhaps to be revived later and perhaps to be abandoned  altogether.  The  resulting  “fabric”  is  far  
from  consistent,  either  in  pattern  or  in  texture.”
122  
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Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
 
 
Tillich’s  prioritizing the metaphysics of being over the metaphysics of meaning involves 
an appropriation of Kant’s  work in terms of metaphysics. Tillich reinterprets Kant in light of 
Heidegger’s  concern  with  neo-Kantianism. Kant  suggests  that  “Metaphysics  must  be  science,  not  
only  as  a  whole,  but  in  all  its  parts,  otherwise  it  is  nothing.”
123 He considers the human tendency 
towards metaphysics as natural or inherent to the faculty of reason124 and holds that “it is 
impossible to conceive of reason to be devoid of this tendency, despite the illusion that results 
from it.”125 But  “What  has  hitherto  been  called  metaphysics  cannot satisfy any critical mind, but 
to forego it entirely is impossible; therefore, a critique of pure reason itself must now be 
attempted.”
126 The traditional, or dogmatic, metaphysics is a quest to have a priori knowledge of 
the reality independent of sensibility and experience. “It is through pure intellectual method that 
these metaphysicians want to arrive at the indisputable knowledge of the ultimate nature of 
objects. This conception, however, is radically mistaken. It is not scientific and empty as Kant 
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shows in the Critique of Pure Reason.”127 The nature of the problem of traditional metaphysics 
as posed by Kant is its seeking a standpoint that could only be appropriate to God. For Kant, 
however, our inability to know what a thing in itself is the first step in recognizing what it means 
to be human.128 
As will be discussed in the following chapter, Heidegger conceives of metaphysics as 
science.  Heidegger’s  project  of  overcoming  metaphysics is an attempt to recover an authentic 
form of metaphysics. For him, “The overcoming of metaphysics can only be represented out of 
metaphysics  itself.”
129 Heidegger’s  fundamental ontology and existential phenomenology do not 
replace but upgrade metaphysics. Heidegger’s  background  comes  from  the  Neo-Kantians. 
Heidegger did his doctoral examination under neo-Kantians, including Heinrich Rickert and 
Wilhelm Windelband, who share strong reaction against irrationalism and speculative naturalism 
and  a  conviction  that  philosophy  could  be  a  “science”  only  if  it  returned  to  the  method  and spirit 
of Kant. But Heidegger assumed that “Kant’s  Critique of Pure Reason should not be seen along 
neo-Kantian lines as an epistemological inquiry into the logical preconditions for the natural 
sciences but should be understood instead as a metaphysical inquiry into the ontological 
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preconditions for raising the question of being.”130 In Heidegger’s  view, Critique of Pure Reason 
not only shows that the goal of dogmatic metaphysics is untenable, but also that it is an attempt 
to develop the critical metaphysics. All through the Critique, Heidegger finds, contrary to the 
popular belief that Kant has purged metaphysics of its basic nature, Kant’s  effort to establish a 
new method of metaphysics. For Heidegger, Kant’s  point  turns  out  to  be  compatible  with,  rather 
than opposed to, his own fundamental ontology. According to Heidegger, Kant’s task was to 
“investigate human being as the necessary foundation for understanding being as such.”131 It was 
this preparatory task – “the  laying  of  the  ground  for  metaphysics”132 – that Heidegger termed 
“fundamental  ontology”  and  defines  as  “the  metaphysics  of  human  Dasein  which  is  required  for  
metaphysics  to  be  made  possible.”
133 Kant never rejected metaphysics as such – only dogmatic 
metaphysics.  Kant’s  own  approach  is  doing  the  work of metaphysics, a fact he acknowledges 
when  he  refers  to  it  as  “the  metaphysics  of  metaphysics,”  or  “critical  metaphysics.”
134 Heidegger 
replaces  Kant’s  own  indefinite  vision  of  a  metaphysics  of  metaphysic  with  fundamental  ontology.   
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In Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), Heidegger revisits Kant’s  Critique of 
Pure Reason and  discusses  it  “in  terms  of the question of the possibility of ontological 
knowledge, seen as the laying of the foundation for metaphysics.”135 “The Neo-Kantians wanted 
to use Kant to overcome and bring about a renunciation of German idealism in general by use of 
the theory of knowledge. Therefore, they took Kant as working through the destruction of 
metaphysics in general. The return to Kant was guided by the need to find a philosophical 
foundation, that is, epistemology, for positivistic concept of science.”136 But Heidegger says in 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,  “The  intention  of  the  Critique of Pure Reason, there, 
remains fundamentally misunderstood,  if  it  is  interpreted  as  a  ‘theory  of  experience’  or  even  as  a  
theory of the positive sciences. The Critique of Pure Reason has  nothing  to  do  with  a  ‘theory  of  
knowledge.’  If  one  generally  could  allow  the  interpretation  of  the  Critique of Pure Reason as a 
theory of knowledge, then that would be to say that it is not a theory of ontic knowledge 
(experience),  but  rather  a  theory  of  ontological  knowledge.”
137 For  Heidegger,  “‘Epistemology’  
is the title for the increasing, essential powerlessness of modern metaphysics to know its essence 
and  the  ground  of  that  essence.”138 He  thinks  that  Kant’s  major contribution to epistemology lies 
                                                 
135 Timothy J. Stapleton, Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1983), 100. 
 
136 Daniel Fidel Ferrer, German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche and Heidegger 
(Verlag Ferrer, 2011), 12. 
 
137 KPM, 11/GA3, 16-7. 
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in helping to “clear the way and to indicate the basis for a fundamental ontology.”139 Heidegger 
says  that  “[In  Kant]  Ontology  is  called  transcendental  philosophy  because it contains the 
conditions and first elements of all our knowledge a priori. Kant always stresses here that as 
transcendental philosophy ontology has to do with the knowledge of objects. This does not mean, 
as Neo-Kantianism interpreted it, epistemology…The  interpretation  of  Kant’s  Critique of Pure 
Reason as  epistemology  completely  misses  the  true  meaning.”140  
The enormous effect  of  Kant’s  work  raised with a new urgency the traditional 
metaphysical issues that had featured so prominently in medieval metaphysics. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Tillich and his contemporaries were inclined to re-examine the 
medieval tradition. Before he re-read Kant through Heidegger,141 Tillich considered Kant merely 
as the fulfillment of the Enlightenment that challenged the possibility of religious knowledge. He 
concludes that Kant is wrong when his refusal of metaphysics becomes an absolute one and 
“rejects  metaphysics  as  such.”
142 Tillich’s  primary  reason  for  organizing  the  sciences  in  The 
System of the Sciences (1923) is to “find a legitimate place for theology after its decline in 
Western consciousness”143 by attempting to establish the epistemological basis for the possibility 
                                                 
139 Haim Gordon, The Heidegger-Buber Controversy: The Status of the I-Thou (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2001), 92. 
 
140 BPP, 128/GA24, 180-1. 
 
141 EP, 97. 
 
142 SS, 182.  
 
143 A. James Reimer, Paul Tillich: Theologian of Nature, Culture and Politics (Münster: LIT 
Verlag, 2004), 134. 
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of  theology.  Tillich  diagnoses  that  the  decline  is  due  to  Kant’s  closing  off  any  experience of 
transcendence. He writes,  “Kant’s  critique  of  rational  metaphysics  still  dominates  the  present  
situation in metaphysics. Today hardly anyone is demanding a revival of this obsolete form of 
metaphysics. The critical attitude toward all metaphysical endeavors  is  still  in  our  blood.”144 
“Since  Kant’s  critique  of  reason,  epistemology  has  achieved  a  dominant  position  in  philosophy.  
Replacing the rational metaphysics that had been destroyed, epistemology attained the rank of a 
fundamental science. The prejudice developed that all real knowledge depends on the theory of 
knowledge.”
145 Kant  “has  brought  theology  down  from  heaven  to  earth”  and  changed  it  into  a  
regulative  or  normative  science.”
146 Tillich explains that “When  the  Enlightenment  made  
metaphysics a rational science, it completely abandoned the metaphysical attitude. It attempted 
to draw the Unconditioned down into the sphere of the conditioned, into the sphere of proof and 
disproof. But in this way, metaphysics was deprived of its object even before its work began. 
Kant’s  critique  merely  drew  the  conclusion  from  this  state  of  affairs.”
147 But Tillich begins to 
reinterpret Kant under the influence of Heidegger. Tillich comes to regard Kant as an important 
contributor to existential ontology.148 Systematic Theology offers  Tillich’s  changed  view  of  
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Kant’s  relation  to  the  traditional  metaphysics.  “When  an  ontological  tradition  has  become  
doubtful and the question arises whether the tools used in the creation of this tradition are 
responsible  for  its  failure…This  was  the  situation  of…Kant  with  respect  to  the  traditional  
metaphysics.”
149 Defending  Kant,  Tillich  writes,  “It  is  unfortunate  that  Kant  often  is  interpreted  
only as an epistemological idealist and an ethical formalist – and consequently rejected. Kant is 
more than this. His doctrine of the categories is a doctrine of human finitude. His doctrine of the 
categorical imperative is a doctrine of the unconditional element in the depth of practical reason. 
His doctrine of the teleological principle in art and nature enlarges the concept of reason beyond 
its cognitive-technical  sense  toward  what  we  have  called  “ontological  reason.””150 A decisive 
factor  in  this  change  is  Tillich’s  having  come  into  contact  with  the  work  of  Heidegger.  Tillich  
recalls,  “When  existential  philosophy was introduced into German, I came to a new 
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  philosophy  and  theology.  Heidegger’s  lectures  at  
Marburg, the publication of his Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), and also his interpretation of 
Kant were significant  in  this  connection”151 “Most  important  in  this  connection  is  Heidegger’s  
attempt  to  interpret  Kant’s  critical  philosophy  in  terms  of  Existential  philosophy,  primarily  in  
terms of human finitude. In his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) he introduces the 
subject  of  his  inquiry  as  Kant’s  attempt  to  found  metaphysics  on  the  human,  that  is,  the  finite,  
                                                 
149 ST1, 71. 
 
150 ST1, 82. The following chapter  discusses  Tillich’s  concept  of  “ontological  reason”  that  
surpasses the purely cognitive interests of technical reason. 
 
151 OB, 56. 
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character  of  reason.”
152 At the end of his days, Tillich accepts that Kant was a decisive influence 
on his thinking and the Critique of Pure Reason was a very apt description of his concept of the 
Unconditioned.153 According John Heywood Thomas, Tillich  “remained  very  much  in  thrall  to  
Kant  throughout  his  life’s  work.”
154 He recalls Tillich remarking during the last summer of his 
life,  “Of  course  I  am  a  Kantian.”
155  
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY 
 
In  response  to  Heidegger’s  fundamental  ontology,  Tillich’s  idea  of  the  Unconditioned  in  
which he locates the answer to the question of the ultimate meaning of existence evolves to 
include ontological relationship between the Unconditioned and the human existence as the 
conditioned. Tillich’s  existential theology is an attempt to explain the unconditional Being itself 
as the ground and source of the ultimate meaning of human existence. It results from his 
correlation of theology and philosophy, and his choice of existentialism is indebted to 
Heidegger’s  critical analysis of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich’s  
distinction between existential theology and non-existential philosophy including traditional 
theology mirrors Heidegger’s  distinction  between  fundamental  ontology  and  other  philosophical  
programs including traditional theology.  
 
Positive Science and Theology 
 
 
Husserl makes a primary distinction between a science of being in general and a science 
of  beings  in  particular.  The  latter  he  terms  “positive  science”  in  that  it  has  entities  as  its  field  of  
research,  which  he  calls  “positum.”  Positive  science  rests  on  an  ontological  “posit,”  a  
presupposition about what the entity it studies is. The given positum is a being that in a certain 
way is already disclosed and is grasped on a pre-scientific level prior to any theoretical 
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apprehending. “Every positive science rests upon a field of givenness or evidence that is 
presupposed but not investigated by the sciences themselves.”1 “The  universe  of  beings  is  the  
sphere from which the positive sciences of nature, history, space secure at any given time their 
domain of objects. Directed straight to beings, they take over in its totality the analysis of all that 
is.”
2 “Philosophy,  however,  lies  in  a  wholly  new  dimension.  It  requires  a  wholly  new  point  of  
departure and a wholly new method, a method that distinguishes it in principle from every 
“positive”  science.”
3 Philosophy  touches  on  “the  question which concerns all [positive sciences] 
in  the  same  way,  namely,  the  question  of  the  meaning  of  the  Being  of  their  domains  of  Being.”
4  
Following quite closely Husserl in drawing a distinction between positive science, or 
ontic science, on the one hand, and ontological science as a fundamental science, on the other, 
Heidegger discerns that there is a basic difference between these positive sciences and ontology 
as  the  science  of  philosophy.  “Ontic  sciences  in  each  case  thematize  a  given  entity  that  in a 
certain manner is always already disclosed prior to scientific disclosure. We call the sciences of 
entities as given – of a positum – positive  sciences…Ontology,  or  the  science  of  being,  on  the  
                                                 
1 Dan  Zahavi,  “Phenomenology,”  in  The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, 
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Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 257. 
 
193 
 
 
 
other hand, demands a fundamental shift of view: from entities  to  being.”5 “There  are  many  
things  we  designate  as  ‘being,’  and  we  do  so  in  various  senses.”
6 Accordingly there are many 
“regional  ontologies.”  These  regional  ontologies  are  all  grounded  in  a  single  common  foundation,  
what Heidegger calls in Being and Time a  “fundamental  ontology.”  Fundamental  ontology  is  
concerned with the question of Being itself, which is, Heidegger holds, the most fundamental 
question,  “the question  of  metaphysics,”7 that human being can raise. Fundamental ontology 
endeavors to discover what, exactly, it means for something to be, or, in other words, to discover 
the fundamental structure of all that is. Fundamental ontology does not posit being for its 
question.8 In Being and Time, Heidegger speaks  of  “a destruction of the history of ontology, with 
the stated aim of retrieving the question of the meaning of being, which has been lost, or 
forgotten, in the metaphysical tradition.”9 In  view  of  the  history  of  metaphysics,  Heidegger’s  
program implies that it is possible to carry on traditional metaphysics only as long as one does 
not  think  the  “ontological  difference,”  the  difference  between  being and entities, that is to say, as 
long as one does not grasp the thought that being is not any entity.10 Ontology in its genuine 
                                                 
5 PT, 41/GA9, 48. 
 
6 BT, 26/SZ, 6. 
 
7 OQB, 291/GA9, 213.  
 
8 Albert  Hofstadter,  translator’s  introduction  to  BPP,  xxix. 
 
9 Robert  P.  Scharlemann,  “The  Being  of  God  When  God  Is Not Being God: Deconstructing the 
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sense is a science of being itself,  not  even  a  science  of  an  entity  called  Dasein.  But  “Being  cannot  
be  represented  or  brought  forth  in  the  manner  of  an  object.”
11 Being is not even an object of 
cognition. Ontology does not posit Being as its subject matter. Therefore, ontology cannot be a 
positive science. Philosophies of the tradition including ontologies are positivistic in the strictest 
sense. For the philosophical tradition has understood being in terms of entities at their objective 
presence. “Being becomes a certain unchanging ground that gives identity and continuity to an 
otherwise ever-changing process of beings in their coming to be in passing away.”12 As Herman 
Philipse  notes,  “philosophers of the tradition took a specific type of being as a paradigm in 
developing their general notion of being.”13 All implicitly hold to an analogous understanding of 
being in terms of the logical necessity for the identity of the objectively present entities. 
Heidegger objects to this kind of conceptual generalization in ontology. Being is not an idea, but 
is  existential.  Being  can  only  be  experienced  by  being  there.  Therefore  “Dasein”  points  to  the  
fact of how the existential comprehension of being  is  fundamentally  rooted  in  Dasein’s  being.  
Dasein  is  not  merely  ontic  in  this  sense.  “Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among 
other  entities.  Rather  it  is  ontically  distinguished.”
14 This aspect of  Dasein’s  existential  
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comprehension of being explains its quality which is ontically distinct from all other entities, 
though Dasein is an entity among many others in  the  world.  Dasein  is  ontic,  but  “Dasein  is  
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.”15 Compared with other possible ontologies, the 
ontology of Dasein is fundamental for Dasein has an ontical primacy as compared to other 
beings. Heidegger insists that the foundation of ontology lies in and remains bound to Dasein. 
Heidegger’s  investigation  of  being is a foundation that he calls fundamental ontology and of 
which he writes that it  “must  be  sought  in  the  existential  analytic  of  human  Being.”16 In other 
words,  Dasein  is  “an  ontical  foundation”  of  ontological  science.
17 This  implies  that  “ontology  
cannot  be  established  in  a  purely  ontological  manner.”
18 Being discloses itself only by way of 
Dasein. Being is given only if the understanding of being, hence the Dasein, exists. This is the 
only  sense  in  which  we  can  say  that  being  “is.”  “Something  like  ‘Being’  has  been  disclosed  in  
the understanding-of-Being which belongs to existent Dasein as a way in which it 
understands.”
19 Consequently,  “The first task [of fundamental ontology] is the demonstration of 
its ontical foundation and the characterization of this foundation itself.”20 On the other hand, 
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16 BT, 34/SZ, 13 
 
17 BPP, 19/GA24, 25-6. 
 
18 BPP, 19/GA24, 25-6. 
 
19 BT, 488/SZ, 437. 
 
20 BPP, 20/GA24, 26-8.  Heidegger’s  emphasis. 
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Dasein as the ontical foundation of ontology is always my Dasein.21 “Because  Dasein  has in each 
case mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun  when  one  addresses  it:  ‘I  
am,’  ‘you  are.’”
22 To be exact, therefore, the question of being is the most fundamental question 
that we can raise for us to understand the ultimate meaning of our being there. As such, ontology 
has for its fundamental discipline the existential analytic of the Dasein. Although the ontological 
difference draws a sharp line of distinction between being itself and beings in particular, 
nevertheless, Dasein is the foundation of ontology. Ontology must start from and return to the 
Dasein. But it is not a positive science.23 In Being and Time, Heidegger uses “existential 
analytic” and “ontological analytic” interchangeably with fundamental ontology, but they are not 
synonymous.24 Heidegger uses them interchangeably in that ontology is grounded in the 
existential analytic – The  ontological  is  grounded  in  the  existential  “analysis,”  although  the  
existential is grounded in the ontological. Ontological analytic is a broader term, and existential 
analytic  is  a  distinctive  feature  of  Heidegger’s  ontology.   
Based on his distinction between positive science and non-positive ontology, Heidegger 
presents  the  lecture  “Phänomenologie  und  Theologie”  during  the  period  that  Being and Time was 
                                                 
21 BT, 67/SZ, 41.  Heidegger’s  emphasis. 
 
22 BT, 68/SZ, 42.  Heidegger’s  emphasis. 
 
23 Albert Hofstadter, translator’s  introduction  to  BPP,  xxix. 
 
24 Cf. Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber (New Brunswick, NJ.: 
Transaction Publishes, 2009), 183. 
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first appearing in publication.25 In this lecture, he sets forth his views on the distinction and 
relationship  between  theology  and  ontology,  “the  relationship of two sciences.”26 In this lecture, 
which John D. Caputo interprets as “Heidegger’s farewell to Christian theology as a matter of 
explicit  and  personal  concern,”
27 Heidegger criticizes traditional Christian theology, which he 
thinks has been “corrupted by its assimilation into Greek metaphysical philosophy.”28 Heidegger 
classifies and criticizes theology as a positive science,29 which is to delimit theology to an ontic 
science. According to Heidegger, proper to the positive character of theology is that theology 
deals  with  an  entity  called  “Christianness  as  something  that  allows  Christianity to become an 
originarily  historical  event…Thus  we  maintain  that  what is given for theology (its positum) is 
Christianness…What  does  “Christianness”  mean?  We  call  faith  Christian.”30 Faith  is  “the  
essential constitutive element of Christianness,”31 and theology  is  “the  science  of  faith.”32 
                                                 
25 Heidegger dedicated the German edition of the  publication  of  this  lecture  to  Bultmann    “in  
friendly remembrance of the Marburg years 1923-1928.” 
 
26 PT, 40. 
 
27 John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 
174. 
 
28 John Reynold Williams, Martin  Heidegger’s  Philosophy of Religion (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1979), 4. 
 
29 PT, 42. 
 
30 PT, 43. 
 
31 PT, 51. 
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Theology  as  the  science  of  faith  makes  faith  its  object.  “Faith  itself  is  a  theme  for  theology.”
33 
Also the whole of entities uncovered by faith are the positum of theology.34 Thus theology 
“makes  faith  and  that  which  is  believed  its  object.”
35 Theology is a positive science in that it 
deals with faith and what is revealed in it as its focus of theoretical objectification. Heidegger 
explains faith as a way of existence of human Dasein.36 Theology,  then,  is  “a  conceptual  
interpretation  of  Christian  existence,”37 or  “faithful  existence.”38 This implies that “The  object  of  
theology is the all-inclusive  relationship  of  God  to  man  and  of  man  to  God.”39 Consequently, 
Heidegger confines theology to specifically confessional doctrine. Heidegger asserts for this 
reason that  philosophy,  as  “the science,”  or  “absolute  science,”40 of Being itself, differs 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 PT, 45.  Heidegger  notes  that  “Etymologically  regarded,  theo-logy means: science of God. But 
God is in no way the object of investigation in theology.”  (48)  Heidegger’s  thinking  seems  to  have  gone  
through some transitions. Heidegger claimed earlier that theology is the science of God. But Heidegger 
maintains in Being and Time that  theology  is  the  science  of  “faith.”  He  writes,  “Taken  superficially, the 
term  ‘phenomenology’  is  formed  like  ‘theology,’  ‘biology,’  ‘sociology’  – names which may be translated 
as  ‘science  of  God’…”  BT, 50/SZ, 28. 
 
33 PT, 45. 
 
34 PT, 45. 
 
35 PT, 46. 
 
36 PT, 43. 
 
37 PT, 47. 
 
38 PT, 50. 
 
39 PT, 48-9.  
 
40 FCM, 1/GA29-30, 1. 
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“absolutely, not relatively,”  from  theology.41 Dogmatic theology of patristic tradition is closer to 
natural science than it is to philosophy in its genuine form. Heidegger says therefore that “there  
is  no  such  thing  as  a  Christian  philosophy;;  that  is  an  absolute  “square  circle.””
42 Heidegger 
explains that theology has been fundamentally one of the sciences that attempts to answer the 
question,  “Which  being  is  the  highest  and  in  what  way  is  it?”
43 According to Heidegger, these 
questions have been answered by the traditional metaphysics which he calls “onto-theology.”  
The old theology is onto-theology, and onto-theology is inherently positivistically metaphysical. 
For Heidegger, ontotheology treats God as a being though it understands God as a supreme being. 
This is a natural outcome of its forgetting the ontological difference between being in general 
and beings in particular. In other words, ontotheology confuses being itself with a particular 
being. Ontotheology deprives the world of its mystery and gives us a God not worthy of 
worship.44 His  criticism  is  that  the  God  of  ontotheology  is  not  the  God  of  religious  faith:  “…the  
cause as causa sui. This is the right name for the god of [ontotheological] philosophy. Man can 
neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in 
                                                 
41 PT, 41.  Heidegger’s  emphasis.   
 
42 PT, 53. 
 
43 KTB, 340/GA9, 277. Heidegger  calls  the  first  question  “the  question  of  God,  the  second,  “the  
question  of  the  divine.”  Taken  together,  Heidegger  writes,  this  dual  “question  of  God  and  of  the  divine”  is  
the theological question. 
 
44 Merold  Westphal,  “Onto-theology,  Metanarrative,  Perspectivism,  and  the  Gospel,”  in  
Christianity and Postmodern Turn: Six Views, ed. Myron B. Penner (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005), 
145. 
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awe  nor  he  play  music  and  dance  before  this  god.”
45 It is a false idolatrous explication of the 
divinity, an idolatry from which the Judeo-Christian is not exempt.46 God of the traditional 
theism  has  in  fact  been  “the  god  of  Aristotle”  that  even  “has  nothing  in  common  with  the  gods  
worshipped  by  the  Greeks.”
47 We  “must  abandon  the  God  of  the  philosophers, God as Causa 
sui.”48 Heidegger thinks that the traditional Christian theism is a not genuine one. It is what 
Heidegger  calls  in  1928  the  “ontic  belief  in  God,”  which  is  basically  “godless.”
49 Nietzsche’s  
word of the absence of God lies at the center  of  Heidegger’s  interpretation  of  the  traditional  
theology. Heidegger does not dispute  that  Nietzsche’s  word against Christianity refers to the 
misunderstood Christian God of the Biblical revelation.  
The early and widespread characterization of Heidegger as an existentialist occasioned a 
vigorous attack against him by Protestant theologians such as Karl Barth and several Catholic 
theologians as well. John Reynold Williams says that the most influential philosophical 
evaluation of the religious potential of  Heidegger’s  philosophy  was  offered  by  Sartre.  Williams 
argues based  on  Sartre’s  celebrated remark that identified Heidegger as among the existential 
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46 GA66, 239. 
 
47 “This  is  precisely  what occurs in most cases when the philosopher speaks of God. So remote is 
this conception from the God most men have in mind that if, by some miracle, and contrary to the opinion 
of philosophers, God as thus defined should step down into the field of experience, none would recognize 
him.”  Henri  Bergson,  The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Aurad and Cloudesley 
Brereton (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935), 233-4. 
 
48 OCM, 72. 
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atheists that  “[Sartre] was responsible for many of the atheistic interpretations of Heidegger.”50 
The extensive  use  which  Sartre  made  of  Heidegger’s  concepts in Being and Nothingness served 
to support his  declaration  that  Heidegger’s  philosophy  is  thoroughly  atheistic.51 As a result, 
Heidegger’s  name  has  been  linked  to  Sartre’s  in  many  books  on  existentialism  as an unrepentant 
atheist.52  One  can  simply  characterize  Heidegger’s  philosophy  as  atheistic,  since  it  appears to 
speak of nothing beyond being. According to Heidegger, being is finite in that it renders itself 
present as an object of human experience. In other words, being is in need of human being. For 
Heidegger, therefore, being cannot be identified with God. Cornelio Fabro in his history of 
modern atheism, God in Exile, interprets the theistic latency of a philosophy according to its 
openness for divine transcendence. He judges the criticism of Heidegger by this criterion, saying 
that “the  Heideggerian  Sein selbst (Being itself)…is  atheistic  in  content,  structure  and  position,  
inasmuch as it is the coming-to-presence of the finite by the instrumentality of a finite being 
condemned  to  a  finite  destiny  like  man’s.”
53 The religious aspect  of  Heidegger’s  philosophy  has  
                                                 
50 John Reynold Williams, Martin Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Religion (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1979), 9. 
 
51 John Reynold Williams, Martin  Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Religion (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1979), 9. 
 
52 Marjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Arthur C. 
Cochrane, The Existentialists and God (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956); David E. Roberts, 
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53 Cornelio Fabro, God in Exile: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern Atheism, From Its 
Roots in the Cartesian Cogito to the Present Day (New York: Newman Press, 1968), 929. Fabro admits 
that Heidegger does not exclud all openness to God, but for all practical purposes God is foreign to and 
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often been evaluated from a narrow and dogmatic standpoint and his concept of Being itself 
incompatible with the view of God described in the Scripture. For Tillich, however, the atheistic 
theological  potentiality  of  Heidegger’s  philosophy  provides  a  fuller  vision  of  the  divine  than  
offered by traditional religious understandings. Tillich finds  in  Heidegger’s  discussion  between  
philosophy and theology that philosophy, as Heidegger conceived it, is more authentically 
religious than traditional theology.  
 
The Correlation of Theology and Philosophy 
  
 
In The System of the Sciences (1923), Tillich notes that “The  phenomenological  school,  
in pursuing its  logical  realism,  is  to  some  extent  moving  toward  a  new  ontology.”54 In his 
important  essay,  “Existential  Philosophy:  Its  Historical  Meaning  (1944),”  Tillich  traces the 
history of existential philosophy from the nineteenth-century German theology to Heidegger, 
describing  him  as  introducing  “a  new  ontology.”
55 This remark seems to be intended to justify 
his employment of the fundamental existential categories Heidegger had outlined in Being and 
Time. In the concluding  paragraph  of  “The  Two  Types  of  Philosophy  of  Religion”  (1946), Tillich 
sets forth his future project of correlating theology with the Heideggerian fundamental ontology 
and  what  he  hopes  it  will  accomplish:  “The  ontological  approach  to  philosophy  of  religion  as  
envisaged by Augustine and his followers, as reappearing in many forms in the history of 
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thought, if critically reinterpreted by us, is able to do for our time what it did in the past, both for 
religion and culture: to overcome as far as it is possible by mere thought the fateful gap between 
religion and culture, thus reconciling concerns which are not strange to each other but have been 
estranged  from  each  other.”
56 
 Tillich agrees with Heidegger that the nature of the methodology to be used to investigate 
the ontological ground of human existence must be existential. Heidegger’s  fundamental  
ontology reveals that ontological reality precedes ontic reality logically, though not 
chronologically. This priority enables a sense of transcendence and enables Tillich to explain it 
without resort to any classical form of supernaturalism. Tillich believes that this immanently 
transcendental Being itself as the ontological Ground of human existence is the domain of true 
God, above the God of traditional theism. As did Heidegger, Tillich locates traditional theology 
within a particular confessional tradition, in this case the Christian tradition, and rejects the 
conservative view of the Scripture  because  it  posits  “a  concept  of  supernaturally  authoritative  
revelation…this concept has been overcome by the wave of religious-historical insights and the 
logical  and  religious  criticism  of  the  conception  of  supernaturalism.”
57 This entails a complete 
negation of conservative models of theology.58 “Theology  is  not  the  science  of  one  particular  
                                                 
56 TT, 29. 
 
57 OITC, 37. 
 
58 For example, Tillich is critical of Barth for confining the source of theology to the Scripture. 
Tillich  thinks  that  Barth’s  emphasis  on  the  supernatural  – at the expense of the natural – promotes 
literalistic readings of the Scripture that do not adequately consider human influences. He says that the 
“total  result…[is]  that  theology  can  be  nothing  but  the  exercise  of  a  critical  self-consciousness upon the 
content of the Christian pronouncement, in which the word of Scripture is the ultimate standard of 
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object among others, which we call God; the Critique of Reason put an end to this kind of 
science.”
59 For Tillich, true, or authentic, theology begins only when one becomes aware of the 
divine  depth  in  the  finite  world  and  symbolizes  this  depth.  He  argues  that  “theology  is  not  a 
scientific  presentation  of  a  special  complex  of  revelation.”
60 In  Tillich’s  view,  traditional 
theism’s  attempt to speak of unsymbolically, that is, literally, of the Unconditioned is to commit 
blasphemy for it is an attempt to reach the unconditionality of the Unconditioned.61 “The 
unconditioned transcendent surpasses every possible conception of a being, including even the 
conception of a Supreme Being.”62 For Tillich, therefore, the fundamental problem of theology is 
its understanding of God as an entity, though it treats God as the outer most anchor in the causal 
chain  of  creation.  “The  God  of  theological  theism  is  a  being  beside  others  and  as  such  a  part  of  
the  whole  of  reality.”
63 Tillich  sharply  critiques  such  conception  of  God  as  a  being.  “It  
                                                                                                                                                             
criticism.”  TRT  108.  In  fact,  Barth  is  more  careful  to  account  for  the  inclusion  of  the  human possibility in 
the God-human relationship. Barth acknowledges that there is movement, in the event of revelation, from 
“below  to  above.”  And  human  beings  are  active  subjects  – even  “partners  with  God”  – in relationship to 
this event. Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, vol. IV/2 of Church Dogmatics, ed. T. F. Torrance, 
trans. G. W. Bromiley (London: T & T Clark, 1989), 8. Rather, Barth criticized the theological method of 
Tillich  “with  the  sardonic  observation  that  it  would  work  in  paradise  or  in  heaven,  but  not  here  below.”  
Robert Barron, The Priority of Christ: Toward a Postliberal Catholicism (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 
2007), 143. 
 
59 OITC, 37.  
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transforms the infinity of God into a finiteness which is merely an extension of the categories of 
finitude.”
64 “If  God  is  a  being,  He  is  subject  to  the  categories  of  finitude...Even  if  He  is  called  the  
“highest  being”  in  the  sense  of  the  “most  perfect”  and  the  “most powerful”  being,  this  situation  is  
not  changed.”
65 “Such  concepts  make  us  picture  God  as  a  thing  with  super-human  qualities.”66 
For Tillich, as in Heidegger, to worship a being as God is superstitious idolatry. It  is  to  “reduce 
Him to that small thing we knew  and  grasped  of  Him;;  and  we  make  it  an  idol.”67 “In  face  of  an  
objectively  existing  God,  atheism  is  right.”
68  
 Rejecting traditional theism, Tillich also draws a sharp distinction between philosophy 
and (authentic) theology and ascribes a separate function to each. As discussed above, for Tillich, 
philosophy must be fundamentally ontological. He  agrees  with  Heidegger  that  “the  meaning  of  
being  is  man’s  basic  concern.  It  is  the  really  human  and  philosophical  question…Man,  as  the  
German philosopher Heidegger says,  is  that  being  which  asks  what  being  is.”69 Theology, as 
Tillich understands it, is also an ontological inquiry in the broad sense. Its concern, however, is 
not  with  “the structure of being in itself,”  but  rather  with  “the  meaning  of  being  for us.”70  
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66 SF, 45. 
 
67 YAA, 151. 
 
68 IH, 46. 
 
69 PaT, 85. 
 
70 ST1, 22. My emphasis. PaT, 87. Tillich’s  emphasis.   
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In other words, theology is concerned with the meaning of Being itself for the answer to the 
question of the ultimate meaning of our existence. This  echoes  Heidegger’s  concern  with  Dasein  
which is always my own. The genuine theological question is the question of the meaning of 
“my  existence.”
71 Tillich writes,  “Asking  for  the  meaning  of  Being, theology asks for the 
ultimate ground and power and norm and aim of Being, as far as it is my being and carries me as 
the abyss and ground of my existence, it asks for the threatening and promising power over my 
existence, for the demanding and judging norm of my existence, for the fulfilling and rejecting 
aim of my existence.”72 The question of being is therefore ultimately an existential question. It is 
the perennial question of humankind about itself, and theology must take issue with it. Though 
Tillich says that the analysis of the human situation precedes existentialism, this is where the 
influence  of  Heidegger’s  existentialism  on  his  theological  development is verified in very 
important ways.73 Tillich  asserts  that  “Theology  is  necessarily  existential”74in the sense that it 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
71 IH, 30. It is absurd to say that my existence can have a meaning even if existence in general  is 
meaningless. But it is not possible to conclude that existence in general is meaningless without explaining 
the meaninglessness of existence in particular. Kurt Baier, “The Meaning of Life,” in The Meaning of Life, 
ed. E. D. Klemke (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 115, argues otherwise: “People are 
disconcerted by the thought that life as such has no meaning…only because they very naturally think it 
entails that no individual life can have meaning either. They naturally assume that this life or that can 
have meaning only if life as such has meaning. But it should by now be clear that your life and mine may 
or may not have meaning (in one sense) even if life as such has none (in the other). Of course, it follows 
from this that your life may have meaning while mine has not.” But as Baier himself indicates, it is absurd 
to say that your life may have meaning in the ultimate sense while mine has not.  
 
72 PaT, 88. Tillich’s  emphasis. 
 
73 Tillich often speaks of the influence of Heidegger upon the development of his own thinking. 
E.g., OB, 48, 56; AR; SG.    
 
74 ST1, 23. 
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deals our existence, while ontology is not necessarily existential. This implies that existentialist 
philosophical thinking is essential correlate to theology – In Tillich, essential correlation differs 
from synthesis. The  questions  from  which  theology  takes  its  rise  are  “existential  questions.”75 “In  
no theological statement can the relation to us be  omitted.”76 Conversely, non-existential 
theology is not genuine theology. Philosophy and theology are correlated in such a way that 
theology is grounded in the existential and ontological philosophy. Tillich distinguishes between 
“existential”  and  “existentialist.”  “The  former  refers  to  a  human  attitude,  the latter to a 
philosophical school. The opposite of existential is detached; the opposite of existentialist is 
essentialist. In existential thinking, the object is involved. In non-existential thinking, the object 
is detached. By its very nature, theology  is  existential.”77 But existentialism as a philosophical 
movement generally defines human existence by the attitude of involvement in the object. In this 
sense,  Tillich’s  theological  attitude  is  essentially  philosophical.  Thus he says that “As  a  
theologian I tried to remain  a  philosopher,  and  conversely  so.”78 Tillich’s  idea of correlation 
reflects the value of philosophy for his theology. He believed that the existential and ontological 
aspect of philosophy is indispensable to theology, because it formulates the questions that 
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theology answers, and also because it provides the form that the theological answers must take.79 
Tillich holds philosophy in high regard. He writes that “No  theologian  should  be  taken  seriously  
as a theologian, even if he is a great Christian and a great scholar, if his work shows that he does 
not  take  philosophy  seriously.”
80 There is no possibility of conflict or synthesis between 
existential theology and non-existential philosophies including traditional ontology, for there is 
no common basis between the two on which to correlate with each other.81  This distinction 
between existential theology and non-existential philosophies clears up “the confusion…which 
causes one to question whether at a given moment Tillich is speaking as a philosopher or as a 
philosophical theologian.” Tillich is an existentialist philosophical theologian. The synthesis 
between theology  and  philosophy  that  Tillich  rejects  as  “the  dream  of  a  Christian  philosophy”82 
is only a synthesis between existential theology and non-existential philosophy. Tillich’s 
existential theology is philosophical theology, and it is essentially Heideggerian. In Heidegger, 
the  existential  is  grounded  in  the  ontological.  Tillich’s  correlation  of  theology  and  philosophy  is  
to take this further and suggest that the ontological in which the existential is grounded is itself 
grounded in the theological. This does not indicate a point at which Tillich differs from 
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Heidegger. Tillich theologizes Heidegger’s  description  of existential understanding of being, not 
against Heidegger but in place of Heidegger.   
Tillich observes that the distinction has been made between atheistic and theistic 
existentialism.  “Certainly  there  are  existentialists  who  could  be  called  “atheistic,”  at  least  
according to their  intention;;  and  there  are  others  who  can  be  called  “theistic.””  In  his  defense  of  
Heidegger, Tillich resists this manner of classification. Authentic existentialism has Being itself 
as its foundation. Heidegger is very cautious about identifying Being itself with God, but Tillich 
carefully identifies Being itself with God in a non-symbolic way. Thus  Heidegger’s  
methodological atheism can be interpreted rather as a religious quest for God. In a sense, theists 
are mistaken in assuming that they know how to approach God. God cannot be known even 
partially because God cannot be divided. Atheists, who do not have God – no one has God as a 
matter of fact – can raise an authentic question of God. The atheistic quest for God is genuine 
one.  “Only  in  this  way  philosophy stands honestly before God,”83 says Heidegger. As Herman 
Philipse points out, Heidegger’s  distinction  between  philosophy  and  theology  does  “not coincide 
with a distinction between areligious thought and religious thought.”84 On the contrary, 
philosophy, insofar as it is authentically existential, is more religious than non-existential 
theology of the tradition. Thus Tillich says that “There  is  no  atheistic  or  theistic  existentialism.”85 
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“I  do  not  believe  that  the  ordinary  distinction  between  atheistic  and theistic existentialism makes 
any  sense.”
86 As Heidegger says, philosophy  “can  no  more  be  theistic  than  it  can  be  atheistic.  
This….is  not  because  of  any  indifferent  attitude  but  out  of  respect  for  the  limits  which  have  been  
set  upon  thought  as  thought….”
87 Tillich goes so far as to say concerning authentic existential 
philosophy that “There  is  no  such  thing  as  Religious  Existentialism  because  there  is  only  
Religious  Existentialism.”
88  
It is evident that, in search of the answer to the question of the meaning of existence and 
in his focus on the individual,  Tillich’s  particular interest in philosophy is directed toward the 
Heideggerian existentialism. Tillich acknowledges that “Existentialism  in  philosophy  is  
represented  more  by  Heidegger…than  anybody  else.”
89 In  Tillich’s  view,  liberating  aspects  of  
Heidegger’s  philosophy  can  be  seen  as  quite  suggestive  of  improving  those  previously  
inadequate theological formulations. In other words, “Heidegger’s  philosophy  can  be  used  with  
profit for the elucidation of the Christian faith in the twentieth century.”90 Of particular 
importance in this regard are his description of human existence, especially the concept of death 
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therein, and his description of being as a gift to the human being,91 which implies that there is 
something even beyond Being itself. Tillich  must  have  felt  that  Heidegger’s  description of 
human existence better serve the rendition of the Biblical message than does the language of 
traditional theology.92 From  the  philosophical  point  of  view,  Heidegger’s  concepts  of  “holy,”  
“divinity,”  and  “God” do not have religious connotation. From the Tillichian point of view, 
however, they are relevant for theology. Of  the  Heideggerian  philosophy,  Tillich  wrote,  “By  its  
explanation of human existence it establishes a doctrine  of  man…closely  related  with  the  
Christian  interpretation  of  human  existence…By  means  of  these  ideas…the  border  between  
theology and philosophy has been drawn more acutely than in my earlier philosophy of religion, 
without abandoning the mutual relation  of  comprehension.”93 
 
Transcendental Subjectivity 
 
Heidegger’s  existential  analytic  presents  “an  archaeology  of  human  being,”94 a set of 
more fundamental layers of the existential illustration of human being. These layers serve as 
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definitions of human being. As  Lawrence  E.  Cahoone  explains,  Heidegger’s  existential analytic 
can be reduced to two essential phases. The central theme of the first step is to disclose the state 
of Dasein, characterizing it as Being-in-the-world. The second step is the temporal interpretation 
of  authentic  Dasein’s  existence.
95 As discussed above, Heidegger objects to anthropology that 
forgets the question of being, anthropology that fails to reflect on the ontological foundations of 
anthropology. Fundamental ontology based on existential analytic of Dasein is not a positive 
science, however. Anthropology in the conventional sense is a positive science in that it posits 
human  beings  without  understanding  “humanness  of  human  beings.”
96 Heidegger was concerned 
about an anthropological misreading of the first step of his existential analytic of Dasein.97 
Following the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger repudiates the charge of anthropology 
in it by pointing out the distinction between human beings and Dasein made in Being and Time. 
He writes, “If  the  human  being  is  only  a  human  being  on  the  ground  of  the  Dasein  in  him,  then  
the question concerning what is more original than a human being cannot be an anthropological 
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97 Heidegger and Husserl attacked and counterattacked each other over the issue of their 
philosophies as philosophical anthropology only. Husserl wrote on the title page of his copy of Being and 
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one.”
98 For  Heidegger,  “the  existential  analytic  of  Dasein  comes  before any psychology or 
anthropology,  and  certainly  before  any  biology.”
99 He objects to the understanding of human 
being through the traditional anthropology in the ancient world and in Christian theology.100 He 
also objects to the modern anthropology that, Heidegger claims, stems from the Cartesian 
conception of the cogito,101 but never to anthropology as such. Nonetheless,  Heidegger’s  
fundamental ontology is a new, or true, kind of anthropology that raises the question of 
humanness as such.102 Heidegger suggests that “the starting point for fundamental ontology is a 
fully worked out account of human understanding.”103 His existential inquiry into the meaning of 
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102 Most modern philosophers were generally attacked by Heidegger as being merely 
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Being itself takes a position halfway between anthropology and pure ontology. It  is  “an  
anthropology as ontology  and  an  ontology  as  anthropology.”104  
Existential analytic of Dasein as a new anthropological approach to humanness is an 
argument toward the development of a notion of Dasein designating transcendental subjectivity 
against subjectivism. Dasein is not an ego-subject. The ego-subject is in relation of opposition 
with its object as an entity is in relation with another entity.105 In this Kant differed not at all 
from Descartes. For both, the ego-subject was a conscious thing. This is a purely ontic 
interpretation of the subject. The existential analytic of Dasein shows that Dasein is not a mere 
entity among many others. Dasein is an ontic entity, but it has a unique comprehension of being. 
Dasein  is  “ontological”  in  this  sense, and it is its ontic excellence.106 Existential analytic of 
Dasein does not introduce a subjectivism into ontology. Subjectivity of Dasein transcends a 
subject-object distinction. It signifies the destruction of the subject-object distinction of 
traditional metaphysics. Heidegger says that philosophy must “start  from  the  ‘subject’  and  return  
to  the  ‘subject’  in  its  ultimate  questions,  and  yet  for  all  that  it  may  not  pose  its  questions  in  a  
onesidedly  subjectivistic  manner.”
107 Philosophy must start from the subject. This is the very 
conception of fundamental ontology. But this subject is not an ego-subject. Heidegger does not 
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think that the ego-subject is a fiction, but that the true subjectivity is more fundamental 
phenomenon. Heidegger does identify Dasein with a concept of subjectivity but it is not in the 
sense which is synonymous  with  “a  common,  subjectivistic  concept  of  ‘subject.’”108 Existential 
analytic of Dasein has nothing to do with subjectivism, if subjectivism be understood to 
designate an interpretation that restricts itself to the purely ontic dimension of Dasein as a subject. 
Dasein “is not a subject in relation to an object but it is this relation itself” which is between 
subject and object.”109 As  William  J.  Richardson  explains,  “This  “between”  is  not  derived  from,  
and therefore subsequent to, the juxtaposition of subject and object, but is prior to the emergence 
of this relation, rendering it possible.” Dasein transcends  selfhood,  and  “the  selfhood  of  Dasein  is  
founded  on  its  transcendence.”
110 Dasein’s  transcendence  is  “the  primordial constitution of the 
subjectivity of  a  subject.”111 In  Heidegger’s  terms,  Dasein  is “prior to the separation of 
epistemological subject and object.”112 Heidegger thinks that “the subject-object distinction, in 
the way we traditionally understood it, is foreign to Greek thought.”113 This point is central to 
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Heidegger’s  analysis  of  modernity:  “Beings can be experienced as objects only where human 
beings have become subjects, those who experience their fundamental relation to beings as the 
objectification – understood as mastery – of what is encountered. For the Greeks, human beings 
are never subjects, and therefore non-human beings can never have the character of objects 
(things that stand-over-against).”114 Heidegger does not deny the relative validity of the subject-
object  schema.  Heidegger  writes,  “What  is  more  obvious  than  that  a  ‘subject’  is  related  to  an  
‘object’  and  vice versa?”  However,  Heidegger  also  adds, “While  this  presupposition  is  
unimpeachable in its facticity, this makes it indeed a baleful one, if its ontological necessity and 
especially  its  ontological  meaning  are  to  be  left  in  the  dark.”
115 As  a  solution,  Heidegger’s  
existential analytic develops a phenomenological notion of subjectivity. According to Heidegger, 
“A  ‘commercium’  of  the  subject  with  a  world does not get created for the first time by knowing, 
nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of 
Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be 
Interpreted beforehand.”116 Dasein as the transcendental subject and world are equiprimordial.  
This means that the analysis of Dasein does not begin with the subject-object distinction of 
epistemology, which is the problem of subjectivism, but with its ontological basis, that is, “the 
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unity of the pretheoretical self-awareness of Dasein.”117 The “subject-object dualism” is a basic 
problem of modernity. Heidegger insisted that the scientific and philosophical deal of the 
detached observer was “an abstract derivation from the socially  defined  “anyone”  self.” 118 
Modern nihilism and atheism are results of subjectivism, according to which the world including 
God seen as an object is subordinated by the human subject to a system which is based on the 
values which the human subject posits. In the subject-object process, the un-objectifiable divine 
reality is dismissed by the human subject, and the objectifiable divinity becomes subject to the 
human subject. The devaluing of the highest values that Nietzsche identifies as characteristic of 
nihilism is a consequence of subjectivism.119 The death of the concept of God is an assertion of 
modern subjectivism, and so also the completion and culmination of traditional metaphysics. 
Tillich reaches the conclusion that objective thinking is not satisfactory for the question 
of the meaning of existence. This judgment is a point of departure for his entire ontological-
existential  enterprise.  “Original  or  archetypal  words  have  been  robbed  of  their  original  power  by  
our objective thinking, and the scientific conception of the world, and thus, have become subject 
to  dissolution.”
120 Believing that objective thinking and the pursuit of an objectively existing 
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God lead to an idolatry and to the complete loss of reality,  Tillich  develops  “non-objectivating”  
existential theology which is neither objective nor subjective in its approach to the source of the 
meaning of existence.121 In  order  to  avoid  both  poles  of  the  antithesis,  he  is  led  to  the  “choice  of  
psychological notions with a non-psychological connotation.”122 Tillich  cites  Heidegger’s  work  
as the most radical example of this type of conceptuality. Existential theology starts from the 
human  subject,  therefore  it  necessarily  involves  psychological  notions.  But  “at  the  same  time  
they must not be merely subjective.”  If  theology  maintains  that  immediate  personal  experience  is  
the door to Being itself,  “it  is  necessary  for  the  concepts  describing  immediate  experience  to  be  
at the same time descriptive of the structure of Being itself.”123 Thus those psychological notions 
are given non-psychological connotation. Tillich identifies the ontological foundation of human 
existence with the ultimate source of its meaning. Being itself is the ontological ground of 
existence as well as the ultimate source of the meaning of existence. Heidegger shows the 
ontological difference between Being itself and beings in particular including human existence. 
There is difference between the two, but not separation ontologically. Human existence as a 
finite conditioned phenomenon can be distinguished, differentiated, or estranged from its 
ontological foundation but it cannot be ontologically separated from it. This relationship of 
ontological union, or to use traditional terminology, consubstantiality, of “the  ultimate  source  
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and meaning of  existence”  and  “existence”  is,  Tillich claims, the basis of existential theology. 
Being itself is postulated as the ultimate source of the meaning of existence and as the 
ontological ground of existence. The ultimate source is postulated as ultimate in that it is 
unconditioned and so it can be the answer to the meaning of conditioned existence because the 
heart of the problem of existence, the reason for asking the question of its meaning, lies in its 
conditionedness. Being itself as the ultimate source cannot be ontologically separated from 
human existence and becomes objectified. For it would, then, become a being, losing its ultimacy. 
The ontological inseparability, or union, between Being itself and human existence implies that 
the ultimate source and meaning of human existence must be sought internally within human 
existence. In other words, Being itself as the ultimate source and meaning of existence internally 
transcends existence within existence. Existential theology opposes objectivism because Being 
itself cannot be objectified. On the other hand, existential theology is not a subjectivism either 
because its ultimate concern transcends the possibilities of human existentiality.  
 
Phenomenological Theology 
 
Heidegger declares that “Only  phenomenology  can  offer  rescue  in  philosophical  need.”124 
The phenomenological project has to do with determining what the subject matter really is.125 
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Heidegger’s  non-subjectivistic, non-objectifying approach to the being of Dasein sought an 
immediate access to understanding Being itself. Heidegger practices the phenomenological 
method particularly in re-examining the understanding and the question of Being.126 
Phenomenology is a way of doing philosophy rather than a particular theory or program. This 
point is made clearly in Being and Time:  “Thus  our  treatise  does  not  subscribe  to  a  “standpoint”  
or  represent  any  special  “direction”;;  for  phenomenology  is  nothing  of  either  sort,  nor  can  it  
become  so  as  long  as  it  understands  itself.  The  expression  “phenomenology”  signifies  primarily a 
methodological conception. This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of 
philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of  that  research.”127 Heidegger and 
Tillich are necessarily linked here because Tillich is dependent on Heidegger in his 
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phenomenological approach to Being itself as the divine ground of the ultimate meaning of 
existence.  
For  Tillich,  Heidegger’s  existential  phenomenology  is  a  whole  new  path  as  the  attempt  of  
understanding of the phenomenon of religion. In Systematic Theology, Tillich defends the 
importance of the Heideggerian phenomenology for theology, describing his own theology as 
phenomenological theology, and advances the Heideggerian exploration of Being itself as the 
possibility of absolute givenness.128 Tillich describes two inadequate methods of positivistic 
approach to the problem of religion in order to answer the question of the meaning of existence. 
“The  first  leads  us  to  the  authoritatively  circumscribed,  written  church  doctrines,  in  order to find 
in them norms that lend themselves to logical treatment. The second turns to the psychological, 
sociological, and historical processes in which religions is present and the subjects of religious 
devotion  are  intended”
129 Tillich thinks that the problem with conceiving of God in the 
positivistic way is that such attempts to secure our relation to God conceptually rather 
disconnects humanity from the real and immediate relation to God. Acknowledging  Heidegger’s  
observation of the ontological difference and his non-dualistic but immanental ontology, Tillich 
writes  that  “The  thinking  of  the  Existential  thinker  is  based  on  his  immediate  personal  and  inner  
experience. It is rooted in an interpretation of Being or Reality which does not identify Reality 
with  ‘objective  being.’  But  it  would  be  equally  misleading  to  say  that  it  identifies  Reality  with  
‘subjective  being,’  with  ‘consciousness’  or  feeling.  Such  a  view  would  still  leave  the  meaning  of  
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‘subjective’  determined  by  its  contrast  with  that  of  ‘objective’…It  is  trying  to  find  a  level  on  
which  the  contrast  between  ‘subject’  and  ‘object’  has  not  arisen.”
130 Tillich  addresses  “the  
ontological  principle”  of  his  existential  theology  that  “Man  is  immediately  aware  of  something  
unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, 
theoretically  as  well  as  practically.”
131 Rejecting both the old authoritative orthodoxy and the 
modern method of an approach through psychology and history of religions, he suggests a new 
way. For Tillich, the real basis of theology is neither the authority of the Church nor even the 
claim to some special access to what is beyond the world. Rather it is to be found in the 
immediacy of actual human existence. Immediate experience is not the content, or a datum, of a 
reflexive act of consciousness, for then it is no longer immediate experience. Immediate 
experience is “not so much a matter of content as an act of consciousness.”132 This is the method 
of  “phenomenological  intuition”
133 that Tillich adopts from Heidegger and whereby he 
approaches Being itself as the ultimate holy reality in an immediate fashion. He writes, “It  is  the  
immediate approach through phenomenological intuition; it is the attempt to isolate and clarify in 
rational terms the content present  in  the  religious  act,  through  an  immediate  approach  to  it.”134 In 
this  approach,  he  says,  “we  turn  neither  to  the  authorities  nor  to  religious  consciousness,  but  
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immediately to the whole of reality, and endeavor to uncover that level of reality which is 
intended  by  the  religious  act.”135 Tillich’s  method  of  phenomenological  intuition  insists  that  the  
real basis of theological thought is human existence itself. Theology is immediately directed 
toward Being itself, the unconditioned divine reality. In this way Tillich felt he could avoid the 
impasse into which he thought theology had been brought. He admits  that  Heidegger’s  
fundamental ontology of  personal  existence  is  right  in  maintaining  that  “immediate  experience  is  
the  door  to  the  creative  source  of  Being,”  and  in  emphasizing  “human  nature  as  the  starting-point 
of  the  Existential  ontology.”
136 Heidegger’s  analysis  of  human  existence  is  Tillich’s  
understanding of the first task theology needs to undertake. As Tillich developed his correlation 
method of existential questions and theological answers, he appealed to Heidegger’s  primordial 
discovery that human existence itself “is  the  door  to  the  deeper  level  of  reality,  that  in  his  own  
existence  he  has  the  only  possible  approach  to  existence  itself.”
137 Tillich refers for this 
statement to Heidegger’s  concept  of  Dasein  as  the  foundation of ontology.138 The door of human 
existence can be open only to the immediate experience of human existence. “The  immediate  
experience  of  one’s  own  existing  reveals  something  of  the  nature  of  existence  generally.”
139 The 
existential theology which Tillich develops can be described as a phenomenology of faith. There 
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is, for Tillich, no escape from this phenomenological method. On the subject of the relation of 
phenomenology to theology, Tillich ardently  claims  that  “theology  must  apply  the  
phenomenological  approach  to  all  its  basic  concepts.”
140 
The  ultimate  object  of  Heidegger’s  phenomenology  is  Being itself.  “Phenomenology,”  
Heidegger  writes,  “is  our  way  of  access  to  the  theme  of  ontology….Only as Phenomenology is 
ontology possible…‘Behind’  the  phenomena  of  phenomenology  there  is  essentially  nothing  
else…Because  phenomena,  as  understood  phenomenologically,  are  never  anything  but  what  goes  
to  make  up  Being…phenomenology  is  the  science  of  the  Being of entities – ontology.”141 Since 
being is the basic theme of philosophy for Heidegger and Tillich, therefore, “Philosophy  is  
universal  phenomenological  ontology.”
142 Philosophy, ontology, phenomenology are inseparable, 
and one cannot properly do one without engaging in the other two.143 Heidegger’s  
phenomenology reveals Being itself which is hidden from the realm of finite, conditioned beings. 
That  which  “remains  hidden  in  an  egregious  sense…is  not  just  this  entity  or that but rather the 
Being of  entities…”144 As such, phenomenology reveals Being itself which is, for Tillich, the 
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“hidden”  divine  reality.
145  Heidegger’s  “phenomenological  conception  of  phenomenon”146 
explains  Tillich’s  concept  of  Being itself as the Ground of being: “[Phenomenon]  is  something  
that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, 
in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it 
is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to 
constitute  its  meaning  and  its  ground.”
147  
 
Technical Reason and Logicism 
 
Phenomenological description of the divine reality is important for Tillich in attempting 
to avoid the impasse between Christian idolatry and anti-Christian logicism. Tillich believed that 
Heidegger  clears  away  the  idols  that  obstruct  our  experience  of  true  divinity.  Heidegger’s  
critique  of  traditional  theology  explains  Tillich’s  radical  departure  from  it.  “It does not penetrate 
to the absolutely transcendent, to that which lies beyond even the most sacred from, whether it be 
called the church or state.”148 Hence the language of the traditional theology which fails to 
communicate the true meaning of the Gospel to the contemporary Christian faith did a disservice 
to theology. This is the practical reason why Tillich adopted the philosophical language of 
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Heidegger. Tillich felt the need to meet the thoughtful and sensitive readers coming from 
“outside  the  Christian  circle.”  “Therefore,  I  was  obliged  to  seek a language which expresses in 
other  terms  the  human  experience  to  which  the  Biblical  and  ecclesiastical  terminology  point…I  
believe that this is generally the situation in which the Christian message has to be pronounced 
today.”
149 “A  special  characteristic of these three volumes,”  wrote  Tillich  in  Systematic Theology, 
“is the kind of language used in them and the way in which it is used.”150 “I  have  used  a  
terminology which consciously deviates from the Biblical or ecclesiastical language. Without 
such deviation, I would not have deemed it worthwhile to develop a theological system for our 
period.”
151 Heidegger’s  existential  phenomenology  provided  Tillich  with  a  perfect  tool  for  his  
theological task. On the other hand, Heidegger shows that ontological, existential, and 
phenomenological approach to the ultimate source and meaning of human existence does not 
confine reason to technical calculation and argumentative reasoning,152 which are the mere 
capacity for cognition, closely aligned to logic. Heidegger and Tillich challenges this so-called 
“technical  reason”  which  contemporary  logical  positivism  claims  to  be  the  exhaustive  and  only  
legitimate expression of human rationality.153 They emphasize that human reason is involved in 
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many human activities beyond cognition. As Bernard Martin notes, while  Tillich’s  argument  for  
the classical concept of the broader range  of  human  rationality  which  he  terms  “ontological” “is 
comparable to the general protest against technical reason in almost all of the major existentialist 
philosophers,”154 it is with (later) Heidegger, with his concept of transcendental logic as 
ontological logic, that Tillich has the closet affinities.  
The early twentieth century marked the end of modern philosophy, and its philosophical 
situation includes the awareness  of  philosophy’s  coming  to  an  end  as  metaphysics  and  in  
precisely the way that the formal theory of logic and mathematics proposes.155 Metaphysical 
principles defining true reality cannot be proved. It is claimed therefore that they cannot have 
any scientific character, for either they arise from an intuition or they come from so-called 
immediate experience. In neither case do they admit scientific examination.156 Heidegger has, 
from the beginning of his career, written and said much on logic. In his earliest writings 
published between 1912 and 1916, Heidegger confronts the major current theories of logic. The 
question of truth was a guiding element in the early Heidegger, predominantly “in questioning 
the logical validity of the truth of a judgment.”157 It is certainly not correct to regard Heidegger 
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as an irrationalist in that a survey of his writings from his doctoral and postdoctoral years at 
Freiburg to the publication of Being and Time reveals a continuous engagement with logical 
issues.158 But since his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1929 in which Heidegger delivered his 
most celebrated speech against “the  reigning  and  never-challenged logic,”159 he has frequently 
been portrayed as an anti-logician.160 As he points out in the lecture, logic turns out to be 
inadequate in answering a more originary questioning. Strict adherence to logic and formal 
investigation will never be sufficient for answer to the question of being. It is not even sufficient 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
158 In 1913, Heidegger took his doctorate with dissertation on “Die Lehre vom Urteil im 
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Language,”  in  Logical Positivism, trans. Arthur Pap, ed. A. J. Ayer (Glencoe, IL.: Free Press, 1959),  69. 
Heidegger  seems  to  have  anticipated  Carnap’s  critique.  In  the  lecture,  Heidegger  explicitly  admits  that  
raising  the  question  of  nothingness  violates  the  principle  of  noncontradiction.  “The  commonly  cited  
ground  rule  of  all  thinking,  the  proposition  that  contradiction  is  to  be  avoided,  universal  “logic”  itself,  
lays  low  this  question.” WIM, 85.  Heidegger’s  inaugural lecture was given on 24 July 1929, and Carnap 
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for asking the question correctly. Heidegger suggests that if logic  “wants  to  be  a  form  of  
scientific  research,  a  philosophizing  logic,”  then  what  “should  most  concern  it”  is  not  further  
technical  development,  but  the  question  of  “the  primary  being  of  truth,”  what  it  means  to  be  
true.161 In other words, “whether inspired by Aristotle or Kant, logical theory sought to account 
for concepts that make empirical scientific knowledge possible, the ground of the objective 
validity of knowledge.”162 Heidegger argues that we can make no progress at all in philosophical 
understanding  without  “a  critical  dismantling  of  traditional  logic  down  to  its  hidden  foundations”  
– “the  metaphysical  foundations  of  logic.”163 This is because logic can provide genuine insight 
into the way we represent the world in our thoughts only if we understand why it is that we 
human  beings  are  constituted  in  such  a  way  “as  to  be  able  to  be  thus  governed  by  laws”:  “How  
‘is’  Dasein  according  to  its  essence  so  that  such  an  obligation  as  that  of  being  governed  by  
logical  laws  can  arise  in  and  for  Dasein?”
164 For Heidegger, logic stands in need of a 
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philosophical foundation. Logic cannot ground itself, but requires something else for its 
foundation.  Heidegger  points  out  that  “logistic”  never  gets  beyond  mathematics  and  to  the  core  
of the logical problem.165 “With this theory there arises for logic a new task of demarcation. In 
order to provide a solution to it, I think that the first thing that it is necessary to show is that 
Logistik does not at all pass beyond mathematics, and that it is unable to reach the truly logical 
problems. I see the weakness of Logistik in that it uses mathematical symbols and concepts 
(foremost the concept of a function), a use that conceals the meanings and meaning changes of 
judgments.”166 Heidegger’s  opposition  to  symbolic  logic  is  based  on  the  idea  that  “the use of 
formalization makes semantical studies impossible.”167 Heidegger maintains this view of 
symbolic logic even after Being and Time.168  
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Heidegger  thinks  that  the  dominance  of  logic  has  to  be  “broken”  in  order  that  we  may  
raise anew the question of the meaning of truth.169 Heidegger does not claim that logic is to be 
eliminated from authentic philosophy,170 but merely that its requirements are insufficient to 
address the question of being. It  does  not  follow  from  logic’s  inadequacy  for the task of 
fundamental ontology that the latter may be illogical. “Dasein’s  understanding  of  being  is  pre-
logical,  but  ontology,  which  is  discourse  about  Dasein’s  understanding  of  being,  is  still  subject  to  
the  normative  constraints  of  logic.”
171 Heidegger is concerned  with  logic’s  alleged  role  in  the  
development of technicity, uncontrolled technology and its dehumanizing effects.172 Logic is the 
way the Cartesian subject objectifies nature and life in dealing with them in sciences – For 
Heidegger, science depends on technology and not conversely. Technology treats everything 
with  objectivity.  Such  “Cartesian  abstraction”  cuts  human  being  off  from  vital  awareness  of  the  
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real.173 In the technological worldview of the modern West, it is not so much philosophy, but 
rather science as technological that has become the realm of revealing of the truth.174 The 
measure of the scientific-technological  truth  proceeds  from  “the  representing,  cognizing  subject,  
by  this  subject  and  for  this  subject…  Only  what  presents  itself  to  our  cognition, only what we en-
counter such that it is posed and posited in its reasons, counts as something with secure standing, 
that means, as an object. Only what stands in this manner is something of which we can, with 
certainty,  say  “it  is.””
175 As Heidegger points  out,  “This  all  leads  to  Max  Planck’s  thesis  about  
being:  “The  real  is  what  is  measurable.””
176 What precisely concerns Heidegger is not 
technology  as  such,  but  its  “essence,” which  Heidegger  calls  “technicity.” “What  is  dangerous  is  
not technology. There  is  no  demonry  of  technology…The  essence  of  technology…is  the  
danger.”
177 The essence of technology is something other than technological. Heidegger states 
paradoxically,  “the  essence  of  technology  is  by  no  means  anything  technological.”
178 “Just as the 
essence of art is not concerned with making artworks, so neither is technology concerned with 
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making and manipulating things.”179 The essence of technology is the fundamental stance in 
which every being is revealed to us as raw material for controlling domination. As such, the 
essence of technology is a way of thinking as a revelation of being, which is called 
“technological  understanding” of being. Heidegger thinks that the technological understanding of 
being “presents a supreme danger because it prevents us from having a proper understanding of 
our own being.”180 The technological way of thinking of being does not understand works of art.  
For it is essentially logical. It cannot understand the essence of art. It only reveals us the works of 
art  as  “standing-reserve”  awaiting  use.181 The technological understanding of being is “a limiting 
way of experiencing the world.”182 The  “greatest  danger,”  according  to  Heidegger,  is  that  “The  
approaching  tide  of  technological  revolution…could  so  captivate,  bewitch,  dazzle,  and  beguile 
man that calculative thinking may someday become so accepted and practiced as the only way of 
thinking.”
183 It is an objectifying thinking that excludes non-objectifiable reality of Being itself. 
The technological thinking forgets Being itself, therefore the human being loses the ultimate 
source and meaning of its existence. The being of everything as a part of standing-reserve 
awaiting use is degraded into a value.184 In this way, as discussed above, Heidegger sees in 
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Nietzsche’s  philosophy  the  completion and summation of the essence of technology. 
“Nietzsche’s  overman might be said to be technological man par excellence.”185 Logic is the 
conceptual tool of overman’s  “technical  reason.”186  
Tillich’s  conception  of  “technical  reason”  is  identical  with  what  Heidegger means by 
“technological  thinking.”  Tillich describes technical reason as  “the  capacity  for  reasoning.”187 
“The  power  of  technical  reason  is  its  ability  to  analyze  reality.”
188 As the capacity for reasoning, 
“technical  reason  has  an  important  function,  even  in  systematic  theology.”
189 “We  should  not  
despise technical reason. We all live from it. Theologians especially should not despise it if they 
wish  to  remain  theologians.”  Tillich  thinks  that  “Technical  reason  always  has  an  important  
function, even in systematic  theology.”190 For  “the  analytic  form  of  thought  used  in  
argumentation must be kept pure,”191 and  “[the]  goal  of  dialectical  harmony  is  the  aim  of  the  
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rational  character  of  systematic  theology.”
192 The  implication  of  Tillich’s  discussion  of  technical  
reason is that, as such, it is not sensitivity to the existential aspects of reality. Tillich writes of 
technical  reason,  “No  existential  problem  is  involved  in  its  use.”
193 Tillich also does not deny the 
logical validity of technical reason, but it lacks  “the  depth  dimension  of  reason.”194 As does 
Heidegger, Tillich especially refers to logical positivism, which attempts to reduce philosophy to 
“logical  calculus,”
195as an extreme example of the use of technical reason.196 He views logical 
positivism as humble and arrogant. “The  positivistic,  empirical  attitude  can  be  both  a  human  
acknowledgement  of  man’s  finitude  and  an  arrogant  dismissal  of  the  question  of  the  truth  which  
concerns us ultimately. This attitude makes understandable also the dominant role logical 
positivism has played in the last decades within the American philosophical scene. It can be 
interpreted as another expression of the humility of philosophers who want to avoid the idealistic 
claim that man is able to participate cognitively in the essential structure of reality. But logical 
positivism can also be interpreted as the desire to escape problems which are relevant to human 
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existence.”
197 In his view, logical positivism made technical reason inhuman principle. “In  some  
forms of logical positivism the philosopher  even  refuses  to  “understand”  anything  that  transcends  
technical reason, thus making his philosophy completely irrelevant for questions of existential 
concern. Technical reason, however refined in logical and methodological respects, dehumanizes 
man.”198 Tillich fears that, in the contemporary situation, technical reason has come into such a 
position of predominance that it threatens to reduce all of the functions of reason to itself and to 
become  the  sole  function  to  be  valued.  “The  public  mind  is  so impregnated with its 
methodological  demands  and  its  astonishing  results…A  consequence  of  this  attitude  is  a  rapid  
decay of spiritual (not only of the Spiritual) life, an estrangement from nature, and, most 
dangerous of all, a dealing with human beings as with  things.”199  
According  to  Tillich,  technical  reason  is  the  foundation  of  the  “pathologies”  of  modern  
society which is structured in a way that symbolizes the outlook of technological culture, while 
technological culture represents a great leap in human development.200 In The Spiritual Situation 
in Our Technical Society, Tillich discusses negative features of technological civilization in 
terms of the problem of technical reason. He names several spiritual problems in technical 
society, but in sum, the question of the ultimate meaning of existence disappears from the center 
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of human consciousness. This situation produces emptiness.201 Technical society transforms 
everything, including persons, into objects. Non-objectifiable reality is excluded. As such, the 
technical culture conceals Being itself from us. Tillich points out that dehumanization is present 
in  the  modern  culture:  “We  are  being  culturally  and  psychologically  conditioned  to  fit  into  a  
system dominated by monopolistic industrial and financial power. And beyond this, machine 
technology itself fosters trends toward standardization, impersonality, and the stifling of creative 
freedom.”
202 
Tillich thinks that technical reason is reason that uses logics to accomplish its goals.  Its 
capacity for reasoning is essentially a capacity for logic. Tillich suggests that theology should not 
concede its logical character in the face of either a philosophical or a scientific critique. Tillich 
explains one of the principles determining the rational character of theology  as  “logical  
rationality.”
203 Therefore,  “Theological  dialectics  does  not  violate  the  principle  of  logical  
rationality.”  The  theologian  must  follow  the  principles  of  meaningful  discourse  formulated  by  
logic,  for  “dialectics  follows  the  movement  of  thought  or movement of reality through Yes and 
No,  but  it  describes  it  in  logically  correct  terms.”
204 Tillich is concerned, however, with the 
logical positivistic claim that technical logic exhausts the methods of verification to test the 
objective truth – There is no such thing as subjective truth. In this way, logical positivism puts 
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aside ontological issues. Tillich begins his Systematic Theology with a critique of technical 
reason,  asking  “whether  the  elimination  of  almost  all  traditional  philosophical  problems  by 
logical  positivism  is  a  successful  escape  from  ontology.”
205 This placement of the discussion of 
technical  logic  at  the  beginning  of  his  system  parallels  Heidegger’s  preoccupation  with  the  
logical problems at the beginning of his philosophical career. Logical positivists attempt, says 
Tillich, to  “take  the  question  of  Being away from philosophy and to surrender it to emotion and 
to poetic expression. Logical positivism presupposes that its prohibitions against philosophy and 
its rejection of all but a few preceding  philosophers  are  not  based  on  arbitrary  preferences…[But]  
The hidden assumption is that Being itself cannot be approached cognitively except in those of 
its  manifestations  which  are  open  to  scientific  analysis  and  verification.”
206 In his 
autobiographical  essay,  Tillich  explains  how  he  was  resisted  by  a  logical  positivist:  “I  once  said  
to a logical positivist that I would like him to attend my lectures and to raise his finger if 
something is said that lacks rationality. He answered that he could not accept this task because he 
would have to raise his finger during the whole lecture. He meant that the material being 
discussed  was  not  subject  to  strict  canons  of  logic.  I  do  not  believe  that  this  is  so…”
207 Tillich 
admits  that  “statements  which  have  neither intrinsic evidence nor a way of being verified have 
no  cognitive  value.” This  is  an  “important  truth.”208 But logical  positivism  must  not  “make  the  
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experimental  method  of  verification  the  exclusive  pattern  of  all  verification.”
209 The claim of 
logical positivism is not permissible that  “truth”  must  be  restricted  to  analytic  statements  or  to  
experimentally confirmed propositions.  
Technical  reason  yields  “controlling  knowledge”
210 which makes possible the “technical 
control  of  nature,”  the  “psychological  control  of  the  person,”  and  the  “organizational control of 
society.”
211 Controlling knowledge is instrumental. “Detachment” or “estrangement” is 
determining element in controlling knowledge.212 “It  unites  subject  and  object  for  the  sake  of  the  
control of the object by the subject. It transforms the object into a completely conditioned and 
calculable  ‘thing.’  It  deprives  it  of  any  subjective  quality.”
213 Both Heidegger and Tillich see 
every aspect of contemporary life, not only machine technology and science but also art, religion, 
and culture, as exhibiting clear marks of the controlling essence of technology.214 Like 
Heidegger, Tillich points out that the technical society, which has been devised for human 
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liberation,  “fell  under  the  bondage  of  objects  it  itself  had  created.”
215 That  is,  “Cognitive  
dehumanization  has  produced  actual  dehumanization.”
216 Controlling knowledge tends toward 
objectification, that is, toward the reduction of the object of knowledge to a thing. Tragically 
“Man  has  become  what  controlling  knowledge  considers  him  to  be,  a  thing  among  things.”
217 
The human being becomes objectified and paradoxically subject to the destructive forces of an 
uncontrolled technical culture. “Man,  for  whom  all  this  was  invented  as  a  means,  becomes  means  
himself in the service of  means.”218 Tillich agrees with Heidegger that this was the fount of 
modern meaninglessness, which he calls  the  problem  of  nihilism,  and  suggests  that  Heidegger’s  
existentialism  is  “the  most  desperate  attempt  to  escape  the  power  of  controlling  knowledge  and 
of  the  objectified  world  which  technical  reason  has  produced.”
219 
Heidegger maintains that logic is the science of validity. For  him,  however,  “the strict 
formalism of mathematical symbolism is insufficient to explain how the elements of judgment 
cohere…to make judgment possible.”220 Heidegger advocates a return to and a renewal of 
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medieval logic by way of the advances of modern Husserlian and “transcendental logic,”221 
which raises fundamental questions of the theory of knowledge and science.222 As Stanley Galt 
Crowell says, “The problem of truth requires a logical theory of the object, and if that theory is to 
be a true theory, its principles must apply to itself.”223 “Logic  itself  therefore  requires  its  own  
categories.”
224 “There  must  be  a  logic  of  logic”  if  logic  is to clarify how knowledge of objects – 
including its own – is possible. The transcendental logic that Heidegger pursues is an ontological 
logic. Heidegger portrays it as a  “logic of origins.”225 The ontological logic precedes the formal 
logic of judgments and “its first function is to produce the fundamental concepts or categories 
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logician is oriented with respect to the pre-given  sciences.  In  Husserl’s  view,  therefore,  logic  is  
considered fundamentally as transcendental. It is a transcendental logic that can answer the requirement 
of a final theory of science, providing the deepest and most universal theory of principles and norms of all 
sciences.  
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“value”  of  logic,  determining  the  categories,  and  elaborating  the relation of an objectively logical sphere 
to a judging subject – make it clear that his understanding of logic is closer to what his contemporaries 
were  dubbing  “transcendental  logic”  than  to  anything  else  on  the  horizon  of  academic  philosophy  at  the  
time.” 
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that articulate the ground of all of reality.”226 Heidegger suggests that ontology must be 
approached by ontological logic which is capable of making the ontological difference between 
Being itself and beings in particular. Ontological logic deals with categories valid of objects a 
priori. The ontological logic brings us into the nearness of being that remains as the conceptually 
ungraspable.227 It is  the  logic  of  Heidegger’s  fundamental ontology and existential 
phenomenology. Technological thinking is an objectifying, therefore subjectivistic, thinking. It is 
Heidegger’s  judgment  that  we  require  non-objectifying ontological thinking of ontological 
reason to account for the “true  reality  and  real  truth”228 of human existence. It does not mean, 
however, that objectifying thinking is unnecessary. Heidegger  sees  that  “it  would  be  foolish  to  
attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We 
depend on  technical  devices;;  they  even  challenge  us  to  ever  greater  advances.”229 We only need 
to see that “the drive to control everything is precisely what we do not control.”230 Heidegger 
says that the forgetting of Being is our “destiny,”231 and consequently the homelessness is the 
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destiny of the world. Technological thinking is a legacy of the metaphysical past that has 
forgotten Being. In a way, then, the technological understanding of reality is our destiny. 
However, it is not our fate. Heidegger suggests that there is a way we can keep our technological 
devices  and  yet  remain  true  to  ourselves  as  thinkers  of  the  ultimate  reality:  “We  can  affirm  the  
unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to 
warp, confuse, and lay waste  our  nature.”232 Heidegger seeks to bring about a transformation in 
our sense of reality by calling attention to our sense of the ontological difference. If we can make 
this distinction not just as a matter of reflection but in our practices, then, we have stepped out of 
the technological understanding of being while we are engaged in a technological thinking.233  
Tillich’s  discussion  of  the  technical  reason  of  positivistic  scientism  inherits  Heidegger’s  
critique of the role of logic in the development of technicity. For Tillich, it is in technical reason 
that one is concerned with formal logic because of the need for correctness and clarity of 
interpretation and explanation.234 However, as Leslie Gordon Tait points out, logical positivism 
in its analysis of semantics has “overlooked the relation of signs, symbols and logical operations 
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to reality.”235 It  overlooks  the  fact  that  “[E]very  epistemological  assertion  is  implicitly  
ontological.”
236 “Any inquiry into these relations necessarily embraces the structure of being and, 
consequently, is ontological.”237 For this reason, Tillich shows a negative attitude toward 
technical reason separated from its ontological basis. “If  the  logical  positivists  cared  to  look  at  
their hidden ontological assumptions as inquisitively as  they  look  at  the  “public”  ontologies  of  
the classical philosophers, they would no longer be able to reject the question of Being itself.”238 
Tillich recognizes the capacity of reason or thinking to be open to the disclosure of Being itself. 
That is, he finds that another type of reason, which Heidegger thinks of as ontological, is at work, 
behind technical reason, in our awareness of the relationship among meanings and values. To 
answer the question of the ultimate meaning of human existence, technical reason requires 
ontological reason, and ontological reason demands reason to surpass the purely cognitive 
interests of technical reason. Technical reason cannot deal with meanings and values. Therefore, 
we can say that logical positivism is right in rejecting a God proved by technical reason. But “the 
human being understood solely in the light of technical reason is dehumanized.”239  
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As the early Heidegger did, Tillich observes that the ontological concept of reason was 
the dominant one in the classical philosophical tradition, and finds that it is a more adequate 
expression of the full range of human rationality.240 He stresses that “in most periods of human 
history they have been understood in just this interrelated way, but since the middle of the 
nineteenth century there has been a threat that technical reason would separate itself and attempt 
to replace ontological reason claiming to be the only legitimate form of reason and thought.”241 
There  is  clearly  a  great  debt  to  Heidegger  in  Tillich’s  attempt  to  raise  the  question concerning 
technical reason as he seeks to show how technical reason circumscribes the human situation. 
Tillich explains ontological reason as “deeper rationality that grasps those elements of reality 
that cannot be reached by technical, controlling reason.”242 In other words, ontological reason 
points to the ultimate source and meaning of human existence. “Ontological  reason  can  be  
defined  as  the  structure  of  the  mind  which  enables  it  to  grasp  and  to  shape  reality.”
243 There is an 
aspect of ontological reason that points beyond itself to that which is manifest in reason. This is 
described  by  Tillich  as  the  “depth  of  reason.”
244 This depth of reason “indicates the potential 
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power of reason as a medium for the self-disclosure of being.”245 According to Tillich, the depth 
of reason is the nature of reason that points to truth itself. Tillich maintains that ontological and 
technical reasons are essentially interdependent and inseparable. Hence they require each another. 
Technical reason cannot be rejected, or replaced by ontological reason. It is “adequate  and  
meaningful  only  as  an  expression  of  ontological  reason  and  as  its  companion.”
246  For Tillich, 
truth  is  established  by  two  concepts  of  reason,  “technical”  and  “ontological.”  This means that 
“There  is  no  danger in this situation as long as technical reason is the companion of ontological 
reason  and  ‘reasoning’  is  used  to  fulfill  the  demands  of  reason.”
247 Thus Tillich finds the same 
solution as Heidegger to the danger of technicity.  Reflecting  on  the  fate  of  “the person in a 
technical society,”  Tillich  argues that humanity can resist the dehumanizing force of managerial 
and technological control only by “a partial nonparticipation in the objectifying structures of 
technical society.”248 The non-participation is not the ultimate solution, however. It points to an 
existential  theological  thinking.  “The  person  as  person  can  preserve  himself  only  by  a  partial  
nonparticipation…But  he  can  withdraw  even  partially  only  if  he  has  a  place  to  which  to  
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withdraw. And this place is the New Reality to which the Christian message points, which 
transcends Christianity as well as non-Christianity.”249 
Tillich argues that if we attempt to provide a formal justification for formal logic as such, 
we need a meta-logical doctrine concerning the  nature  of  logical  truth.  Tillich’s  metalogic  is  a 
metaphysics of logic,  and  it  corresponds  Heidegger’s  transcendental  logic. Tillich thinks that 
ontological reason can show the essential structure of Being itself, though not explaining what 
Being itself is. Tillich introduces “metalogic”250 as  a  way  of  showing  “the  basic  ontological  
structure”
251 of Being, which is “the self-world polarity.”252 “The self having a world to which it 
belongs – this highly dialectical structure – logically and experientially precedes all other 
structures.”
253 Metalogical reasoning breaks through the  “finitude  of  reason”254 to the 
transcendental meaning of all existence, by contemplating unconditional content in conditional 
forms  that  is  “the principal assumption of metalogic, the paradoxical imminence of the 
transcendent.”255 Tillich writes, “This  is  only  possible,  however,  if  being  is  not  only  conceived  as  
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a logical category but is also perceived as an actual living import. The approach to being 
proceeds through the aesthetic, ethical, social, religious functions as well as through the logical. 
For each of these functions being is something different, and yet in all these functions it is the 
same being that underlies them, the unconditionally real which gives import to all forms. The 
question is now that of making these [metalogical] approaches to being accessible to logical 
thinking, to find forms that, without losing their logical correctness, will grasp and give 
expression to the being that imbues the logical forms and that is apprehended in all these 
functions.  We  call  this  method  “metalogical”  by  way  of  analogy  to  the  word  “metaphysical.””
256 
The metalogical method is devised in order to intuit Being itself in its relation to beings in 
particular. Metalogic is indispensable if one is to apprehend the true meaning of existence. 
“Metalogic  does  not  violate  the  autonomy  of  scientific  form,  yet  metalogical  knowledge  is  an  act  
that  creates  a  living  relation  to  reality.”
257 Tillich’s  system  is  developed  on  the  basis  of  metalogic. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ONTOLOGY OF ANXIETY 
 
Tillich’s  theology  begins with the question of the meaning of life. Tillich’s  friend  and  
Harvard colleague, James Luther Adams writes of him, “Always  for  Tillich  religious  concern  
must be a concern about the meaning of life for us in  our  total  existence.”1 The question of the 
meaning of life is fundamentally the question of the meaning of personal existence. Heidegger 
and Tillich are ultimately concerned, implicitly and explicitly, with this existential question. The 
question of the meaning of existence is raised because existence is experienced as a problem by 
human being. In their view, the root of the problem of existence lies in the finite conditionality of 
existence. As a solution, existentially unconditioned Being itself is postulated as the ultimate 
source and meaning of existence. Ontology is required, but Being itself is approachable only 
through  the  phenomenon  of  Dasein.  Heidegger’s  fundamental  ontology  returns  us  to  the  
fundamental beginning that is the existential analytic of Dasein. Its method is phenomenological, 
for the immediate experience of phenomenological intuition is the entrance to the dimension of 
Being itself. Thinking and understanding of Being itself become possible by means of 
transcendental metalogic of ontological reason. This chapter discusses  the  heart  of  Tillich’s  
theological anthropology, the concept of finitude, in relation to Heidegger’s  project  of  existential 
analysis of the being of Dasein. In Tillich, the question of Being is produced by the shock of 
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non-being. The shock of non-being is inescapable to human existence due to human finitude. 
Tillich’s  existential  theology  intends  to  be  a  saving  theology  that  speaks  to  this  human  situation.
2 
What  Tillich  found  to  be  of  particular  interest  is  Heidegger’s interpretative understanding of the 
structure of human finitude. The principle markers of this structure includes death, conscience, 
guilt, death, anxiety, and resolve.  
 
Authentic Existence as the Lost Dreaming Innocence 
 
Life asking the ultimate question is authentic. But the ultimate existential question is not 
raised autonomously. According to Heidegger, one is driven to the authenticity of life by the 
“call of conscience.”3 To be authentic, one should listen  to  “the  voice  of  being”4 wherein Being 
itself is disclosed. The approach to Being that Heidegger takes in Being and Time starts with a 
characterization of human beings in their inauthenticity, or everydayness.5 Heidegger’s  notions  
of authenticity and inauthenticity are ontological notions. They do not translate straightforwardly 
into ordinary moral categories, respectively as good and evil. Richard M. McDonough notes that 
“There  is  no  more  need  to  translate  these  categories  into  moral  terms  than  there  is  to  translate  
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concepts of life in general into  moral  terms.”6 In  Heidegger’s  view,  there  is  no  pre-existing, a 
priori human nature that determines what we are. Instead, we are what we make of ourselves in 
the  course  of  living  out  our  active  lives.  This  is  what  it  means  to  say  that  the  “‘essence’  of  Dasein 
lies  in  its  existence.”
7 Heidegger  observes  that  Dasein,  in  this  world,  is  always  “being-with-one-
another,”  which  means  that  “one  belongs  to  the  Others.”
 8 But  “The  ‘who’  [of  the  Others]  is  not  
this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 
‘who’  is  the  neuter,  the  ‘they’  [das Man].”9 Heidegger  says  that  the  “they”  is  “a  primordial  
phenomenon  [which]  belongs  to  Dasein’s  positive  constitution.”
10 The  “they”  is  not  “definite 
others,”
11 or a numeral pronoun.  It is not a measurable entity. It is impersonal, anonymous 
public  “one”  while  “any  other  can  represent  them  [the  others].”
12 Dasein, as Being-with-one-
another, “stands in subjection to others.”13 This means that our participation in such a social 
context,  which  the  “they”  already defined before Dasein comes to it, is a fundamental dimension 
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of our existence as humans. For this reason, our everyday actions make sense only because they 
exemplify the taken-for-granted patterns and norms of the shared life-world of the others. This 
involvement  in  public  forms  of  life  “threatens  to  level  all  decisions  to  the  lowest  common  
denominator  of  what  is  acceptable  and  well  adjusted.”
14 Consequently, it restricts  “the  possible  
options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable – 
that  which  is  fitting  and  proper.”  Dasein  is  lost  in  the  “they.”  Heidegger  asserts  that  “Everyone  is  
the  other,  and  no  one  is  himself.”
15 “Dasein,  as  a  they-self,  gets  ‘lived’  by  the  commonsense  
ambiguity  of  that  publicness.”16 Heidegger  calls  this  inauthenticity  the  “falling”  of  Dasein.17 
Falling explains the division between authenticity and inauthenticity in Heidegger. Inauthentic 
Dasein  “has  fallen  away  from  itself  as  an  authentic  potentiality  for  being its Self, and has fallen 
into  the  world.”
18 Dasein’s  authentic potentiality for being its self is nothing but its potentiality 
for revealing Being itself through itself. Inauthentic Dasein is fallen Dasein, and in its everyday 
real life, no Dasein can claim to be authentic. Falling is everydayness of Dasein.  
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Tillich’s  concept  of  essence  corresponds  to  Heidegger’s  notion of Dasein’s authentic 
existence,  and  Tillich’s  existence  to  Dasein’s  inauthentic existence.19 Tillich understands essence 
as the principle of the unity of Dasein and Being itself. Tillich calls the unity with Being itself 
Dasein’s  “essential  perfection.”
20 Existence is understood as the principle of the separation and 
distance of Dasein’s  essential reality from Being itself in actual creation and so contains the 
elements of estrangement, sin, and guilt. The language Tillich employs to address the meaning of 
the Fall is the categories of essence and existence. For Tillich, the Fall is an event that essence 
and existence are separated under the conditions of existence. As in Heidegger, the Fall is a fall 
into the world. Creation is the Fall, that is, coincidently, from essence into existence.21 Tillich 
defends himself against the charge of making the Fall an ontological necessity by pointing out 
that the Fall  is  neither  a  “structural  necessity”22 nor  a  “logical  coincidence.”23 The Fall is  “the 
actualization  of  the  ontological  freedom.”
24 By this Tillich means that human essence proceeds 
into its existential distortion through the activation of the will against its essential humanity. Just 
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as in Heidegger, the fallenness of the they-self’s  inauthentic  everydayness is not of a particular 
individual, Tillich also suggests that “There  is  no  individual  fall.”25  
 According to Tillich, creation and fall, though distinguished, coincide, and the only kind 
of existence we know and experience is inauthentic one, fallen from the perfect state of essence. 
It  has  been  argued  that  it  is  here  that  Tillich’s  parallelism  with  Heidegger  falls  apart.
26 Tillich 
emphasizes the unavoidable consequence of the fallen state of human existence, which is the true 
meaning of his statement about the coincidence of creation and the Fall that explains the 
paradoxical identity between the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein. As John Macquarrie 
says, “so  far  as  any  Dasein  factically  exists,  it  is also  guilty.”27 But Heidegger seems to think that 
Dasein’s  transition  from  the  inauthentic  to  the  authentic  is  always  possible  because  of  the  voice  
of  conscience.  Even  in  one’s  fallen  condition, one can still hear the call of the authentic self 
because, as long as Dasein lives, authenticity and inauthenticity are possible ways of being for it. 
Authenticity seems to remain an ontological possibility in fallenness. However, the point of 
emphasis  in  Heidegger’s  discussion  of  everydayness as an inauthentic, basic, mode of Dasein 
lies,  from  the  methodologically  atheistic  philosophical  point  of  view,  in  Dasein’s  inability  to  
direct itself to authentic possibilities because human beings are too deeply caught up in the they 
and cannot move themselves out of their inauthentic mode of being on their own. As does Tillich, 
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Heidegger emphasizes that authentic  existence  is  “a  factical  ideal  of  Dasein.”28 Dasein always 
finds itself not in its authentic self, but  in  its  inauthentic  self,  which  Heidegger  calls  the  “they-
self.”  Heidegger’s  Dasein  remains  “selfsame,”29 and there exists only inauthentic they-self. 
There is no such thing as an interior soliloquy of the authentic self.30 Heidegger writes, 
“Authentic  Being-one’s-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a 
condition  that  has  been  detached  from  the  “they”;;  it is rather an existentiell modification of the 
“they”  – of  the  “they”  as  an  essential  existentiale.”31 The they-self is not merely an existentiale, 
but  an  “essential”  existentiale.
32 Heidegger thinks therefore that for Dasein, its being is always 
different from itself, in short, never coinciding with itself. According to Tillich, human being 
“decides  for  self-actualization, thus producing  the  end  of  dreaming  innocence.”33 The lost 
dreaming innocence is Tillich’s  Heideggerian  interpretation of original sin. For Tillich, the 
dreaming innocence is not only lost, but has never existed. It is real, not a fiction. But all we 
experience about the human condition is its fallen existence. Heidegger says that “So  neither  
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for Research in Values and Philosophy: Washington, D.C., 2008), 117. 
 
31 BT, 168/SZ, 130.  Heidegger’s  emphasis. 
 
32 Heidegger  defines  an  existentiale  as  that  which  makes  up  Dasein’s  ontological  construction.  
For instance, understanding is  one  existentiale  of  Dasein.  Heidegger’s  existentiale  is  neither  a  substitute  
for  Kant’s  categories,  nor  a  substitute  for  the  classic  discussion  of  universals.  Cf.  BT, 182-4/SZ, 143-4. 
 
33 ST2, 33. 
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must  we  take  the  fallenness  of  Dasein  as  a  ‘fall’  from  a  purer  and  higher  ‘primal  status.’  Not only 
do we lack any experience of this ontically, but ontologically we lack any possibilities or clues 
for  Interpreting  it.”
34 
 
Authentic Guilt and Transmoral Consciousness 
 
In Heidegger, the they-self is not merely fallen and inauthentic, but is thus meant to be 
overcome in authentic ways. Dasein remains inauthentic for as long as it is, but is not necessary 
for  Dasein  to  have  lost  itself  in  everydayness  and  to  live  away  from  itself  in  falling  into  “they’s  
inauthenticity.”  The  possibility  of  an  authentic  existence  remains  open  for  Dasein.  This  implies  
that inauthentic Dasein is responsible for being authentic. Dasein’s  responsibility  for  itself  is  a  
strictly ontological notion, and Dasein cannot shift this burden to someone else. For Heidegger, 
being held responsible implies that Dasein’s  having  “not”  responded.35 But this “not”  is not 
something we do not, but something we are not. Dasein cannot be released from this 
responsibility by doing something. This “not”  is  the  very  being of Dasein as being-responsible. 
This  “not”  of  responsibility  is  “formal,”36 or structural, so that Dasein never is its own self, never 
meets its responsibilities. The sense of irresponsibility constitutes guilt. Dasein does not incur 
guilt from something it does or fails to do, but rather it is guilty from the very fact that it is 
                                                 
34 BT, 220/SZ, 176. 
 
35 BT, 328-9/SZ, 283. 
 
36 BT, 327-8/SZ, 282-3. 
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“there”  at  all. Thus Heidegger says that “Being  guilty  is  not  the  result  of  a  guilty  act,  but  
conversely,  the  act  is  possible  only  because  of  an  original  ‘being  guilty.’”
37 Dasein never has a 
“good conscience.”38 No Dasein is in an authentic mode. Heidegger says that the issue for 
Dasein is to “be  ‘guilty’  authentically – ‘guilty’  in  the  way  in  which  it  is.”39 Heidegger wants us 
to  have  a  “nevertheless”  attitude  –  feel guilty, nevertheless be authentic.40 Therefore, for 
Heidegger, authenticity does not mean innocence. It is to become guilty by assuming 
responsibility for its own self. “Dasein  is  essentially  guilty.”41 But Dasein “willfully 
misinterprets  guilt,  treating  it  as  pertaining  not  to  one’s  entire  being  but  rather  to  a  specific  
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38 BT, 326/SZ, 281. 
 
39 BT, 333/SZ, 287. 
 
40 As Calvin O. Schrag, Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), 170, points out, it is in Heidegger that the distinction 
between inauthentic and authentic guilt becomes explicit, although the roots of this distinction go back to 
Kierkegaard. In the Postscript Kierkegaard elaborates what he considers lower and less genuine 
conceptions of guilt. He suggests that authentic guilt-consciousness is not a momentary event of 
temporary action carried out by the individual but is a constant feature of his or her existence. That is, 
once the person has broken through to the insight that he or she is guilty, the human being cannot return 
to the previous mode of existence. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to 
Philosophical Fragments, vol. 12.1 of Kierkegaard’s  Writings, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 533. 
 
41 BT, 353/SZ, 305.  
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deed.”42 In inauthentic consciousness, guilt appears as the violation of some moral rule, the 
failure  to  satisfy  “manipulable  rules  and  public  norms.”
43  
Heidegger demonstrates that the call of conscience evokes a sense of guilt. “The  call,”  
writes  Heidegger,  “is  precisely  something  we  ourselves  have  neither  planned  nor prepared for 
nor  willingly  brought  about.  ‘It  [Being]’  calls,  against  our  expectations  and  even  against  our  
will.”
44 For Heidegger, “the conscience issues a silent call of the self to the self to step into 
authenticity, that is, to assume responsibility for its own self and thus inevitably to become 
schuldig [guilty].”45 Heidegger strips guilt of its ethical content in favor of a more fundamental 
existential sense.46 He  says  that  “Original  guilt  cannot  be  defined  by  morality,  since  morality  
already presupposes  it  for  itself.”47 Following Heidegger, Tillich understands Dasein as guilty in 
a sense distinct from the theological concept of sin. As  Gary  Dorrien  illustrates,  “Tillich  was  
fascinated by Heidegger’s  vivid theorizing  of  the  “thrown”  character” of being-there (Dasein) 
                                                 
42 Julian Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 86. 
 
43 BT, 334/SZ, 288.  
 
44 BT, 320/SZ, 275. 
 
45 Uwe Carsten Scharf, The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation: Interpreting the Divine-
Human Interplay in Paul Tillich's Work 1913-1964 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 92. 
 
46 The idea of a fundamental, or primordial, guilt is not original to Heidegger. He ascribes it to 
Goethe:  “The  agent  is,  as  Goethe  also  said,  always  unscrupulous  [gewissenlos,  lit.  ‘conscienceless’].  I  can  
only be really unscrupulous, when I have chosen wanting-to-have-a-conscience.”  HCT, 319/PGZ, 441. 
There lies the fundamental and irreducible impotence or powerlessness of Dasein. Dasein can never 
overcome the finitude of thrownness.  
 
47 BT, 286/SZ, 242.  
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and the perils that attend the  self’s coming-to-awareness of its arbitrarily given (“thrown”) 
existence.”48 To exist for Tillich means to experience a loss of essentiality. He describes this 
state  of  human  existence  as  “being thrown out of paradise,”49 “thrown  into  existence.”50 Like 
Heidegger, Tillich thinks that human being has the potential to transcend the limits of 
existence,51 although its dreaming innocence is lost. This potential has the signification of being 
guilty. This  means  that  “guilt  becomes  an  existential  concept  if  it  is  the  expression  of  one’s  own  
deviation from what one essentially is and therefore ought to be. Guilt in this sense is connected 
with  the  anxiety  of  losing  one’s  true  being.”
52 As in Heidegger, Tillich conceives of 
responsibility and guilt as the ontological condition of human existence. Sin is not only 
necessary. It is sin that drives human beings into existence. He  writes,  “In  the  difficult  steps  of  
transition from potentiality to actuality, an awakening takes place. Experience, responsibility, 
and  guilt  are  acquired,  and  the  state  of  dreaming  innocence  is  lost.”
53 Heidegger states that a 
good conscience is not possible, and the task for Dasein is to become guilty authentically. In 
response, Tillich develops the idea of  “transmoral  conscience.”  In  his  essay  “The  Transmoral  
                                                 
48 Gary Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology: Idealism, Realism, and Modernity, 
1900-1950 (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 491. 
 
49 ST3, 54. 
 
50 ST2, 131. 
 
51 ST1, 191. 
 
52 EARA, 281. 
 
53 ST2, 34. 
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Conscience”  he  identifies  himself  with  Heidegger  concerning  the  interpretation  of  conscience  
and  describes  Heidegger’s  view  as  follows:    “Conscience  summons  us  to  ourselves,  calling  us  
back from the talk of the market and the conventional behavior of the masses. It has no special 
demands;;  it  speaks  to  us  in  the  “mode  of  silence.”  It  tells  us  only  to  act  and  to  become  guilty  by  
acting,  for  every  action  is  unscrupulous.”
54 In outlining his  idea  of  “transmoral  conscience”, he 
paraphrases Heidegger approvingly in the same essay:  “The  call  of  conscience  has  the  character  
of the demand that man in his finitude actualize his genuine potentialities, and this means an 
appeal  to  become  guilty.”
55 Tillich is at one with Heidegger in denying the possibility of a good 
conscience. “Only  self-deception can give a good moral conscience, since it is impossible not to 
act  and  since  every  action  implies  guilt.”
56 He  agrees  with  Heidegger  that  “Existence  as  such  is  
guilty.”
57  
In Heidegger, Dasein is not only essentially guilty, but also essentially uncanny. Dasein 
exists as “as  Being  thrown into  the  world.”58 Dasein  is  “thrown  Dasein.”59 Dasein as being-in-
the-world finds itself uncomfortable. Heidegger interprets this feeling of uneasiness as the 
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feeling  of  “uncanniness”  which  means  “not-being-at-home.”60 Uncanniness is  Dasein’s  basic  
state and it belongs to  Dasein’s  essence.  Heidegger avoids the question whether Dasein is created 
or not.61 For him, Dasein finds itself already in the world, feeling uncanny. At least, then, Dasein 
begins to exist from the moment it is thrown out of its home. This means that Dasein finds itself 
already in the world, feeling simultaneously uncanny and guilty. Put differently, uncanniness 
essentially belongs to thrownness and guilt. As  such,  Tillich’s  doctrine  of  the  coincidence  of  
creation  and  the  Fall  corresponds  to  Heidegger’s  analysis  of  the  coincidence  of  Dasein’s  birth 
and its essential guilt. Heidegger understands technology as bound up at the deepest level with 
our current uncanniness. Technology serves as a means to remove from humanity the feeling of 
uncanniness. But in the meantime, it created the illusion of limitless possibility, which worked to 
prevent  humanity  from  asking  “why”  we  live.  Consequently, the initial desire for the 
transcendence of earthly limits is forgotten. It is at the very moment when humanity seems to be 
at home everywhere in the world that Heidegger sees the greatest danger of uncanniness. 
Describing this meaningless situation of the modern world, Heidegger writes, “Everything  is  
functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is functioning and that the 
functioning  drives  us  more  and  more  to  even  further  functioning.”
62 It is for this reason that 
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Heidegger says that “It  is  precisely  [machine-powered technology] and it alone that is the 
disturbing  thing,  that  moves  us  to  ask  the  question  concerning  technology  as  such.”
63  
Tillich also investigates the paradoxical implications of technology as both a means to 
overcome the uncanniness of nature and the foundation of a new uncanniness produced by its 
growing independence from its human origins. Tillich  observes  that  “Every  human  being  can  
discern within his soul a feeling in relation to the world that one might call  a  “feeling  of  
uncanniness”  [Unheimlichen]. It is not as though we were continually encountering uncanny 
things. The so-called uncanny things are merely the changing symbols of a basic sense of 
uncanniness that humankind feels in relation to existence itself. Our existence, this existence that 
we in fact are, is what is characteristically uncanny for us. Uncanny, i.e., not homelike, not 
familiar,  foreign  and  threatening  is  our  situation  in  the  world  as  such.”
64 Tillich interprets the 
“technical  city”  as  a  symbol  of  humanity’s  attempt  to  escape  the  feeling  of  uncanniness  and  of  
humanity’s  search  for  fulfillment  through  technological  control.
65 “While the technical city 
symbolizes the age of the fulfillment of the technical utopia of the Renaissance, it has also 
become  “the  symbol  for  the  uncertainty  that  hangs  over  our  age…As  the  technical  structures  
develop an independent existence, a new element of uncanniness emerges in the midst of what is 
most well known. And this uncanny shadow of technology will grow to the same extent that the 
whole  earth  becomes  the  ‘technical  city’  and  the  technical  house…[The  technical  city]  has  
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become  lifeless,  and  it  induces  lifelessness  in  us…[This  new  uncanniness],  a  kind  of  dread  of  the  
lifeless world, which serves us but which cannot  speak  as  life  speaks  to  life.”66  
 
Anxiety of Existential Death 
 
Uncanniness is the experience of not being at home. Facticity belongs to this experience. 
Heidegger’s  concern  with  “home”  is  best  illuminated  in  his  preoccupation  with  Friedrich 
Hölderlin’s  poetry  during  the  1930s  and  early  1940s.  Heidegger’s  concern  with  Hölderlin  is  
Dasein’s  “return  home.”
67 In  his  essays  on  Hölderlin’s  poetry,  Heidegger  uses  a  host  of  words  to  
characterize Being itself, including “the Source,” “the Origin,” and “the Holy,”68 and comments 
that Dasein is at home in Being itself.  Being itself is  “the  foundation  of  being-at-home.”69 A 
home is an Origin, Source, or Ground.  Dasein  attempts  to  “flee  in  the  face  of  the  not-at-home.”  
Dasein flees nowhere actually. Such attempt only makes Dasein feel better and inauthentic. The 
call  of  conscience  “calls  [Dasein]  back”  from  it fleeing to the  they,  and  toward  “its  ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being,”70 which is death. This means that Heidegger sees Dasein as uncanny 
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67 See  Friedrich  Hölderlin,  “Homecoming  (1801),”  in  Friedrich Hölderlin: Selected Poems and 
Fragments, trans. Michael Hamburger (London: Penguin Books, 1994). 
 
68 GA4, 35, 38, 51, 64, 73, 74. 
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70 BT, 322/SZ, 276. 
 
264 
 
 
 
because it is marked by death. Death is our  “ownmost possibility”71 for the reason that we can 
represent other Daseins in performing many functions in life whereas “[n]o one can take the 
other’s dying away from him.” “By its very essence, death is in every case mine.”72 According to 
Heidegger, we are not ourselves, or inauthentic, as long as we live and behave according to rules 
or roles which are connected with substitutability. This possibility of substitutability breaks 
down at death.73 Anticipating death awakens Dasein to the authentic existence, and living in the 
experience of death makes our life authentic.74 In Heidegger, death has a positive function in that 
it  is  the  link  to  authenticity  by  influencing  Dasein’s  interpretation  of  existence.
75 For confronting 
death as our ownmost possibility allows us to acknowledge that our existence is the problem for 
us. Death discloses our existence as something for which we are responsible. Confronting death 
makes  it  clear  to  Dasein  that  “death  is  possible  at  any  moment,  and  the  essential  contingency of 
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72 BT, 284/SZ, 240.   
 
73 Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Being:  A  Critical  Interpretation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 360. 
 
74 Heidegger’s  idea  of  death  as  one’s  own  most  possibility  should not be interpreted to mean that 
the possibility of substitutability breaks down at one point only, namely, death. Herman Philipse points 
out  that  “death  is  not  more mine in the sense of unsubstitutability than breathing, eating, or playing 
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each  individual  life  becomes  apparent.”
76 In the experience of anxiety in the face of death, we are 
forced to confront our own finitude. But inauthentic Dasein seeks to repress this finitude by 
“slinking  away…from  the  uncanniness  of  its  being.”77  
Authentic Dasein is an anxious Dasein that experiences its being-toward-death. 
Heidegger suggests that Dasein becomes inauthentic when it flees from its own being toward 
death. Conversely, Dasein becomes authentic by relating properly to its own death.78 But  “The 
“They”  does  not  permit  us  the  courage  for  anxiety  in  the  face  of  death.”
79 Constantly concerned 
with measuring its acts against public criteria, an inauthentic life is entangled in its immediate 
concerns and drifts along with the taken-for-granted mundane activities of everydayness.80 
Fleeing from death results in a loss of a sense of ending of Dasein, or Heidegger puts it, a sense 
of  “the  possible  impossibility”  of  its  existence.
81 Dasein  “admits  that there is an empirical 
certainty that all humans die, but as long as it is not our turn, our own death does not really 
concern us most of the time. Heidegger stigmatizes this stoic and commonsensical attitude 
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toward death as inauthentic.”82 As  Charles  B.  Guignon  remarks,  “Heidegger’s  concept  of  
authenticity is supposed to point to a way of life that is higher than that of average 
everydayness.”83 Authenticity lies in the affirmation of the inescapable truth of the human 
condition that what the future holds for any and every Dasein is death. A definition of authentic 
Dasein is therefore provided as “being-toward-death.”  Our  “being-toward-death”  is  constitutive  
of who we authentically are. This is the reason why Heidegger thinks that human “identity 
cannot be isolated from the temporal stream.”84 Existential death is different from “demise.”85 It 
does  not  indicate  the  event  that  ends  Dasein’s  physical life. Heidegger explains that death is not 
an event. It is not something that happens at the end of life.86 Death is not an event toward which 
one is moving. Heidegger makes a strict distinction between death and demise. “When  Dasein  
dies – even when it dies authentically – it does not have do so with an experience of its factical 
demising,  or  in  such  an  experience.”
87 Heidegger claims that demise, the event that ends 
Dasein’s  life,  is  not significant for the phenomenological investigation of death. “The event that 
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ends  one’s  life  is  phenomenologically  opaque.”
88 We cannot experience our demise or that of 
others.89 Death,  on  the  other  hand,  is,  as  Heidegger  says,  “a  phenomenon  of  life”  and  is  available  
for phenomenological investigation.90 Rather,  death  “is”  only  in being toward death. “Dasein  is  
always  already  delivered  onto  its  death.”
91 That is, death is intelligible only as a certain sort of 
“being-toward.”92 Death is Dasein’s  way  to  be  – Dasein is constantly dying. Heidegger wants us 
to understand death as a possibility, that is, as a way of life.93  
Heidegger ontologizes anxiety of death. Anxiety of existential death is existential anxiety, 
which  is  different  from  “fear.” 94 Heidegger’s  analysis  of  anxiety  expressly  does  not  have  “fear”  
of death as its subject. He makes a distinction between fear and anxiety in terms of their 
respective causes. Heidegger  draws  a  contrast  between  the  fear  in  “expecting”  death  (erwarfen) 
and  the  anxiety  of  “anticipating”  it  (vorlaufen), thereby distinguishing authentic being-toward-
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92 BT, 277, 289, 303/SZ, 234, 245, 259. 
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death from mere expectation as a kind of projection of the understanding.95 This means, as he 
argues,  that  while  anxiety  and  fear  are  “kindred  phenomena,”
96 fear has a specific object and 
anxiety  does  not.  He  writes,  “that  in  the  face  of  which  we  fear  is  a  detrimental  entity  within-the-
world which comes from some definite region but is close by and is bringing itself close, and yet 
might  stay  away.”
97 On the other hand, “That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity 
within-the-world…That  in  the  face  of  which  one  is  anxious  is  completely  
indefinite…Accordingly,  when  something  threatening  brings  itself  close,  anxiety  does  not  ‘see’  
any  definite  ‘here’  or  ‘yonder’  from  which  it  comes.  That  in  the  face  of  which  one  has  anxiety  is  
characterized by the fact that what threatens is nowhere.”98 Heidegger goes on to say that the true 
“object of anxiety”99 is the world as a whole.100 Actually he means that the object of anxiety in 
anticipating death is our position and condition in this world. Shortly after that, he concludes that 
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the object of anxiety, instead  of  being  “the  world,”  is  “being-in-the-world  itself.”101 Therefore, 
Heidegger  explains  that  “‘Nowhere’…does  not  signify  nothing…that  which  threatens  cannot  
bring itself close from a definite direction within what  is  close  by;;  it  is  already  ‘there,’  and  yet  
nowhere;;  it  is  so  close  that  it  is  oppressive  and  stifles  one’s  breath,  and  yet  is  nowhere.”
102 Fear 
has its object, but anxiety is only caused without having a concrete object. Anxiety as a hidden 
potential  is  said  to  “underlie”  fear,  making  it  possible.
103 But it is only fear that, according to 
Heidegger, we ordinarily experience.104 “‘Real’  anxiety  is  rare.”105 For Heidegger, existential 
anxiety is “not an indication of pathology.”106 It is not something that can, or should, be 
overcome. For it is a fundamental structure of the human condition. This means that the call of 
conscience calls Dasein back to itself which is inauthentic – In reality, there is only two modes of 
existence, living with an awareness of its inauthenticity and living without it. The call of 
conscience brings Dasein face to face with itself as thrown into a world in which it is not at home. 
Dasein is essentially uncanny and existentially anxious. The call of conscience, or the 
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breakthrough to authentic existence, Heidegger says, comes as a “shock.”107 Anxiety is the 
awareness  of  the  shock  of  dying,  or  “existential  death”
108 as  Dasein’s  possibility  of  not  really 
having  any  possibilities  to  be.  Existential  death  is  Dasein’s  possible  non-being. As such, anxiety 
of existential death renders manifest non-being,109 which in turn deepens  Dasein’s understanding 
of Being itself. Heidegger  explains:  “Non-being is that which renders possible the manifestation 
of  beings  as  such  for  the  human  Dasein.”
110 Anxiety of existential death brings to light the 
distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, and it leads into the experience of the 
ontological difference. Anxious Dasein would not be forgetful of the ontological difference.  
From  this  anxious  “mood”  there  arises  the  authentic  existential  question  of  the  ultimate  meaning  
of existence. It offers a point of departure in questioning the meaning of existence. 
Tillich’s  description of the human response to existential anxiety is significantly 
Heideggerian. For  Tillich,  Heidegger’s  consideration  of  anxiety  is  enormously  useful  to  redefine  
questions of human existence and theology. Bernard Martin notes, that “his  entire  cosmological 
view  is  colored  by  his  acceptance  of  anxiety  as  man’s  fundamental  psychic  experience”  is  
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clear.111 It  is  quite  evident  that  Heidegger’s  portrayal of the human condition supplies much of 
the background for the three types of anxiety that Tillich delineates and describes in his Courage 
To Be – the anxiety of fate and death, the anxiety of guilt and condemnation, and the anxiety of 
emptiness and meaninglessness. Tillich  defines  anxiety  as  “finitude in awareness.”112 Human 
being becomes aware of its finitude through the experience of its possible non-being, and the 
experience of possible non-being is made  possible  by  anticipating  one’s  own  death,  that  is,  
through  the  experience  of  “having  to  die.”  The problems of finitude, non-being, and death are the 
key themes in  most  of  Tillich’s  works.  “We  philosophize  because  we  are  finite  and  because  we  
know that we are finite. We are a mixture of being and nonbeing, and we are aware of it. It is our 
finitude…which  drives  us  to  search  for  ultimate  reality.”
113 It can be shown that what Tillich 
suggests here is that we philosophize  in  the  Heideggerian  way.  “Recent  Existentialists,  especially  
Heidegger…have  put  nonbeing  (Das Nichts, le néant) in the center of their ontological 
thought.”
114 “Heidegger’s  ‘annihilating  nothingness’  describes  man’s  situation  of  being  
threatened by nonbeing in an ultimately inescapable way, that is, by death. The anticipation of 
nothingness  at  death  gives  human  existence  its  existential  character…problem  of  nonbeing  is  
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inescapable. It is the problem of finitude.”115 Wilhelm and Marion Pauck comment that it is 
probably because of “Paul  Tillich’s  lifelong  dread  of  death”116 that finitude, non-being, and death 
lie at the heart of his thought. Theodor W. Adorno, who wrote his habilitation under Tillich, also 
recalls that  Tillich’s  intimate  friends  found  it  impossible  to  imagine  that  he  might  one  day  die.117 
For Tillich, death represents the  “absolutely  unknown,”  “the  darkness  in  which  there  is  no  light  
at  all,”  “the  real  and  ultimate  object  of  fear  from  which  all  other  fears  derive  their  power,”
118 “the  
anxiety of being eternally  forgotten.”  Death  means  for  him parting, separation, isolation, and 
opposition.119 A month before his sixty-fifth birthday he remarked in a letter to his friend, 
“Inasmuch  as  I  shall  be  sixty-five years old this year, and there are some signs that I am not in 
the forties any longer, the anticipation of death (Heidegger) becomes an increasingly prevalent 
occupation  of  mine.”120 To him, death was always a stranger to be unmasked.121 He says,  “the  
anxiety of death overshadows all concrete anxieties and gives them their ultimate 
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seriousness.”
122 As such, having to die is the ultimate reminder of our contingency. For 
Heidegger, ontology as the philosophy of life should recognize how life is connected with death, 
and include the phenomenon of death in its characterization of life.123 Likewise,  Tillich’s  
question concerning the meaning of life is raised in response to the frightful presence of death. 
“The  words  for  life  first  arose  through  the  experience  of  death. In any case, the polarity of life 
and  death  has  always  colored  the  word  “life.””
124 As in Heidegger, the anxious mood offers 
Tillich a point of departure in questioning the meaning of existence. 
Tillich said in 1954, three years after the publication of the first volume of his Systematic 
Theology, that “Now  I  come  to  the  basic  question  asked  by  Heidegger  again  and  again,  a  
question asked in many ways and asked differently by him in his different periods, but it is 
always the same question: Why is there something and not nothing?...The question...is not a 
logically answerable question so much as it is an outcry, the expression of shock. And this shock 
is the birthplace of all philosophical thinking; it is the philosophical shock of the individual who, 
for the  first  time,  has  encountered  the  possibility  that  there  might  be  nothing.”125 Tillich further 
clarifies the point in stating that “the  experience  out  of  which  philosophy  is  born…is  the  
philosophical  shock…What  is  the  meaning  of  being?  Why  is  there  being  and not-being? What is 
the  structure  in  which  every  being  participates?  Questions  like  these…are  essentially  human,  for  
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man as the German philosopher Heidegger says, is that being which asks what being is. This 
question and the shock with which it takes hold of us is especially human. It is the foundation of 
humanism  and  the  root  of  philosophy.”
126 Tillich’s  Systematic Theology begins a discussion on 
“Being and God” with the Heideggerian  “shock.”  Tillich understands the shock precisely as a 
“shock  of  possible  non-being.”127 Being itself is disclosed through this experience of non-being. 
He writes that “The ontological question, the question of Being itself, arises in something like a 
“metaphysical shock” – the shock of possible non-being.”128 “Anxiety  is  the  existential 
awareness of non-being.”129 The metaphysical shock is, precisely  speaking,  an  “ontological 
shock”130 in which we become aware of the possibility that there might be nothing rather than 
something. At  the  center  of  Tillich’s thought, the presence of Being itself appears only through 
the shock of non-being. What  is  shocking  is  one’s  awareness  of  one’s  own  possible  non-being. 
The  shock  “points  to  a  state  of  mind  in  which  the  mind  is  thrown  out  of  its  normal  balance,  
shaken  in  its  structure.”
131 “One’s  own  possible non-being”  means,  of  course,  death. One’s  
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“encounter  with  nothingness”  through  its  shocking  awareness  of  its  “moving towards death”132 is 
held by Tillich “to be the source of a basic anxiety which is universally, though not always 
consciously, present in human being and pervasive of its entire being.”133 “If man is left to his 
“having to die,” the essential anxiety about non-being is transformed into the horror of death. 
Following  Heidegger,  Tillich  understands  death  as  “having  to  die.”  “What is significant here is 
not the fear of death, that is, the moment of dying. It is anxiety about having to die which reveals 
the ontological character of time…This anxiety is potentially present in every moment. It 
permeates the whole of man’s being.”134 Death is not an event taking place at the end of physical 
life. “Death  is  present  in  every  life  process  from  its  beginning  to  its  end.”135 That is, as 
Heidegger has shown, death coincides with birth. “The  conditions  of  life  are  also  the  conditions  
of  death…The  moment  of  our  conception is the moment in which we begin not only to live but 
also  to  die.”
136 “Our  having  to  die  is  a  shaping  force  through  our  whole  being  of  body  and  soul  in  
every  moment.”
137 Accordingly, anxiety of existential death is consciously and unconsciously 
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effective in the whole process of living. Tillich says, “Like the beating of the heart, it is always 
present, although one is not always aware of it.”138 Only the dead are not anxious.  
 
Psychoanalytic Description of Anxiety 
 
Heidegger  interprets  anxiety  as  a  “state-of-mind.”139 This psychological aspect is 
overlooked when philosophers think about human being. “They do not primarily preoccupy 
themselves with concrete experiences, but they rather allow themselves to build theories about 
human living in an abstract sense.”140 Heidegger’s  existential  analysis  of  anxiety  has  had  
extensive influence on contemporary psychology, as the works of R. D. Laing, Rollo May and 
Erich Fromm attest.141 Psychology  inspired  by  Heidegger’s  work  opens  up  our  view  of  the  world,  
which is normally so closed and confined.142 It asks new ontological questions, rather than 
remaining based in the ontic problems that  restrain  a  person’s  being  in  the  world.  Unfortunately, 
however, few psychologists and psychotherapists have gone through the trouble of studying 
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Heidegger in any detail, in spite of the recent flourishing of the existential therapies.143 The 
relation between Heidegger and psychology has long been a neglected theme until the 
publication of the so-called Zollikon Seminars in 1987, 144 which records in  detail  Heidegger’s  
intensive engagement and interaction with a group of psychiatrists. Heidegger  saw  Freud’s  
metapsychological theory as a primary example of the misapplication of the scientific method 
specifically to human beings.145 Heidegger made it clear that he saw psychoanalysis as a major 
threat:  “the  view  that  psychology  – which long ago turned into psychoanalysis – is taken in 
Switzerland  and  elsewhere  as  a  substitute  for  philosophy  (if  not  for  religion)…”
146 Heidegger 
considered Freud to be a representative  of  “modern  science”  which,  he  pointed  out,  was  “based  
on the fact that the human being posits himself as an authoritative subject to whom everything 
which  can  be  investigated  becomes  an  object.”
147 Heidegger stood in opposition to Freud, 
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sharply criticizing him as an  advocate  of  “the  dictatorship  of  scientific  thinking.”148 Medard Boss 
describes Heidegger’s  feelings  toward  Freud:  “…Heidegger  never  ceased  shaking  his  head.  He  
simply did not want to have to accept that such a highly intelligent and gifted man as Freud could 
produce such artificial, inhuman, indeed absurd and purely fictitious construction about Homo 
sapiens.”
149 Heidegger points out  that  all  of  Freud’s  metapsychological theory remains solely on 
the ontical level – the level of things. Heidegger maintains that Freud’s  metapsychological  
inquiry is “oblivious to the genuinely ontological dimension of human existence.” Freud did not 
consider  what  must  be  presupposed  for  a  human  to  “be.” As  a  result,  “Freud’s  metapsychological  
theory fails to advance an understanding of what it means to be psychoanalytical.”150 
It is well known that Tillich also actively worked with psychologists and psychoanalysts 
for many years. Tillich participated in organized discussion with the New York Psychology 
Group (NYPG),  in  which  Tillich,  along  with  Erich  Fromm,  was  seen  as  a  “natural  leader”  by  the  
other members.151 Tillich’s  “commitment to the issues of religion and health, pastoral 
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psychology, theology and counseling can be discerned in his post NYPG publications.”152 Tillich 
believes that psychoanalysis  can  serve  to  “unmask hidden levels of reality” and assist one in 
accepting reality.153 He claims that “Unmasking  is  painful  and,  in  certain  circumstances,  
destructive. But without this painful process the ultimate meaning of the Christian gospel cannot 
be  perceived.”
154 He  suggests  that  the  theologian  should  use  psychoanalysis  “for  exposing  the  
true condition of man as often as he can rather than propagating an idealism that smoothes over 
the  ambiguities  of  existence.”
155 In his later writings, Tillich “regards psychoanalysis an 
important auxiliary science in theology.”156 Tillich values psychoanalysis for having 
“rediscovered”  the  full  depth  and  meaning  of  the  theological  concept  of  sin  in  the  first  place. He 
writes, “There  can be no doubt that the growth of the two movements, existentialism and depth 
psychology, is of infinite value for theology. Both of them brought to theology something which 
it  always  should  have  known  but  which  it  had  forgotten  and  covered  up…the  inner  self-
destructiveness  of  man  in  his  estrangement  from  his  essential  being.”
157 Tillich discerns that 
“There  is  a  common  root  and  intention  in  existentialism  and  psychoanalysis…The  common  root  
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of existentialism and psychoanalysis is the protest against the increasing power of the philosophy 
of consciousness  in  modern  industrial  society.”158 Tillich particularly appreciates  Freud’s  
discoveries of the depth of human estrangement and his elaboration on anxiety. “The 
existentialists allied themselves with Freud’s analysis of the unconscious in protest against a 
psychology of consciousness which had previously existed. Existentialism and psychotherapeutic 
psychology are natural allies and have always worked together. This rediscovery of the 
unconscious in man is of the highest importance for theology…It has placed the question of the 
human condition at the center of all theological thinking…In this light we can say that 
existentialism and Freud, together with his followers and friends, have become the providential 
allies of Christian theology in the twentieth century.”159 Evidently, “two important influences on 
Tillich’s  account  of  anxiety,  within  which  he  takes  up  the  concepts  of  guilt  and  courage,  are  the  
work of Heidegger and psychoanalytic theory.”160 But Tillich’s  theological concept of anxiety is 
stronger affinity with Heidegger than with the account provided by psychoanalysis.   
Tillich is in line with Heidegger in criticizing Freud for not thinking through the 
distinction between essential (authentic existence) and existential (inauthentic existence). Tillich 
says that “Freud…was  unclear,  namely,  he  was  not  able  to  distinguish  man’s  essential  and  
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existential  nature.”
161 In other words, “Freud  did  not  see  that  his  description  of  human  nature  is  
adequate for man only in his existential  predication  but  not  in  his  essential  nature.”162 Freud was 
not  able  to  point  out  the  “basic  anxiety”
163 of  human  existence,  that  “he  might  not  be!”164 Freud 
did  not  go  beyond  the  realm  of  Dasein’s  inauthentic  existence. Tillich follows Heidegger in 
comprehending the basic anxiety not as pathological, but as existential. Freud misunderstood the 
distinction between pathological and existential anxiety. Pathological  anxiety  underlies  Dasein’s  
inauthentic existence, but existential anxiety is the heart of authentic existence. Heidegger, Freud, 
and  Tillich  are  equally  clear  that  anxiety  has  “a  quality  of  indefiniteness  and  lack  of  object,”165 
“the  negation  of  every  object.”
166 But Tillich believes that his own analysis concerning the 
difference between existential and pathological anxiety points toward the Heideggerian principle 
that existential anxiety is the structural anxiety and cannot be eliminated, while pathological 
anxiety is primarily an object of medical healing or psychotherapy. Tillich suggests that “Only in 
the light of an ontological understanding of human nature can the body of material provided by 
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psychology and sociology be organized into a consistent and comprehensive theory of 
anxiety.”
167  
 
God in the Age of Anxiety 
 
Heidegger says that that we live in “the epoch of Being,”168 a situation in  which  “Being  
withdrew  itself  as  Being.”
169 By  “epoch,”  Heidegger  means  “holding  back.”170 The epoch of 
Being is not an era or age of Being, but a situation of the absence of Being. As discussed above, 
the epoch of Being is presently determined and characterized by modern technology – It is not 
correct to say that Heidegger views modern technology as the present epoch of Being. Heidegger 
thinks that Being itself has been hidden from the beginning of its history. Furthermore, Being 
conceals itself more and more. Nevertheless, Being has never been completely hidden 
throughout  the  history  of  Being  because  beings  cannot  become  manifest  without  the  “light  of  
Being.”  Hence,  the  history  of  Being  is also a revelation of Being. Illuminating beings, Being 
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reveals itself in its very concealment.171 But  “The  unconcealment  of  beings,  the  brightness  
granted  them  [by  Being],  obscures  the  light  of  Being,”  for  “as  it  reveals  itself  in  beings,  Being  
withdraws.”
172 Heidegger says that the epoch of Being is intended by Being itself. Being refuses 
itself to us.173 Being turns away from us.174 Being has abandoned us so that we live in 
abandonment by Being and are homeless.175 The history of Being began with forgetfulness of 
and by Being.176 Consequently, Being is hidden and our life is meaningless.177 Heidegger says 
that Being is an abyss,178 and is a mystery to us.179 According to Heidegger, however, an entirely 
new epoch of Being, a new situation of our understanding of and relation to Being, will come 
about in which the meaning of Being itself and the relationship between Being itself and human 
being undergoes a profound modification. For this Heidegger proposes the cultivation of 
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“meditative thinking” that prepares us for the coming of another epoch of Being.180 Meditative 
thinking has the character of openness to what is given. It is philosophical thinking which, 
properly  carried  out,  leads  to  one’s  “openness  to  the  mystery.”
181 Heidegger states that 
“Philosophy  will  be  able  to  bring  out  no  direct  change  in  the  present condition of the world. This 
applies…to  all  merely  human  thought  and  endeavor.  Only  a  God  can  save  us.  The  sole  
possibility that remains is to prepare the attitude – through thought and poetry – for the 
appearance  of  the  God.”
182 This idea of Heidegger’s  hidden  God  becomes the philosophical 
foundation  of  Tillich’s  post-monotheistic theology of the God above God. Heidegger illustrates 
the coming of the new epoch of Being as Being’s  “turning (Kehre),”183 which is the 
unconcealment of the concealment of Being. That  is,  the  turning  is  a  turning  “toward  nowhere  
except into Being itself.”184 This does not mean that concealment ceases. Turning is  Being’s  
coming to presence as concealment and unconcealment. The turning will begin with our 
experience of the hiddenness of Being,185 with the experience of the ontological difference 
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between Being and beings. And  it  “comes to pass suddenly.”186 Heidegger anticipates that Being 
appears suddenly  in  its  own  “light”  or  “clearing.”187 “In  this  turning,  the  clearing  belonging  to  
the essence of Being suddenly clears itself and lights up,”188 and Being is disclosed in thinking. 
Heidegger  calls  this  event  a  “leap  (Sprung)  of  thinking.”189 In this leap, thinking experiences that 
it does nothing but respond to a call of Being which at the same time becomes manifest as such 
only in this response.190 Tillich interprets the returning Being itself as the hidden divine reality. 
Tillich must have thought that  “thinking”  in  the  sense  of  the  later  Heidegger  is  an  analogue  of  the  
search for God in faith. His assumption is confirmed by the positive ways in which Heidegger 
characterizes his concept of thinking. Thinking  is  essentially  “asking,”  “questioning,”  and  
“wondering,”  and  Heidegger  calls  such questioning a “piety  of  thinking.”191 In thinking, 
something  becomes  manifest  which  “manifests  itself  while  it  hides  itself  at  the  same  time,”  this  
is, Being.192 Thinking is a way toward that which is worthy of our quest,193 and  “Most  
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Thinkworthy”  is  Being.
194  Heidegger says that the quest for Being is the ultimate aim of our 
existence.195 The  “leap  of  thinking”  brings  us  into  our  “belonging  to  Being.”196 Being is not a 
product of thinking. Rather thinking is grasped by Being, which Heidegger calls an “event of 
Being.”197 When thinking is grasped by Being, thinking finds itself being there for the first time.  
Grasped by Being, humans are there, experience the ontological difference between Being and 
beings, face the fact of death, fall into the anxiety of finitude, feel uncanny and guilty, 
philosophize, and think.198 Those experiences are “an  essential  trait  of  Being itself.”199 Dasein is 
summoned by the call of conscience to the authentic acceptance of the truth of Dasein in facing 
its possible non-being (its finitude and being-toward-death). The call of conscience requires that 
we do not run away from recognizing our finitude, and accept it as an inescapable condition. 
Heidegger’s  conception  of  “the  authentic  acceptance”  is  exemplified  in  his  discussion of 
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Sophocles’  Antigone.200 Antigone represents an authentic Dasein. Heidegger contends that, 
instead of turning away from the uncanny, Antigone accepts it and thereby becomes homely. In 
her appropriation of death and non-being, Antigone knows herself as belonging to Being.201 
Tillich interprets the epoch of Being as the age of anxiety. There  is  no  notion  of  an  “age  
of  anxiety”  in  Heidegger.  He did not hold that the existential-ontological situation portrayed in 
Being and Time is  peculiar  to  modern  humanity.  When  Tillich  writes  that  “Today  it  has  become  
almost a truism to call our time an  “age  of  anxiety,”202 he does not mean that anxiety is a new 
historical phenomenon.203 Tillich only describes the recovery of the meaning of anxiety as one of 
the achievements of the twentieth century.204 Like Heidegger, Tillich thinks that anxiety is a 
universal characteristic of the human existence. He argues  that  anxiety  is  “an  ontological  
quality…Anxiety  is  always  present,  although  often  latent.”
205 By “the age of anxiety,” Tillich 
only means that the twentieth century witnesses the rise of existentialism among intellectuals, 
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and it characterizes the religious situation of the twentieth century.206 Tillich and Heidegger 
share the same point of departure, that the transformation in our understanding of Being itself 
takes place in a sudden switch. The possibility of such a sudden switch is not exclusive to the 
twentieth century. A person is suddenly faced with the possibility of non-being, that is of passing 
away  into  nothingness.  It  is  “the  ‘shock’  which  grasps  the  mind  when  it  encounters  the  threat  of  
non-being”207 In other words, “The  threat  of  non-being, grasping the mind, produces the 
‘ontological  shock’  in  which  the  negative  side  of  the  mystery  of  being  – its abysmal element – is 
experienced.”
208 This shows that the problem of human existence entails the problem of non-
being. But, as Heidegger explains, this non-being is not non-being in general, but the non-being 
of Dasein. Non-being is always only understood authentically as the non-being of a given Dasein. 
For Tillich, being-toward-death as the essential nature of Dasein implies that the finitude of 
human existence is due to a mixture of its being and non-being.209 Such a mixture is the 
fundamental ontological structure of the created world. For this reason, Heidegger understands 
Being and non-being to be one.210 “Non-being…reveals  itself  as  belonging  to  the  Being  of  
beings.”
211 Tillich expresses this in his own words as  follows:  “Being  is  essentially  related  to  
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non-being…There can be no world unless there is a dialectical participation of non-being in 
Being.”
212 Tillich thinks that Heidegger took a right path to search for an answer to the problem 
of  human  finitude.  Tillich  writes,  “[Heidegger]  attempts  to  penetrate  into  the  ultimate  structure  
of Being. Man, for Heidegger, is the doorway to the mystery of Being, and he enters into this 
path with all the powers of his great philosophical mind. But man is not himself the theme or the 
subject  at  the  center  of  this  inquiry.  At  the  center  is  Being  and  nothing  but  Being.”
213 Tillich 
believes that Being itself overcomes non-being.214 Logically speaking, it does not follow from 
this that Being itself is the answer to the ultimate question, the question of the ultimate meaning 
of existence. But Tillich explains that, when Being itself grasps us, Being itself can be 
experienced as the power that enables us to resist non-being in the form of existential anxiety. In 
Tillich, the state of being grasped by the power of Being itself is defined as “faith.”215 Therefore 
faith  is  not  a  “human  attitude”  or  capability  but  a  movement  of  Being itself toward the human, 
where the human can do nothing but stand still.216 Faith is existential experience in and through 
which one’s  basic  connection  with  Being itself is disclosed. Revelation is nothing but an event in 
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which a person is grasped by Being itself and, as a result, is “ultimately  concerned”217 about 
Being itself. “Revelation  is  first  of  all  the  experience  in  which  an  ultimate  concern  grasps  the  
human  mind.”218 Revelation, for Tillich, refers to a quality of experience. Understood in this 
manner, revelation is not the negation of reason. Instead,  revelation  is  “the  state  of  mind  in  which  
reason  is  beyond  itself.”
219 “Revelation is reason”220 being grasped by the power that transcends 
it. The Scripture, in this analysis, is a medium of revelation. It is not itself revelation. To equate 
the two is to distort the meaning of revelation.  
Heidegger  states  that  Being  is  “transcendens.”  He  writes,  “Being,  as  the  basic  theme  of  
philosophy,  is  no  genus  of  an  entity;;  yet  it  pertains  to  every  entity.  Its  “universality”  is  to be 
sought higher up. Being and the structure of being lie beyond every entity and every possible 
character that an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple…Every  
disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth 
(the disclosure of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.”221 According to Heidegger, as long as 
humanity encounters everything within the framework of technology, the world is without 
salvation and all traces of the Holy are wiped out222 because technological frame of mind does 
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not admit of a notion of transcendence.223  Heidegger’s  understanding  of  Being itself as 
transcendental reality indicates an important religious implication.  
Tillich  fully  appropriates  Heidegger’s  understanding  of  Being itself.  He  states  that  “God  
is Being itself.”224 It  has  been  said  that  Tillich’s  statement  that  God  is  Being itself is rejected by 
Heidegger. Heidegger  remarks  that  were  he  to  write  a  theology  the  word  “Being”  would  not  
appear in it.225 But Tillich does not go beyond Heidegger in his understanding of God.  
Tillich’s  statement,  “God  is  Being itself,”  does  not  exhaust  the  divine  reality. Tillich warns us 
that “To  speak  unsymbolically  about  Being itself is  untrue.”226 The  statement,  “God  is  Being 
itself,”  can  only  mean that God is the symbol of Being itself.  Tillich  says  that  “God  is  the  
fundamental  symbol  for  what  concerns  us  ultimately.”
227 As illustrated above, according to 
Tillich, what concerns us ultimately is Being itself. Tillich  is  correct  to  say  that  “The  statement 
that God is Being itself is non-symbolic  statement”228 when it means that God is the symbol for 
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Being itself. Hence, God is Being itself and this does not apply conversely.229 When Tillich says 
that the statement “God  is  Being itself”  is  a non-symbolic statement, and later that it  is  “both  
non-symbolic  and  symbolic,”230 Tillich  overemphasizes  Heidegger’s  view of the revelatory 
power of language  as  the  “house  of  being.” Tillich laments the situation in which some 
philosophy deprives us of the power of language  in  expressing  theological  matters.  “Let  me  
quote  a  word  of  Heidegger  against  it.  For  him  language  is  the  “house  of  being.”  as  he  says,  being  
habitat, so to speak, in the human language. When Being makes itself manifest it makes itself 
manifest through the  word.”231 For Heidegger, however, language is not as powerful as Tillich 
envisages. Heidegger would think that even describing divine reality symbolically is misleading.  
Heidegger and Tillich share a sense of holiness brought by Being itself, or of divine 
presence in Being itself. Tillich’s  view  of  the  proper  relation  that  human  being  might  establish  
with Being itself again echoes  Heidegger’s  reading  of  Antigone, according to which Antigone 
understands that that against which nothing can be done is the utter strangeness of human being 
in the world and accepts the necessity of the tragic drama of being human.232 For Tillich, Being 
itself “justifies  man through grace and accepts him.”233 It does not mean that Being itself “stand  
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in  a  private  relation  to  man.”
234 Rather, it  is  his  interpretation  of  Heidegger’s  doctrine  that  
Dasein’s  way  of  being  is  “existence,”  to  stand  toward  Being itself,235 and “the  Dasein in  man…is  
the essence that belongs to Being itself.”236 For Heidegger, Being itself is  Dasein’s  inner Being, 
its ontological Ground. We essentially belong to Being itself even in the midst of existential 
despair and anxiety. Tillich follows Heidegger in his understanding of the ontological relation 
between Being itself and human beings, and claims that human beings belong to Being itself.237 
He pictures human’s  belonging  to  Being itself as such being always already accepted by Being 
itself. Under the conditions of existence, we experience uncanniness as “estrangement  from  the  
Ground  of  our  being.”
238 “We  cannot  escape, however,”  for  “we  are  bound  to  it  [Being itself] for 
all eternity, just as we are bound to ourselves.”239 Tillich  assures  us  that  “Man  is  never  cut  off  
from  the  Ground  of  being,  not  even  in  the  state  of  condemnation.”
240 Here lies a resolution for 
our existential anxiety, the answer the question of the ultimate meaning of existence. By 
accepting our acceptance, we can affirm our own being in spite of those tragic elements of our 
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existence. According to Tillich, “accepting  our  acceptance”  means  the  “state  in  which a being is 
aware of its possible non-being”  by  means  of  the  “in  spite  of”  of  self-affirmation.241 Accepting 
acceptance is to response to the call of Being itself. As Heidegger says, “Readiness  for  anxiety  is  
a Yes to the urgent call to fulfill the highest claim, a claim that is made upon the human essence 
alone. Of all beings, only the human being, called upon by the voice of Being, experiences the 
wonder of all wonders.”242 Tillich’s  admonition,  “Simply  accept  the  fact  that  you  are  
accepted,”
243 is his summary of the  Gospel  message  of  God’s  grace  in  the  Heideggerian  language.  
“If  that  [accepting our acceptance] happens  to  us,  we  experience  grace.”244 Heidegger uses the 
terms authentic and inauthentic to describe human beings in the relationship of their 
responsibility to the call of Being. The authentic existence requires that we do not run away from 
recognizing our finitude but accept it as an inescapable condition. As discussed above, Tillich 
translates authentic being into “the  essential  state”  of  human  existence,245 “what  he  essentially  
is,”
246 or  “essential man,”247 which is equivalent to Jesus as the Christ in Tillich.  “New  Being”  
which Jesus  as  the  Christ  represents  is  Tillich’s  restatement  of  Heidegger’s  authentic  existence.  
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For Tillich, the Christ is the Bearer of the New Being. This means that as the New Being, Jesus 
Christ needs not  be  “God”  in  the  traditional  sense  of  the  term. The  heart  of  Tillich’s  Christology  
is Heideggerian. Schleiermacher also contributed to Tillich’s  formulation  of  the  concept of the 
New Being.248 In both Tillich and Schleiermacher, Christ is the bearer of a new reality. 
Schleiermacher’s  view  of  Jesus  as  the  original  image  of  what  human  being  essentially  is,  is  
logically equivalent  to  Tillich’s  formulation.  But,  as  John  Charles  Cooper  points, 
Schleiermacher’s  elucidation of Christian doctrine is devoid of ontology.249 Tillich took 
“essence”  as  seriously  as  “existence.”  It must be noted that Tillich has maintained that 
Schleiermacher is not a direct influence on his Christology.250 Tillich says that he differs from 
Schleiermacher in that for him Christ exemplifies the New Being under the conditions of 
existence,  and  yet  Schleiermacher’s  Jesus  as  the  original  image  represents  the  idealistic  
transcendence of true humanity over existence.251 
Heidegger  connects  “courage”  with  the  capacity  to  withstand  the  existential  anxiety  at  the  
heart of Dasein. Along  with  finitude,  courage,  or  “resoluteness,”  is  a  key  term  in  the  first  half  of  
Being and Time. Nowhere  are  Tillich’s  Heideggerian  debts  more  evident  than in his work The 
Courage To Be. Heidegger is directly referenced only a few times in it, but his intellectual 
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influence  pervades  the  entire  text.  Throughout  the  text,  Tillich  translates  Heidegger’s  description  
of existence in Being and Time. There is a striking similarity between the two works. Heidegger 
writes, “The  lucid  courage  for  essential  anxiety  assures  us  the  enigmatic  possibility  of  
experiencing  Being…What  would  all  courage  be  if  it  did  not  find  its  permanent  counterpart  in  
the experience of essential anxiety? To the degree that we degrade such essential anxiety, 
together with the relationship of Being to humans that is cleared within it, we denigrate the 
essence  of  courage…In  the  abyss  of  horror,  courage  recognizes  the  scarcely  broached  realm  of  
Being from whose clearing every being first returns to what it is and can be.”252 For Heidegger, 
authentic existence is the way of “death-accepting courage.”253 Therefore, courage is the ultimate 
locus of authenticity.254 Dasein comes to itself, to an awareness of its inauthenticity and 
homelessness, when it faces its mortality with courage. In other words, authentic existence is an 
“anticipatory  resoluteness”  in  the  face  of  this  finality.
255 We should neither  have  “cowardly  fear”  
of death256 nor wait for death passively, but have the courage to exist in the awareness of our 
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finitude. Courage is not for our preparation for the final letting go in death. Authentic existence 
is not fatalistic about its finitude. Rather, “Courage  is  able  to  withstand  the  nothing.”257  
As Tillich searches for the answer to question of the ultimate meaning of existence, 
toward the end of The Courage To Be, he turns to Heidegger. Tillich suggests that the solution to 
the ultimate question can be found in  Heidegger’s  notion  of  courage. “Heidegger in Sein und Zeit 
describes  the  courage  of  despair  in  philosophically  exact  terms.”
258 Tillich notes that no other 
thinker until Heidegger had grasped its true importance. “Meaninglessness  in  all  its  aspects  can  
be faced only by those who resolutely take the anxiety of finitude and guilt upon themselves. 
There is no room, no criterion for what is right and wrong. Resoluteness makes right what shall 
be  right.  One  of  Heidegger’s  historical  functions  was  to  carry  through  the  existentialist  analysis  
of the courage to be as oneself more fully than anyone else and, historically speaking, more 
destructively.”
259 Tillich’s  most  direct  answer  to  the  problem  of  death  is  also  “courage”  in  the  
Heideggerian sense. He concludes, “The  anticipation  of  nothingness  at  death  gives human 
existence  its  existential  character…In  existentialism  there  is  no  way  of  conquering  this  threat.  
The  only  way  of  dealing  it  lies  in  the  courage  of  taking  it  upon  one’s  self:  courage!”
260  
 
 
 
                                                 
257 PWIM, 234/GA9, 103. 
 
258 CTB, 148. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION: NEW THEOLOGY 
 
Tillich is ultimately concerned to answer the question of the ultimate meaning of human 
existence. My research has shown that Tillich and Heidegger share important religious 
convictions concerning this ultimate question. The old method of authority, which appeals to the 
sacred Scripture or church doctrines, breaks down under the weight of the ultimate existential 
question of ultimate reality because unavoidable conflicts arise between dogmatic materials and 
scientific treatment, with the result that authority is undermined by science. Seeing that concrete 
notions of God end up as being idolatrous,1 Tillich calls for transcending theism through an 
appeal  to  the  God  above  God  of  theism.  In  Tillich’s  view,  Heidegger  does  not  preclude  but  rather  
supports an authentic search for God and a genuine philosophical theism.2 Tillich is convinced 
by  what  he  has  discovered  within  Heidegger’s  work, that theology and philosophy share the 
same  object  of  concern.  “There  is  both  in  the  doctrine  of  revelation  and  in  philosophy  a  point  at  
                                                 
1 As Iain D. Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 35, points  out,  the  conclusion  suggested  by  Heidegger’s  critique  of  Kant  on  ontotheology  is  
that  “the  real  problem  with  the  ontological  proof  is  not  that  it  might  be  invalid  but,  rather,  that  it  reflects  
and reinforces a phenomenologically misguided and historically disastrous approach to thinking about 
humanity’s  relation  to  “the  divine.”” 
 
2 Tillich  was  not  alone  in  having  discovered  the  religious  potential  of  Heidegger’s  work.  Cf.  Karl 
Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, ed. Richard Wolin, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 133, saw Heidegger as primarily a religious thinker, offering a post-
Christian  alternative  to  theism:  “The  basis  that  serves  as  the  background  for  everything said by 
Heidegger, and that permits many to take notice and listen attentively, is something unsaid: the religious 
motive, which has surely detached itself from Christian faith, but which precisely on account of its 
dogmatically unattached indeterminacy appeals all the more to those who are no longer faithful Christians 
but  who  nonetheless  would  like  to  be  religious.” 
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which the  two  are  one.”3 Tillich came to a different understanding of the relationship between 
philosophy and theology as a result of his contact with Heidegger. He modifies his earlier 
dialectical  method  of  “questioning”  and  “answering”  so  as  to  accommodate  his new 
understanding. The method of correlation is one consequence of that new understanding affected 
by the Heideggerian thinking.  In  his  1927  lecture  “Phenomenology  and  Theology,”  Heidegger  
asserts that theology is a positive science with a thematized area of inquiry. It is his contention 
that theology as a positive science of God is “absolutely  different  from  philosophy,”4 which has 
become synonymous with the definition of fundamental ontology in Being and Time.5 But 
Heidegger has certain reservations in describing theology as a science. He comments in the same 
lecture that “The  most  central  question  is  whether,  indeed,  theology  in  general  is  a  science.”  Put  
differently, is theology a science at all, and does it have to be? This question is raised almost in 
passing in the lecture, but it does not appear innocent. But Heidegger  says  that  “This  question  is  
deferred  here.”
6 Heidegger implies that a new approach to the divine has to be sought, even 
though  he  does  not  indicate  such  new  way  explicitly  as  “theology.”  This  becomes  clearer  
through  his  later  writings.  Thus  whereas  in  “Phenomenology  and  Theology”  Heidegger  seems  to  
seek to delimit theology to an ontic science, Heidegger suggests in his later essays a kind of 
                                                 
3 GW1, 299. 
 
4 PT, 41. 
 
5 The  lecture  “Phenomenology  and  Theology”  was  given  March  9.  Being and Time was published 
in April 8. 
 
6 PT, 42. 
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theology which might move beyond the question of the God of the Hebrew and Christian faith in 
light of his view of the ontological difference, in which  Tillich’s  use  of  Heidegger  to  shift  our  
understanding of God as a being to Being itself is rooted. It should be noted that 
“Phenomenology  and  Theology”  was  first  published  as  late  as  1969.
7 This suggests that 
Heidegger’s  understanding  of  this  matter  has  not  changed  since  the  period  in  which  he  composed  
Being and Time.  Tillich  must  have  recognized  that  one  of  the  threads  which  united  Heidegger’s  
thought is theological, though in a new sense.  
Tillich  agrees  with  Heidegger’s  position  that  the  question  of  Being  is  the  most  
fundamental  question  of  philosophy.  Herman  Philipse  points  out  that  “We still do not know why, 
according to Heidegger, the question of being is the most fundamental question man can raise.”8 
The same question  can  be  posed  of  Tillich’s  statement  that  we cannot be ultimately concerned 
about what is not the ultimate. According to Tillich, we can be ultimately concerned only about 
what is ultimate. The clearest expression of this point is as follows: “The ultimate concern is 
concern about what is experienced as ultimate.”9 Tillich does not explain why humans are 
ultimately concerned only about the ultimate reality.  Heidegger’s  ultimate  question  and  Tillich’s  
ultimate concern are psychologically grounded. As Tillich says, the more we acknowledge our 
existence as finite and estranged, the stronger our ultimate concern about being and meaning, our 
                                                 
7 Martin  Heidegger,  “Phänomenologie  und  Theologie,”  in  Archives  de  Philosophie  32  (1969):  
356-95.  
 
8 Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 98. 
 
9 DF, 9. 
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longing for participation in the divine life.10 Their question and concern grow out of such 
existential mood of anxiety that they share. Having experienced the anxiety of finitude, 
particularly of being-toward-death, they look at the ontological conditions of human existence. 
What makes the existential finiteness problematic is the threat of non-being. It is this threat of 
non-being that connects Being to the thought of Heidegger and Tillich.11 It also points out why 
there is more emphasis, in their philosophical and theological projects, on the being of the self 
than on the being of the external world. The threat of non-being lets Being itself be the source 
and  force  of  proper  thinking  for  Heidegger  and  Tillich.  In  Tillich’s  view,  Heidegger  brilliantly  
describes how this existential mood reveals the way in which we are attuned to Being itself. 
Heidegger’s  fundamental  question  and  Tillich’s  ultimate  concern  are  directed  toward  the  same  
object, Being itself, for this psychological reason.  
Driven by the objectives of answering the ultimate question of the meaning of existence, 
Heidegger pursues a different path than that of the traditional theology and of the traditional 
metaphysics. Tillich saw in Heidegger the basis for a new theological formulation of Being itself 
for the Christian faith. Heidegger needs to bear some responsibility for the entertainment of such 
a  move.  Plainly  enough,  Heidegger’s  notion  of  Being  put  Tillich  on  the  path  to  a  viable  onto-
theology. In his Letter on Humanism, as Calvin O. Schrag points out, he does invite the reader to 
consider a rather direct connection between the truth of Being and the question about the 
                                                 
10 ST1, 177; ST3, 405. 
 
11 Tillich writes, “In  every  conscious  being,  life  is  aware  of  its  exhaustibility;;  it  dimly  feels  that  it  
must come to an end, and the symptoms of its exhaustion not only make it conscious of this fact but also 
awaken  a  longing  for  it  [life].” ST3, 57. 
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meaning of God.12 Heidegger writes, “Only  from  the  truth  of  Being  can  the  essence  of  the  holy  
be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the 
light  of  the  essence  of  divinity  can  it  be  thought  or  said  what  the  word  “God”  is  to  signify.”
13 
Given such a close alignment of the question of Being and the question about the signifying 
power  of  the  word  “God,”  we  can  justifiably  expect  a positive response from Heidegger to 
Tillich’s  assessment  of  his  lecture  as  a  “good  sermon.”  Heidegger  notes  with  respect  to  the  text  
referred  to  above  that  “what  is  being  discussed  there  is  the  God  of  the  poet,  not  the  revealed  
God.”
14 This resonates with Heidegger’s  occasional  remarks  that  were  he  to  write  a  theology  the  
word  “Being”  would  not  appear.  This  implies  that  the  God  of  the  poet,  for  Heidegger,  is  even  
beyond  “Being-Itself.”  Therefore,  it  may  seem  that  Heidegger  and  Tillich  differ  from  each  other 
in their discussion of God. It should be noted, however, that, for Tillich, Being itself is only the 
most  concrete  dimension  of  “the  Unconditioned  transcendent.”  The  concreteness  of  Being itself 
expresses the point at which the transcendental divine and the finite actualities of human 
condition meet.  The  “boundary  line”  is  the  conditionality  of  Being itself. It is in this sense, that 
Being  is  finite  for  Heidegger.  Heidegger’s  Being  is  not  the  same  as  Hegel’s  Absolute.  Being  is  
                                                 
12  Calvin  O.  Schrag,  “Transcendence  and  Transversality,”  in  Transcendence and Beyond: A 
Postmodern Inquiry, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2007), 215. 
 
13 LH, 267/GA9, 182. 
 
14 John  D.  Caputo,  “Transcendence  and  Beyond:  A  Concluding  Roundtable,”  in  Transcendence 
and Beyond: A Postmodern Inquiry, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007), 215. 
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not supratemporal but historical  and  finite.  Heidegger  thinks  that  Being  “needs”  Dasein15 as the 
“there”  of  its  manifestation,  as  its  “shepherd.”
16 Its manifestations are in time. Being is not 
transcendental  in  this  sense.  Being  is  just  out  there,  not  over  there.  “Being  is  always  and  
everywhere,”  says  Heidegger.17 The  question,  “Why  is  there  something,  rather  than  nothing?”  is  
not about Being itself,  but  about  its  “truth”  which  transcendens  Being itself. Heidegger remarks, 
therefore,  that  “Primordial  transcendence  and  the  understanding  of Being are one and the 
same.”
18 This basic  structure  of  the  Heidegger’s ontological cosmology that the existential is 
grounded in the  ontological  developed  into  Tillich’s  system  in  which  the ontological is in turn 
fundamentally grounded in the theological.   
The  Heidegger’s  existential  analytic  effects  a  transition  in  Tillich  from  life-philosophical 
interests  to  those  of  a  more  existential  focus.  Tillich’s  method  of  correlation  is  an  existential  
method. As J. Heywood Thomas points out,  “the  method  of  correlation is a matter of being an 
‘existential’  theology.”
19 Both poles of the correlation are existential. Theology must be 
necessarily  existential  in  order  to  answer  the  “existential  question.”
20 Traditional theology is 
unable to answer the existential question because it is not itself existential. The other pole is, 
                                                 
15 GA5, 343; TK, 38; CTP, 177/GA65, 251. 
 
16 VS, 108-9. 
 
17 OCM, 61. 
 
18 MFL, 141/GA26, 177-8. 
 
19 John Heywood Thomas, Tillich (London: Continuum, 2000), 59. 
 
20 ST1, 60. 
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precisely  speaking,  “existential  theological”  answers, not simply theological answers. Tillich 
creatively appropriates Heidegger’s  project of fundamental ontology, which grounds the 
existential in the ontological, as his “correlating  method”  that  correlates  the  two  existential  poles  
of the correlation. As a result, the nature of existential  theology’s  answers to the existential 
question are ontological, and they entail Being itself. This fundamental ontological answer is not 
a final answer to the question of the ultimate meaning of existence. This ultimate question asks 
the  “meaning,”  or  “truth,”  of  Being itself. Being itself is the lowest dimension of the truth of 
Being,  which  Heidegger  calls  the  “vicinity,” or  “nearness,” of God’s  being.21 He refers to 
Hölderlin’s  poetry,  whose  terminology  he considers is holy.22 Hölderlin  speaks  of  a  “flight  of  
gods”  who  have  kept  themselves  far  away  from  human  beings  as  long as humans were neither 
inclined to live near to them nor capable of doing so.23 Our task  is  “to  prepare  for  a  stay  in  their  
vicinity.”  The  goal  of  this  preparation  is  “the  surrounding  area  of  the  locality  in  which  the  God  of  
the  gods  appears.”
24 The vicinity of the God is the farthest point fundamental ontological 
thinking of Being can reach, and it is the nearest point of the Unconditioned transcendent which 
is the ultimate reality.  
                                                 
21 GA17, 311-4; GA65, 11-2. 
 
22 Norbert Fischer, The Philosophical Quest for God: A Journey Through Its Stations (Münster: 
LIT, 2005) 261.  
 
23 GA65, 11-2. 
. 
24 GA4, 195. 
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Tillich declares that religious knowledge is knowledge of ultimate reality that answers the 
ultimate question.25 Theology  is  “not  primarily  the  unfolding  of  a  tradition;;  it  is  rather  a  turning  
towards  reality.”
26 Theology must find a new approach to ultimate reality. Tillich thinks that 
Heidegger’s  philosophy  exhibits  better  attitude  than  do  traditional  theologians.  Tillich’s  attempt  
to discover anew the powerful experiences of reality that lay behind the traditional religious 
symbols – now so largely powerless – is  in  many  ways  similar  in  purpose  to  Heidegger’s  attempt  
to discern the original experiences from which the leading conceptions of philosophy have been 
created.  Ultimate  reality  is  “the  transcendental  foundation”
27 of the ontological difference. 
Heidegger’s  consideration  of  primordial  transcendence  is  an  essential  element  of  his  meditations  
on the question of Being. It  is  in  fundamental  ontology’s  directedness  towards  transcendence  that  
Heidegger believes fundamental ontology will find its fulfillment. The foundation of ontology is 
the  “truth”  of  Being.
28 The  truth  of  Being  as  ultimate  reality  is  the  “transcendence”  of Being.29 
Heidegger’s  ultimate  question  is  not  of  Being itself in terms of the ontological difference, but of 
the truth of Being. As Heidegger came to see it, the truth of Being is not Being itself but points to 
                                                 
25 RV, 58. 
 
26 RV, 58. 
 
27 Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Being:  A  Critical  Interpretation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 170. 
 
28 IWIM, 289/GA9, 209. 
 
29 IWIM, 289/GA9, 209. 
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the mystery  of  the  process  of  Being’s  self-giving being to beings.30 The truth of Being discloses 
the  “Ground”  of  being,  which  is  Tillich’s  ultimate  concern.  The  Ground  of  being  is,  for  Tillich,  
“the  truth  which  is  of  ultimate  concern,  the  truth  of  being  as  being,  the  truth  which  is  present  in  
the final revelation.”31 As in Heidegger, the  “fundamental  ontology”  is  not sufficient for the 
purpose of satisfying  Tillich’s  ultimate concern about the transcendence of Being.32 The question 
of the transcendental truth of Being shows clearly the limits of fundamental ontology. 
Fundamental  ontology  only  “recalls”  the  truth  of  Being.  As Heidegger says, the attempt to grasp 
the  truth  of  Being  “has  already  left  the  realm  of  all  ontology  with  its  very  first  step.”
33 The 
ultimate reality as the ultimate source and meaning of human existence lies beyond the scope of 
fundamental ontology. The beyondness of the truth of Being explains why Heidegger speaks of 
the  need  to  think  “over  and  beyond”  the  fundamental  ontology,  to  think  of  the  truth  of  Being  in  a  
way  that  is  “no  longer”  ontological.
34 He proposes an alternative way of approaching the mystery 
of Being. The new way transcending fundamental ontology of Being for dealing with the 
mystery of Being is a meditative attitude of openness toward the possible reception of the divine 
                                                 
30 LH, 254-5/GA9, 165. 
 
31 ST1, 149. 
 
32 IWIM, 288/GA9, 209. 
 
33 IWIM, 289/GA9, 219. 
 
34 VS, 104. 
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reality, if any.35 Heidegger entitles his own endeavor to go beyond the fundamental ontology 
simply  “thinking.”  For  Heidegger,  the  meditative  thinking  is  not  a  faculty  of  the  mind  that  
formulates or articulates a concept about the truth of Being. He explicitly rejects the suggestion 
that thinking produces the truth of Being. Rather he argues that thinking is where the mysterious 
truth of Being takes place.36 Heidegger thinks that the beyondness of Being is not something that 
“thinking”  can  grasp  autonomously. It is in this sense that Heidegger describes the truth of Being 
is an event of Being. Heidegger’s  meditative  thinking  implies  that  he  wants  to  keep  the  question  
of  God  undecided.  In  the  final  analysis,  Heidegger’s  way  of  thinking  retains  a  sense  of  wonder 
about the mystery called God. But the mystery of Being is ineffable. Heidegger says that the 
existence of God cannot, without blasphemy, be proved, any more than we can prove causality.37 
Being has been forgotten, but Being itself cannot be thought of as if it is an object of thought. 
The beyondness of Being, the mysterious truth of Being is far beyond thinking.  This does not 
                                                 
35 Some commentators maintain that Heidegger abandoned the project of fundamental ontology 
as set forth in Being and Time. See, for example, Herman Philipse, Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Being:  A  
Critical Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 170; Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-
the-World:  A  Commentary  on  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time,  Division  I (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 
133.  It does not seem to be true, however. It is only such that the new way of approaching the mystery of 
Being became more important for him. Late in life, however, Heidegger would confirm that all along, the 
fundamental ontology of Being was aimed at thinking of the truth of Being. In an open letter written six 
weeks before his death in 1976, which is one of his very last statements, Heidegger clearly and 
emphatically identifies the question of Being as the fundamental question of his lifetime of thinking, then 
he distinguishes between the problem of the ontological difference as the core concern for ontological 
questioning and the problem of the truth of Being as his own proper concern which the fundamental 
ontology has not been capable of addressing. LHC 1-4. Ontology remains necessary for Heidegger. In 
reply to a question as to whether he had changed his position,  Heidegger  answered:  “The  former  position  
was  only  pause  on  the  way.”  Sprache, 98. 
 
36 PWIM, 105/GA9, 236. 
 
37 N1, 366/N2, 106. 
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mean that Heidegger rejects the possibility of an encounter with the true God. For Heidegger, 
this can take place on the level of faith. As John Macquarrie points out,  Heidegger’s  
understanding  of  theology  is  committed  to  “the  new  theology…to  confine  itself  to  a  hermeneutic  
of  faith.”
38 Therefore, he wants to avoid every prematurity with regard to the question of the 
possible revelation of the divine reality. The thinking for the truth of Being require waiting, 
“even  a  life  long.”
39 Heidegger characterizes his  thinking  in  an  interview  in  1948  as  a  “waiting  
for  God.”
40 He advises that we should humbly wait for God.41 We can only wait for the truth of 
ultimate reality staying in the vicinity of Being in hoping that we and the true God correspond to 
Being which is the boundary between the human and the divine.42 Waiting is not an absence of 
thought, but an openness for the truth of Being, coupled with resignation concerning worldly 
matters.43 In waiting, we should rest in the act of resigning. As soon as we represent what we are 
waiting for, says Heidegger, we are not waiting anymore. Therefore “In  waiting  we  leave  open  
                                                 
38 John Macquarrie, Heidegger and Christianity (New York: Continuum, 1994), 55. 
 
39 VA, 133. 
 
40 Stefan  Schimanski,  “On  Meeting  a  Philosopher,”  Partisan Review 15, no. 4 (April 1948): 511. 
The three lecture courses on Höderlin, which was his search for the way to a new, more essential, 
primordial kind of thinking, at the University of Freiburg (HH, Winter Semester, 1934-5; GA52, Winter 
Semester, 1941-2;;  and  Hölderlins  Hymne  “Der  Ister,”  Summer  Semester,  1942)  contribute  to  the  
understanding of the nature of the openness of his thought on the idea of God. 
 
41 OCM, 51/ID, 54-5. 
 
42 HH, 174. 
 
43 BPP, 18/GA, 24 
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what we are waiting for,”44 so that we may relate directly to what transcends us. According to 
Heidegger, “Through  an  illumination  of  transcendence  we  first  achieve  an  adequate  concept  of  
Dasein, with respect to which it can now be asked how the relationship of Dasein to God is 
ontologically  ordered.”
45  
Heidegger’s  “thinking”  open up for Tillich a radical possibility of developing a new 
theology, a possible post-theological way of thinking about the God above God. Tillich says, 
“the  later  Heidegger’s  mystical  interpretation  of  Being  is  something  new.”
46 Tillich reformulates 
Heidegger’s  concept  of  thinking  of  Being  to  offer  a  new  vision of the Christian experience of 
God. Tillich agrees with Heidegger that theology, as a science of God, is impossible in the truest 
sense because of an element of ultimate indeterminacy in the Unconditioned transcendent.47 
Hence,  Tillich  describes  his  theology  as  theonomous  “philosophy.”  Tillich’s  notion  of  
“theonomy”  can  be  traced  to  Heidegger’s  “thinking.”  Theonomy is such an important concept in 
his understanding of the relation of existential question and existential theological answers. 
According  to  Tillich,  “Theonomy  is  a  turning  toward  the  Unconditioned  for  the  sake  of  the  
Unconditioned.”
48 Theonomy  (divine  law)  is  “the  uncreated  divine  light  in  the human  soul”49and 
                                                 
44 DT, 68. 
 
45 LH, 267/GA9, 181. 
 
46 HJ, 24. 
 
47 ST1, 108. 
 
48 SS, 203. 
 
49 AHCT, 185. 
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it  “implies  our  own  personal  experience  of  the  presence  of  the  divine  Spirit  within  us.”
50 Just as 
Heidegger’s  thinking  transcends  fundamental  ontology  without  abandoning  it,  so  does  Tillich’s  
theonomous philosophy transcend autonomous philosophy while affirming it. Tillich writes, 
“Theonomy  is  in  contrast  to  heteronomy  an  imbuing  of  autonomous  forms  with  transcendent  
import. It originates not through the renunciation of autonomy, as does, for example, the Roman 
Catholic idea of authority, but only through the deepening of autonomy in itself to the point 
where  it  transcends  itself.”
51 In  other  words,  theonomy  is  an  autonomy  that  “is  aware  of  its  
divine  Ground.”
52 In  a  “personal  word,”53 Tillich  explains,  “Theonomous  philosophy  does  not  
mean the decision for a particular philosophy that would be appropriate to faith. Such a 
[philosophy] does not exist. Rather, theonomy means the making visible of the inner 
transcendence of each last [or, ultimate] – and not only last – philosophical concept, and with 
that, the making visible of the inner transcendence of Being itself…It  [theonomous  
philosophy]…must  demonstrate  the  positive  and  negative  starting  point  for  the  breakthrough  of  
transcendence in world and culture under consideration of every philosophy.”54 It is not very 
difficult to see in the task of Tillich’s  theonomous philosophy which shows the  “inner  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
50 AHCT, 322. 
 
51 Theonomie, 1128-9. 
 
52 AHCT, 323. 
 
53 GW12, 223. 
 
54 GW12, 223. 
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transcendence of Being itself”  a  parallel  to  the  task  of  Heidegger’s  “thinking.”  And it is not 
coincidental that Tillich characterizes his theology with concepts deeply  rooted  in  Heidegger’s 
thought.  
Searching for the answer to the question of the ultimate meaning of human existence, 
Tillich and Heidegger traveled side by side, so far as the main aspects of a philosophico-
anthropological approach to the Unconditioned transcendent go. Theology taught us who we are. 
Metaphysics explained what we are. Heidegger’s  fundamental  ontology  showed how we are by 
means  of  existential  phenomenology.  But  the  question  “Why  am  I?”  remained  unanswered.  Their 
journey is incomplete, but the shore is visible in their consciousness. Both Heidegger and Tillich 
were existentialists in that they were ultimately concerned about the meaning of human existence. 
Their ultimate concern was neither ontological nor theological, but existential. They were 
anxious men. Existentialism,  Tillich  says,  is  the  “good  luck  of  Christian  theology.”55 There is no 
God but ultimate divine reality, and Heidegger and Tillich were its prophets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 ST2, 27. 
 
 312 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Ackermann, Robert John. Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look. Amherst: The University of  
Massachusetts Press, 1990. 
 
Adams, James Luther.  An Examined Faith: Social Context and Religious Commitment. Boston:  
Beacon Press, 1991. 
 
______. Introduction to Political Expectation, by Paul Tillich. New York: Harper  
& Row, 1981. 
 
______. Paul  Tillich’s  Philosophy  of  Culture,  Science  and  Religion. New York:  
Harper and Row, 1965. 
 
Adorno, Theodor W. Werk und Wirken Paul Tillichs: Ein Gedenkbuch. Edited by Wolf-Dieter  
Marsch. Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1967. 
 
Arendt,  Hannah.  “Martin  Heidegger  at  Eighty.”  In  Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical  
Essays, edited by Michael Murray, 293-303. New Haven and London: Yale University  
Press, 1978. 
 
______. The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 1971. 
 
Armaner,  Türker.  “The  Reception  of  Kierkegaard  in  Turkey.”  In  Kierkegaard’s  International  
Reception. Edited by Jon Stewart. Vol. 8 of Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception  
and Resources. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009. 
 
Armbruster, Carl J. The Vision of Paul Tillich. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967. 
 
Askay,  Richard,  and  Franz  Mayr.  translators’  afterwords  to Zollikon Seminars: Protocols,  
Conversations, Letters, edited by Medard Boss, translated by Richard Askay and Franz  
Mayr. Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press, 2001. 
 
Askay, Richard, and Jensen Farquhar. Apprehending the Inaccessible: Freudian Psychoanalysis  
and Existential Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006. 
 
Baier,  Kurt.  “The  Meaning  of  Life.”  In  The Meaning of Life, edited by E. D. Klemke, 81-117.  
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
 
Bambach, Charles R. Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism. Ithaca: Cornell  
University Press, 1995. 
 
Bandy,  Thomas  G.  “Tillich’s  Limited  Understanding  of  the  Thought  of  Henri  Bergson  as  “Life   
Philosophy.””  In  Theonomy  and  Autonomy:  Studies  in  Paul  Tillich’s  Engagement  with   
Modern Culture, edited by John J. Carey, 3-17. Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press,  
303 
 
 
 
1984. 
 
Barash, Jeffrey. Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning. Revised ed. New  
York: Fordham University Press, 2003.  
 
Barrett, William. Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy. New York: Anchor Books,  
1990. 
 
______. What is Existentialism? New York: Grove Press, 1964. 
 
Barron, Robert. The Priority of Christ: Toward a Postliberal Catholicism. Grand Rapids: Brazos  
Press, 2007. 
 
Barth, Karl, The Doctrine of the Word of God. 2nd. ed. Vol. I/1 of Church Dogmatics, edited by  
G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, translated by G. W. Bromiley. London: T. & T.  
Clark, 2003. 
 
______. Ethics. Edited by Dietrich Braun. Translated by Geoffrey Bromiley. New York: Seabury  
Press, 1981. 
 
______. The Doctrine of Creation. Vol. III/3 of Church Dogmatics, edited and translated by G.  
W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960. 
 
______. The Doctrine of Reconciliation. Vol. IV/2 of Church Dogmatics, edited by T. F.  
Torrance, translated by G. W. Bromiley. London: T & T Clark, 1989. 
 
Begbie, Jeremy S. Voicing  Creation’s  Praise: Towards a Theology of the Arts. London:  
Continuum, 1991. 
 
Beistegui, Miguel de. Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Bennett, Oliver. Cultural Pessimism: Narratives of Decline in the Postmodern World.  
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001. 
 
Berg,  Eric  B.  “Martin  Heidegger’s  Debt  to  Martin  Luther.”  Kinesis 32, no. 1 (2005): 47-75. 
 
Bergson, Henri. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by T. E. Hulme. New York: G. P.  
Putnam’s  Sons,  1912. 
 
______. Creative Evolution. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. New York: Henry Holt, 1911. 
 
______. Matter and Memory. Translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. London:  
304 
 
 
 
Allen and Unwin, 1911. 
 
______. The Creative Mind. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. Totowa, NJ.: Littlefield, Adams  
and Co., 1970. 
 
______. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Translated by R. Ashley Aurad and  
Cloudesley Brereton. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935. 
 
______. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Translated by F.  
L. Pogson. London: George Allen, 1913. 
 
Bernt, Alois, and Konrad Burdach, eds., Der Ackermann aus Böhmen. Vol. 3 of Vom Mittelalter  
zur Reformation: Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutschen Bildung, edited by Konrad  
Burdach. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1917. 
 
Blattner,  William.  “The  Concept  of  Death  in  Being  and  Time.”  In  Man and World 27, edited by  
Joseph Kockelmans and Calvin Schrag, 49-70. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,  
1994. 
 
Boelen,  Bernard  Jacques.  “Martin  Heidegger  as  a  Phenomenologist.”  In  Phenomenological  
Perspectives: Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg, edited  
by Philip J. Bossert, 93-114. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975. 
 
______. Existential Thinking: A Philosophical Orientation. Chicago: Duquesne University Press,  
1968.  
 
Bolt, Barbara. Heidegger Reframed. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011. 
 
Borgmann,  Albert.  “Heidegger  and  Symbolic  Logic.”  In  Heidegger and the Quest for truth, ed.  
Manfred Fringes, 139-62. Chicago: Quadrangle Brooks, 1968. 
 
Bowie, Andrew. Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction. London:  
Routledge, 1993. 
 
Braaten, Carl E.  “Paul  Tillich  and  the Classical Christian Tradition.” In A History of Christian 
 Thought: From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism, xiii-xxxv. Edited by  
Carl E. Braaten. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968. 
 
Braken,  Joseph  A.  “Schelling’s  Positive  Philosophy.”  Journal of the History of Philosophy 15,  
no. 3 (July 1977): 324-30. 
 
Brash, Jeffrey Andrew. Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning. Revised ed.  
305 
 
 
 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2003. 
 
Britton, Karl. Philosophy and the Meaning of Life. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. 
 
Brogan, Walter A. Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being. Albany: State University  
of New York Press, 2005. 
 
Brown, Robert F. The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influence of Boehme on the Works of  
1809-1815. Lewisburg, PA.: Bucknell University Press, 1977. 
 
Bultmann,  Rudolf.  “Autobiographical  Reflections.”  In  Existence and Faith, edited by Schubert  
Ogden, 283-88. New York: Meridian, 1960. 
 
Buren,  John  van.  “Martin  Heidegger,  Martin  Luther.”  In  Reading Heidegger from the Start:  
Essays in His Earliest Thought, edited by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, 159-74.  
New York: State University Press of New York, 1994.  
 
Buren,  John  van.  “The  Earliest  Heidegger:  A  New  Field  of  Research.”  In  A Companion to  
Heidegger, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, 19-31. Oxford: Blackwell,  
2005. 
 
______. The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King. Bloomington: Indiana University  
Press, 1994. 
 
Burkholder,  J.  Lawrence.  “Power.”  In  Power, Authority, and the Anabaptist Tradition, edited by  
Benjamin W. Redekop and Calvin W. Redekop, 1-13. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins  
University Press, 2001. 
 
Cadwallader, Eva Hauel. Guest Preface to Martin Heidegger on the Way, by William Henry  
Werkmeister, edited by Richard T. Hull. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996. 
 
Cahoone, Lawrence E. The Dillema of Modernity: Philosophy, Culture, and Anti-Culture.  
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988. 
 
Calvin  O.  Schrag,  “Transcendence  and  Transversality,”  in  Transcendence and Beyond: A  
Postmodern Inquiry, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana  
University Press, 2007), 204-18. 
 
Campbell, Scott M. The  Early  Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Life:  Facticity,  Being,  and  Language.  
Fordham University Press, 2012. 
 
Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays.  Translated  by  Justin  O’Brien.  New   
306 
 
 
 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964. 
 
Caputo, John D. “Atheism,  A/theology  and  the  Postmodern  Condition.”  In  The Cambridge  
Companion to Atheism. Edited by Michael Martin, 267-82. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 2007. 
 
______. “Heidegger  and  Theology.”  In The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, edited  
by Charles B. Guignon, 326-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
______.  “Meister  Eckhart  and  the  Later  Heidegger:  The  Mystical  Element  in  Heidegger’s   
Thought.”  Journal of Historical Philosophy 12, no. 4 (October 1974): 479-4. 
 
______.  “Phenomenology,  Mysticism  and  the  Grammatica Speculativa:  A  Study  of  Heidegger’s   
Habilitationsschrift.”  Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 5, no. 2 (1974):  
101-17. 
 
______.  “Transcendence  and  Beyond:  A  Concluding  Roundtable.”  In  Transcendence and  
Beyond: A Postmodern Inquiry, edited by John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, 219- 
38. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.  
 
______. Demythologizing Heidegger. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. 
 
______. Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics. New York: Fordham  
University, 1982. 
 
______. The  Mystical  Element  in  Heidegger’s  Thought. Rev. ed. New York: Fordham University  
Press, 1990. 
 
______. “Toward  a  Postmodern  Theology  of  the  Cross.”  In  Postmodern Philosophy and  
 Christian Thought, 202-25. Edited by Merold Westphal. Bloomington: Indiana  
University Press, 1999.  
 
Carel, Havi. Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger. Amstrerdam: Rodopi, 2006. 
 
 
Carey,  John  J.  Editor’s  introduction  to  Theonomy  and  Autonomy:  Studies  in  Paul  Tillich’s 
Engagement with Modern Culture. Edited by John J. Carey, xi-xviii. Macon, GA.:  
Mercer University Press, 1984.  
 
Carnap,  Rudolf.  “The  Elimination  of  Metaphysics  Through  Logical  Analysis  of  Language.”  In   
Logical Positivism, translated by Arthur Pap, edited by A. J. Ayer, 60-81. Glencoe, IL.:  
Free Press, 1959. 
307 
 
 
 
 
Carr, Karen Leslie. The Banalization of Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to  
Meaninglessness. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. 
 
Chackalackal, Saju. Unity of Knowing and Acting in Kant: A Paradigmatic Integration of the  
Theoretical and the Practical. Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 2002. 
 
Chanter, Tina. “The  Problematic  Normative  Assumption  of  Heidegger’s  Ontology.”  In  Feminist  
Interpretation of Martin Heidegger. Edited by Nancy J. Holland and Patricia Huntington,  
73-108. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Press, 2001. 
 
______. Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger. Stanford: Stanford  
University Press, 2001. 
 
Chapelle, Daniel. Nietzsche and Psychoanalysis. Albany: State University of New York Press,  
1993. 
 
Chaplin, Tamara, Turning on the Mind: French Philosophers on Television. Chicago: University  
of Chicago Press, 2007. 
 
Chapman, Christopher N. Freud, Religion, and  Anxiety:  How  Freud’s  Critique  of  Religion   
Neglected His Advances in Psychoanalytic Theory. Morrisville, NC.: Lulu.com, 2007. 
 
Chaudhuri, Haridas, and Frederic Spiegelberg, eds. The Integral Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo: A  
Commorative Symposium. London: Allen and Unwin, 1960. 
 
Church, F. Forrester. Preface to The Essential Tillich: An Anthology of the Writings of Paul  
Tillich, edited by F. Forrester Church. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
 
Clayton,  John  Powell.  “Questioning,  Answering,  and  Tillich’s  Concept  of  Correlation.”  In   
Kairos  and  Logos:  Studies  in  the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology, edited by  
John J. Carey, 135-57. Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1984. 
 
______. The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich and the Possibility of a Mediating Theology.  
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980. 
 
Cochrane, Arthur C. The Existentialists and God. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956. 
 
Cohn, Hans W. Heidegger and the Roots of Existential Therapy. London: Continuum, 2002. 
 
Come, Arnold Bruce. Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self. Montreal: McGill- 
Queen’s  University  Press,  1995. 
308 
 
 
 
 
Cooper, John Charles. Spiritual  Presence  in  the  Theology  of  Paul  Tillich:  Tillich’s  Use  of  St.   
Paul. Macon: Mercer University Press, 1997. 
 
Cooper, Mick. Existential Therapies. London: Sage Publications, 2003. 
 
Copleston, Frederick. Modern Philosophy: From Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard,  
and Nietzsche. Vol. 7 of A History of Philosophy. New York: Doubleday, 1994. 
 
Crowe, Benjamin D. Heidegger’s  Phenomenology  of  Religion:  Realism    and  Cultural  Criticism.  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. 
 
Crowell, Steven Galt. “Heidegger  and  Husserl:  The  Matter  and  Method  of  Philosophy.”  In A  
Companion to Heidegger, 49-64. Edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall.  
Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. 
 
______. Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental  
Phenomenology. Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press, 2001. 
 
Dahlstrom, Daniel O. “Heidegger  and  German  Idealism.”  In  A Companion to Heidegger, edited  
by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall. 65-79. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. 
 
______. Heidegger’s  Concept  of  Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
2001. 
 
Danner, Helmut. Das Göttliche und der Gott bei Heidegger. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain,  
1971. 
 
Dastur,  Françoise.  “The  Reception  and  Nonreception  of  Heidegger  in  France.”  In  French  
Interpretations of Heidegger: An Exceptional Reception, edited by David Pettigrew and  
François Raffoul, 265-89. Albany: State University of New York, 2009. 
 
Davis, Bert W. Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit. Evanston, IL.:  
Northwestern University Press, 2007. 
 
Day, Jerry. Voegelin, Schelling, and the Philosophy of Historical Existence. Columbia:  
University of Missouri Press, 2003. 
 
Deleuze,  Gilles.  “Immanence:  A  Life.”  In  Pure Immanence: Essays On A Life, translated by A.  
Boyman, 25-33. New York: Zone Books, 2001. 
 
Denker, Alfred. Historical  Dictionary  of  Heidegger’s  Philosophy. Lanham, MD.: Scarecrow  
309 
 
 
 
Press, 2000. 
 
Dennison, William D. The Young Bultmann: Context for His Understanding of God, 1884-1925.  
New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008. 
 
Derrida,  Jacques.  “The  Animal  That  Therefore  I  Am  (More  to  Follow),”  translated  by  David  \
 Wills. Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 369-418. 
 
Deurzen, Emmy van. “Existentialism  and  Existential  Psychotherapy.”  In  Heart and Soul: The  
Therapeutic Face of Philosophy. Edited by Chris Mace, 215-36. London: Routledge,  
1999. 
 
______.  “Guest Foreword.”  In Heidegger and the Question of Psychology: Zollikon and  
Beyond, by Mark Letteri. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009. 
 
______. Everyday Mysteries: Existential Dimensions of Psychotherapy. Oxford: Routledge, 1997. 
 
Deurzen, Emmy van, and Claire Arnold-Baker. Existential Perspectives on Human Issues: A  
Handbook for Practice. London: Palgrave, 2005. 
 
Diemer, Alwin. Edmund Husserl. Meisenheim: Hain, 1965. 
 
Dijk, Paul van. Anthropology in the Age of Technology: The Philosophical Contributions of  
Günther Anders. Translated by Frans Kooymans. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2000. 
 
Dillenberger,  John.  “The  Union  years:  Always  in  transition.”  In  Spurensuche: Lebens- und  
Denkwege Paul Tillichs, edited by Nord Ilona, René Tillich and Yorick Spiegel, 173-81.  
Berlin: LIT, 2001. 
 
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. Vol. 7 of  
Gesammelte Schriften. Edited by Bernhard Groethuysen. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1958. 
 
______. Die geistige Welt. Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens. Vol. 5 of Gesammelte  
Schriften, ed. Georg Misch. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1957. 
 
______. Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels und andere Abhandlungen zur Geschichte des Deutschen  
Idealismus. Vol. 4 of Gesammelte Schriften. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1957. 
 
______. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium  
der Gesellschaft. Vol. 1 of Gesammelte Schriften. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1959. 
 
Dorrien, Gary. Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology.  
310 
 
 
 
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. 
 
______. The Making of American Liberal Theology: Idealism, Realism, and Modernity, 1900- 
1950. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003. 
 
Dostal,  Robert  J.  “Gadamer:  The  Man  and  His  Work.”  In  The Cambridge Companion to  
Gadamer, edited by Robert J. Dostal, 13-35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
2002. 
 
Dourley, John P. Paul  and  Tillich  and  Bonaventure:  An  Evaluation  of  Tillich’s  Claim  to  Stand  in   
the Augustinian-Franciscan Tradition. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1975. 
 
______. Paul Tillich, Carl Jung and the Recovery of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. “Heidegger  on  the  Connection  Between  Nihilism,  Art,  Technology,  and   
Politics.”  In The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Edited by Charles B. Guignon,  
345-72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
______. “Heidegger  on  Gaining  a  Free  Relation  to  Technology.”  In  Technology and  
the Politics of Knowledge, edited by Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay, 97-107.  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. 
 
______. Being-in-the-World:  A  Commentary  on  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time,  Division  I.  
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. 
 
Dutt, Carsten. Preface to Gadamer in Conversation: Reflections and Commentary, edited by  
Richard E. Palmer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 
 
Ebeling, Gerhard. Luther: An Introduction to His Thought. Translated by R. A. Wilson.  
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970. 
 
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent  
World. New York: Basics, 2003. 
 
Evans, Robert Allen. Intelligible and Responsible Talk About God. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973.  
 
Fabro, Cornelio. God in Exile: A Study of the Internal Dynamic of Modern Atheism, From Its  
Roots in the Cartesian Cogito to the Present Day. New York: Newman Press, 1968. 
 
Fackenheim,  Emil  L.  “Schelling’s  Conception  of  Positive  Philosophy.”  Review of Metaphysics 7,  
no. 4 (June 1954): 563-82. 
 
311 
 
 
 
Farber, Marvin. The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a  
Rigorous Science of Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943. 
 
Farías, Victor. Heidegger and Nazism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989. 
 
Farin, Ingo. Studies in Early Heidegger (1919-1923). Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  
2003. 
 
Fay, Thomas A. Heidegger: The Critique of Logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. 
 
Fehér,  István  M.  “Heidegger’s  Understanding  of  the  Atheism  of  Philosophy:  Philosophy,   
Theology, and Religion in His Early Lecture Courses up to Being and Time.”  American  
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69, no. 2 (May 1995): 189-228. 
 
Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche and Heidegger.  
Verlag Ferrer, 2011. 
 
Fischer, Norbert. The Philosophical Quest for God: A Journey Through Its Stations. Münster:  
LIT, 2005. 
 
Foucault,  Michel.  “Life:  Experience  and  Science.”  In  Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. Vol.  
2 of Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, edited by James D. Faubion, 465-6. New  
York: Free Press, 2000. 
 
Foulquié, Paul. Existentialism. Translated by Kathleen Raine. New York: Roy Publishers, 1950. 
 
Freud,  Sigmund.  “Inhibitions,  Symptoms  and  Anxiety.”  In On Psychopathology: Inhibitions,  
Symptoms and Anxiety and Other Works, In The Pelican Freud Library, translated  
by James Strachey, vol. 10. London: Penguin Books, 1979. 
 
______.  “The  Ego  and  the  Id.”  In  The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of  
Sigmund Freud, translated by James Strachey, vol. 19, 1-66. London: The Hogarth Press,  
1974. 
 
Fromm, Erich. The Fear of Freedom. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960. 
 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg.  “Martin  Heidegger  und  die  Marburger  Theologie.”  In  Zeit und  
Geschichte, edited by Erich Dinkler, 169-78. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1964. 
 
______.  “Martin  Heidegger’s  One  Path,”  translated  by  P.  Christopher  Smith.  In   
Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, edited by Theodore  
Kisiel and John van Buren, 22-4. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
312 
 
 
 
 
______. Heidegger’s  Way. Translated by John W. Stanley. Albany: State University of New  
York Press, 1994. 
 
______. Philosophical Hermeneutics. Translated and edited by David E. Linge. Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 2004. 
 
______. The Beginning of Philosophy. Translated by Rod Coltman. New York: Continuum, 1998. 
 
Gelven, Michael. A  Commentary  on  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time. Revised ed. Dekalb, IL.:  
Nothern Illinois University Press, 1989. 
 
Gerdmar, Anders. Root’s  of  Theological  Anti-Semitism: German Biblical Interpretation and the  
Jews, from Herder and Semler to Kittel and Bultmann. Leiden: Brill, 2009. 
 
Gill,  Jerry  H.  “Paul  Tillich’s  Religious  Epistemology.”  Religious Studies 3 no. 2 (1967-1968):  
477-498. 
 
Gordon, Haim. The Heidegger-Buber Controversy: The Status of the I-Thou. Westport:  
Greenwood Press, 2001. 
 
Gordon, Peter Eli Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos. Cambridge: Harvard  
University Press, 2010. 
 
______. Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy. Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 2003. 
 
Granberg,  Anne.  “Mood  and  Method  in  Heidegger’s  Sein and Zeit.”  In  Metaphysics, Facticity  
and Interpretation: Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries, 91-113. Edited by Dan  
Zahavi, Sara Heinämaa and Hans Ruin. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.  
 
Gray,  J.  Glenn.  “Heidegger’s  Course:  From  Human  existence  to  Nature.”  Journal of Philosophy  
54, no. 8 (April 1957): 197-207. 
 
Grene, Marjorie. Dreadful Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. 
 
Grenz, Stanley J., and Roger E Olson. 20th-Century Theology: God and the World in a  
Transitional Age. Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 1992. 
 
Grigg, Richard. Symbol  and  Empowerment:  Paul  Tillich’s  Post-Theistic System. Macon, GA.:  
Mercer University Press, 1985. 
 
313 
 
 
 
Groth, Miles. Translating Heidegger. Amherst: Humanity Books, 2004. 
 
Guignon,  Charles  B.  “Authenticity,  Moral  Values,  and  Psychotherapy.”  In The Cambridge  
Companion to Heidegger, edited by Charles B. Guignon, 268-292. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
______. Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983. 
 
Hall,  Douglas  John.  ““The  Great  War”  and  the  Theologians.”  In  The Twentieth Century: A  
Theological Overview. Edited by Gregory Baum, 3-13. Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis, 1999. 
 
Hamilton, Kenneth. The System and the Gospel: A Critique of Paul Tillich. Grand Rapids:  
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1963. 
 
Hammond, Guyton B. Conscience and Its Recovery: From the Frankfurt School to Feminism.  
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993. 
 
Hanley, Catriona. Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger: The Role of Method in Thinking  
and the Infinite. Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 
 
Hart, Kevin. The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology, and Philosophy. New York:  
Fordham University Press, 2000. 
 
Hastings, Brad. Twist of Fate: The Moirae in Everyday Psychology. Lanham: University Press of  
America, 2008. 
 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel’s  Logic. Translated by William Wallace. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1975. 
 
Heidegger,  Martin.  See  “Abbreviations  of  Heidegger’s  Works.” 
 
Hemming,  Laurence  Paul.  “Nihilism:  Heidegger  and  the  Grounds  of  Redemption.”  In  Radical  
Orthodoxy: A New Theology, edited by John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham  
Ward, 91-108. London: Routledge, 1999. 
 
______. Heidegger’s  Atheism:  The  Refusal  of  a  Theological  Voice. Notre Dame, IN.: University  
of Notre Dame Press, 2002. 
 
Hodge, Joanna. Heidegger and Ethics. London: Routledge, 1995. 
 
Hofstadter,  Albert.  “Translator’s  Appendix:  A  Note  On  the  Da  and  the  Dasein.”  In  The Basic  
Problems of Phenomenology, by Martin Heidegger, translated by Albert Hofstadter, 333- 
314 
 
 
 
7. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. 
 
______.  “Translator’s  Introduction.”  In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, by Martin  
Heidegger, translated by Albert Hofstadter, xv-xxxi. Bloomington: Indiana University  
Press, 1982. 
 
Hogan,  Pádraig.  “Leaning  as  Leavetaking  and  Homecoming.”  In  Heidegger, Education, and 
 Modernity. Edited by Michael A. Peters, 211-28. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield,  
2002.  
 
Holbrook, David. Gustav Mahler and the Courage To Be. London: Vision Press, 1975. 
 
Hölderlin,  Friedrich,  “Homecoming  (1801).”  In  Friedrich Hölderlin: Selected Poems and  
Fragments, translated by Michael Hamburger. London: Penguin Books, 1994. 
 
Hopper, David Henry. Tillich: A Theological Portrait. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968. 
 
Hunsinger, George. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Concept of Death. Stanford: Stanford  
University Press, 1968. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Briefwechsel. Edited by Karl Schuhmann and Elisabeth Schuhmann.  
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994. 
 
______. Die Idee der Phänomenologie: Fünf Vorlesungen. Edited by Walter Biemel.  
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. 
 
______. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction  
to Phenomenological Philosophy. Translated by David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern  
University Press, 1970. 
 
Ingraffia, Brian D. Postmodern  Theory  and  Biblical  Theology:  Vanquishing  God’s Shadow.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Irwin,  F.  Ruth.  “Heidegger and Nietzsche: Nihilism and the Question of Value in Relation to  
Education.”  Studies in Philosophy of Education 22 (3-4): 227-44. 
 
Janicaud, Dominique, and Jean-François Mattéi. Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought.  
Translated by Michael Cendre. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 
 
Jaspers, Karl. Philosophische Autobiographie. Munchen: R. Piper, 1977. 
 
Jaspert, Bernd, ed. Sachgemäße Exegese: Die Protokolle aus Rudolf Bultmanns  
315 
 
 
 
Neutestamentlichen Seminaren 1921-1951. Vol. 43 of Marburger Theologische Studien.  
Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1996. 
 
Joske,  W.  D.  “Philosophy  and  the  Meaning  of  Life.”  Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52, no.  
2 (1974): 93-104. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London:  
Macmillan, 1933. 
 
______. Kant’s  Prolegomena  to  Any  Future  Metaphysics. 3rd ed. Translated and edited by Paul  
Carus. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1912. 
 
______. Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik. Vol. 9 of  
Werke in zehn Bänden, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche  
Buchgesellschaft, 1983. 
 
Kärkkäinen, Veli-Matti. Christology: A Global Introduction. Baker Academic, 2007. 
 
Kaufmann,  Walter  Arnold.  “Existentialism  from  Dostoevsky  to  Sartre.”  In  Existentialism from  
Dostoevsky to Sartre, edited by Walter Arnold Kaufmann, 11-51. Cleveland: Meridian  
Books, 1956. 
 
______. Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary. New York: Doubleday, 1965. 
 
______. Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber. New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishes, 2009. 
 
Kegley, Charles W., and Robert W. Bretall, eds. The Theology of Paul Tillich. New York:  
Macmillan, 1956. 
 
Keller, Pierre. Husserl and Heidegger on Human Existence. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 2004. 
 
Kelsey, David H. The  Fabric  of  Paul  Tillich’s  Theology. New Haven: Yale University, 1967. 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Vol. 12.1  
of Kierkegaard’s  Writings, edited  and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
_______. Letters and Documents. Translated by Henrik Rosenmeier. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1978. 
 
______. The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte. Princeton: Princeton University Press,  
316 
 
 
 
1990. 
 
 
Killen, R. Allan. The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich. Kampen: Kok,1956. 
 
Kisiel, Theodore. Heidegger’s  Way  of  Thought:  Critical  and  Interpretative  Signposts. Edited by  
Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz. New York: Continuum, 2002. 
 
______. “On  the  Genesis  of  Heidegger’s  Formally  Indicative  Hermeneutics  of  Facticity.”  In   
Rethinking Facticity. Edited by François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson, 41-68. Albany:  
State University of New York Press, 2008). 
 
______. The Genesis of Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time. Berkeley: University of California Press,  
1995. 
 
Köchler,  Hans.  “The  Problem  of  Reality  as  Seen  From  the  Viewpoint  of  Existential   
Phenomenology.”  In  Foundations of Morality, Human Rights, and the Human Sciences:  
Phenomenology in a Foundational Dialogue with the Human Sciences, edited by Anna- 
Teresa Tymieniecka, 175-87. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983. 
 
Krell,  David  Farrell.  “The  “Factical  Life”  of  Dasein:  From  the  Early  Freiburg  Course  to  Being  
and Time.”  In  Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, edited  
by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren 361-79. New York: State University Press of  
New York, 1994. 
 
______. Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  
1992. 
 
Küng, Hans. Great Christian Thinkers: Paul, Origen, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther,  
Schleiermacher, Barth. Translated by John Bowden. New York: Continuum, 2006. 
 
Kusch, Maren. Language as Calculus Vs. Language as Universal Medium: A Study in Husserl,  
Heidegger and Gadamer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. 
 
Lachs, John, and Robert Talisse, eds. American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia. New York:  
Routledge, 2008. 
 
Laing, Ronald David. The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. London:  
Penguin Books, 1990. 
 
Lawlor,  Leonard.  “Life:  An  Essay  on  the  Overcoming  of  Metaphysics.”  In  The Edinburgh  
Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophies. Edited by Constantin V. Boundas, 517- 
317 
 
 
 
30. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. 
 
Leibrecht,  Walter.  “The  Life  and  Mind  of  Paul  Tillich.”  In  Religion and Culture: Essays in  
Honor of Paul Tillich, edited by Walter Leibrecht, 3-27. New York: Ayer, 1972. 
 
Lovitt, William. Introduction to The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, by  
Martin Heidegger. Translated by William Lovitt. New York: Harper, 1977. 
 
Löwith, Karl. Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism. Edited by Richard Wolin. Translated by  
Gary Steiner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 
 
______. My Life in Germany Before and After 1933: A Report. Translated by Elizabeth King.  
Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994. 
 
Luther,  Martin.  “An  Open  Letter  to  the  Christian  Nobility  of  the  German  Nation  Concerning  the   
Reform  of  the  Christian  Estate  (1520).”  In  Works of Martin Luther, translated by Charles  
M. Jacobs, vol. 2, 61-164. Philadelphia: A. J. Holman Company and the Castle Press,  
1915. 
 
______.  “Heidelberg  Disputation  (1518).”  In  Luther’s  Works, translated by H. J. Grimm, edited  
by Jaroslav Pelikan, vol. 31, 39-58. Saint Louis: Concordia University Press, 1958. 
 
______.  “Lectures  on  Romans.”  In  Luther’s  Works, translated by Walter G. Tillmanns and Jacob  
A. O. Preus, edited by Jaroslav Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and H. T. Lehmann, vol. 25,  
468-84. Saint Louis: Concordia University Press, 1972. 
 
______.  “On  the  Councils  and  the  Church,  1539.”  In  Selected Writings of Martin Luther, 1529- 
1546, translated by Charles M. Jacobs, edited by Theodore G. Tappert, vol. 3, 195-370.  
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967. 
 
______. Lecture’s  on  Genesis,  Chapters  1-5. Translated by George V. Schick. Vol. 1 of Luther’s   
Works, edited by Jaroslav Pelikan. Saint Louis: Concordia University Press, 1958. 
 
MacIntyre,  Alasdair.  “Existentialism.”  In  A Critical History of Western Philosophy, edited by  
Daniel  John  O’Connor,  509-29. New York: The Free Press, 1964. 
 
Macquarrie, John. An Existentialist Theology. London: SCM, 1955. 
 
Macquarrie, John. Heidegger and Christianity. New York: Continuum, 1994. 
 
Mahan, Wayne W. Tillich’s  System. San Antonio, TX.: Trinity University, 1974. 
 
318 
 
 
 
Malpas, Jeff. Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Exploration in the Topology of Being.  
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012. 
 
______. Heidegger’s  Topology:  Being,  Place,  World. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of  
Technology Press, 2006. 
 
Manning, Russell Re. Theology  at  the  End  of  Culture:  Paul  Tillich’s  Theology  of  Culture  and  Art.  
Leuven: Peeters Publishers: 2005. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert. Hegel’s  Ontology  and  the  Theory  of  Historicity. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987. 
 
Martin, Bernard. The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich. New Haven: College and University  
Press, 1964. 
 
Martin, Ronald E. American Literature and the Destruction of Knowledge: Innovative Writing in  
the Age of Epistemology. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991. 
 
Marx, Werner. The Philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling: History, System, and Freedom.  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. 
 
May, Rollo. Existence: A New Dimension in Psychology and Psychiatry. New York: Basic Book,  
1958. 
 
McCarthy, Vincent A. Quest for a Philosophical Jesus: Christianity and Philosophy in Rousseau,  
Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1986. 
 
McDonough, Richard M. Martin  Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time. New York: Peter Lang  
Publishing, 2006. 
 
McGrath, S. J. The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the  
Godforsaken. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006. 
 
Molina, Fernando. Existentialism as Philosophy. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed  
Publishing Co., 1953. 
 
Moody,  Harry  R.  “The  Meaning  of  Life  and  the  Meaning  of  Old  Age.”  In  What Does It Mean To  
Grow Old?: Reflections from the Humanities, edited by Thomas R. Cole and Shally  
Gadow, 9-40. Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1986. 
 
Morrison, Roy Dennis. Science, Theology, and the Transcendental Horizon: Einstein, Kant, and  
Tillich. Atlanta, GA.: Scholars Press, 1994. 
 
319 
 
 
 
______.  “Tillich’s  Telescoping  of  Ontology  and  Naturalism.”  In  Kairos and Logos: Studies in  
the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology, ed. John J. Carey, 83-106. Macon, GA.:  
Mercer University Press, 1984. 
 
Mul, Jos de. The  Tragedy  of  Finitude:  Dilthey’s  Hermeneutics  of  Life. Translated by Tony  
Burrett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. 
 
Newport, John P. Paul Tillich. Waco, TX.: Word Books, 1984.  
 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich  Wilhelm.  “Ecce  Homo.”  In  Basic Writings of Nietzsche, translated and  
edited by Walter Arnold  Kaufmann, 655-791. New York: Random House, 2000.  
 
______. Genealogy of Morals. Translated by William A. Hausemann. Vol. 10 of The Works of  
Friedrich Nietzsche, edited by Alexander Tille. New York: The Macmillan Company,  
1897. 
 
______. The Gay Science. Translated by Walter Arnold Kaufmann. New York: Random House,  
1974. 
 
______. The Twilight of the Idols. Translated by Thomas Common. Vol. 11 of The Works of  
Friedrich Nietzsche, edited by Alexander Tille. New York: The Macmillan Company,  
1897. 
 
______. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter Arnold Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New  
York: Random House, 1968. 
 
______. Thus Spake Zarathustra. Vol. 4 of The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, edited  
by Oscar Levy, translated by Thomas Common. London, T. N. Foulis, 1909. 
 
______. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Edited by Adrian Del Caro and Robert Pippin. Translated by  
Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Novalis. Werke und Briefe. Edited by Alfred Kelletat. Munich: Winkler, 1962. 
 
Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
 
Nuovo, Victor. Visionary Science. A Translation  of  Tillich’s  ‘On  the  Idea  of  a  Theology  of   
Culture’  With  an  Interpretive  Essay. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987. 
 
______. Visionary  Science.  A  Translation  of  Tillich’s  ‘On  the  Idea  of  a  Theology  of  Culture’   
With an Interpretive Essay. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987. 
 
320 
 
 
 
O’Keeffe,  Terence.  “Paul  Tillich  and  the  Frankfurt  School.”  In  Theonomy and Autonomy:  
Studies  in  Paul  Tillich’s  Engagement  with  Modern  Culture, edited by John Carey, 67-87.  
Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1984. 
 
O’Meara,  Thomas  F.  ““Christianity  is  the  Future  of  Paganism”:  Schelling’s  Philosophy  of   
Religion,”  Meaning, Truth and God, edited by Leroy S. Rouner, 216-36. Notre Dame:  
University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. 
 
______.  “Tillich  and  Heidegger;;  A  Structural  Relationship.”  In  Harvard Theological Review 61,  
no. 2 (1968): 249-61. 
 
Ogden,  Schubert  M.  “The  Understanding  of  Theology  in  Ott  and  Bultmann.”  In  The Later  
Heidegger and Theology, vol. 1 of New Frontiers in Theology: Discussing Among  
German and American Theologians, edited by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., 
157-173. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.  
 
Osborne, Kenan B. New Being: A Study of the Relationship Between Conditioned and  
Unconditioned Being According to Paul Tillich. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967. 
 
Ott,  Hugo.  “Heidegger’s  “Mentality  of  Disunity.””  In  The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and  
Politics, edited by Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis, 93-113. Philadelphia, Temple  
University Press, 1992. 
 
______. Martin Heidegger: A Political Life. Translated by Allan Blunden. New York:  
HarperCollins, 1993. 
 
Overgaard, Søren. Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic  
Publishers, 2004. 
 
Owensby, Jacob. Dilthey and the Narrative of History. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. 
 
Palmer,  Richard  E.  “Hermeneutics  [1966-1978].”  In  Philosophy of Science, vol. 2 of  
Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, edited by G. Fløistad, 453-505. The Hague:  
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. 
 
______. Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and  
Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969. 
 
Pauck, Marion. Preface to Dynamics of Faith, by Paul Tillich. New York: HarperCollins, 2001.  
 
Pauck, Wilhelm, and Marion Pauck. Life. Vol. 1 of Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought. New  
York: Harper and Row, 1976. 
321 
 
 
 
 
Peacocke,  John,  “Heidegger  and  the  Problem  of  Onto-Theology,”  In  Post-Secular Philosophy:  
Between Philosophy and Theology, edited by Phillip Blond, 177-94. London: Routledge,  
1996. 
 
Peters,  Michael  A.  “Introduction:  Heidegger,  Education,  and  Modernity.”  In  Heidegger,  
Education, and Modernity, edited by Michael A. Peters, 1-24. Oxford: Rowman and  
Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 
 
Peukert,  Helmut.  “Bultmann  and  Heidegger.”  In  Rudolf Bultmann in Catholic Thought, edited by  
Thomas  F.  O’Meara  and  Donald  M.  Weisser,  196-221. New York: Herder and Herder,  
1968. 
 
Pfau, Thomas. Idealism and the Endgame of Theory: Three Essays by F. W. J.  
Schelling .Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
 
Philipse, Herman. Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Being:  A  Critical  Interpretation. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1998. 
 
Picht,  Georg.  “Einleitung  und  Antworten  von  Georg  Picht.”  In  Theologie – Was ist das?, edited  
by Georg Picht and Enno Rudolph. Stuttgart: Kreuz Verlag, 1977. 
 
Piper, Otto. Recent Developments in German Protestantism. London: Student Christian  
Movement Press, 1934. 
 
Pöggeler,  Otto.  “Destruction  and  Moment.”  In  Reading Heidegger from the Start : Essays in His  
Earliest Thought, edited by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, 137-56. New York:  
State University Press of New York, 1994. 
 
Queen,  Edward  L.  “Tillich,  Paul  Johannaes  (1886-1965).”  In  The Encyclopedia of American 
 Religious History. 3rd edition. Edited by Edward L. Queen, Stephen R. Prothero,  
Gardiner H. Shattuck, 988-90. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009. 
 
Randall,  John  Herman.  “The  Philosophical  Legacy  of  Paul  Tillich.”  In  The Intellectual Legacy of  
Paul Tillich, edited by James R. Lyons, 21-51. Detroit: Wayne State University Press,  
1969. 
 
Ratschow, Carl Heinz. Preface to Paul Tillich: Main Works. Edited by Carl Heinz. Berlin:  
Walter de Gruyter, 1990. 
 
Rayment-Pickard, Hugh. Impossible  God:  Derrida’s  Theology,  Transcending  Boundaries  in   
Philosophy and Theology. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 
322 
 
 
 
 
Raymond,  Diane Barsoum. Existentialism and the Philosophical Tradition. Englewood Cliffs,  
NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1991. 
 
Reginster, Bernard. The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche On Overcoming Nihilism. Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 2006.  
 
Reimer, A. Jame. Paul Tillich: Theologian of Nature, Culture and Politics. Münster: LIT Verlag,  
2004. 
 
Richardson, William J. Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. New York: Fordham  
University Press, 2003. 
 
Richardson, William J. Introduction  to  ““Only  a  God  Can  Save  Us”:  The  Spiegel Interview  
(1966).”  In  Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, by Martin Heidegger, edited by  
Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Preceden Publishing, 1981. 
 
Rickey, Christopher. Revolutionary Saints: Heidegger, National Socialism, and Antinomian  
Politics. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 2002. 
 
Robbins, Jeffrey W. Between Faith and Thought: An Essay on the Ontotheological Condition.  
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003. 
 
Roberts, David E. Existentialism and Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. 
 
Robinson,  James  M.  “The  German  Discussion  of  the  Later  Heidegger,”  In  The Later Heidegger  
and Theology, vol. 1 of New Frontiers in Theology: Discussing Among German and  
American Theologians, edited by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., 3-76. New  
York: Harper and Row, 1963. 
 
Rockmore, Tom. On  Heidegger’s  Nazism  and  Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California  
Press, 1992. 
 
Rorty,  Richard.  “Pragmatism  Without  Method.”  In  Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth:  
Philosophical Papers, Volume  I, 63-77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Roth, Michael. The  Poetics  of  Resistance:  Heidegger’s  Line. Evanston, IL.: Northwestern  
University Press, 1996. 
 
Rupp, George. Culture-Protestantism: German Liberal Theology at the Turn of the Twentieth  
Century. Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977. 
 
323 
 
 
 
Sadler, Ted. Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being. London: Athlone Press, 1996. 
 
Sadler, William Alan. Existence and Love: A New Approach in Existential Phenomenology. New  
York:  Charles  Scribner’s  Sons,  1969. 
 
Safranski, Rüdiger. Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil. Translated by Ewald Osers.  
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
Saltzman, Judy Deane. Paul  Natorp’s  Philosophy of Religion Within the Marburg Neo-Kantian  
Tradition. New York: Olims, 1981. 
 
Sandbothe, Mike. The Temporalization of Time: Basic Tendencies in Modern Debate on  
Philosophy and Science. Translated by Andrew Inkpin. Lanham, M.D.: Rowman &  
Littlefield, 2001. 
 
Santaniello, Weaver. Nietzsche, God and the Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in  
Relation to the Nazi Myth. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
 
Sartre, Jean Paul. No Exit and Three Other Plays. Translated by S. Gilbert. New York: Random  
House, 1955. 
 
______. Existentialism and Human Emotions. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York:  
Citadel Press, 1985. 
 
_____. Existentialism is a Humanism. Translated by Carol Macomber. New Haven: Yale  
University, 2007. 
 
Luce, Arthur Aston. Bergson’s  Doctrine  of  Intuition:  The  Donnellan  Lectures  for  1921. London:  
MacMillian, 1922. 
 
_____. Theory of Practical Ensembles. Translated by A. Sheridan-Smith. Vol. 1 of Critique of  
Dialectical Reason. London: New Left Books, 1976. 
 
______. War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phoney War 1939–40. Translated by Quintin Hoare.  
London: Verso, 1984. 
 
Schalow, Frank, and Alfred Denker. Historical  Dictionary  of  Heidegger’s  Philosophy. 2nd ed.  
Lanham, MD.: Scarecrow Press, 2010. 
 
______. Heidegger and the Quest for the Sacred: From Thought to the Sanctuary of Faith.  
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 
 
324 
 
 
 
Scharf, Uwe Carsten. The Paradoxical Breakthrough of Revelation: Interpreting the Divine- 
Human Interplay in Paul Tillich's Work 1913-1964. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999. 
 
Scharlemann,  Robert  P.  “Ontology  and  Ontology.”  North American Paul Tillich Society 20  
(April 1994): 1. 
 
______.  “Schelling’s  Impact  on  Protestant  Theology.”  In  Inscriptions and Reflections: Essays in  
Philosophical Theology, 92-105. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989. 
 
______.  “The  Being  of  God  When  God  Is  Not  Being  God:  Deconstructing  the  History  of   
Theism.”  In  Inscriptions and Reflections: Essays in Philosophical Theology, 30-53.  
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989. 
 
______.  “The  Scope  of  Systematics:  An  Analysis  of  Tillich’s  Two  Systems.”  Journal of Religion  
48, no. 2 (April 1968): 136-49. 
 
______.  “Tillich  on  Schelling  and  the  Principle  of  Identity.”  The Journal of Religion 56, no. 1  
(January 1976): 105-112. 
 
______. Reflection and Doubt in the Thought of Paul Tillich. New Haven: Yale University Press,  
1969. 
 
Scheler, Max. Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. Darmstadt: Reichl, 1928. 
 
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, Philosophie der Offenbarung. Vol. 3 of Friedrich  
Wilhelm  Joseph  Schelling’s  Sämmtliche  Werke, edited by K. F. A. Schelling. Stuttgart:  
Cotta, 1858. 
 
______. Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie. Vol. 10 of Sämmtliche Werke. Stuttgart: J. S.  
Cotta’scher,  1861. 
 
______. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Sämmtliche Werke. Edited by K. F. A.  
Schelling. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1859. 
 
______. On the History of Modern Philosophy. Translated by Andrew Bowie. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
______. The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures. Translated by Bruce  
Matthews. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. 
 
Schlink,  Edmund.  “Weisheit  und  Torheit.”  Kerygma and Dogama 1 (1955): 1-22. 
 
325 
 
 
 
Schrag, Calvin O. Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity. Bloomington: Indiana  
University Press, 1986. 
 
______. Doing Philosophy with Others: Conversations, Reminiscences, and Reflections. West  
Lafayette, IN.: Purdue University Press, 2000. 
 
______. Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude. Evanston:  
Northwestern University Press, 1961. 
 
______. God as Otherwise Than Being: Toward a Semantics of the Gift. Evanston, IL.:  
Northwestern University Press, 2002. 
 
Schüßler,  Werner.  “Die  Dogmatik  Paul  Tillichs  in  neuem  Licht:  Zwei Funde von Bedeutung für  
die Tillich-Forschung.”  Theologie und Philosophie 62 (1987): 243-52. 
 
Schwöbel,  Christoph.  “Tillich,  Paul  (1883-1965).”  In  The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern  
Christian Thought, edited by Alister E. McGrath, 638-42. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
Segal,  Steven.  “Meaning  Crisis.”  In  Essays on Philosophical Counseling. Edited by Ran Lahav  
and Maria Da Venza Tillmanns, 118-23. Lanham: University Press of America, 1995. 
 
Seidel, George. Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics. London: University of Nebraska Press,  
1964. 
 
Sembera, Richard. Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to Being and Time. Ontario: University  
of Ottawa Press, 2007. 
 
Sheehan,  Thomas.  “A  Paradigm  Shift  in  Heidegger  Research.”  Continental Philosophy Review  
34 (2001): 183-202. 
 
______. Introduction to Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the  
 Confrontation With Heidegger, by Edmund Husserl, translated and edited by Thomas  
Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997. 
 
______. “Heidegger’s  Early  Years:  Fragments  for  a  Philosophical  Biography.”  In  Heidegger:  
The Man and the Thinker, edited by Thomas Sheehan, 3-19. Chicago: Preceden  
Publishing, 1981. 
 
______.  “Heidegger’s  Lehrjahre.”  In  The Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years,  
edited by John Sallis, Giuseppina Chiara Moneta, and Jacques Taminiaux, 77-137.  
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988. 
 
326 
 
 
 
______.  “Reading  a  Life:  Heidegger  and  Hard  Times.”  In  The Cambridge Companion to  
Heidegger, edited by Charles B. Guignon, 70-96. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 1993. 
 
Shirley, Greg. Heidegger and Logic: The Place of Lógos in Being and Time. London:  
Continuum, 2010. 
 
Siegfried,  Theodor.  “The  Significance  of  Paul  Tillich’s  Theology  for  the  German  Situation.”  In   
The Theology of Paul Tillich, edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, 68-83.  
New York: MacMillan, 1956. 
 
______.  “The  Significance  of  Paul  Tillich’s  Theology  for  the  German  Situation.”  In  The  
Theology of Paul Tillich, edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, 102-17.  
New York: MacMillan, 1956). 
 
Sloan, Douglas. Faith and Knowledge: Mainline Protestantism and American Higher Education.  
Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994. 
 
Smith, Gregory Bruce. Martin Heidegger: Paths Taken, Paths Opened. Lanham, MD.: Rowman  
and Littlefield Publishes, 2007. 
 
______. Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity. Chicago: The University of  
Chicago Press, 1996. 
 
Smith, James K. A. The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational  
Hermeneutic. Downers Grove, IL.: InerVarsity Press, 2000. 
 
Smith,  Joel  R.  “Creation,  Fall,  and  Theodicy  in  Paul  Tillich’s  Systematic Theology.”  In Kairos  
and  Logos:  Studies  in  the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology. Edited by John J.  
Carey, 141-65. Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1984. 
 
Spiegelberg, Herbert, and Karl Schuhmann. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical  
Introduction. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishes, 1994. 
 
______. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. Dordrecht: Kluwer  
Academic Publishers, 1992. 
 
Spielvogel, Jackson J. Western Civilization, Volume C: Since 1789. 7th ed. Belmont, CA.:  
Wadsworth, 2008. 
 
Stapleton, Timothy J. Husserl and Heidegger: The Question of a Phenomenological Beginning.  
Albany: State University of New York, 1983. 
327 
 
 
 
 
Stefan  Schimanski,  “On  Meeting  a  Philosopher,”  Partisan Review 15, no. 4 (April 1948): 605-11. 
 
Steiner, George. Martin Heidegger. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
 
Stenger, Mary Ann, and Ronald H. Stone. Dialogues of Paul Tillich. Macon, GA.: Mercer  
University Press, 2002. 
 
Stewart,  Roderick  M.  “Signification  and  Radical  Subjectivity  in  Heidegger’s   
Habilitationsschrift.”  Man and World 12, no. 3 (1979): 360-86. 
 
Stokes, Allison. Ministry After Freud. New York: Pilgrim: 1985. 
 
Stone,  Jerome  Arthur,  “Tillich  and  Schelling’s  Later  Philosophy.”  In  Kairos and Logos: Studies  
in  the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology, edited by John J. Carey, 3-35. Macon,  
GA.: Mercer University Press, 1984. 
 
Storck, Joachim W., ed. Martin Heidegger-Elisabeth Blochmann Briefwechsel, 1918-1969.  
Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1989. 
 
Tait, Leslie Gordon. The Promise of Tillich. Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott, 1971. 
 
Taylor, Eugene. The Mystery of Personality: A History of Psychodynamic Theories. Dordrecht:  
Springer, 2009. 
 
Taylor, Mark Kline, ed. Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries. London: Collins, 1987. 
 
______.  “Introduction:  The  Theological  Development  and  Contribution  of  Paul  Tillich (1886- 
1965).”  In  Paul Tillich: The Theologian of the Boundaries, edited by Mark Kline Taylor,  
11-34. London: Collins, 1987. 
 
Tepl, Johannes von. Death and the Plowman; or, The Bohemian Plowman. Translated by Ernst  
N. Kirrmann. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958. 
 
Thatamanil, John J. The Immanent Divine: God, Creation and the Human Predicament.  
Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2006. 
 
Thatcher, Adrian. The Ontology of Paul Tillich. Oxford: Oxford University, 1978.    
 
Thiselton, Anthony C. The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical  
Description. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980. 
 
328 
 
 
 
Thomas,  John  Heywood.  “J.  G.  Fichte  and  F.  W.  J.  Schelling.”  In  Nineteenth-Century Religious  
Thought in the West, 41-79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
______. Paul Tillich: An Appraisal. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963. 
 
______. Tillich. London: Continuum, 2000. 
 
Thompson, Ian E. Being  and  Meaning:  Paul  Tillich’s  Theory  of  Meaning,  Truth  and  Logic.  
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981. 
 
______. Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
______.  “Ontotheology.”  In  Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays, edited by Daniel O.  
Dahlstrom, 106-132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
 
Tietz,  Udo.  “German  Existence-Philosophy,”  in  A Companion to Phenomenology and  
Existentialism. Edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, 162-87. Oxford:  
Blackwell, 2009. 
 
Tillich, Hannah. From Time to Time. New York: Stein and Day, 1974. 
 
Tillich, Paul. See “Abbreviations  of  Tillich’s  Works.” 
 
Tonner, Philip. Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being. London: Continuum, 2010. 
 
Toulmin, Stephen. The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964. 
 
 
Underhill, Evelyn. Mysticism. Stilwell: Digireads.com Publishing, 2005. 
 
Vallega, Aljandro. A. Heidegger and the Issue of Space: Thinking on Exilic Grounds. University  
Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003. 
 
Vedder, Ben. Heidegger’s  Philosophy  of  Religion:  From  God  to  gods. Pittsburgh: Duquesne  
University Press, 2007. 
 
Vycinas, Vincent. Earth and gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. The  
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. 
 
Westerink, Herman. Controversy  and  Challenge:  The  Reception  of  Sigmund  Freud’s   
Psychoanalysis in German and Dutch-Speaking Theology and Religious Studies. LIT  
329 
 
 
 
Verlag, 2009. 
 
Westphal,  Merold.  “Onto-theology,  Metanarrative,  Perspectivism,  and  the  Gospel.”  In   
Christianity and Postmodern Turn: Six Views. Edited by Myron B. Penner, 141-53.  
Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005. 
 
Wheeler, Randolph C. Kantian  Imperatives  and  Phenomenology’s  Original  Forces. Council for  
 Research in Values and Philosophy: Washington, D.C., 2008. 
 
White, David. Logic and Ontology in Heidegger. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1985. 
 
Wiebe,  Paul,  “From  System  to  Systematics:  The  Origin  of  Tillich’s  Theology.”  In  Kairos and  
Logos:  Studies  in  the  Roots  and  Implications  of  Tillich’s  Theology, edited by John J.  
Carey, Macon, 109-19. GA.: Mercer University Press, 1984. 
 
Wilder,  Courtney,  S.  “Existentialism  and  Exegesis:  Being  and  the  Bible  in  Bultmann  and   
Tillich.”  PhD  diss.  The  University  of  Chicago,  2008. 
 
Williams, John Reynold. Martin  Heidegger’s  Philosophy of Religion. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier  
University Press, 1979. 
 
Wilson, Colin. Introduction to the New Existentialism. London: Hutchinson, 1966. 
 
Winchester, James J. Nietzsche’s  Aesthetic  Turn:  Reading  Nietzsche  After  Heidegger,  Deleuze,   
Derrida. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. 
 
Wittgenstein, Luwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears and B. F.  
McGuiness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. 
 
Woessner, Martin. Heidegger in America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
 
Wolin, Richard. The Politics of Being. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. 
 
______.  “Introduction:  What  is  Heideggerian  Marxism?”  In  Heideggerian Marxism, by Herbert 
 Marcuse, edited by Richard Wolin and John Abromeit, xi-xxx. Lincoln: The University  
of Nebraska Press, 2005. 
 
Wright, George. Religion, Politics and Thomas Hobbes. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. 
 
Young, Julian. Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. Hannah Arendt: For Love of the Word. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale  
330 
 
 
 
University press, 2004. 
 
Zahavi,  Dan.  “Phenomenology.”  In  The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy.  
Edited by Dermot Moran, 661-92. London: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Zimmerman, Michael E. Heidegger’s  Confrontation  with  Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art.  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. 
 
Žižek,  Slavoj.  The Indivisible Remainder: Essays on Schelling and Related Matters. London:  
Verso, 1997. 
 
 
 
